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- Abstract 
This  thesis  examines  the  development  of  Plato's  thought  on  the  subject  of  the  soul-body 
relation.  I  will  not  attempt  to  cover  ever3ýing  that  Plato  says  about  the  soul  -  for 
example  I  will  discuss  'proofs'  of  immortality  only  in  so  far  as  they  have  a  bearing  on 
the  interpretation  of  soul  and  body.  In  this  life  at  least  human  beings  have  both  a  soul 
and  a  body;  as  a  result,  the  soul  by  necessity  interacts  with  the  body.  This  interaction, 
though,  is  not  simply  an  interrelation  between  two  completely  different  and  separate 
entities;  rather  the  relation  between  soul  and  body  is  far  more  complicated. 
The  purpose  of  the  introduction  is  to  present  a  preliminary  view  of  the  soul,  in  that  way 
we  could  better  understand  the  background  that  Plato  had  to  take  under  consideration. 
Within  the  introduction  the  Apology  is  used  so  as  to  show  the  importance  of  the  idea  of 
the  soul  in  Socratic  ethics,  and  to  indicate  that  the  Socratic  idea  that  we  should  care  for 
the  soul  rather  than  the  body,  becomes  crucial  within  Plato's  philosophy.  The  dialogues 
that  follow,  the  Gorgias  and  the  Meno,  provide  early  indications  of  the  complex  relation 
required  between  soul  and  body,  for  Plato's  moral,  metaphysical  and  epistemological 
concerns.  Thus,  although  Plato,  in  these  dialogues,  does  not  give  us  a  clear  definition 
of  the  soul's  nature  and  its  relation  to  the  body,  the  perplexity  and  ambiguity  concerning 
the  soul's  nature  leads  to  the  more  detailed  analysis  of  it  in  later  dialogues. 
The  Phaedo  appears  to  offer  a  view  of  the  soul  as  a  simple  immaterial  entity  wholly 
distinct  from  the  body.  Even  within  this  dialogue,  though,  there  are  signs  that  this 
simple  view  of  the  soul  is  not  adequate  for  Plato's  moral  and  metaphysical  concerns, 
this  becomes  evident  as  well  in  the  Symposium. 
i The  first  dialogue  where  the  notion  of  the  tripartite  soul  is  introduced  is  the  Republic. 
The  chapter  concerned  with  the  relevant  books  of  the  Republic  -  books  IV,  IX,  and  X- 
shows  that  the  tripartite  soul  is  in  accord  with  Plato's  moral  and  metaphysical  concerns. 
The  soul  is  explicitly  presented  as  tripartite  and  because  of  this,  it  requires  a  close 
relation  to  the  body.  What  is  not  yet  achieved,  though,  in  this  dialogue'is  the 
presentation  of  the  particular  relation  required  between  soul  and  body.  Although  the 
tripartite  theory  implies  a  close  relation  between  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  and  the 
body,  Plato  does  nothing  to  explain  exactly  how  the  soul  and  the  body  are  related.  This 
is  the  task  that  the  next  chapter  is  set  to  accomplish.  This  is  done  through  looking  at  the 
Timaeus.  In  the  Timaeus  I  look  at  the  detailed  construction  of  the  human  being.  The 
parts  of  the  soul  are  located  in  the  body.  There  is  also  some  account  of  how  bodily 
events  affect  the  soul,  and  how  the  soul  affects  the  body.  The  language  used  by  Plato 
shows  that  soul  and  body  cannot  be  treated  as  simply  two  elements  that  are  accidentally 
connected.  The  relation  portrayed  then  between  the  two  is  that  of  mutual  dependence. 
In  the  final  chapter,  thus,  I  am  concerned  with  the  crucial  question  whether  Plato  is  a 
dualist  or  not.  To  argue  that  Plato  cannot  fall  under  the  category  of  Cartesian  dualism,  I 
discuss  Descartes  and  Aristotle's  views  on  the  soul-body  relation  to  show  their 
differences.  In  particular  by  using  Aristotle's  view  as  an  intermediate  one,  and  by 
bringing  forward  a  number  of  points  discussed  earlier  in  the  thesis  regarding  Plato's 
view,  I  show  that  the  key  notion  of  Cartesian  dualism  cannot  apply  to  Plato's  theory. 
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vi Introduction 
Writing  a  thesis  on  Plato's  view  about  the  relation  of  soul  and  body,  one  has  firstly  to 
examine  Plato's  view  of  the  soul.  Plato,  throughout  the  dialogues,  presents  us  with  a 
number  of  possible  readings  regarding  the  soul's  nature,  but  a  more  detailed  reading  of 
the  dialogues  can  show  that  there  is  a  development  of  thought  from  a  simple  soul,  that 
is  seen  as  reason,  towards  a  tripartite  soul.  This  change  from  a  simple  soul  to  a 
tripartite  one  may  be  seen  as  a  random  one,  but  I  would  like  to  argue  that  Plato's 
thought  progressed  towards  the  tripartite  soul  because  of  his  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  concerns.  Plato's  notion  of  soul  moreover,  as  it  progresses,  shapes  his 
view  of  the  relation  between  soul  and  body.  To  talk  about  the  soul-body  relation,  then, 
requires  also  to  establish  the  philosophical  background  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  the 
various  views  on  the  soul,  qmXT).  Such  a  background  will  show  views  that  directly  or 
indirectly  influenced  Plato. 
One  of  the  essential  beliefs  of  the  ancient  Greeks  regarding  the  soul,  OXTI,  is  that  OXTI 
is  what  makes  something  'living';  the  possession  or  not  of  soul  determines  what  is 
animate  and  what  is  inanimate.  A  characteristic  example  of  the  notion  that  soul  is  the 
source  of  life  is  Thales'  philosophy.  He  held  that  whatever  exhibited  some  kind  of 
motion  must  have  possessed  soul:  'Thales,  too,  seems  from  what  they  relate,  to  have 
supposed  that  the  soul  was  something  kinetic,  if  he  said  that  the  [magnesian]  stone 
possesses  soul  because  it  moves  iron'  (Aristotle  de  anima  A2,405al9,  K.  Rý  S.  89)'. 
But  there  is  much  more  than  this  to  the  notion  of  qw  '.  Within  the  philological  XTI 
tradition,  the  first  reference  to  soul  as  an  aetherial  element  is  that  given  by  Homer.  One 
All  the  quotations  regarding  the  Presocratics  are  taken  from  G.  S.  Kirk,  J.  E.  Raven  and  M.  Schofield, 
The  Presocratic  Philosophers  Cambridge  University  Press  1983,  unless  otherwise  stated. 
I might  ask  what  is  the  need  for  presenting  Homer's  notion  of  the  soul.  Well,  although 
Homer  does  not  strictly  belong  to  the  philosophical  background  of  Plato,  his  works 
were  considered  as  authoritative  teachings  among  the  ancient  Greeks.  Moreover, 
Plato's  insistence  on  using  the  Homeric  epics  to  draw  examples,  and  his  usual 
argumentation  against  the  validity  of  Homer's  teachings  in  relation  to  moral  concerns, 
indicates  that  Homer  is  a  valid  reference  as  regards  the  shaping  of  people's  view  of  the 
soul.  Homer,  then,  refers  to  soul  as  that  which  distinguishes  the  living  from  the  dead. 
In  particular,  he  treats  the  soul  as  a  ghost-like  shade.  In  fact,  as  Gulley  puts  it,  any 
thought  of  survival  after  death  was  naturally  associated  with  soul,  since  it  was  the  soul, 
as  the  breath  of  life,  which  deserted  the  body  at  deathý.  A  striking  feature  of  the 
Homeric  view  of  soul  is  that  the  souls  are  dream-like  shadows  which  in  order  to  show 
any  mental  capacity,  need  to  drink  blood.  A  view  of  this  kind  implies  that  the  souls, 
although  they  are  immaterial  representations  of  the  people  they  were  before  they  die, 
they  are  not  fully  conscious  after  death.  As  Bernard  Williams  says,  'psyche  stands  for 
Homer  as  something  that  is  mentioned  only  when  someone  is  fainting,  dying,  or  dead. 
When  the  person  is  dead,  it  is  pictured  as  existing  in  a  very  flimsy,  deprived,  and 
unenviable  condition  A.  His  argument  goes  finther;  he  argues  that  the  fact  that  the 
figures  encountered  in  the  underworld  bear  the  names  of  dead  people  does  not  show 
that  they  are,  straightforwardly,  those  peoples.  This  view  holds  because  the  soul  for 
Homer  cannot  be  identified  with  the  self  As  Adkins  puts  it,  the  Homeric  man's  psyche 
is  not  his  self,  or  his  personality.  This  is  so,  because  as  Adkins  says:  'the  psyche  is 
composed  of  a  very  tenuous  stuff,  which  resides  in  the  body  while  the  individual  is 
Norman  Gulley,  ne  Philosophy  ofSocrates,  1968,  p.  194. 
3  The  soul  as  drinking  blood  is  fast  mentioned  by  Circe  in  Odyssey  10-536-7  (s%ýOd  11.49-50);  of  greater 
interest,  however,  are  the  references  made  by  Odysseus  himself  at  Od.  11.95-6,152-54. 
4  Bernard  Williams,  Shame  and  Necessity,  University  of  California  Press,  1994,  p.  23. 
5  Williams,  p.  175,  note  3. 
2 alive,  flies  away  through  some  orifice  at  death  and  goes  down  to  HadeS,  6 
.A  finther 
point  for  supporting  the  claim  that  for  Homer  the  psyche  is  not  the  self,  is  the  fact  that 
Homer  makes  no  systematic  reference  to  retribution  in  after-life.  Thus,  for  Homer  the 
issue  of  personal  survival,  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word,  does  not  arise. 
Moving,  now,  to  the  strictly  philosophical  background  of  Plato,  a  view  on  the  soul's 
survival  after  death  that  influenced  Plato  immensely  is  offered  by  the  Pythagoreans. 
They  believed  in  the  soul's  personal  survival  after  death,  its  immortality  and 
transmigration.  In  detail,  the  Pythagorean  doctrine  can  be  surnmarised  as  having  two 
main  components;  namely  the  soul's  immortality,  and  the  universe's  orderly  structure. 
The  Pythagorean  view  of  the  soul  would  include  the  notion  that  the  soul  is  immortal, 
reincarnated,  and  ultimately  released  into  a  better  existence:  'On  the  subject  of 
reincarnation  Xenophanes  bears  witness  in  the  elegy  which  begins:  "Now  I  will  turn  to 
another  tale  and  show  the  way.  "  What  he  says  about  Pythagoras  runs  thus:  Once  they 
say  that  he  was  passing  by  when  a  puppy  was  whipped,  and  he  took  pity  and  said: 
"Stop,  do  not  beat  it;  for  it  is  the  soul  of  a  friend  that  I  recognized  when  I  heard  it  giving 
tongue.  "  (Xenophanes  Fr.  7,  K.  R.  S.  260).  As  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield  say,  it  is  very 
likely  that  Pythagoras  himself  expressed  the  doctrine  of  reincarnation  in  terms  of  OX4, 
SOU17. 
Evidence  of  that  could  be  found  in  Pindaes  second  Olympian  ode  (56-77): 
'Those  of  the  dead  that  are  lawless  in  mind  pay  the  penalty  straightway  here  -  but  the 
sins  committed  in  this  realm  of  Zeus  are  judged  below  the  earth  by  one  who  pronounces 
sentence  with  hateful  necessity.  The  good  upon  whom  the  sun  shines  for  evermore,  for 
6  A.  W. H.  Adkins,  From  the  Many  to  the  One,  London  1970,  pp.  14-15. 
7  See  farther  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  p.  220. 
3 equal  nights  and  equal  days,  receive  a  life  of  lightened  toil,  not  vexing  the  soil  with  the 
strength  of  their  hand,  no,  not  the  water  of  the  sea,  thanks  to  the  ways  of  that  place;  but 
in  the  presence  of  the  honoured  gods,  all  who  rejoiced  in  keeping  their  oaths  share  a  life 
that  knows  no  tears,  while  the  others  endure  labour  that  none  can  look  upon.  And  those 
who,  while  dwelling  in  either  world,  have  thrice  been  courageous  in  keeping  their  souls 
pure  from  all  deeds  of  wrong,  they  traverse  the  highway  of  Zeus  to  the  tower  of  Kronos, 
where  the  ocean-breezes  blow  around  the  Island  of  the  Blest...  '  (Pindar  Olympians  II 
56-77,  K.  R.  S.  284). 
The  implication  of  such  a  view  is  the  thought  of  living  beings  as  composed  of  bodies 
and  souls,  and  of  the  soul  as  more  important  than  the  body.  Placing  emphasis  on  the 
soul's  immortality  and  its  transmigration,  as  Richard  D.  McKirahan  says,  implies  that 
our  interests  extend  beyond  ourselves  and  beyond  this  lifetimes.  This  is  finther 
supported  by  G.  S.  Kirk,  J.  E.  Raven  and  M.  Schofield,  who  hold  that  Pythagoras' 
eschatological  theory  taught  that  after  death  the  soul  is  subject  to  a  divine  judgement. 
According  to  Pythagoras,  punishment  follows  in  the  underworld  for  the  wicked,  but  a 
better  place  for  the  good,  who  if  they  remain  free  from  wickedness  in  the  next  world 
and  in  a  fin-ther  reincarnation  in  this,  may  at  last  reach  the  isles  of  the  blessed9. 
The  Pythagoreans  sought  to  explain  the  world  on  the  basic  principle  that  number  is  of 
fundamental  importance  in  the  world.  As  Richard  D.  McKirahan  argues,  the  main 
philosophical  interest  of  their  discussion  of  the  universe  is  in  its  account  of  the  origin, 
in  which  the  KOSMOS  resembles  number,  geometrical  figures,  and  the  musical  intervals 
8The  influence  of  the  Pythagorean  philosophy  to  Plato's  views  of  the  soul's  immortality,  its 
transmigration,  and  the  theory  of  harmony  will  be  pointed  out  in  the  discussion  of  particular  dialogues. 
9See  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  p.  238. 
4 by  being  the  product  of  the  imposition  of  limit  on  the  unlimited'o.  These  notions  are 
found  in  Philolaus'  theory.  He  held  that:  'Nature  in  the  universe  was  harmonised  from 
both  unlimiteds  and  limiters  -  both  the  universe  as  a  whole  and  everything  in  it' 
(Diogenes  Laertius  VIII,  85,  K.  R.  S.  424).  Philolaus  hence  combines  the  idea  of 
unlimiteds  and  limiters,  to  that  of  harmony;  'About  nature  and  harmony  this  is  the 
position.  The  being  of  objects,  being  eternal,  and  nature  itself  admit  of  divine,  not 
human,  knowledge  -  except  that  it  was  not  possible  for  any  of  the  things  that  exist  and 
are  known  by  us  to  have  come  into  being,  without  there  existing  the  being  of  those 
things  from  which  the  universe  was  composed,  the  limiters  and  the  unlimiteds.  And 
since  these  principles  existed  being  neither  alike  nor  of  the  same  kind,  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  them  to  be  ordered  into  a  universe  if  harmony  had  not  supervened  - 
in  whatever  manner  this  came  into  being...  '  (Stobaeus  Anth.  121,7d,  K.  FL  S.  429). 
Tbus,  a  major  part  in  the  formation  of  such  a  view  is  played  by  the  notion  of  harmony; 
for  the  Pythagoreans  everything  in  the  world  is  ordered  according  to  numerical 
relations:  'All  the  so-called  acusmata  fall  into  three  divisions:  some  of  them  signify 
what  a  thing  is,  some  of  them  what  is  the  most  such  and  such,  some  of  them  what  one 
must  do  or  not  do.  Examples  of  the  "what  is  it?  "  sort  are:  What  are  the  isles  of  the 
blessed?  Sun  and  moon.  What  is  the  oracle  at  Delphi?  The  tetractys:  which  is  the 
harmonia  in  which  the  sirens  sing.  Examples  of  the  'What  is  the  most  ... 
?'  sort  are: 
What  is  the  most  just  thing?  To  sacrifice.  What  is  the  wisest?  Number;  but  second  the 
man  who  assigned  names  to  things.  What  is  the  wisest  of  the  things  in  our  power? 
Medicine.  What  is  the  fmest?  Harmonia.  What  is  the  most  powerful?  Knowledge. 
What  is  the  best?  Happiness.  What  is  the  truest  thing  said?  That  men  are  wicked' 
1ORichard  D.  McKirahan,  Jr.,  Philosophy  before  Socrates,  Hackett  Publishing  Comp.  1994,  p.  115. 
Moreover,  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield  (p.  324)  show  that  according  to  Diogenes  Laertius  (viii,  85)  the 
notion  of  the  unlimiteds 
(E4  a'TTEI'PCaV  TC)  and  the  limiters  (TrEpa[VOVTCOV)  is  introduced  by  Philolaus,  the 
Pythagorean  philosopher  of  the  fifth  century,  but  the  meaning  remains  oblique. 
5 (larnblichus  Vita  Pythagorae  82,  K.  R.  S.  277).  The  Pythagoreans'  teaching  about 
harmony  and  the  numerical  ratio  is  recognised  by  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield  as 
deriving  from  Pythagoras  himsele'.  What  should  be  noted,  here,  though,  is  that  there  is 
not  a  clear  indication  as  to  what  extent,  if  at  all,  Pythagoras  himself  combined  these  two 
main  doctrines,  the  soul's  immortality,  and  the  universe's  orderly  structure,  into  a 
unified  view  of  world  and  man.  Similarly,  E.  Zeller  when  he  refers  to  the  Pythagorean 
theory,  talks  about:  'order  and  harmony  through  which  the  totality  of  things  is  combined 
into  a  beautiful  whole,  a  cosmos,  and  ... 
is  chiefly  perceptible  to  us  in  harmony  of  tones, 
and  in  the  regular  motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies'  12 
.  That  Plato  used  the  idea  of  the 
soul's  judgement  after  death,  as  well  as  the  idea  of  harmony  is  apparent  throughout  his 
dialogues.  He  constantly  identifies  beauty  and  goodness  with  harmony  and  in  the 
Phaedo  85e  ff.  He  criticises  the  idea  that  the  soul  is  a  harmony.  The  notion  that  the  soul 
will  face  judgement  after  death  for  its  way  of  life  appears  in  his  eschatological  myths 
throughout  his  works. 
An  important  thinker  who  not  only  discusses  the  soul's  nature  after  death,  but  also 
argues  for  its  place  within  the  world,  is  Heraclitus.  Although  Heraclitus'  thought  is 
known  as  obscure,  his  aim  is  to  generate  a  view  of  the  world  of  which  men  are  part.  He 
places  emphasis  on  Logos  and  how  men  can  reach  Logos  through  observation  and 
understanding:  'Of  the  Logos  which  is  as  I  describe  it  men  always  prove  to  be 
uncomprehending,  both  before  they  have  heard  it  and  when  once  they  have  heard  it.  For 
although  all  things  happen  according  to  this  Logos  men  are  like  people  of  no 
experience,  even  when  they  experience  such  words  and  deeds  as  I  explain,  when  I 
distinguish  each  thing  according  to  its  constitution  and  declare  how  it  is;  but  the  rest  of 
"See  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  pp.  233-234. 
12  Edward  Zeller,  Outlines  ofthe  History  ofGreek  Philosophy,  London,  1886,  p.  5  1. 
6 men  fail  to  notice  what  they  do  after  they  wake  up  just  as  they  forget  what  they  do  when 
asleep.  '  (Sextus  adv.  math.  VII,  132  K.  R.  S.  194).  Logos,  though,  is  treated  as  an 
actual  component  of  things  and  so,  co-extensive  with  the  primary  cosmic  constituent; 
fire:  'God  is  day  night,  winter  summer,  war  peace,  satiety  hunger  [all  the  opposites,  this 
is  the  meaning];  he  undergoes  alterations  the  way  that  fire,  when  mixed  with  spices,  is 
named  according  to  the  scent  of  each  of  them'  (Hippolytus  Ref.  IX,  10,8  K.  PL  S.  204). 
As  Kirk,  Raven,  and  Schofield  hold  13 
, 
Heraclitus  regards  fire  as  the  motive  point  of  the 
cosmological  processes.  'This  world-order  [the  same  of  all]  did  none  of  gods  or  men 
make,  but  it  always  was  and  is  and  shall  be:  an  everliving  fire,  kindling  in  measures  and 
going  out  in  measures'  (Clement  Strom.  V,  104,1  K.  P,  S  217).  His  view  on  cosmology, 
now,  is  important  because  it  unites  his  physical  theory  of  change  among  the  three  world 
masses:  water,  and  earth,  with  the  Logos,  which  again  is  the  measure  and  regularity  of 
large-scale  cosmological  change.  'All  things  are  an  equal  exchange  for  fire  and  fire  for 
all  things,  as  goods  are  for  gold  and  gold  for  goods'  (Plutarch  de  E.  8,388D  K.  PL 
S.  2  19)14.  Connecting,  then,  the  large-scale  cosmology  to  the  role  of  man,  Heraclitus 
holds  that  the  soul  is  composed  of  fire,  of  fiery  aither.  'For  souls  it  is  death  to  become 
water,  for  water  it  is  death  to  become  earth;  from  earth  water  comes-to-be,  and  from 
water,  soul'  (Clement  Strom.  VI,  17,2  K.  FL  S.  229).  His  treatment  of  the  soul  as  fire 
then,  as  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield  state,  implies  that  the  soul  plays  a  part  in  the  great 
cycle  of  natural  change.  The  soul  has  some  kind  of  Physical  affmity,  and  therefore 
connection,  with  the  cosmic  fire  15 
. 
This  point  leads  us  to  Heraclitus'  objective;  namely  to  show  that  man's  life  is  bound  up 
with  his  surroundings.  Since  the  soul  is  a  representative  portion  of  the  cosmic  fire, 
13  For  a.  detailed  analysis  of  Heraclitus,  philosophy  see  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  pp.  181-212. 
14  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  pp.  198-200. 
"Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  pp.  204-206. 
7 intellect  is  placed  in  the  soul.  Such  a  notion  leads  to  the  discussion  of  man's  soul  and 
its  relation  to  the  body.  Heraclitus  describes  the  waking  and  the  sleeping  states  of  man: 
In  the  waking  state  men  'become  intelligent  by  drawing  in  this  divine  reason  [logos] 
through  breathing',  and  when  asleep,  men  become  forgetful  because  'the  channels  of 
perception  are  shut,  our  mind  is  sundered  from  its  kinship  with  the  surroundings,  and 
breathing  is  the  only  point  of  attachment  to  be  preserved...  '  (Sextus  adv.  math.  VIL  129. 
K.  R.  S.  234).  Thus,  Kirk,  Raven,  and  Schofield  argue  that  Heraclitus  treats  the 
intelligent  -  awake  -  condition  as  consequent  upon  the  apprehension  of  Logos".  Soul, 
when  man  is  awake,  can  reach  Logos  through  perception.  The  Heraclitean  view  of 
death,  now,  is  important  because  it  seems  to  suggest  that  certain  souls  survive  death: 
'For  better  deaths  gain  better  portions'  (Clement  Strom.  IV,  49,3  K.  PL  S.  235).  The 
implication  then,  pointed  out  by  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield  is  that  not  all  souls  become 
water,  some  leave  the  body  and  are  reunited  with  the  aitherial  fire  17 
.  It  should  be  noted, 
here,  that  Heraclitus  does  not  talk  of  personal  survival,  but  rather  of  absorption  of  soul 
by  the  cosmic  fire.  Thus,  Heraclitus'  theory  seems  to  favour  explanations  of  soul  in 
general  and  perception  and  thought  in  particular,  in  terms  of  material  phenomena.  Such 
an  attempt,  although  it  provided  a  unified  view  of  the  workings  of  the  world,  cannot 
give  an  account  of  personal  identity.  The  soul  is  treated  as  stuff  and  therefore  is  not 
adequate  for  outlining  the  self  Plato's  objective  like  Heraclitus  is  to  show  what  is  the 
soul's  part  in  the  world'  8,  but  the  constitution  of  soul  for  Plato  is  neither  fire  nor  Logos. 
Plato  is  much  more  interested  in  the  individual  soul  and  its  relation  to  the  body. 
16  See  further  Kirk,  Raven,  Schofield,  pp.  205-6,  on  the  analysis  of  fragment  234. 
17  See  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  pp.  207-208. 
'  80n  the  soul's  relation  to  the  world  see  the  Timaeus  discussion  regarding  the  connection  between  World- 
Soul  and  human  soul. 
8 Another  pre-Socratic  philosopher,  who  is  concerned  with  the  place  of  man  in  the  world, 
is  Empedocles.  Through  his  two  poems,  On  Nature  and  Purifications,  two  accounts 
emerge;  a  materialistic  account  and  a  religious  one  respectively.  In  his  poem  On 
Nature,  Empedocles  introduces  four  'roots  of  all  things'.  These  are  four  primary 
elements  -.  air,  fire,  water,  earth  -  which  form  the  substances  that  constitute  the  world: 
'Hear  first  the  four  roots  of  all  things:  shining  Zeus,  life-bringing  Hera,  Aidoneus  and 
Nestis  who  with  her  tears  waters  mortal  springs'  (Aetius  1,3,20  K.  PL  S.  346).  The 
mixture  of  substances,  then,  whether  they  come  together  or  separate  is  brought  about 
due  to  Love  and  Strife.  This  is  a  dual  process  that  recurs  ceaselessly;  '...  And  these 
things  never  cease  their  continual  interchange,  now  through  Love  all  coming  together 
into  one,  now  again  each  carried  apart  by  the  hatred  of  Strife.  So  insofar  as  they  have 
learned  to  grow  one  from  many,  and  again,  as  the  one  grows  apart  grow  many,  thus  far 
do  they  come  into  being  and  have  no  stable  life;  but  insofar  as  they  never  cease  their 
continual  interchange,  thus  far  they  exist  always  changeless  in  the  cycle'  (Sirnplicius  in 
Phys.  158,1.  K.  P-  S.  348)19.  The  mixing  of  these  elements  take  the  forms  of  man, 
animal,  plant;  'the  various  species  of  animals  were  distinguished  by  the  quality  of  the 
mixture  in  them'  (Aetius  V,  19,5,  K.  R.  S.  375)20.  Man,  then,  is  treated  by  Empedocles 
as  part  of  this  materialistic  account  of  the  world's  creation.  His  detailed  explanation  of 
perception  is  indicative.  In  order  to  explain  perception,  he  uses  the  doctrine  of  pores 
and  effluences.  Man  perceives  when  certain  effluences,  which  stream  from  objects, 
encounter  the  fitting  pores  in  the  body:  'Empedocles  has  the  same  theory  about  all  the 
senses,  maintaining  that  perception  arises  when  something  fits  into  the  passages  of  any 
of  the  senses.  This  is  why  one  sense  cannot  judge  the  objects  of  another,  since  the 
passages  of  some  are  too  wide,  of  others  too  narrow  for  the  object  perceived,  so  that 
'9See  flifther  Kirk,  Raven,  and  Schofield,  pp.  286-288. 
2OFor  a  detailed  analysis  of  Empedocles'  cosmology  see  Kirk,  Raven,  and  Schofield,  pp.  300-305. 
9 some  things  pass  straight  through  without  making  contact  while  others  cannot  enter  at 
all'  (Theophrastus  de  sensu  7,  K.  Rý  S.  3  91)21.  Such  a  theory  then,  as  R.  J.  Hankinson 
argues,  implies  firstly  that  these  physiological  processes  are  all  there  is  to  perception; 
no  room  is  left  for  immaterial  souls,  and  secondly  this  materialist  account  of  perception 
leads  to  a  materialist  account  of  cognition  in  generaI22.  Thus,  we  see  how  Empedocles 
can  hold  that  it  is  with  blood  that  men  thhk  His  materialistic  explanation  of  the  world 
and  of  man  though  seems  to  contradict  his  religious  account  of  man's  destiny,  as 
becomes  clear  from  his  poem  Purifications. 
In  his  poem  Purifications  Empedocles  seems  to  be  influenced  by  mystery  religions  that 
argue  for  incarnation:  'Among  beasts  they  are  bom  as  lions  with  lairs  in  the  hills  and 
beds  on  the  ground,  and  as  laurels  among  fair-tressed  trees'  (Aelian  Nat.  anim.  MI,  7, 
K.  R.  S.  408).  Similarly,  'But  at  the  end  they  come  among  men  on  earth  as  prophets, 
bards,  doctors,  and  princes,  and  thence  they  arise  as  gods  highest  in  honour,  sharing 
with  the  other  immortals  their  hearth  and  their  table,  without  part  in  human  sorrows  or 
weariness'  (Clement  Strom.  IV,  150,1  and  V,  122,3.  K.  R.  S.  409).  It  is  worth  noticing 
that  Empedocles  does  not  refer  to  souls  that  incarnate  but  to  daimons.  His  reference  to 
man  as  a  daimon  indicates  firstly  that  man  is  still  part  of  the  world,  and  secondly,  that 
there  is  an  affinity  between  gods  and  men.  This  is  due  to  the  capacity  for  thought.  The 
main  problem  here  is  the  inadequacy  of  explanation  of  the  relation  of  the  daimon  to  the 
human  body.  Plato  could  have  been  influenced  by  Empedocles'  view  of  perception,  or 
21  On  a  detailed  analysis  of  Empedocles'  theory  of  effluences  and  pores  see  Kirk,  Raven,  and  Schofield, 
pp.  309-310.  For  evidence  that  Empedocles'  theory  is  physiological  see  Andre  Laks,  'Soul,  sensation, 
and  thought',  in  A.  A.  Long  (ed),  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Early  Greek  Philosophy,  Cambridge 
University  Press,  1999,  esp.  pp.  250-251,  and  R.  J.  Hankinson,  'Greek  medical  modes  of  mind',  in 
Stephen  Everson  (ed.  ),  Companions  to  Ancient  Thought  2:  Psychology,  Cambridge  Univ.  Press,  1991, 
pp.  198-199. 
22Hankinson,  P.  199. 
10 by  his  view  that  the  daimon  goes  beyond  the  human  form  and  is  still  part  of  the  world23, 
but  he  would  still  have  to  provide  a  solution  to  Empedocles'  obscurity  that  arises 
concerning  the  personal  identity  issue;  whether  what  survives  is  the  same  T  as  the  one 
that  lives  in  the  human  form. 
The  fact,  then,  that  there  is  not  an  agreed  doctrine  of  the  soul  to  be  found  before  Plato, 
makes  it  even  more  difficult  for  him  to  establish  what  the  soul  is,  and  thus  explain  the 
soul's  relation  to  the  body.  However,  a  point  of  reference  for  the  development  of 
Plato's  thought  regarding  his  moral  philosophy,  epistemology,  psychology  and 
metaphysics,  is  obviously  the  teachings  of  Socrates.  Since  Socrates  left  no  written 
work,  the  sources  of  our  knowledge  of  his  teachings  are  the  writings  of  Xenophon  24  and 
Plato  himself.  Although  it  may  seem  that  Xenophon's  picture  of  the  Socratic 
philosophy  is  different  to  that  of  Plato's,  in  the  essential  points  they  remain  consistene'. 
Socrates'  main  concern  is  with  the  reform  of  moral  life  by  true  knowledge.  Based  on 
this  conviction,  Socrates  argues  that  men  should  concentrate  on  the  care  of  their  souls. 
This  notion  is  found  both  in  Xenophon's  Memorabilia  26  and  in  Plato's  Apology"  and 
Crito.  To  care  for  the  soul  is  important  because  the  soul  is  treated  as  what  contains 
reason,  the  intellect.  According  to  Xenophon,  Socrates,  while  conversing  with 
23  Empedocles'  workings  of  mixtures  in  the  body  could  be  parallel  to  the  Platonic  idea  of  the  workings  of 
the  eye  in  the  Timaeus,  or  Empedocles'  falling  daimon  could  be  seen  as  similar  to  the  view  in  the 
Timaeus  that  soul  leaves  the  stars  and  enters  the  human  form. 
24  R.  B.  Rutherford  (ne  Art  of  Plato,  1995,  p.  29)  argues  that  Xenophon's  Defence  of  Socrates  is  later 
than  Plato's  and  does  not  rest  on  first  hand  authorial  knowledge.  For  the  relation  between  Xenophon's 
works  and  Plato's  see  further  Rutherford,  pp.  47-56. 
21ZeHer  (p.  104)  argues  that  if,  with  the  help  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  we  penetrate  the  meaning  of  the 
Socratic  doctrine  we  can  form  from  the  accounts  which  Xenophon  gives  his  teaching  and  method  a 
consistent  picture,  which  answers  to  the  historical  position  and  importance  of  the  philosopher. 
26  All  the  quotations  used  for  Xenophon  are  from  Amy  L.  Bonnete,  Xenophon  Memorabilia,  Cornell 
University  Press,  1994. 
27  The  Apology  is  treated  as  involving  doctrines  that  are  traditionally  accepted  as  Socratic,  although 
presented,  enhanced  by  Plato. 
11 Aristodemus,  argues  that  the  universe  is  the  product  of  divine  wisdom.  When 
Aristodemus  objects  that  he  does  not  see  the  governors  of  the  universe,  Socrates  replies: 
'Nor  do  you  see  your  own  soul,  which  is in  authority  over  your  body;  so  that,  in  this 
way,  at  least,  it  is  possible  for  you  to  say  that  you  do  nothing  by  design  but  everything 
by  chance'  (Xen.  Memorabilia  Book  I,  chapter  4,  section  9).  The  emphasis  then  is 
placed  on  the  existence  of  intelligence,  both  in  the  world  and  in  the  human  being; 
intelligence  directs  the  world  and  the  human  being. 
In  Plato's  Apology  Socrates  also  argues  for  the  care  of  the  soul  over  that  of  the  body; 
this  is  what  Socrates  holds  for  himself  and  at  the  same  time  wants  to  teach  to  his  fellow 
citizens;  this  is  his  mission2s.  Socrates'  primary  belief  in  the  importance  of  leading  a 
good  life,  of  choosing  right  over  wrong.  This  is  stressed  by  pointing  out  to  the 
Athenians  that  although  they  are  eager  to  possess  wealth,  fame  and  honour,  they  do  not 
care  for  wisdom,  truth,  and  the  best  possible  state  of  their  souls.  In  Plato's  words:  'are 
you  not  ashamed  of  your  eagerness  to  possess  as  much  wealth,  reputation  and  honors  as 
possible,  while  you  do  not  care  for  nor  give  thought  to  wisdom  or  truth,  or  the  best 
possible  state  of  your  soulT  'xpTjpaTCOV  PEV  OýK  aiaVvll  EmpAoupwos  o'TrcA35  cot  icrTat 
q  Ca5  7TX6crra,  Kai  6OgTj5  Kai  TIPfiS,  #OVTjGECa!  9  6i  Kalt  aXTJOStag 
Kal  Tfis  qiuAs  67rca!;  6g 
PEXTim 
E*aTat  OU'K  EITIPEXfi  OU'5E'  #OMPýEIS;  "  (29e).  In  order  to  clarify  that  caring  for 
the  soul  is  more  significant  than  wealth  or anything  material,  Socrates  says  that  'wealth 
does  not  bring  about  excellence,  but  excellence  makes  wealth  and  everything  else  good 
for  men  both  individually  and  collectively'. 
6OU'K  EK  XpllpdTWV  C'XPCIT'l  ylp'YVETat,  aXX  Eý 
"For  Socrates'  mission  as  the  care  of  the  soul  see  G.  Vlastos,  'The  Paradox  of  Socrates',  Ae  Philosophy 
ofSocrates,  New  York,  1971,  p.  9.  See  also,  W.  K.  C.  Guthrie,  Socrates,  Cambridge  Univ.  Press,  1971, 
p.  147;  P.  Duncan,  'Socrates  and  Plato',  Philosophy  15,60  (1940)  p.  342;  C.  D.  C.  Reeve,  Socrates  In  the 
Apology,  Cambridge,  1989,  p.  x;  R.  Hackforth,  The  Composition  of  Plato's  Apology,  Cambridge  Univ. 
Press,  1933,  p.  91,  and  D.  Gallop,  Plato  Defence  of  Socrates,  Euthyphro,  Crito,  Oxford  Univ.  Press, 
1997,  p.  xviii. 
12 ape-rrig  XpTjpaTa  Kai  Ta  aXXa  c'xya6a  TCý15  CX'V6pCSTrOIS  a"TraVTa  Kall  'ISiq  Kal  81,  poclq., 
(30b).  Hence,  the  belief  held  by  Socrates  that  the  care  of  the  soul  is  connected  to  the 
notion  of  acting  rightly,  is  important  because  it  points  towards  a  moral  theory  which 
holds  that  to  act  rightly  is  to  do  the  best  possible  action  to  keep  the  soul  righteous. 
The  soul,  then,  becomes  important  for  its  ability  to  acquire  moral  excellence.  The  soul 
becomes  the  seat  of  morality  as  well  as  knowledge".  As  Vlastos  says  'the  soul  is 
,  30  improved  morally  by  right  action,  and  intellectually  by  right  thinking  . 
The 
significance  of  the  'good,  just  life'  is  also  evident  in  Plato's  Crito  where  Socrates  asks: 
'...  is life  worth  living  for  us  with  that  part  of  us  corrupted  that  unjust  actions  harm  and 
just  actions  benefitT  (Crito  47e).  Socrates'  belief  on  leading  the  good,  just  life,  no 
matter  the  costý  becomes  apparent  when  he  claims  that:  'We  should  not  then  think  so 
much  of  what  the  majority  will  say  about  us,  but  what  he  will  say  who  understands 
justice  and  injustice,  the  one,  that  is,  and  the  truth  itself.  So  that,  in  the  first  place,  you 
were  wrong  to  believe  that  we  should  care  for  the  opinion  of  the  many  about  what  is 
just,  beautiful,  good,  and  their  opposites.  '  (Crito  48a  6-10)  Thus,  Socrates'  answer  to 
the  argument  'the  many  are  able  to  put  us  to  death'  (Crito  48a  10-  11),  is  that:  '...  the 
most  important  thing  is  not  life,  but  the  good  life'  (Crito  48b  4-5).  Thus,  although 
Socrates  does  not  explicitly  refer  to  the  soul,  it  is  clear  that  he  does  believe  that  the 
health  of  the  soul  is  of  supreme  importance  and  that  this  is  harmed  by  injustice. 
The  Socratic  belief  in  the  value  of  the  good  life  leads  us  to  his  belief  regarding  the  issue 
of  death.  Xenophon  in  his  Defence  of  Socrates  reports  that:  'it  was  his  [Socrates']  full 
persuasion,  that  death  was  more  eligible  for  him  than  life  at  such  a  season'.  This  is  so, 
29According  to  Burnet  ('The  Socratic  Doctrine  of  the  Soul',  Proceedings  of  the  British  Academy  1915- 
1916,  Oxford  Univ.  Pr.,  1916,  especially  p.  245)  Socrates  is  the  first  to  treat  the  soul  thus. 
30VIaStOS,  1971,  p.  6. 
13 because  it  is  god  who  thinks  this  to  be  the  best  time  for  Socrates  to  die.  The  claim  that 
the  god  decides  when  it  is  best  for  Socrates  to  die  illustrates  Socrates'  religious  beliefs. 
At  the  same  time  it  may  seem  to  imply  that  Socrates'  faith  in  god  is  so  great  that  makes 
him  hold  that  death  is  not  destruction.  Towards  the  end  of  the  Apology,  Socrates  claims 
that  death  is  either  a  dreamless  sleep  or  a  change  from  here  to  another  place  (40c-d).  At 
40c  Socrates  takes  the  absence  of  a  divine  sign  to  indicate  that  death  is  a  good  thingý'. 
Similarly,  at  41c-d  he  argues  that  the  good  man  cannot  be  harmed.  The  most  natural 
way  to  take  these  references  is  that  they  imply  a  life  after  death  in  which  goodness  is 
somehow  to  be  rewarded.  But  Socrates  does  not  explicitly  commit  himself  to  this.  In 
fact,  at  40c  he  says  that  death  is  either  nothingness  or  migration  to  another  place.  He 
even  argues  that  extinction  may  be  a  good  thing  -  like  a  dreamless  sleep.  Some 
scholars  therefore  insist  that  Socrates  is  agnostic  about  life  after  death,  and  may  even 
think  that  he  inclines  to  the  extinction  view. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  idea  that  the  soul  survives  death  makes  it  easier  to  see  how 
Socrates  could  believe  that  'a  good  man  cannot  be  hanned"'.  It  is  also  notable  that  he 
describes  the  life  after  death  at  some  length,  which  suggests  that  he  takes  it  seriously". 
Crito  54b-c  also  assumes  that  the  soul  survives  death.  There  is  reason  therefore  to 
agree  wi  these  scholars  who  think  that  the  general  tendency  of  the  Apology  suggests 
that  the  soul  probably  does  survive  death'.  But  this  does  not  help  us  very  much  in 
determining  the  view  of  the  historical  Socrates.  The  account  of  life  after  death  could  be 
a  Platonic  embellishment  on  Socrates'  own  position. 
31  See  fin-ther  Duncan  p.  344;  Elmmark,  'Socrates  and  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul',  Eranos  44  (1946)  pp. 
117-119. 
32  From  41d  one  could  infer  that  what  is  implied  is  the  notion  of  personal  survival  after  death.  See 
further,  Ehnmark  p.  120. 
33  See  further  E.  de  Strycker,  Plato's  ApoloSy  ofSocrates,  Leiden,  1994,  p.  229. 
34  Guthrie,  1971,  p.  160. 
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Socrates'  teachings,  then,  could  be  summarised  as  follows:  Firstly,  Socrates'  emphasis 
on  virtue  and  honour  is  reported  both  by  Xenophon  and  Plato:  Xenophon  in  the 
Memorabilia  reports:  '...  he  rid  many  individuals  of  these  things,  after  making  them 
desire  virtue  and  providing  them  with  hopes  that  if  they  attended  to  themselves  they 
would  be  gentlemen  (noble  and  good)'  (Xen.  Mem.  1,2,  section2).  In  the  Apology, 
Plato  argues  that  Socrates  would  not  consider  the  dilemma  of  life  or  death,  but  rather 
consider  if  one  is  acting  in  a  right  or  a  wrong  manner  (Apology  28b-c).  What  such 
statements  imply  is  a  strong  moral  code,  a  code,  which  Socrates  believes,  everyone 
should  live  according  to.  Socrates  holds  that  determining  what  is  right  and  what  is 
wrong  is  the  first  and  foremost  crucial  point  of  living  one's  life.  Secondly,  Socrates 
insisted  on  the  care  of  the  soul.  According  to  Xenophon,  Socrates  'educated  both  his 
soul  and  his  body  in  a  regimen  such  that  one  using  it  would  live  confidently  and 
securely...  '  (Xen.  Mem.  iii.  5,1-4).  As  mentioned  above,  in  Plato's  Apology  the 
emphasis  remains  on  the  care  of  the  soul  over  that  of  the  body  (29e).  This  does,  of 
course,  imply  that  the  soul  can  in  some  way  be  distinguished  from  the  body  even  if  it 
cannot  survive  the  death  of  the  body.  What  should  be  noted  here  is  that  the  notion  of 
the  care  of  the  soul  does  not  only  show  the  possibility  of  the  improvement  of  one's  soul, 
but  it  also  implies  the  possibility  of  the  decline  of  one's  soul.  Although  Socrates  does 
not  mention  the  soul's  decline  as  a  possibility,  the  fact  that  he  holds  that  the  soul  can 
change,  requires  him  to  give  an  account  of  the  source  of  such  a  change,  whether  that  is 
for  the  best  or  for  the  worst.  The  implication,  thus,  that  the  soul  can  be  affected  either 
positively  or  negatively  reveals  traces  of  a  theory  concerning  the  soul-body  relation  that 
is  yet  to  be  developed  by  Plato. 
15 The  primary  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  show  that  all  the  way  from  the  middle  period 
dialogue  Phaedo  to  the  late  dialogue  Timaeus  one  can  observe  both  a  continuity  in 
Plato's  thought  on  the  relation  between  soul  and  body,  and  most  importantly,  a  progress 
towards  a  view  that  pays  more  focus  on  the  interrelation  between  the  two.  This 
treatment  of  Plato's  dialogues  will  require  an  understanding  not  only  of  the  middle  and 
late  period  dialogues,  but  also  of  the  early  ones  as  the  basis  of  Plato's  views.  In  this 
thesis  it  will  be  held  that  since  Plato  is  the  author  of  the  dialogues,  the  way  the 
dialogues'  themes  develop  is  Platonic35.  Such  a  statement  is  made  not  so  as  to 
disregard  Socrates'  importance  as  a  philosopher,  but  rather  so  as  to  indicate  one  line  of 
thought.  I  will  regard  the  dialogues  as  being  Platonic,  and  at  the  same  time,  Socrates' 
due  will  be  given  by  stating  that  he  is  not  only  Plato's  teacher,  but  also,  as  argued 
before,  the  inspiration  of  Plato's  philosophy.  Since  he  wants  to  stress  his  interest  in 
Socratic  ethics  36 
,  Plato  uses  Socrates  as  the  main  character  for  his  dialogues.  Plato  uses 
Socratic  ethics  as  the  basis  for  his  epistemology  as  well  as  for  his  metaphysics.  Plato 
feels  that  it  is  his  obligation  to  bring  the  Socratic  beliefs  on  morality  forward,  towards  a 
more  elaborate  philosophical  view. 
The  need  to  elaborate  on  the  early  dialogues  as  well  as  the  later  ones,  originates  from 
the  thesis'  main  objective,  namely  to  show  how  Plato's  theory  of  soul-body  relation 
develops.  The  development  hypothesis,  though,  requires  a  discussion  concerning  the 
chronological  order  of  the  dialogues.  Plato's  dialogues  are  customarily  divided  into 
three  periods  early,  middle  and  late.  In  this  thesis  I  will  present  two  early  dialogues; 
Gorgias  and  Meno,  two  middle  dialogues;  Phaedo  and  Republic,  including  a  reference 
35For  an  account  of  the  debate  between  advocates  of  'unity'  and  separatists,  see  E.  N.  Tigerstedt, 
Interpreting  Plato,  Uppsala  1977. 
36For  the  influence  of  Socratic  ethics  on  the  development  of  Plato's  philosophy  as  a  whole,  see,  for 
example,  de  Strycker,  p.  12.  See  further  Duncan,  p.  346;  J.  H.  Randall,  Plato  Dramatist  of  the  Life  of 
Reason,  Columbia  Univ.  Pr.,  1970,  p.  97. 
16 to  the  Symposium  and  the  Phaedrus,  and  the  late  dialogue  Timaeus.  The  chronological 
arrangement  of  the  dialogues,  thus,  is  of  concern  since  it  can  indicate  the  degree  of 
development  of  Plato's  thought.  The  fact  that  the  Gorgias  and  the  Meno  belong  to  the 
early  Platonic  dialogues  is  widely  accepted,  similarly  the  Symposium  the  Phaedo,  the 
Republic  and  the  Phaedrus-"  belong  to  the  middle  period.  Again  the  Timaeus  is  treated 
as  being  one  of  the  late  dialogues. 
Although  this  arrangement  is  widely  accepted  38 
,  problems  arise  for  the  particular 
relation  of  dialogues  within  the  same  period.  For  the  aim  of  this  thesis  the  relative 
chronological  arrangement  between  Gorgias  and  Meno  as  well  as  Phaedo  and 
Symposium  is  in  question.  Although  it  is  not  easy  to  find  any  clear  grounds  for  dating 
the  Meno  and  Gorgias  relative  to  each  other,  most  scholars  hold  that  the  Gorgias  is 
earlier  than  Men039.  Since  as  L.  Brandwood  argues,  little  can  be  said  on  the  sequence 
of  dialogues  in  the  early  group,  and  division  into  subgroups  seems  out  of  the  question4o, 
the  order  that  is  followed  in  this  thesis  is  adopted  purely  for  expository  reasons.  The 
same  goes  for  the  middle  dialoguee'.  Thus,  so  far  as  the  middle  dialogues  are 
37  Whereas  I'm  inclined  to  think  that  the  Phae&-us  may  be  later  than  the  Republic  -  the  doctrine  of 
division  of  the  soul  indicates  that  it  is  late  within  the  middle  dialogues  -  their  exact  chronological  order  is 
of  no  concern.  This  is  so  because  the  Phaedrus  does  not  have  much  that  adds  on  the  specific  issues  that 
concern  this  thesis. 
38For  a  good  summary  on  various  approaches  on  the  issue  of  chronology,  mainly  concerning  the  middle 
and  the  late  period  dialogues,  see  Leonard  Brandwood,  'Stylometry  and  Chronology',  in  R.  Kraut  (ed), 
Yhe  Cambridge  Companion  to  Plato,  Cambridge  University  Press,  1992,  pp.  90-120.  For  a  detailed 
argument  concerning  the  chronological  order  of  the  early  and  the  middle  dialogues  see  Charles  H.  Kahn, 
'Did  Plato  write  Socratic  DialoguesT,  in  Hugh  H.  Benson  (ed),  Essays  on  the  Philosophy  of  Socrates, 
Oxford  University  Press,  1992,  pp.  35-51.  A  chronological  table  of  the  dialogues  in  relation  to  relevant 
historical  events  is  provided  by  Rutherford,  pp.  35-36. 
39Brandwood  (p.  109)  refers  to  Ritter  as  holding  that  Gorgias  is  prior  to  Meno,  but  it  is  pointed  out  that 
this  is  only  a  probability.  Kahn  (1992,  p.  36)  treats  Meno  as  'a  curtain-raiser  for  the  middle  dialogues. 
In  the  same  article  he  refers  to  Guthrie  who  again  presents  Gorgias  as  prior  to  Meno,  although  he 
hesitates  about  their  relative  date.  Another  scholar  who  places  Meno  at  the  end  of  the  early  dialogues  is 
Terence  Irwin,  Plato's  Moral  Themy,  the  Early  and  Midd7e  Dialogues,  Oxford  Univ.  Press  1977,  pp. 
291-293. 
'Brandwood,  p.  115. 
41  For  the  date  of  the  Symposium  see  K.  J.  Dover,  'The  Date  of  Plato's  Symposium,  Phronesis  10  (1965) 
pp.  2-16.  See  further  H.  B.  Mattingly  Phronesis  3  (1958)  31ff;  J.  S.  Morrison,  Classical  Quarterly,  n.  s. 
14  (1964)  pp.  45-46. 
17 concerned,  I  believe  that  the  account  of  the  soul  of  the  Phaedo  is  probably  prior  to  that 
of  the  Republic.  This  is  consistent  with  the  views  of  most  scholars  about  the  relative 
dating  of  these  dialogues".  Therefore,  the  analysis  of  each  dialogue  will  be  a  self- 
contained  one  and  at  the  same  time  traces  of  ideas  that  develop  from  one  dialogue  to 
another  will  be  indicated  accordingly. 
42  See  further  the  list  provided  by  D.  W. D.  Ross,  Plato's  Theory  ofIdeas,  Oxford  195  1,  p.  2. 
18 Soul  and  Body  in  the  Gorgias 
The  next  dialogue  I  shall  consider  is  Gorgias'.  My  main  concern  will  be  to  explore  its 
implications  for  the  doctrine  of  soul  and  body  through  its  use  of  the  health  analogy  and 
its  discussion  of  punishment.  Although  the  health  of  the  body,  at  a  basic  level,  may 
seem  as  implying  a  mere  parallel  picture  to  the  condition  of  the  soul,  the  way  that  the 
ways  the  soul  affects  the  body  and  the  body  affects  the  soul,  lead  us  to  think  that  Plato's 
view  of  the  soul-body  relation  goes  beyond  a  mere  parallelism.  Similarly,  Plato's  view 
of  punishment  as  a  means  to  improving  the  soul  implies  that  the  soul  is  at  least 
indirectly  influenced  by  the  condition  of  the  body.  These  issues  will  be  discussed  here 
so  as  to  show  how  they  develop,  in  Plato's  middle  and  late  dialogues,  into  a  coherent 
system  of  body-soul  interaction. 
Socrates  and  Polus 
Health  Analogy 
The  first  passage  I  shall  examine  is  at  463e  ff.  where  Socrates  uses  the  analogy  of  the 
healthy  state  for  both  body  and  SOU12,  in  describing  his  own  view  about  the  nature  of 
oratory.  Socrates'  account  of  oratory  is  based  on  a  distinction  between  spurious  and 
'Although  the  chronology  of  Gorgias  in  relation  to  the  Meno  is  doubtful,  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis  I 
shall  treat  the  Gorgias  before  the  Meno.  This  is  so  because  the  Gorgias'theme  is  mainly  moral,  while 
the  Meno  is  involved  with  epistemological  notions,  and  introduces  the  notion  of  recollection.  On  the 
chronological  order  between  the  two  dialogues  see  further  E.  R.  Dodds,  Plato:  Gorgias:  A  Revised  Text 
with  Introduction  and  Commentaq,  Clarendon  Press,  1959,  pp.  18-19;  W. K  C.  Guthrie,  A  Histo?  y  of 
Greek  Philosophy  IV,  Cambridge,  1975,  p.  236;  PL  W.  Sharples,  Plato  Meno,  Aris  and  Phillips,  1985,  p. 
6. 
2Anthony  Kenny  (The  Anatomy  Of  The  Soul,  Blackwell,  1973,  p.  1)  argues  that  it  was  Plato  who 
developed  in  the  Gorgias  the  'healthy  mind'  metaphor  in  unprecedented  detail  and  in  the  Republic 
crossed  the  boundary  between  metaphor  and  philosophical  theory. 
19 genuine  arts.  The  genuine  arts  aim  at  the  good  and  use  reason,  while  the  spurious  aim 
at  gratification  and  are  mere  empirical  knacks;  they  can  render  no  rational  account  of 
their  procedure  3.  Within  each  of  these  categories  there  are  some  that  apply  to  the  body 
and  some  to  the  soul.  The  cmft  concemed  with  the  soul  is  politics  divided  into  two 
parts:  legislation  and  justice,  and  the  craft  concerned  with  the  body  is  gymnastics  and 
medicine.  Moreover,  Plato  sees  a  parallel  between  the  crafts  concerned  with  the  soul 
and  those  concerned  with  the  body:  'the  counterpart  of  gymnastics  is  legislation,  and 
the  part  that  corresponds  to  medicine  is  justice'  (464b-c).  Gymnastics,  legislation, 
medicine,  and  justice  are  the  four  crafts,  then,  which:  'provide  care  for  both  body  and 
soul,  with  a  view  to  what  is  best'  (464b-c),  and  rest  on  scientific  knowledge  of  good 
and  evie.  On  the  other  hand,  the  knack  or  flattery  that  wears  the  mask  of  medicine  is 
pastry  baking,  while  cosmetics  is  the  kind  of  flattery  that  corresponds  to  gymnastics, 
sophistry  is  the  kind  of  flattery  that  corresponds  to  legislation,  and  oratory  is  the  kind  of 
flattery  that  corresponds  to  justice  (465b-c).  The  conclusive  distinction,  thus,  between 
an  art  and  a  mere  knack  is  that  the  former  aims  at  the  good  of  its  subject,  while  the  latter 
does  not.  As  E.  R.  Dodds  puts  it:  'The  four  spurious  arts  are  distinguishable  in  two 
ways  from  the  genuine  -  by  their  aim,  which  is  merely  pleasure,  and  by  their  empirical 
character  which  means  that  they  cannot  give  any  rational  account  of  their  procedure' 
(465a)5 
. 
This  distinguishes  them  from  genuine  arts,  which,  as  Henry  Teloh  suggests, 
must  satisfy  the  following  conditions:  An  art  (1)  discerns  the  nature  of  its  subject,  so 
that  (2)  it  may  see  the  good  of  its  subject,  and,  then,  (3)  it  seeks  the  best  means  to 
achieve  its  desired  end  which  is  the  good  of  its  subjece. 
3paUl  Shorey,  What  Plato  Said,  University  of  Chicago  press,  1933,  p.  138. 
4  Held  by  A.  E.  Taylor,  Plato:  The  Man  and  his  Work,  London,  197  1,  p.  I  11. 
5  Dodds,  1959,  on  463e5-466a3. 
6  Henry  Tcloh,  Socratic  Education  in  Plato's  Early  Dialogues,  University  of  Notre  Dame  Press,  1986,  p. 
131. 
20 The  point  of  the  distinction  between  gymnastics  and  medicine,  as  Allen  points  out', 
seems  to  be  that  the  former  maintains  bodily  health  and  equilibrium  while  the  latter 
restores  the  body  to  equilibrium.  Similarly,  legislation  seems  to  maintain  equilibrium  in 
the  soul  while  justice  restores  it.  The  correspondence  between  the  above  pairs  points  to 
the  idea  that  soul  and  body  are  parallel  to  one  another;  namely,  both  the  soul  and  the 
body  are  able  to  acquire  either  a  healthy  or  an  unhealthy  state  of  being.  When  the  body 
is in  an  unhealthy  state  it  is  obvious  that  it  needs  to  be  restored  through  medicine.  The 
fact,  though,  that  the  soul  -  when  in  a  similar  state  -  needs  to  be  restored,  is  both  an 
innovation  of  Plato  as  well  as  a  very  crucial  point  for  his  theory  concerning  the  body- 
soul  relation.  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  the  soul  is  vulnerable  to  wickedness 
and  needs  to  be  taken  care  of;  this  is  the  role  ofjustice.  Since  justice  normally  involves 
the  infliction  of  punishment,  this  must  be  used  as  the  means  to  improve  the  soul. 
Another  important  point  about  the  above  division  is  that  Plato  a)  presents  the  soul  as 
being  the  one  that  governss  the  body:  'If  the  soul  didn't  govern  the  body  but  the  body 
governed  itselý  and  if  pastry  baking  and  medicine  weren't  kept  under  observation  and 
distinguished  by  the  soul,  but  the  body  itself  made  judgements  about  them...  then  the 
world  according  to  Anaxagoras,  would  prevail....  all  things  would  be  mixed  together  in 
the  same  place,  and  there  would  be  no  distinction  between  matters  of  medicine  and 
health,  and  matters  of  pastry  baking'  (465c-d  ).  Allen  rightly  argues  that:  'This  is  an 
important  argument  for  the  Socratic  thesis  that  not  only  are  body  and  soul  distinct,  but 
soul  -  that  is,  mind  -  must  govern  body  even  with  respect  to  the  excellence  proper  to  the 
'PL  E.  Allen,  The  Dialogues  ofPlato,  vol.  1,  Yale  University  Press,  1984,  p.  196 
$It  is  not  made  clear  yet,  whether  Plato  believes  that  the  soul  should  govern  the  body,  or  whether  it 
actually  does  govern  it.  Perhaps  what  Plato  assumes  is  that  the  soul  is  largely  successful  in  governing  the 
body  -  otherwise  there  would  be  no  order  -  but  that  it  is  not  wholly  successful  -  that  -is  why  there  is  vice 
and  disease. 
21 body,  which  is  health'9.  Thus,  although  the  first  part  of  this  particular  speech  of 
Socrates  appears  to  treat  the  soul  and  the  body  as  being  parallel  to  one  another,  in  fact 
these  last  lines  indicate  that  the  soul-body  relation  is  much  more  complicated  than  a 
simple  parallel  direction.  The  fact  that  Plato  takes  the  soul  to  govern  the  body  is 
indicative  that  he  considers  that  the  soul,  though  different  from  the  body,  is  capable  of 
affecting  it. 
It  is  interesting  to  mention  here  that  Plato  seems  to  attribute  to.  the  body  the  ability  to 
judge.  At  the  same  time,  though,  he  makes  it  clear  that  he  does  not  value  the  body.  He 
says  that:  'If  the  soul  didn't  govem  the  body  but  the  body  governed  itself,  and  if  pastry 
baking  and  medicine  weren't  kept  under  observation  and  distinguished  by  the  soul,  but 
the  body  itself  made  judgements  about  them,  making  its  estimates  by  reference  to  the 
gratification  it  receives,  then....  there  would  be  no  distinction  between  matters  of 
medicine  and  health,  and  matters  of  pastry  baking'  (465c-d).  The  situation  presented  is 
highly  hypothetical.  Although  one  cannot  say  with  certainty.  whether  Plato  was 
seriously  contemplating  the  idea  of  attributing  judgements  to  the  body,  or  whether  he 
was  just  referring  to  the  body  having  those  desires  as  part  of  its  nature,  it  seems  that 
Plato  does  not  seriously  attribute  to  the  body  the  ability  to  judge.  He  rather  argues  that 
it  is  the  body's  nature  to  be  driven  by  certain  desires.  The  soul  is  treated  as  being 
superior  to  and  as  governing  the  body,  partly,  because  Plato  needs  a  ground  to  base  the 
importance  of  the  differentiation  between  a  real  and  an  apparent  state  for  anything.  If 
the  soul  did  not  govern  the  body,  if  one  was  left  to  make  judgements  based  only  on  the 
body's  desires,  there  would  be  no  way  to  differentiate  the  real  from  the  apparent.  As  in 
the  distinction  between  real  arts  and  mere  knack  -  real  arts  can  render  a  rational  account 
while  knack  cannot  -  the  distinctive  point  between  soul  and  body  is  determined  by 
Wen,  P.  197. 
22 knowledge.  Since  it  is  driven  only  by  its  desires,  the  body  cannot  by  itself  differentiate 
the  real,  the  good,  from  the  apparent,  the  pleasurable.  It  cannot,  therefore,  render  a 
rational  account  of  anything;  it  cannot  have  knowledge. 
Thus  Plato  treats  the  soul  as  the  ruling  element,  but  he  also  wants  to  show  that  the 
distraction  that  any  person  may  face  occurs  due  to  the  conflict  of  soul  and  body  within 
that  personlo.  The  opposition  between  soul  and  body,  thus,  holds  because  the  soul  here 
seems  to  represent  reason,  while  the  body  represents  the  desires.  What  Plato  does  not 
make  apparent  here  is  the  point  that  a  failure  of  the  soul  to  govern  the  body  results  in 
vice,  which  is  sickness  of  the  soul,  and  disease,  which  is  sickness  of  the  body.  The 
soul,  then,  is  chosen  to  be  superior  over  the  body  because  the  soul  is  the  reasonable  part 
in  man,  the  one  able  to  have  knowledge.  Socrates  concludes  this  passage  by  saying 
that:  "Oratory  is  the  counterpart  in  the  soul  to  pastry  baking,  its  counterpart  in  the  body" 
(465d-e),  emphasising  once  more  that  oratory  is  not  a  real  art  because  it  does  not 
involve  knowledge. 
Punishment 
Having  shown  that  the  real  art  for  the  soul's  well  being  is  justice  Socrates  tries  to  show 
the  important  role  of  punishment  for  the  soul's  improvement.  According  to  Socrates, 
happiness  is  determined  by  education  and  justice  (470e).  On  the  other  hand,  injustice  is 
connected  with  misery:  'A  man,  who  acts  unjustly,  a  man  who  is  unjust,  is  thoroughly 
miserable,  the  more  so  if  he  doesn't  get  his  due  punishment  for  the  wrongdoing  he 
commits,  the  less  so  if  he  pays  and  receives  what  is  due  at  the  hands  of  both  gods  and 
`Ihis  notion  of  a  person  being  confused  in  the  Timaeus  will  be  attributed  to  the  soul's  embodiment. 
23 C 
men9 
a5IKC3V  TE  Kal  0  aSIK05  navTco5  pEv  aeXiog,  aOXICO'TEP05  PEVTOI  EaV  Pil  615Cý 
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dexios  iav  6,  w  s;  K71V  Kati  'ruyXddvTj  11  EI 
51KTIS  ýTTO'  6ECSV  TE  Kali  dv6p6mov.  9  (472e).  Socrates  holds  that:  'Of  two  miserable 
people  one  could  not  be  happier  than  the  other,  but  the  one  who  avoids  getting  caught... 
is  the  most  miserable  one'  (473d-e). 
Even  from  this  early  stage,  one  has  the  feeling  that  Socrates'  notion  of  happiness,  and 
consequently  his  belief  on  the  significance  of  punishment,  is  not  in  accordance  to  the 
popular  notion  of  it.  The  Greek  word  eudaimonia  has  connotations  that  the  English 
word  happiness  does  not  entail;  it  can  be  related  to  words  like  blessed".  Perhaps  the 
main  difference  in  meaning  between  eudaimonia  and  happiness  is  that  shown  by 
Vlastos;  namely,  eudaimonia  places  emphasis  on  the  attainment  of  well  being,  while  the 
English  word  happiness  can  also  be  defined  as  the  state  of  pleasurable  content  12 
. 
For 
Socrates,  being  happy  is  not  a  matter  of  degree;  it  is  not  liable  to  quantitative 
measurement,  and  punishment  is  treated  as  the  necessary  means  to  improvement,  not  an 
end  in  itself.  The  implication  at  this  point  is  that  Socrates,  unlike  those  who  adopt  the 
hedonistic  approach  to  happiness,  associates  happiness  with  self-conti:  ol.  The  principle 
13  that  Socrates  seems  to  hold  here  is,  as  Vlastos  states  ,  that  happiness  is  desired  by  all 
human  beings  as  the  ultimate  end  of  all  their  mtional  acts.  Given  such  a  principle,  one 
has  to  consider  the  relation  between  happiness  and  the  good  which,  in  turn,  leads  to  the 
relation  between  happiness  and  virtue.  Happiness  and  the  good  are  terms  used 
14  interchangeably  ,  while  the  relation  between  happiness  and  virtue  seems  more 
"For  the  association  of  the  word  happiness  to  words  like  blessed,  see  Phaedrus  250b-c,  and  Aristotle's 
Nicomachean  Ethics  11  78b  9-10  and  20-3. 
"Gregory  Vlastos,  'Happiness  and  Virtue  in  Socrates'  Moral  Theory',  in  G.  Fine  (ed)  Plato  2,  Oxford 
University  Press,  1999,  p.  107. 
13VIaStOS,  1999,  p.  108  and  n.  14. 
14VIastos,  1999,  p.  109,  n.  20;  regarding  Gorgias  494c495b,  p.  128  and  n.  82. 
24 complicated.  What  Socrates  makes  clear  about  the  relation  between  happiness  and 
virtue  is  that  one  will  have  happiness  if  and  only  if  one  has  virtue'5.  This  point  is 
finther  supported  by  the  earlier  Socratic  comment:  '...  the  honourable  and  the  good  man 
and  woman  is  happy  the  unjust  and  wicked  miserable'  (470e  9-11).  The  implication, 
then,  is  that  for  Socrates  there  is  a  correct  standard,  when  one  reaches  that  standard,  one 
then  reaches  virtue  and  thus  happiness  16 
. 
In  order  to  stress  his  point  that  happiness  cannot  be  achieved  without  virtue,  Socrates 
moves  into  a  more  detailed  argument:  'You  and  I  and  everybody  else  consider  doing 
what  is  unjust  worse  than  suffering  it,  and  not  paying  what  is  due  worse  than  paying  it' 
(474b).  Here  Socrates  introduces  principles  governing  the  comparison  between  two 
admirable  things,  and  between  two  shameful  things:  'Whenever  one  of  two  admirable 
things  is  more  admirable  than  the  other,  it  is  because  it  surpasses  the  other  in  one  of 
f  t17,  these,  pleasure  or  bene  I  or  in  both'  and  'Whenever  one  of  two  shameful  things  is 
more  shameful  than  the  other,  it  will  be  so  because  it  surpasses  the  other  either  in  pain 
or  in  badness'  (475a-b).  In  other  words,  he  establishes  specific  criteria  for  what  is  more 
admirable  and  what  is  more  shameful.  Socrates  tries  to  determine  whether  doing  what 
is  unjust  is  more  shameful  than  suffering  it:  'Now  if  doing  what  is  unjust  is  in  fact  more 
shameful  than  suffering  it,  wouldn't  it  be  so  either  because  it  is  more  painful  and 
surpasses  the  other  in  pain,  or  because  it  surpasses  it  in  badness,  or  bothT  (475b),  and  it 
is  obvious  that  doing  what  is  unjust  is  not  more  painful  than  suffering  it.  He  concludes 
`Vla.  stos,  1999,  p.  126. 
'611e  point  that  happiness  is  associated  with  self-control  will  be  discussed  towards  the  end  of  Socrates' 
argument  with  Polus,  at  478d-e,  as  well  as  in  the  discussion  between  Socrates  and  Callicles  at  491  e-492e. 
The  relation  between  happiness,  justice,  virtue,  and  good  living  will  be  further  explored  within  Socrates' 
discussion  with  Callicles  at  506c-507c. 
17  For  various  references  of  what  is  beneficial  within  the  Platonic  dialogues  see  Vlastos,  1999,  p.  134 
note  100. 
25 that  since  doing  what  is  unjust  surpasses  suffering  it  in  badness,  doing  what  is  unjust  is 
worse  than  suffering  it  (475c).  The  argument  is  structured  as  follows: 
PI  doing  what  is  unjust  is  more  shameful  because  it  either  surpasses  suffering  it  in  pain 
or  badness. 
P2  doing  what  is  unjust  is  not  more  painful  than  suffering  injustice. 
Conclusion  1:  Doing  what  is  unjust  is  more  shameful  because  it  surpasses  it  in  badness. 
Conclusion  2:  So,  because  it  surpasses  it  in'badness,  doing  what  is  unjust  would  be 
worse  than  suffering  it. 
The  usual  objection  to  this  argument  is  that  Polus  should  either  have  argued  that  doing 
injustice  is  not  aiiaXpov,  or  else  he  should  have  denied  that  what  is  ailaxpOv  is  bad.  He 
could  then  have  insisted  that  pain  is  the  only  evil  and  that  doing  injustice  is  therefore 
better  for  us  than  suffering  it. 
Another  problem  that  Socrates  seems  to  face  here  is  that  he  is  not  strictly  entitled  to 
claim  that  doing  injustice  is  more  shameful  than  suffering  injustice,  as  he  does  at  475b. 
It  has  been  agreed  that  if  A  is  more  shameful  than  B  that  must  be  because  A  surpasses 
B  in  badness  or  in  pain.  But,  even  if  doing  injustice  surpasses  suffering  it  in  badness,  it 
is  clear  that  suffering  injustice  surpasses  doing  injustice  in  pain.  So,  based  on  one 
criterion,  suffering  injustice  turns  out  to  be  more  shameful  while,  based  on  the  other 
criterion,  doing  injustice  turns  out  to  be  more  shameful.  This  discrepancy  could  be 
solved  by  assuming  that  Socrates  presupposes  here  that  the  evils  of  the  soul  count  more 
than  the  evils  of  the  body.  My  argument  here  then  is  that  the  above  idea  implies  the 
superiority  of  the  soul's  virtue  over  that  of  the  body.  In  other  words,  between  the  two 
evils,  pain  and  badness,  the  former  is  of  less  importance  for  it  is  bodily,  while  the  latter 
is  of  greater  value  since  it  is  of  the  soul. 
26 Within  the  framework  of  this  idea  that  the  soul  has  greater  worth  than  the  body,  Plato, 
thus,  argues  for  the  value  of  punishment.  The  question  Socrates  raises  is  'Whether  a 
wrongdoer's  paying  what  is  due  is  the  worst  thing  there  is,  or  whether  his  not  paying  it 
is  even  worse'  (476a).  It  is  important  to  note  that  Socrates  makes  Polus  accept  that 
paying  what  is  due  and  being  justly  disciplined  for  wrongdoing  are  the  same  thing. 
This  point  is  essential  for  it  connects  with  Plato's  above  belief  that  punishment  is 
treated  as  the  necessary  means  to  improvement's.  Furthermore,  in  order  to  explain  this 
view  of  punishment,  Plato  introduces  what  looks  like  a  simple  logical  point:  'If 
somebody  acts  upon  something,  there  also  has  to  be  something  that  has  something  done 
to  it  by  the  one  acting  upon  iff  '&Pa  Ell  T15  T1  ITOIEý1,  aVaYKII  TI  gival  Kal  TracXov  Ono' 
TOUTOU  TOO  Troi0OVTOS;  '  (476b),  then,  'is  paying  what  is  due  a  case  of  being  acted  upon 
or  of  acting  upon  something?  '  'T6  61KT)V  Movat  ITOTEPOV  TraC)(SIV  T1  ECITIV  11  1T01aV;  9 
(476d),  Polus  answer  then  is  that  'It  must  be  a  case  of  being  acted  upon...  by  the  one 
administering  discipline  "  Avayq  TraoXEiv...  UITO  YE  TOO  KoXa;  OVT05'  (Gorgias  476d). 
The  conclusion  then  is  that  since  one  who  disciplines  correctly  disciplines  justly  (476e), 
'...  the  one  being  disciplined  is  acted  upon  justly  when  he  pays  what  is  due  ......  0' 
KOXaý6PEV05  51IRV  6160ý5  6IKaia  ndcrXEO  (476e).  Plato  here  assimilates  paying  what  is 
due,  with  being  disciplined.  This  makes  it  much  more  plausible  to  suppose  that 
punishment  is  good  for  those  on  whom  it  is  imposed.  Although  Plato  does  not,  in  this 
passage,  provide  us  with  a  reason  why  being  disciplined  is  good  for  us,  he  makes  it 
clear  at  505b9  that  discipline  restrains  our  desires  and  thus  brings  about  order  within  us. 
"According  to  Mary  Margaret  Mackenzie  (Plato  On  Punishment,  University  of  California  Press,  London, 
1981,  p.  179),  Plato  proposes  that  punishment  is  the  means  by  which  we  may  acquire  the  good  fortune  of 
a  virtuous  disposition. 
27 Socrates  concludes  his  discussion  of  this  view  of  punishment  by  saying  that:  'one  of 
these  men  does  admirable  things,  and  the  other,  the  one  being  disciplined,  has 
admirable  things  done'to  him,  and  if  they  are  admirable  they  are  good.  For  they  are 
either  pleasant  or  beneficial'  (476e-477a).  Since  punishment  is  evidently  not  pleasant, 
this  statement  apparently  shows  that  punishment  is  something  beneficial  for  the  one 
who  is  being  disciplined.  Clearly  this  argument  is  fallacious  since  even  if  one  concedes 
that  acting  justly  is  beneficial,  there  is  still  a  question  about  who  receives  the  benefit. 
One  could  argue  that  it  is  the  person  who  imposes  the  punishment  and  society  at  large 
that  benefits.  Socrates  ignores  this  point  and  states  that:  'the  soul  is  improved  if  it  is 
justly  disciplined.  Hence,  one  who  pays  what  is  due  gets  rid  of  something  bad  in  his 
soul'  (477a).  Therefore,  punishment  is  the  means  to  improvement,  to  the  ultimate  result 
of  happiness".  To  show  that  punishment  benefits  the  soul,  Plato  returns  to  the  body- 
soul  analogy  discussed  in  464a-465d.  Plato  here  compares  the  badness  of  body  to  the 
badness  of  soul;  concerning  a  person's  physical  condition,  what  is  bad  consists  of 
'weakness,  disease,  ugliness,  and  the  like'  (477b),  and  the  corrupt  condition  of  the  soul 
has  to  do  with  "injustice,  ignorance,  cowardice  and  the  like"  (477b).  The  most 
shameful  state  of  wickedness,  now,  among  poverty,  disease,  and  injustice,  is  injustice 
since  'It's  the  source  either  of  the  greatest  pain,  or  of  harm,  or  of  both'  (477c).  Socrates 
here  concludes  that:  'The  reason  that  corruption  of  one's  soul  is  the  most  shameful  of 
them  all  is  that  it  surpasses  the  others  by  some  monstrously  great  harm  and  astounding 
badness,  since  it  doesn't  surpass  them  in  pain'  (477d-e). 
it  is  important  to  note  here  that  Socrates  seems  to  take  the  wickedness  of  the  soul  to  be 
worse  than  anything  else  because  of  the  soul's  superiority  over  anything  else.  Then  as 
Mackenzie  puts  it:  'The  worst  evil  that  a  man  can  suffer  is  neither  material  nor  physical 
19This  will  be  analysed  towards  the  end  of  the  discussion  between  Socrates  and  Polus. 
28 misfortune,  but  psychological  disorder,  which  is  corrected  by  the  art  of  justice 
According  to  the  body-soul  analogy,  punishment  is  the  medicine  of  wickedness  - 
painful,  but  useful  to  effect  a  cure;  when  it  succeeds,  it  makes  us  more  temperate  and 
just,  therefore  we  should  seek  punishment  just  as  we  consult  a  doctor'20.  Although 
there  is  a  strong  analogy  here  between  the  role  of  medicine  and  that  of  punishment,  to 
argue  that:  'We  should  seek  punishment  just  as  we  consult  a  doctor',  produces  a  kind  of 
circularity  since  it  requires  some  degree  ofjustice  already  existing  in  us.  Someone  who 
is  able  to  recognise  that  he  has  done  wrong  and  so  is  motivated  to  seek  punishment 
would  not  have  an  unjust  soul.  He  would  not,  therefore,  need  punishment  as  a  cure  of 
injustice.  Plato  implicitly  recognises  this  point  by  assimilating  punishment  and  self- 
discipline;  someone  who  is  basically  just  might  undertake  self-discipline  to  improve  his 
character  or  to  avoid  becoming  corrupted. 
The  Treatment  against  Wickedness 
The  argument,  now,  becomes  twofold;  Socrates  proceeds  to  show  how  a  treatment 
against  wickedness  can  be  either  imposed  by  the  judges,  or  by  the  person  himself.  The 
parallel  between  body  and  soul  still  holds.  Getting  medical  treatment  is  beneficial 
because  those  who  receive  it  'are  getting  rid  of  something  very  bad,  so  that  it  is  worth 
their  while  to  endure  the  pain  and  so  get  well'  (478c).  In  other  words,  the  pain  caused 
by  the  doctors  is  not  the  end  result,  it  is  the  means  to  something  far  more  important,  the 
health  of  the  person.  Here  Socrates  reintroduces  happiness,  eudaimonia.  He  argues 
that  although  it  is important  for  one  to  get  rid  of  something  bad  either  in  his  body  or  in 
his  soul,  the  happiest  man,  concerning  his  body,  is  he  who  does  not  need  to  be  treated 
since  he  is  not  sick.  The  claim  made  is  the  following:  'Happiness  evidently  is  not  a 
2OMackenzie  p.  183.29 matter  of  getting  rid  of  something  bad;  it  is  a  matter  of  not  even  contracting  it  to  begin 
with'  (478c).  He  applies  this  idea  to  those  that  are  not  treated.  He  applies  the  idea  that 
the  most  miserable  one  is  he  who  is  not  treated  to  the  soul  as  well  as  to  the  body:  'Of 
two  people,  each  of  whom  has  something  bad  in  either  body  or  soul,  the  most  miserable 
is  the  one  that  is  not  treated  and  does  not  get  rid  of  the  bad  thing'  (478d). 
Socrates,  then,  shows  how  punishment  is  directly  related  with  the  issue  of  happiness: 
'The  happiest  man  is  the  one  who  does  not  have  any  badness  in  his  soul...  and  second,  I 
suppose,  is  the  man  who  gets  rid  of  it'  (478d-e).  Referring,  then,  to  the  second, 
Socrates  says:  'this  is  the  man  who  gets  lectured  and  lashed,  the  one  who  pays  what  is 
due'  (478e).  These  points  indicate  that  the  soul  is  improved  through  both  education  and 
corporal  discipline.  The  notion  of  the  soul's  improvement  through  education  and 
punishment  is  finther  developed  in  the  Republic.  In  books  II  and  III  Plato  describes  an 
education,  which  will  bring  the  souls  of  the  guardians  to  order.  Then,  in  book  IV  he 
claims  that  'it  is  more  profitable  to  act  justly,  live  in  a  fme  way,  and  be  just'  (445a) 
rather  than  'to  act  unjustly  and  be  unjust,  provided  that  one  doesn't  pay  the  penalty  and 
become  better  as  a  result  of  punishment'  (445a).  Plato,  once  more,  is  trying  to  establish 
that  both  education  and  punishment  are  beneficial  for  the  soul.  Returning  to  the 
Gorgias  text,  Plato  treats  punishment  as  one  way  that  an  unjust  man  can  be  improved. 
This  is  significant  for  this  thesis,  since  it  indicates  that  the  soul  is  capable  of  being 
improved  by  action  on  the  body.  If,  as  seems  likely,  Plato  is  here  thinking  of  corporal 
punishment,  this  indicates  that  the  soul  is  affected  due  to  bodily  changes;  the  body  is 
punished  so  that  the  soul  is  benefited.  It  is  implied,  then,  that  the  relation  between  the 
soul  and  the  body  is  not  merely  parallel,  but  rather  an  interdependent  one. 
30 Hence,  man.  by  facing  punishment,  is  paying  what  is due,  and  as  a  result  he  gets  rid  of 
wickedness  21.  Trying  to  avoid  punishment  or  physical  treatment,  is  a  result  of 
ignorance:  'they  focus  on  its  painflilness,  but  are  blind  to  its  benefit  and  are  ignorant  of 
how  much  more  miserable  it  is  to  live  with  an  unhealthy  soul  than  with  an  unhealthy 
body,  a  soul  that  is  rotten  with  injustice  and  impiety'  (479b-c).  Once  again  it  becomes 
apparent  that  the  greater  value  of  the  soul  as  compared  with  the  body  is  considered  self- 
evident. 
The  discussion  between  Socrates  and  Polus  concludes  with  a  summary  of  the  main 
points  of  the  argument:  A)  '...  what  a  man  should  guard  himself  against  most  of  all  is 
doing  what  is  unjust,  knowing  that  he  will  have  trouble  enough  if  he  does'  (480a),  in 
other  words  a  man  should  always  be  just.  B)  'And  If  he  or  anyone  else  he  cares  about 
acts  unjustly,  he  should  voluntarily  go  to  the  place  where  he  will  pay  his  due  as  soon  as 
possible;  he  should  go  to  the  judge  as  though  he  were  going  to  a  doctor,  anxious  that  the 
disease  of  injustice  should  not  be  protracted  and  cause  his  soul  to  fester  incurably' 
(480b),  the  health  analogy  then  still  holds.  Q  '...  So  that  he  may  pay  his  due  and  get 
well;  and  compel  himself  and  the  others  not  to  play  the  coward,  but  to  grit  his  teeth  and 
present  himself  with  grace  and  courage  as  to  a  doctor  for  cauterisation  and  surgery, 
pursuing  what  is  good  and  admirable  without  taking  any  account  of  the  pain'  (480c), 
one  should  prefer,  therefore,  the  improvement  of  the  soul  over  the  bodily  pain.  D)  'He 
should  be  his  own  chief  accuser,  and  the  accuser  of  other  members  of  his  family,  and 
use  his  oratory  for  the  purpose  of  getting  rid  of  the  worst  thing  there  is,  injustice,  as  the 
unjust  acts  are  being  exposed'  (480d).  Along  with  punishment,  one  should  use  oratory 
as  an  educational  tool  towards  the  main  goal,  the  improvement  of  one's  soul.  Socrates' 
reference  to  oratory  here  seems  to  be  a  paradox  since  his  earlier  claim  that  rhetoric  is 
VA  point  similar  to  that  is  made  in  Laws  book  )CI,  934b. 
31 part  of  flattery  (462e).  This  might  suggest  that  he  could  not  mean  the  passage  seriously. 
But  an  alternative  view  is  possible.  The  passage  may  be  seen  as  looking  forward  to 
503a  ff.  where  Socrates  begins  to  talk  about  the  genuine  orator  who  seeks  the  good  of 
the  people.  Similarly,  in  this  passage,  he  may,  as  Rutherford  puts  it,  be  tying  to 
redefine  rhetoric  so  that  it  resembles  dialectic.  In  an  ideal  world,  the  philosophic  orator 
would  ensure  the  proper  workings  of  justice  and  made  certain  that  he  and  all  he  cared 
for  received  the  treatment  they  needed  even  if  it  must  be  painful  and  unpleasant22.  Such 
an  analysis  of  the  way  Plato  uses  the  paradox  could  be  ftu-ther  supported  by  the  cave 
image  in  the  Republic.  In  particular,  when  Plato  refers  to  man's  descent  from  the  sun  to 
the  cave,  he  argues  that  this  is  done  so  that  he  can  'spread  happiness  throughout  the  city 
by  bringing  the  citizens  into  harmony  with  each  other  through  persuasion  [my  italics]' 
(519e).  Here  Plato  talks  about  the  philosopher's  difficult  task  of  persuading  everyone 
to  study  the  good.  Thus,  for  Plato  the  true  orator  uses  his  power  of  persuasion  to  lead 
men  to  the  good  and  so  to  happiness.  This  seems  to  be  effective,  though,  only  in  an 
ideal  city. 
There  are,  then,  a  number  of  points  in  the  discussion  between  Socrates  and  Polus  that 
imply  interrelation  between  soul  and  body.  The  discussion  indicates  that  the  good  of 
the  soul  is  more  valuable  than  that  of  the  body.  Emphasis  is  also  placed  on  the  notion 
that  the  soul  should  govern  the  body.  Moreover,  Plato's  parallel  between  justice  for  the 
soul  and  health  for  the  body  suggests  that  one  could  refer  to  both  as  being  'healthy'  or 
'unhealthy'.  In  making  these  points  Plato  not  only  shows  a  parallelism  between  soul 
and  body,  but  also  indicates  that  there  is  an  essential  interaction  between  the  two.  This 
becomes  apparent  if  one  brought  forward  the  following  points:  firstly,  Plato  argues  that 
if  the  soul  failed  to  properly  govern  the  body,  the  body  will  become  diseased. 
22Rutherford,  p.  156.32 Secondly,  he  holds  that  indulgence  of  the  body  may  lead  to  disease  in  the  soul.  In  other 
words,  both  body  and  soul  will  be  damaged  if  the  body  becomes  dominant.  Thirdly,  he 
introduces  the  notion  that  punishment  -  imposed  either  by  oneself  or  by  an  outside 
authority  -  may  restore  the  soul  to  health;  a  punishment  which  in  the  first  instance 
affects  the  body,  may  improve  the  SOU123. 
Through  the  health  analogy,  then,  Plato  shows  that  since  the  soul  could  be  in  an 
unhealthy  state,  there  must  be  ways  to  restore  it.  One  effective  way  to  bring  health  back 
to  soul  is  punishment,  either  corporal  or  by  imposing  penalties.  The  healthy  state  of 
soul,  then,  is  achieved  by  bringing  order  back  to  the  soul.  In  other  words,  the  argument 
for  the  role  of  punislunent  seems  to  be  as  follows: 
PI  The  healthy  state  of  the  soul  is  justice. 
P2  Justice  is  a  kind  of  order;  if  someone  is  just  and  virtuous,  there  is  an  order  in  him,  he 
is  happy. 
P3  The  unhealthy  state  of  soul  is  injustice. 
P4  If  someone  is  unjust,  the  order  within  him  is  disrupted. 
P5  Education  and  punishment's  role  is  to  restore  order  in  the  soul. 
//C  Therefore,  the  soul's  return  to  its  healthy  state  is  achievable  through  education  and 
punishment. 
"A  detailed  analysis  of  how  soul  and  body  interact  will  be  developed  in  the  Timaeus.  What  is  of 
importance  here  is  that  the  Gorgias  can  be  portrayed  as  the  first  dialogue  that  such  issues  pointing  toward 
an  interrelation  become  apparent. 
33 Socrates  and  CaUicles 
Harmony/Order  within  Oneself 
When  Callicles  questions  whether  Socrates  is  serious  in  the  claims  he  is  making, 
Socrates  begins  his  reply  by  comparing  his  own  love  for  Alcibiades  and  philosophy 
with  Callicles'  love  for  the  people  (demos)  and  Demos  the  son  of  Pyrilampes  (481d). 
This  dichotomy  of  love  does  not  create  problems  for  Socrates  because  his  love  for 
philosophy  is  above  all.  It  does,  though,  create  difficulties  for  Callicles  because  he  does 
not  stay  firm  in  his  beliefs  but  changes  his  views  according  to  what  the  objects  of  his 
love  want  to  hear  (48ld-e).  Socrates  concludes  his  point  by  saying  that:  '...  it  is better 
to  have  my  lyre  or  a  chorus  that  I  might  lead  out  of  tune  and  dissonant,  and  have  the 
vast  majority  of  men  disagree  with  me  and  contradict  me,  than  to  be  out  of  harmony 
with  myself,  to  contradict  myself,  though  I'm  only  one  person'  (482b-c).  This  shows 
that  Socrates  values  philosophy  because  only  through  philosophy  does  he  achieve 
harmony  within  himself4 
. 
Here  Socrates  lays  the  traces  for  a  theory  that  will  be 
25  developed  by  Plato 
Callicles,  however,  presents  quite  a  different  ideal,  that  of  the  strong  man  whom  he 
eventually  describes  as  follows:  'by  the  ones  that  are  the  superior  I  do  not  mean 
cobblers  or  cooks,  but  those  who  are  intelligent  about  the  affairs  of  the  city...  And  not 
only  intelligent,  but  also  brave,  competent  to  accomplish  whatever  they  have  in  mind, 
"'The  idea  of  harmony  as  order  within  oneself  obviously  alludes  to  the  Pythagoreans,  and  is  further 
developed  in  the  Gorgias  507e-508a.  The  relation  of  excellence,  happiness  and  the  love  of  philosophy 
are  also  discussed  in  the  Symposium. 
'5  Ilie  development  of  Plato's  notion  of  happiness  becomes  apparent  in  the  Symposium  as  well  as  in  the 
Republic,  and  it  will  be  analysed  accordingly.  For  the  points  that  Gorgias  lacks  see  further  Charles  Kahn, 
Plato  and  the  Socratic  Dialogue,  Cambridge  University  Press,  1996,  esp.  pp.  144-145,  including  n.  24. 
34 without  slackening  off  because  of  softness  of  spirit'  (491b).  Callicles  claims  that  these 
'Should  be  the  ones  who  rule  their  cities,  and  what  is  just,  is  that  they,  as  the  rulers, 
should  have  greater  share  than  the  others,  the  ruled'  (491c-d).  Socrates  changes  the 
direction  of  the  conversation  by  asking  whether  the  strong  persons  admired  by  Callicles 
will  exercise  self-control  or  not.  By  self-control  Socrates  refers  to  'Being  self- 
controlled  and  master  oneself,  ruling  the  pleasures  and  appetites  within  oneself  (49ld- 
e).  Although  Plato  does  not  yet  provide  us  with  a  clear  explanation  of  which  part  of 
man  these  pleasures  refer  to,  there  is  a  definite  suggestion  that  he  has  in  mind  relations 
of  conflict  and  control  between  soul  and  body.  This  is  so  because  the  pleasures  and 
appetites  must  surely  be  closely  related  to  the  body. 
Callicles'  objection  is  that  a  man  could  not  prove  to  be  happy  if  he  is  enslaved  to 
anyone,  and  the  man  who  lives  correctly  is  the  one  that  allows  his  own  appetites  to 
grow  and  not  be  restrained  (49le492a).  What  Socrates  cleverly  adds  to  Callicles'  view 
is  that  such  a  way  of  living  is  considered  by  Callicles  to  be  'excellence'  or  'virtue' 
(492e).  Socrates  wants  to  distinguish  between  what  Callicles  would  accept  as 
excellence,  and  his  own  conception  of  moral  excellence. 
Socrates,  then,  refers  to  the  religious  idea  that  life  is  death  and  to  the  myth  of  the  jars. 
In  Plato's  own  words,  there  is  a  view  that:  'we  are  now  dead  and  our  bodies  are  our 
tombs,  the  part  of  our  souls  in  which  our  appetites  reside  is  actually  the  sort  of  thing  to' 
%W-  be  open  to  persuasion  and  to  shift  back  and  forth,  'fi&l  Ydp  TOU  EwycayE  Kal  71KOUCa  TCaV 
Co#3V  65  OV  ýPiIS 
TeveaPEV* 
Kal  T6  Piv  ac3pa 
iCrTIV 
111Rv  ofilia,  -rfis  6E  EV 
qluXfiS  TOGTO 
ca  ai  Emeuptat  Elm'  TuyXavEi  6v  olov  dvanvieEc6al  K(X'1  PETaTrITrTEiv  aVCa  KaTCa9  (493a). 
L 
The  imagery  of  the  body  as  a  tomb  seems  to  imply  that  it  acts  as  a  restraining  power  on 
the  soul.  The  same  picture  seems  to  be  drawn  in  the  Cratylus  and  the  Phaedo.  In 
35 Cratylus  400c  Socrates  attributes  to  some  people  the  idea  of  the  body  being  the  tomb  of 
the  soul,  or  as  a  sign  because  the  soul  signifies  whatever  it  wants  by  means  of  the  body. 
But  he  then  seems  to  prefer  another  explanation  of  the  naming  of  the  body.  According 
to  the  Orphic  tradition,  the  body  is  treated  as  the  prison  of  the  soul  since  it  is  being 
punished  for  something.  In  the  Phaedo  Plato  presents  us  with  an  image  of  the  body  as 
the  prison  of  the  soul;  the  soul  is  being  'imprisoned  in  and  clinging  to  the  body... 
forced  to  examine  other  things  through  it  as  though  a  cage  and  not  by  itself  (82e),  but 
the  purpose  of  this  quotation  is  to  show  that  the  soul  is  tied  up  with  the  body  and  that  at 
most  it  examines  things  outside  itself;  it  is  involved  with  desireS26  .  Another  reference 
to  the  idea  that  while  we  are  in  the  hmnan  fbým  our  souls  are  dead  is  attributed  by 
27 
Sextus  Empiricus  to  Heraclitus 
. 
Within  the  Gorgias  context,  though,  no  further 
discussion  is  made  concerning  the  body  as  tomb  of  the  soul  image.  Since  it  is 
mentioned  only  briefly  in  the  Gorgias,  it  may  be  no  more  than  a  metaphor.  But  if  it 
were  taken  seriously,  it  would  suggest  a  distinctive  view  of  soul  and  body.  The  body  as 
a  tomb  image  would  suggest  that  embodiment  is  not  essential  to  the  soul;  it  does  not 
affect  its  functioning  and  does  not  change  its  nature.  Neither  is  it  essential  to  the  body 
that  it  is  animated.  We  have  thus  a  view'of  the  soul  and  body  as  separate  in  that  neither 
is  really  essential  to  the  other.  We  shall  find  other  passages  in  Plato  which  on  the 
surface  at  best  appear  to  support  this  extreme  dualism,  28,  though,  there  are  of  course 
many  passages  which  suggest  different  views.  Thus,  we  are  left  to  consider  is  whether 
Plato  arTived  at  a  consistent  view  on  these  points. 
The  idea,  now,  that  the  soul  contains  an  element  that  is  like  a  jar  and  is  open  to 
persuasion,  is  one  passage  that  suggests  a  quite  different  view  to  the  extreme  dualistic 
26  A  detailed  analysis  of  this  image  is  made  in  the  Phaedo  chapter. 
27  See  further  Dodds,  1959,  on  492elO-I  I  and  493a  2-3. 
28  For  instance  the  affinity  argument  in  the  Phaedo. 
36 position  implied  by  the  body  as  the  tomb  image.  Within  the  image  of  the  jars,  the 
important  contrast  is  between  a  better  and  a  worse  element  within  the  soul.  It  thus  hints 
at  the  Platonic  parts  of  the  soul  developed  as  a  theory  later  on  in  the  Republic.  This 
image  is  introduced  in  order  to  persuade  us  to  choose  the  orderly  life  over  the  disorderly 
one;  Socrates  wants  to  persuade  Callicles  to  '...  concede  that  the  orderly  life  is  better 
than  the  undisciplined  one'  (494a).  According  to  the  myth,  the  part  where  the  appetites 
I 
reside  is  presented  as  a  jar  [pithos],  on  account  on  its'  being  persuadable  (493a). 
Similarly,  the  fools,  the  uninitiated  29,  are  like  people  whose  jars  are  leaking  (493b)  and 
the  most  miserable  ones  are  those  that  are  trying  to  carry  water  into  the  leaking  jar  using 
another  leaky  thing,  a  sieve  that  symbolises  the  disordered  soul.  This  image  is  also 
difficult  to  interpret.  At  a  superficial  level  it  may  seem  clear  enough.  Those  who  lack 
self-control  are  constantly  trying  to  satisfy  their  desires.  But  this  attempt  is  doomed  to 
frustration  because  the  desires,  like  leaking  jars  that  can  never  be  filled,  can  never  be 
satisfied.  But  the  detail  of  this  image  poses  more  problems.  The  sieve,  with  which  the 
most  deprived  characters  try  to  fill  their  jars,  is  said  to  represent  the  soul.  The  point  of 
the  comparison  with  the  sieve  is  that  the  souls  of  these  people  are  unable  to  hold 
anything  because  of  their  unbelief  and  forgetfulness:  '61  amaTiaV  TE  Kall  meTiv,  (493c). 
'So,  these  people's  misery  seems  to  stem  not  only  from  their  unsatisfied  desires,  but  also 
from  their  lack  of  knowledge.  In  493b  the  desires  that  are  represented  as  jars  are  said  to 
be  part  of  the  soul,  but  almost  immediately  the  sieve  is identified  with  the  soul.  As  Ivan 
M.  Linforth  argues,  Plato  here  likens  the  sieve  to  the  whole  soul,  but  if  he  were 
following  the  fully  developed  doctrine  of  the  parts  of  the  soul  as  it  appears  in  the 
Republic  and  the  Timaeus,  he  would  have  likened  the  sieve  to  the  rational  part  of  the 
29The  reference  to  the  uninitiated  again  shows  Plato's  knowledge  and  influence  by  Orphic  and 
Pythagorean  doctrines. 
37 SOU130.  In  that  manner,  a  leaky  sieve  would  be  the  rational  part  of  a  disorderly  soul.  If, 
then,  the  rational  part  is  not  in  its  proper  state  itself,  is  not  guided  by  one  goal  -  that  of 
moral  excellence  and  happiness  -  its  relation  to  the  appetitive  part  would  be  affected  -  it 
would  be  easily  persuaded  by  the  appetites;  it  would  'shift  back  and  forth'.  As  a  result, 
the  soul  as  a  whole  would  be  disorderly.  Such  an  argument,  though,  in  order  to  be 
complete,  requires  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  soul's  nature,  which  is  to  be  provided  only 
later  in  the  Republic.  Hence,  within  the  image  of  the  jars  and  the  sieve,  Plato  seems  as 
if  he  is  trying  to  distinguish  between  two  views.  According  to  the  first,  the  appetites  are 
part  of  the  soul,  while  there  is  a  separate  part  that  is  the  location  of  knowledge  and 
belief.  According  to  the  second  view,  the  appetites  are  distinct  from  the  soul, 
presumably  because  they  belong  to  the  body.  Thus,  it  is  not  yet  clear  whether  the 
appetites  are  seen  as  part  of  the  soul  or  as  external  to  it.  However  we  take  the  image, 
though,  it  clearly  represents  a  quite  different  way  of  thinking  about  the  nature  of  the 
soul  to  that  implied  by  the  tomb  image.  The  desires,  presumably,  come  at  least  in  part 
from  the  body.  So  the  jars  image  suggests  a  complex  interaction  between  soul  and 
body,  one  which  affects  the  nature  of  both. 
Plato  uses  the  above  image  in  a  further  attempt  to  persuade  Callicles  to  choose  the 
orderly  life,  'the  life  that  is  adequate  to  and  satisfied  with  its  circumstances  at  any  given 
time  instead  of  the  insatiable,  undisciplined  life'  (493c-d).  For  this  purpose  Plato  uses 
another  example  that  involves  the  jars  imagery,  that  of  two  men,  each  of  who  has  many 
jars.  The  first  man  is  satisfied  when  his  jars  are  full,  while  the  other  one  needs  to  keep 
on  filling  his  jars  continuously  because  they  are  leaky  and  rotten,  and  thus  he  suffers 
extreme  pain  (493d-494a).  The  point  is  that  happiness  comes  through  self-control 
30IVan  M.  Linforfth,  'SouI  and  Sieve  In  Plato's  Gorgias',  University  of  California  Publications  In 
Classical  Philology  12  (1944)  p.  302. 
38 rather  than  through  being  undisciplined.  Still,  even  after  Socrates'  second  example, 
Callicles  is  not  persuaded  that  the  orderly  life  is  better  than  the  undisciplined  one. 
According  to  Callicles  living  pleasantly  consists  of  'having  as  much  as  possible  flow  in' 
(494b).  An  important  distinction  for  Socrates  is  that  between  what  is  pleasant  and  what 
is  good:  'The  good  is  not  just  unrestricted  enjoyment'  (495b)31.  In  order  to  make  this 
distinction  valid,  Socrates  claims  that  good  and  evil  are  opposites.  We  cannot  therefore 
have  both  at  the  same  time  (495e).  So,  he  claims  that:  'If  we  find  things  that  a  man 
both  gets  rid  of  and  keeps  at  the  same  time,  it's  clear  that  these  things  wouldn't  be 
what's  good  and  what's  bad'  (496c).  By  using  the  instances  of  hunger  and  thirst,  then, 
Socrates  makes  Callicles  admit  that:  'every  deficiency  and  appetite  is  painful'  (496d). 
But  by  arguing  that  drinking  and  eating  are  pleasant  if  one  has  the  relevant  appetite 
(496d-e),  Socrates  concludes  that:  '...  it  turns  out  that  good  things  are  not  the  same  as 
painful  ones,  and  bad  things  are  not  the  same  as  painful  ones.  For  pleasant  and  painful 
things  come  to  stop  simultaneously,  whereas  good  things  and  bad  ones  do  not,  because 
they  are  in  fact  different  things.  How  then  could  pleasant  things  be  the  same  as  good 
ones  and  painfid  things  the  same  as  bad  onesT  (497d).  Thus,  good  things  and  pleasant 
things  are  not  the  same. 
Socrates'  ultimate  point  is  for  Callicles  to  agree  that  all  things  are  done  for  the  sake  of 
what  is  good  (499e)32  .  The  requirement  that  Plato  introduces  is  that  not  everyone  can 
fmd  out  which  of  the  pleasures  are  good  and  which  are  bad.  This  is  the  task  of  a 
craftsman.  By  going  back  to  the  distinction  between  arts  and  knacks,  showing  the 
practice  of  the  good  and  the  practice  of  the  pleasant  respectively,  Socrates  stresses  once 
"Plato's  insistence  on  choosing  what  is  good  instead  of  what  is  pleasant  was  pointed  out  earlier  in 
relation  to  the  issue  of  happiness.  See  the  analysis  of  470e473e  and  475a-C. 
32From  this  point  onwards  Callicles  is  no  longer  an  effective  contributor  to  the  dialogue. 
39 more  the  significance  of  giving  an  account  instead  of  acting  irrationally.  Socrates,  asks 
Callicles  whether:  '...  it  is  for  every  man  to  pick  out  which  kinds  of  pleasures  are  good' 
ones  and  which  are  bad  ones,  or  does  this  require  a  craftsman  in  each  case'  (500a).  By 
summarising  the  main  points  of  the  argument,  which  concern  the  differences  between 
arts  and  knack,  Socrates  shows  Callicles  that,  considering  the  soul,  the  gratification  of 
pleasures  is  'a  kind  of  flattery...  in  which  a  person  may  wait  upon  a  pleasure  without 
any  consideration  of  what  is  better  or  worse'  (5  01  c). 
The  argument  then  continues  with  Socrates  clarifying  his  point  by  arguing  that:  'a  man 
should  satisfy  those  of  his  appetites  that,  when  they  are  filled  up,  make  him  better,  and 
not  those  that  make  him  worse,  and  that  this  is  a  matter  of  craft...  "  (503c-d)33 
.  The 
important  addition  to  this  is  that:  Me  man  who  speaks  with  regaid  to  what's  best  says 
whatever  he  says  not  randomly  but  with  a  view  to  something'  (503  d-e).  This 
'something'  is  nothing  else  but  order  and  organisation.  Having  shown  that  being 
orderly  is  actually  good  for  objects  as  well  as  for  bodies,  Socrates  asks  Callicles:  'What 
about  the  soul?  Will  it  be  a  good  one  if  it  gets  to  be  disorganised,  or  if  it  gets  to  have 
certain  organisation  and  orderT  (504b).  The  name  that  is  given  to  what  comes  into 
being  in  the  body  as  a  result  of  organisation  and  order  is  'lawful'  and  'law'.  Thus  Plato 
returns  to  the  crucial  issue  ofjustice  and  self-control  within  the  soul.  We  should  notice 
here  that  Plato's  treatment  of  the  soul,  as  having  the  capacity  to  be  orderly  or  not, 
implies  that  the  soul  itself  is  complex.  If  we  are  to  talk  about  something  being 
disorganised  or  on  the  other  hand,  self-controlled,  there  must  be  at  least  two  elements 
within  it  so  as  to  cause  these  dynamics.  According  to  the  Republic  IV  443  c-e  and  IX 
3'7be  idea  that  man  should  satisfy  those  appetites  that  make  him  better  is  developed  in  the  Republic  IX 
571b,  and  it  will  be  discussed  accordingly. 
40 586d-e,  self-control,  is  shown  when  the  lower  elements  of  the  soul  follow  reason;  such 
an  arrangement  within  the  soul  is  seen  as  orderly  and  therefore  as  good. 
In  the  Gorgias,  now,  Socrates  states  that:  'as  long  as  it's  [the  soul]  corrupt,  in  that  is 
foolish,  undisciplined,  unjust,  and  impious,  it  should  be  kept  away  from  its  appetites 
and  not  be  permitted  to  do  anything  other  than  what  it  will  make  it  better'  (505b). 
Socrates  here  seems  to  assume  that  when  someone  is  wicked,  he  is  so  in  all  respects. 
We  should  note  here  the  suggestion  that  in  order  for  the  soul  to  be  disciplined,  its 
appetites  should  be  restrained:  'Now  isn't  keeping  it  away  from  what  it  has  an  appetite 
for,  disciplining  iff  (5O5b9).  This  indicates  that  either  the  appetites  are  restrained  from 
within  the  person  himself,  by  the  reasonable  part  of  the  soul,  or  by  the  'craftsman'  who 
is  able  to  distinguish  what  is  good  from  what  is  bad.  If  one  accepts  that  Plato  has  in 
mind  the  first  alternative,  then  one  should  once  more  accept  the  existence  of  a  double 
complexity  within  the  SOU134  ,a  complexity  that  will  give  prevalence  of  the  reasonable 
element  over  the  appetitive  element.  If  however  the  second  alternative  applies,  the 
connection  between  an  undisciplined  person  and  the  'craftsman',  the  expert  is  stressed. 
The  suggestion  then  is  that  only  those  who  are  brought  up  under  the  guidance  and 
governance  of  the  wise  can  hope  to  be  virtuous.  An  issueworth  mentioning  is  that 
Plato  seems  not  to  have  clarified  whether  a)  each  and  every  person  is  competent  to 
direct  himself,  b)  this  is  always  the  task  of  an  expert,  or  c)  whether  virtue  comes  about 
through  the  co-operation  of  the  individual  and  the  expert. 
Socrates'  argument  with  Callicles  somehow  restates  and  reinforces  most  of  the  points 
made  in  the  argument  with  Polus,  but  it  also  suggests  some  important  new  themes.  The 
3'Even  if  there  are  only  appetites  within  the  soul,  the  soul  has  a  certain  complexity.  By  supposing  that,  in 
addition,  a  source  of  order  is  needed  within  the  soul,  an  extra  layer  of  complexity  is  added. 
41 main  idea  presented  in  Socrates'  argument  with  Callicles  is  that  the  good  of  the  soul 
consists  of  virtue,  an  element  that  must  be  sharply  distinguished  from  pleasure. 
Pleasures  are  presented  as  bodily  repletions  with  no  real  value  because  bodily  desires 
cannot  ever  be  satisfied.  What  is  crucial,  though,  is  that  in  developing  these  ideas, 
Socrates  also  seems  to  attribute  the  desires  to  a  part  of  the  soul.  This  implies  that  the 
soul  is  complex,  but  it  also  raises  questions  about  how  these  desires  relate  to  the  body. 
To  make  matters  more  complicated,  Socrates  introduces  the  idea  of  the  body  as  a  tomb 
for  the  soul,  an  idea  that  seems  to  imply  that  soul  and  body  are  totally  separate  entities 
that  are  accidentally  coexistent.  At  the  saine  time  though,  Socrates  refers  to  the  myth  of 
jars,  which  explicitly  points  toward  the  idea  that  the  soul  is  complex  and  that  since  the 
desires  are  partly  bodily,  soul  and  body  interact. 
Continuing,  Socrates  presents  the  argument  as  a  whole:  a)  He  distinguishes  the  pleasant 
from  the  good  once  again:  'Is  the  pleasant  the  same  as  the  good?  -  It  isn't  as  Callicles 
and  I  have  agreed'  (506c).  b)  He  stresses  the  necessity  for  order:  'But  the  best  way  in 
which  the  excellence  of  each  thing  comes  to  be  present  in  it...  is  due  to  whatever 
organisation,  correctness,  and  craftsmanship  is  bestowed  on  each  of  them'  (506d-e).  c) 
Finally  he  shows  that  a  self-controlled  soul  is  orderly  and  therefore  good:  '...  an  orderly 
soul  is  a  self-controlled  one?  ...  So  a  self-controlled  soul  is  a  good  one'  (507a). 
Socrates  thus  states,  once  more,  that:  'if  the  self-controlled  soul  is  a  good  one,  then  a 
soul  that  is  been  affected  the  opposite  way  of  the  self-controlled  one  is  a  bad  one.  And 
this  ... 
is  the  foolish  and  undisciplined  one'  (507a).  In  what  follows,  Socrates  lists  the 
things  that  one  would  necessarily  possess  if  one  is  self-controlled:  one  would  be  just, 
pious,  brave,  and  completely  good,  blessed,  and  happy  (507b-c).  From  the  above  it  is 
42 easy  for  Socrates  to  conclude  that:  'A  person  who  wants  to  be  happy,  must  evidently 
pursue  and  practice  self-control'  (507c). 
In  order  to  strengthen  his  argument,  Socrates  brings  about  the  authority  of  'wise  men' 
who  claim  that  there  is  an  overall  world-order:  '...  wise  men  claim  that  partnership  and 
friendship,  orderliness,  self-control,  and  justice  hold  together  heaven  and  earth,  and 
gods  and  men,  and  that  is  why  they  call  this  universe  a  world  order  ...  and  not  a  world- 
disorder'  (507e-508a).  Although  little  is  made  of  this  point  in  the  context,  it  seems  to 
be  the  first  passage  that  mentions  an  idea  that  will  become  crucial  in  Plato's  later 
works;  that  is  the  idea  that  the  order  of  the  just  soul  reflects  the  order  of  the  universe  at 
large  35 
. 
Evidently,  Plato's  idea  that  there  is  an  order  common  to,  shared  by  the  universe 
and  the  soul  seems  to  derive  from  earlier  cosmologies.  The  Pythagoreans  talked  about 
the  existence  of  harmony  in  the  world  and  in  the  human  soul,  Heraclitus  talked  about 
order  that  comes  from  opposites,  and  Empedocles  talked  about  the  bonds  of  the  world 
due  to  love.  What  is important  about  Plato's  theory  is  that  he  parallels  the  order  of  the 
universe  to  that  of  the  complex  soul.  He  thus  emphasises  that  there  should  be  order  in 
the  soul  like  that  existing  in  the  world.  In  order  for  the  soul  to  be  orderly,  as  he  has 
already  stated,  the  soul  should  be  self-controlled.  The  self-controlled  soul  is  good 
(506e-507a),  and  if  one  is  self-controlled,  he  will  be  happy  (507c). 
From  508b  until  513d  Socrates  repeats  both  that  one  should  be  just  if  he  is  to*  be  'an 
orator  in  the  right  way'  (508c),  as  well  as  his  previous  argument  that  doing  injustice  is 
worse  than  suffering  it.  He  concludes  his  point  on  politics  by  arguing  that  the  older 
politicians  were  no  better  than  the  new  ones,  and  that  what  they  did  was  that:  'they 
"T'he  notion  of  world  order  and  its  relation  to  order  displayed  within  the  human  beings  will  be  further 
discussed  in  the  Timaeus  chapter. 
43 proved  to  be  better  servants  than  the  men  of  today,  and  more  capable  than  they  of 
satisfying  the  city's  appetites'  (517b). 
Socrates,  then,  continues  by  repeating  the  'twofold  activity  related  to  both  body  and 
SOU1936:  '...  and  that  one  of  these  is  menial  and  by  it  can  be  provided  food,  if  our  bodies 
are  hungry;  drink,  if  our  bodies  are  thirsty;  and  if  they  are  cold,  clothing,  bedding, 
shoes,  or  anything  else  that  our  bodies  come  to  desire'  (517d).  What  Socrates  stresses, 
here,  is  the  superiority  of  gymnastics  and  medicine  over  other  arts,  because:  '...  Of  its 
knowledge  of  what  food  or  drink  is  good  or  bad  for  bodily  excellence,  a  knowledge 
which  all  the  others  lack'  (517e).  Applying  the  same  concept  now  to  the  soul,  Socrates 
searches  for  'justice  and  self-control'  (5  19a). 
Socrates  then  returns  to  the  issue  ofjustice  and  in  particular  to  the  question  why  it  pays 
to  be  just.  At  522e  he  states,  as  in  the  Apology,  that:  'for  no  one  who  isn't  totally  bereft 
of  reason  and  courage,  is  afraid  to  die;  doing  what's  unjust  is  what  he's  afraid  of.  For 
to  arrive  to  Hades  with  one's  soul  stuffed  full  of  unjust  actions  is  the  ultimate  of  all  bad 
things'.  He  thus  introduces  the  myth  of  judgement  after  death  as  a  paradigm  for  this 
notion. 
The  Gorgias  is  the  first  dialogue  that  ends  with  an  eschatological  myth  of  judgement; 
two  more  dialogues  conclude  in  the  same  manner;  the  Phaedo  and  the  Republic4'.  The 
main  framework  is  the  judgement  of  souls  after  death.  Although  it  is  very  difficult  to 
decide  how  much  of  the  myth  Plato  wants  his  readers  to  take  literally,  it  seems  safe  to 
3'For  517d  I  am  using  the  W.  D.  Woodhead's  translation  of  Gorgias  in  E.  Hamilton  (ed),  ne  Collected 
Dialogues  OfPlato,  1996. 
371t  should  be  noted  that  the  myth  in  the  Phaedrus  is  often  treated  as  offering  a  fourth  eschatological 
myth.  It  is  not  discussed  here,  though,  because  it  is  not  a  myth  of  judgement  and  it  is  not  placed  at  the 
end  of  the  dialogue. 
44 argue  that  the  myth  is  drawing  an  ideal  picture  of  reward  or  payment  and  retribution 
according  to  the  way  one  lived  one's  life.  Since  Plato  wants  to  show  how  men  should 
live  their  lives,  by  choosing  the  just,  orderly  life  instead  of  the  unjust  one,  he  takes  the 
myth  as  being  literally  true  and  presents  it  as  ffirther  evidence  to  his  argument.  The 
obvious  objection  that  one  could  raise  at  this  point  is  that  to  treat  the  myth,  as  being 
literally  true,  is  only  one  of  the  interpretations  possible  for  the  myth.  Two  more 
interpretations  would  be  to  treat  the  myth  as  a  tool  of  persuasion,  or  to  consider  it  as  an 
analogy. 
According  to  the  literal  truth  view,  Plato  believes  the  main  features  of  the  mythical 
story;  namely,  that  our  souls  are  judged  and  punished  after  death.  The  myth  thus 
provides  an  additional  reason  for  following  the  life  of  virtue.  The  obvious  objection  to 
that  is  that  Plato  actually  provides  no  reason  for  believing  the  myth;  it  cannot  provide 
any  rational  support  for  Plato's  moral  and  metaphysical  views.  Of  course  if  Plato's 
audience  already  believed  in  such  a  myth,  referring  to  it  would  give  them  a  reason  for 
following  the  life  of  virtue.  But,  it  is  clear  that  belief  in  a  life  after  death  in  which  the 
wicked  are  punished  and  -the  good  rewarded  was  far  from  universal  in  Plato's  day. 
Those  who  did  not  hold  such  a  belief  would  not  be  impressed  by  Plato's  myth,  while 
those  who  did  believe  it  would  need  little  reminding  of  it.  A  possible  response  to  this  is 
that  there  are  rational  grounds  for  believing  in  rewards  and  punishments  after  death 
although  he  does  not  make  these  grounds  very  clear  in  the  Gorgias.  In  Laws  X  887- 
907,  for  instance,  he  argues  that  the  order  of  the  universe  shows  that  it  is  under  the 
control  of  a  divine  mind  which  does  care  about  human  affairs.  We  may  therefore  be 
sure  that  ultimately  the  good  will  prosper  and  the  bad  will  suffer.  In  the  Gorgias  507e- 
508a  Socrates  links  his  moral  beliefs  to  the  claim  that  the  universe  is  an  orderly  whole 
45 under  the  direction  of  divine  wisdom.  He  might  well  take  that  to  imply  that  there  must 
be  rewards  and  punishment  after  death. 
The  second  interpretation  to  consider  is  that  the  myth  is  a  device  designed  to  win  over 
people  to  the  life  of  virtue,  rather  than  to  imply  literal  truth.  It  would  thus  be  a  device 
used  by  the  genuine  omtor,  who  seeks  the  good  of  his  subjects,  even  though  it  might 
even  be  false  in  a  literal  sense.  Rutherford  seems  to  adopt  this  view.  He  argues  that 
'here  we  see,  perhaps,  a  kind  of  pure  rhetoric,  a  persuasive  use  of  myth  in  the  service  of 
philosophy,  but  it  is  neither  conclusive  nor  argumentative'38  . 
The  third  interpretation  of  the  myth,  is  that  of  taking  it  as  a  different  way  to 
philosophical  argument  of  conveying  the  same  truth.  For  instance,  according  to 
Penelope  Murray  'dialectic  and  myth  can  be  viewed  as  different  modes  of  explanation 
for  Plato,  without  the  one  being  superior  to  the  other,  and  neither  mode  being  self- 
sufficient  939  . 
Christopher  Rowe,  now,  takes  the  above  point  further.  He  argues  that  to 
the  extent  that  Plato  envisages  the  use  of  mythoi  as  an  alternative  to  rational  argument, 
in  order  to  inculcate  beliefs  and  attitudes  in  the  non-philosophical,  there  is  also  a  clear 
sense  in  which  the  contrast  between  mythical  and  non-mythical  corresponds  to  that 
between  rational  and  irrational.  His  point,  thus,  is  not  that  the  mythical  is  simply 
defmed  by  irrationality,  but  rather  that:  'story-telling,  by  virtue  of  the  simplicity  and 
directness  of  its  appeal,  may  be  used  as  a  means  of  control  in  the  context  of  people  for 
whom  other  means  are  inappropriate  by  virtue  of  their  own  inadequate  degree  of 
rationality  40 
. 
But  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  this  claim  of  two  ways  of  conveying  the 
"Rutherford,  P.  175. 
'!  Penelope  Murray,  'What  is  a  Mythos  for  PlatoT,  in  Richard  Buxton  (ed),  From  Myth  to  Reason? 
Oxford  Univ.  Press,  1999,  p.  261. 
4OChristopher  Rowe,  'Myth,  11istory,  and  Dialectic  in  Plato's  Republic  and  Tirnaeus-Critias',  in  Buxton, 
1999,  p.  278. 
46 truth  really  amounts  to.  It  is  not  obvious  how  two  accounts  whose  literal  meaning 
seems  to  be  different  convey  the  same  truth.  Of  course,  one  could  use  an  analogy  or  a 
metaphor  to  illustrate  a  point,  as  Plato  often  doeS419  but  the  myth  of  the  Gorgias  does 
not  seem  to  be  a  mere  analogy  or  metaphor.  Both  the  philosophical  account  and  the 
myth  imply  that  it  is  in  our  interest  to  be  just,  but  if  the  myth  is  merely  a  way  of 
emphasising  this  point,  it  is  really  just  a  rhetorical  device. 
The  way  in  which  we  interpret  the  myth  has  a  bearing  on  our  interpretation  of  the  soul- 
body  relation.  If  the  literal  meaning  is  true,  the  soul  is  a  separate  entity,  capable  of 
independent  existence,  although  it  does  seem  to  be  affected  by  its  involvement  with  the 
body.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  myth  is  simply  a  rhetorical  device,  or  if  it  is  a  means  of 
conveying  the  same  truths  that  are  conveyed  in  the  philosophical  arguments,  then  it  can 
add  nothing  to  the  account  of  soul  and  body  contained  in  the  dialogue.  The  soul  is 
important  but  that  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  it  is  capable  of  independent  existence. 
would  like  to  argue  though  that  the  fact  that  the  Gorgias  myth  is  not  the  only  reference 
to  life  after  death  and  to  the  souls  being  rewarded  or  being  punished,  seems  to  imply 
that  it  contains  some  literal  truth. 
The  Gorgias'  myth  then,  bears  some  common  elements  to  the  myths  of  the  Phaedo  and 
of  the  Republic42,  but  it  also  has  characteristic  differences.  The  similarities  among  the 
three  myths  can  be  identified  as  being  the  following:  a)  all  three  myths  are  placed  at  the 
end  of  the  dialogues.  b)  All  three  myths  refer  to  the  souls'  survival  after  death.  c)  All 
three  emphasise  that  souls  are  influenced  during  their  embodied  lives,  and  thus  that  it  is 
important  to  live  a  just  life  rather  than  an  unjust  one,  and  d)  all  three  treat  the  souls  as 
41  For  example  see  the  complex  beat  image  in  Republic  IX. 
42  Both  the  Phaedo's  and  the  Republic's  myths  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  the  respective  chapters  of  this 
thesis. 
47 being  liable  to  judgement,  including  the  idea  of  being  rewarded  or  punished.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  are  a  number  of  differences  that  are  indicative  for  each  dialogue.  For 
example,  the  Gorgias  makes  no  reference  to  the  issue  of  reincarnation,  which  is 
essential  for  both  the  Phaedo  and  for  the  Republic.  Another  point  of  contrast  between 
the  Gorgias  and  the  Republic  is  that  within  the  elaborate  description  of  the  Republic's 
myth,  the  issue  of  personal  choice  is  developed;  an  issue  not  mentioned  in  the  Gorgias. 
Hence,  it  seems  to  me,  that  Plato's  insistence  on  the  soul's  survival  as  a  moral  agent, 
which  implies  the  possibility  of  the  soul's  change,  is  not  a  point  that  he  accidentally 
repeats,  but  is  a  point  that  bears  significant  implications  for  his  theory.  Thus  I  would 
have  to  disagree  with  Fritz  Craf  s  view  that  in  Plato's  four  eschatological  myths  it  is 
impossible  to  discern  a  set  of  shared  features,  or  that  these  myths  cannot  be  combined  to 
produce  a  larger  picture  43 
. 
Craf  accepts  that  these  myths  exhibit  thematic  affmities,  but 
argues  that  each  of  them  stands  alone:  myth  cannot  capture  the  truth,  only  hover  about 
it".  Taking  into  account  their  similarities  I  would  like  to  argue  that  the  three  myths 
could  be  combined  to  form  a  larger  picture,  if  not  every  detail  is  taken  into  account. 
Like  his  philosophical  arguments,  Plato's  myths  develop  so  as  to  give  to  his  audience 
and  to  us  readers  a  complete  view  of  Plato's  belief  in  life  after  death. 
Returning  to  the  Gorgias'  myth,  then,  Socrates  describes  two  different  places  for  those 
who  die.  Those  who  lived  ajust  and  pious  life  go  to  the  Isle  of  the  Blessed,  while  those 
who  lived  -in  an  unjust  and  godless  way  go  to  the  prison  of  payment  and  retribution; 
Tartarus.  During  Cronus'  and  Zeus'  time  men  faced  living  judges  while  they  were  still 
alive,  but  their  cases  were  badly  decided  because  they  were  judged  when  fully  clothed. 
Thus,  Zeus  decided  that  everyone  must  be  judged  when  they  are  stripped  naked  of  all 
11  Fritz  Craf,  Greek  Mythology,  John  Hopkins  University  Press,  1993,  p.  188. 
44  Craf,  p.  188. 
48 these  things  for  they  should  be  judged  when  they  are  dead.  The  judge  should  also  be 
naked  and  dead.  So  that,  only  with  his  soul  he  should  study  the  soul  of  each  person 
immediately  upon  his  death,  when  he  is  isolated  from  all  his  kinsmen  and  has  left 
behind  on  earth  all  that  adornment,  so  that  the  judgement  may  truly  be  a  just  one.  If  we 
compare  this  myth  with  the  view  of  afterlife  presented  in  the  Apology,  the  one  thing 
that  strikes  as  obvious  is  that  in  the  Apology  Socrates  did  not  want  to  confme  himself  in 
any  particular  view  concerning  the  souls'  survival  after  death.  In  the  Gorgias,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  seems  that  only  a  view  of  afterlife  that  directly  results  from  the  embodied 
life  is  at  issue.  The  souls'  condition  after  death  depends  on  the  moral  aspects  of  one's 
life  during  embodiment.  This  is  the  view  that  Plato  wants  to  stress  when  he  refers  to 
death. 
Death 
Having  introduced  the  myth  and  presented  it  as  true,  Socrates  surnmarises  what  death  45 
is:  'Death  ... 
is  nothing  but  the  separation  of  two  things  from  each  other,  the  soul  and 
the  body.  So,  after  they're  separated,  each  of  them  stays  in  a  condition  not  much  worse 
than  the  one  they  were  in  when  the  person  was  alive.  The  body  retains  its  nature  and 
the  care  it  had  received  as  well  as  the  things  that  have  happened  to  it,  are  all  evident.  ... 
All  that's  in  the  soul  is  evident  after  it  has  been  stripped  naked  of  the  body,  both  things 
that  are  natural  to  it  and  things  that  happened  to  it,  things  that  the  person  came  to  have 
in  his  soul  as  a  result  of  his  pursuit  of  each  objective'  (524b-d).  Plato's  treatment  of 
death,  here,  as  the  separation  of  two  things,  is  important  since  it  implies  that  within  the 
"51t  should  be  emphasised  here  that  this  is  a  very  specific  definition  of  death  that  does  not  include  the 
vagueness  of  the  Apology's  attempt  to  define  death.  In  the  Apology,  since  Plato  shows  what  Socrates 
must  have  thought,  Plato  does  not  want  to  be  specific  about  what  death  is.  Here,  on  the  other  hand,  since 
he  wants  to  place  emphasis  on  the  moral,  good,  happy  life,  his  remarks  are  rather  conclusive. 
49 human  fi-ame  two  things  are  involved;  for  the  soul  to  survive  death,  it  ought  to  be 
ontologically  separate  from  the  body.  At  the  same  time,  though,  the  soul  is  treated  as 
the  bearer  of  one's  moral  character.  This  in  turn  implies  that  the  soul's  relation  to  the 
body  cannot  be  that  of  an  accidental  coexistence;  in  order  to  be  influenced  by  the  body, 
the  embodied  soul  must  be  linked  to  the  body.  What  I  would  like  to  stress  here  is  that 
Plato's  reference  to  the  survival  of  the  soul  after  death  is  the  first  instance  of  several 
ones  to  follow  in  his  dialogues.  This  raises  the  same  kind  of  issue  that  we  saw  when 
comparing  the  image  of  the  tomb  and  of  the  jars.  The  fact  that  Plato  indicates  not  only 
that  the  soul  is  something  separate  from  the  body,  but  also  that  it  needs  to  be  in  an 
interrelation  to  it,  requires  an  effort  to  show  that  these  two  Platonic  points  do  not 
necessarily  negate  one  another.  I  will  later  argue  that  the  tension  can  be  solved,  if  one 
keeps  in  mind  the  tripartite  notion  of  the  soul  particularly  as  it  is  developed  in  the 
Timaeus. 
The  point  that  the  soul  is  the  bearer  of  one's  character  is  implicit  in  Plato's  account  of 
punishment  after  death.  Socrates  brings  back  the  issue  of  punishment  with  a  very 
important  addition,  the  distinction  between  the  curable  and  the  incurable.  He  points  out 
that  'those  who  are  benefited,  who  are  made  to  pay  their  due  by  gods  and  men,  are  the 
ones  whose  errors  are  curable;  even  so  their  benefit  comes  to  them,  both  here  and  in 
Hades,  by  way  of  pain  and  suffering,  for  there  is  no  other  possible  way  to  get  rid  of 
injustice'  (525b).  Plato  seems  to  treat  the  issue  of  punishment  as  the  means  for  one's 
correction  either  in  this  life  or  after  death.  This  is  important  for  one's  understanding  of 
what  Plato  thinks  a  person  consists  of.  The  fact  that  punishment  can  benefit  the  soul 
both  in  life  and  after  death  shows  that  Plato  treats  the  soul  as  the  essence  of 
spersonality'. 
50 The  dialogue  concludes  with  Socrates'  statement  that:  'I  think  about  how  I'll  reveal  to 
the  judge  a  soul  that's  as  healthy  as  it  can  be 
... 
by  practising  truth,  I  really  try  ...  to  be 
and  to  live  as  a  good  man,  and  when  I  die,  to  die  like  that'  (526d-e).  Thus,  Socrates 
stresses  which  way  of  living  is  best:  to  practice  justice  and  the  rest  of  excellence 
both  in  life  and  in  death'  (527e). 
Tbus,  although  the  Gorgias  could  be  seen  as  not  bringing  forward  a  specific  view  of 
soul-body  relation,  my  attempt  was  to  show  that  three  main  issues  indicate  and  require  a 
particular  interrelation  between  soul  and  body,  namely  a)  Plato  presents  punishment  as 
beneficial  for  men.  He  holds  that  through  punishment  of  the  body,  the  soul  benefits. 
Like  the  idea  that  soul  should  govern  the  body  (465c-d),  such  a  notion  cannot  stand 
without  the  notion  that  soul  and  body  are  not  simply  in  parallel  states  but  affect  each 
other.  Ultimately,  soul  and  body  are  not  accidentally  coexisting;  the  order,  the  health  of 
the  one  affects  the  order,  the  health  of  the  other.  b)  His  use  of  the  image  of  the  leaking 
jars,  now,  is  so  ambiguous  that  does  not  allow  us  to  talk  about  a  complete  division  of 
the  soul's  elements  and  the  bodily  elements.  Plato  explicitly  refers  to  appetites  as  being 
located  to  the  part  of  the  soul  characterised  as  undisciplined,  which  indicates  that  there 
should  be  at  least  another  part  jhat  will  not  be  characterised  as  undisciplined,  and  again 
it  seems  obvious  that  the  appetites  reside  in  the  body.  The  only  possible  interpretation 
of  this  passage  could  be  that  it  indicates  a  kind  of  interaction  between  the  complex  soul 
and  the  body.  c)  Finally,  when  Plato  refers  to  the  soul's  surviving  death  and  having  a 
particular  character  that  is  partly  innate  and  partly  due  to  the  previous  embodiment,  the 
obvious  inference  would  have  to  be  that  soul  and  body,  while  in  the  human  form,  do 
interact.  This  is  fiulher  stressed  if  one  bore  in  mind  that  Plato  describes  the  punishment 
of  the  soul  after  death  in  physical  terms. 
51 Meno 
The  Meno  is  often  considered  as  one  of  the  later  dialogues  of  Plato's  early  period.  For 
example,  W.  K.  C.  Guthrie  says  that  the  Meno  serves  to  introduce  Plato's  own  thought, 
and  even  identifies  the  point  where  we  can  see  the  transition  [from  Socrates  to  Plato] 
taking  place  [in  81  a]'.  Vlastos  sees  the  mathematical  interests  apparent  in  the  Meno  as 
demonstrating  that  here  'we  see  Plato  well  started  on  the  course  that  will  take  him  to  the 
other  extreme  from  the  convictions  he  had  shared  with  Socrates  in  the  elenchus 
,2  dialogues  .  Similarly,  R.  W.  Sharples'  view  is  that  Meno  marks  a  transitional  stage 
between  the  early  dialogues  and  the  middle  ones,  and  it  can,  therefore,  provide  an 
insight  into  some  of  Plato's  thoughts  that  led  to  the  views  of  the  middle  period  3.  In 
particular,  the  knowledge-as-recollection.  theory,  which  plays  an  important  part  in  the 
dialogues  of  Plato's  middle  period,  is  carefully  explained  and  demonstrated  as  if  Plato 
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were  introducing  his  readers  to  it  for  the  first  time 
want  to  follow  these  authors  and  suggest  that  the  appearance  of  the  recollection 
argument  -  with  the  implied  theory  of  Forms  -  as  well  as  the  belief  vs.  knowledge  issue 
are  the  two  points  that  indicate  a  shift  from  the  exposition  and  elaboration  of  the 
Socratic  ethical  beliefs  to  Plato's  metaphysics  and  epistemology. 
However,  my  interest  in  this  dialogue  is  based  not  so  much  on  the  epistemological 
points,  but  rather  on  the  effect  that  the  issue  of  true  belief  vs.  knowledge  has  on  Plato's 
1W.  K.  C.  Guthrie,  Plato:  Protagoras  andMeno,  Middlesex,  1986,  p.  24. 
'Gregory  Vlastos,  'Elenchus  and  Mathernatics',  in  H.  Benson  (ed),  Essays  On  The  Philosophy  Of 
Socrates,  New  York,  Oxford  University  Press  1992,  pp.  146-7. 
3  Sharples,  p.  I 
'See  further  Guthrie,  1986,  pp.  17-18 
5P.  Woodruff  writes  that  in  the  Meno  the  theory  of  learning  as  recollection,  and  the  distinction  between 
knowledge  and  true  belief,  are  new;  see  'Plato's  Early  Theory  of  Knowledge',  in  Benson,  p.  102. 
52 concept  of  the  person.  The  second  point  of  interest  is  the  role  of  sense-experience  in 
the  recollection  process.  These  two  notions  will  indicate  ftuther  problems  in  specifying 
the  precise  relationship  between  soul  and  body.  The  Meno's  account,  which  implies 
firstly  that  the  soul  has  existed  prior  to  its  present  embodiment  and  secondly  that 
knowledge  is  not  acquired  through  the  senses  but  is  recollected,  may  seem  to  imply  that 
there  is  a  minimal  interconnection  between  the  soul  and  the  body.  The  soul  seems  not 
to  depend  on  the  body  for  its  existence,  and  its  central  activity  does  not  seem  to  require 
a  body.  What  I  would  like  to  argue,  though,  is  that,  although  on  a  superficial  reading 
soul  and  body  can  be  seen  as  completely  separate  entities,  such  a  reading  would  be 
misleading.  If  we  examine  the  text  closely,  we  will  see  that  the  Meno's  account  of 
knowledge  gives  a  central  role  to  the  senses. 
Virtue 
The  first  question  asked  in  the  Meno  is:  'Can  virtue  be  taughtT  (70a).  Socrates  answers 
.  that  he  is  'so  far  from  knowing  whether  virtue  can  be  taught  or  not  that  I  do  not  even 
have  any  knowledge  of  what  virtue  itself  is'  (71  a).  The  issue  that  arises  from  Socrates' 
answer  is  crucial  for  Plato's  philosophy.  Socrates  claims  that  he  has  no  knowledge 
about  what  virtue  is.  What  he  does  not  explicitly  state  though,  is  that  he  does  have 
beliefs  about  virtue.  Although  Socrates  claims  not  to  know  anything  about  virtue,  he 
implicitly  shows  himself  to  have  beliefs  about  it.  The  elenchus  relies  on  such  beliefs 
and  on  the  assumption  that  they  must  contain  some  truth,  which  can  be  brought  out  by 
questioning. 
Socrates  asks  Meno  to  tell  him  what  is  virtue.  He  says:  'But  Meno,  by  the  gods,  what 
do  you  yourself  say  that  virtue  is  ...  so  that  I  may  have  spoken  a  most  unfortunate  untruth 
53 when  I  said  that  I  had  never  met  anyone  who  knew,  if  you  and  Gorgias  are  shown  to 
know'  (71d).  Thus,  although  Socrates  indeed  disclaims  knowledge,  at  the  same  time, 
he  does  not  deny  that  Meno  may  be  able  to  tell  him  what  he  thinks  virtue  is.  In  other 
words,  Socrates  says  that  one  cannot  know  anything  about  virtue  if  one  does  not  know 
what  it  is,  but  evidently  he  has  some  beliefs  about  virtue.  In  the  course  of  the  elenchus, 
it  emerges  for  example  that  Socrates  and  Meno,  share  the  belief  that,  men,  women  and 
children  can  all  be  virtuous  (72e-73a),  and  that  the  virtuous  are  temperate  and  just 
(73b).  Thus,  Socrates  must  hold  that  beliefs  about  virtue  are  enough  to  enable  one  to 
speak  about  it. 
If  both  Socrates  and  Meno  have  beliefs  about  virtue  we  would  expect  at  least  some  of 
those  beliefs  to  be  true.  Moreover,  a  set  of  beliefs  that  was  largely  false  would  not  help 
in  talking  about  virtue  or  anything  else.  Socrates  evidently  assumes  most  of  one's 
beliefs  about  virtue  to  be  true.  So,  although  Socrates  claims  that  there  cannot  be 
knowledge  without  a  definition,  this  does  not  contradict  the  assumption  that  some 
beliefs  may  be  reliable.  Rather,  one  needs  this  assumption  in  order  to  be  involved  in  the 
elenchus. 
Socrates  hopes  to  move  from  beliefs  about  instances  of  virtue  to  a  definition  of  virtue. 
This  can  be  seen  a  little  later  where  Socrates  asks  Meno  to  give  him,  not  instances  of 
virtue,  but  that  form  which  makes  all  cases  of  virtues  what  they  are  (72c).  What 
Socrates  wants  to  distinguish  here  is  the  difference  between  instances  of  virtue  and  that 
common  factor  that  makes  all  the  particulars  what  they  are;  he  is  looking  for  'one 
54 description  to  fit  them  all'  (73d)6.  The  important  point,  then,  about  the  early  pages  of 
the  Meno  is  that  although  Socrates  does  not  claim  to  have  knowledge,  he  has  beliefs. 
This  is  Plato's  answer  to  the  paradox,  which  Meno  introduces  at  80e,  that  we  either 
have  knowledge  of  something  or  we  can  not  say  anything  about  it:  'a  man  cannot  search 
either  for  what  he  knows  or  for  what  he  does  not  know?  He  cannot  search  for  what  he 
knows  -  since  he  knows  it,  there  is  no  need  to  search  -  nor  for  what  he  does  not  know, 
for  he  does  not  know  what  to  look  for'.  The  recollection  argument  that  follows,  then, 
acts  as  an  example  in,  determining  the  nature  of  Plato's  view  of  the  knowledge  -  belief 
relation.  Moreover,  I  shall  argue  that  the  fact  that  Plato  sees  the  relation  of  knowledge 
and  belief  in  this  way  has  an  important  bearing  on  the  relation  between  soul  and  body. 
The  recollection  argument 
Socrates  disagrees  with  Meno  in  that  he  believes  that  he  can  look  for  something  if  he 
does  not  know  what  it  is.  Plato  supports  this  view  by  introducing  two  main  ideas:  the 
inimortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  notion  of  recollection;  his  account  of  the  soul  and  his 
epistemology  are  thus  interconnected.  Socrates  could  have  answered  Meno  by  saying 
that,  although  he  does  not  know  what  he  is  looking  for,  he  has  beliefs  about  it.  But  as  it 
stands  such  a  claim  would  not  be  adequate  because  not  all  beliefs  are  related  to 
knowledge,  they  do  not  all  lead  to  knowledge.  What  Plato  seems  to  hold,  though,  is 
that  some  beliefs  are  related  to  knowledge  by  the  fact  that  both  these  beliefs  and 
knowledge  derive  from  the  soul.  In  order  to  make  such  a  claim;  he  needs  to  introduce 
the  idea  of  the  soul's  immortality  and  the  recollection  theory.  He  introduces  the  former 
6As  Kahn  says  (1992,  p.  42),  Plato  uses  here  phrases  like  "the  same  of  all  cases"-  which  hint  at  the  theory 
of  Forms  -  but  he  does  not  clarify  the  ontological  status  of  these  forms.  As  we  will  see  later  on,  Plato's 
commitment  to  the  theory  of  Forms  occurs  in  the  Phaedo. 
55 by  referring  to  the  sayings  of  priests  and  priestesses.  He  claims:  Mie  soul  is  immortal, 
has  been  bom  often  and  has  seen  all  things  here  and  in  the  underworld,  there  is  nothing 
which  it  has  not  learned,  so  it  is  in  no  way  surprising  that  it  can  recollect  the  things  it 
knew  before,  both  about  virtue  and  other  things'  (8  1  c-d).  Plato  obviously  influenced  by 
previous  theories  -  probably  Pythagorean  -  of  soul's  transmigration  and  reincarnation, 
presents  a  picture  according  to  which  the  soul  not  only  survives  death,  but  also  carries 
with  it  knowledge  acquired  before.  If  such  a  picture  is  correct,  the  suggestion  is  that 
when  man  forms  a  true  belief  about  something,  he  is  in  fact  recollecting  it.  The 
validity,  therefore,  of  a  belief  is  based  on  whether  it  is  recollected  or  not;  and  this  is 
tested  through  fin-ther  questioning.  Thus,  Plato  introduces  the  slave-boy  example  to 
show  Meno  how  the  boy  does  not  learn  but  recollects  (8  1  e).  Another  important  point  is 
that  Plato's  account  of  knowledge  through  recollection  implies  a  process  with  several 
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stages  between  sheer  ignorance  and  knowledge  .  It  thus  contrasts  with  the  underlying 
assumption  of  Meno's  dilemma  that  complete  knowledge  and  complete  ignorance  are 
the  only  alternatives. 
To  explain  his  view  of  recollection  Socrates  asks  a  slave-boy  how  to  construct  a  square 
with  double  the  area  of  a  square  with  its  sides  being  two  feet  long  and  an  area  of  four 
square  feet.  It  is  notable  here  that  recollection  is  seen  as  a  process;  Plato  recognises 
stages  within  the  recollection:  The  first  stage  is  the  slave-boy's  wrong  conviction  that 
the  double  square  will  have  a  double  side:  'Obviously  Socrates  it  will  be  twice  the 
length'  (82e).  The  second  stige  is  reached  when  the  slave-boy  is  shown  that  his  answer 
was  wrong,  and  he  is  reduced  to  ignorance:  'by  Zeus,  Socrates,  I  do  not  know'  (84a). 
The  third  stage  of  the  recollection  is  where  the  slave-boy,  by  responding  to  Socrates' 
7Guthrie,  1986,  p.  112 
56 questions,  reaches  the  true  belief  that:  'the  double  figure  would  be  that  based  on  the 
diagonal'  (85b). 
Thus,  Socrates  proves  to  Meno  that  although  the  slave-boy  did  not  know  the  correct 
answer,  he  managed  to  reach  the  correct  opinion  without  being  told  the  answer  by 
Socrates  or  anyone  else:  'so  these  opinions  were  in  him'  (85c).  But,  there  is  still 
another  stage  if  the  slave-boy  is  to  reach  knowledge;  as  Socrates  says:  'If  he  [the  slave] 
were  repeatedly  asked  these  same  questions  ... 
in  the  end  his  knowledge  about  these 
things  would  be  as  accurate  as  anyone's'  (85d).  In  other  words,  it  seems  that  repeated 
questioning  is  both  necessary  and  sufficient  to  move  one  from  belief  to  Knowledge. 
These  are  then  the  different  stages  of  recollection  that  enable  Plato  to  deny  Meno's 
paradox. 
The  recollection  theory  in  Meno  is  presented  to  provide  an  answer  to  the  question  how 
does  one  know  about  something.  Socrates'  discussion  with  the  slave-boy  provides  an 
example  of  how  one  can  reach  knowledge.  For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  it  is 
important  to  consider  the  question  whether  sense  perception  should  be  considered  a 
necessary  condition  for  recollection  or  not.  Although  this  may  seem  a  purely 
epistemological  point,  for  my  purposes,  its  importance  lies  in  the  implications  it  has  for 
the  body-soul  relation. 
Although  Plato  in  the  Meno  is  not  primarily  dealing  with  the  body-soul  relation,  I  shall 
argue  that  the  role  of  the  senses  in  the  recollection  argument  has  important  implications 
for  this  issue.  When  Plato  says  that  through  the  process  of  recollection  we  are  all. 
capable  of  reaching  true  beliefs,  he  implies  that  the  process  by  which  we  reach  true 
beliefs  starts  with  the  senses.  Tbis,  in  turn,  implies  that  the  soul  is  the  seat  both  of 
57 knowledge  and  of  sense  perception.  One's  soul  is  the  element  that  enables  one  to  form 
beliefs  about  concepts  -  like  virtue  -  or  geometrical  notions,  because  it  is  the  soul  that 
'has  seen  all  things  here  and  in  the  underworld'.  However,  Plato  seems  to  argue  not 
only  that  in  this  embodied  life  these  beliefs  are  realised  by  starting  off  with  the  senses, 
but  also  that  the  same  beliefs  are  innate.  It  is  this  that  gives  them  the  potential  to 
become  knowledge.  In  order  to  grasp,  therefore,  Plato's  view  of  the  particular  relation 
between  soul  and  body,  one  must  firstly  understand  his  view  of  knowledge. 
The  recollection  argument  involves  the  following  central  claims:  A)  the  soul  exists  prior 
(and  after)  the  body  and  thus  acquires  knowledge.  This  implies  that  the  soul  is 
something  separate  from  the  body,  capable  of  existing  in  an  independent  way.  B)  The 
soul,  while  in  this  embodied  state,  is  able  to  form  beliefs,  to  recollect  what  it  once 
knew,  the  soul  is  in  a  way  operating  along  with  the  body;  the  body  is  the  recipient  of 
any  sensory  stimulus  which  the  soul  categorises  through  recollection.  Q  Thus,  the 
embodied  soul  is  able  to  turn  true  beliefs  into  knowledge  'through  fin-ffier  questioning'. 
if  one  considers  these  points  carefully,  one  will  come  up  with  a  very  interesting 
problem.  When  Plato  refers  to  the  soul  as  being  able  to  acquire  knowledge  before  birth, 
he  definitely  has  in  mind  that  this  knowledge  does  not  come  about  by  sense-experience. 
On  the  other  hand,  Plato  seems  to  refer  to  knowledge  acquired  before  embodiment  as 
being  recollected'in  this  life  by  the  soul.  The  soul,  though,  does  not  straightforwardly 
recollect  knowledge;  rather  it  first  recollects  beliefss  that  can  be  turned  into  knowledge 
through  further  questioning.  These  beliefs,  as  the  recollection  example  indicated,  are 
formed  with  the  help  of  the  senses,  but  the  Socratic  need  for  definition  shows  Plato's 
'  This  might  seem  to  suggest  that  the  soul  when  disembodied  is  capable  of  beliefs  not  knowledge.  This  is 
not  the  case  though.  In  fact,  if  my  reading  of  the  text  is  correct,  Plato's  point  must  be  that  although,  the 
soul  when  disembodied  has  knowledge,  in  this  life,  due  to  the  embodiment  it  first  reaches  beliefs  that 
have  been  triggered  off  by  the  senses. 
58 conviction  that  the  senses  cannot  be  the  source  of  knowledge.  The  point  seems  to  be 
that  judgements  based  on  sense  perception  are  fragmented;  they  can  tell  us  about 
particular  instances  of  virtue  but  not  about  virtue  as  such.  These  two  points  might  seem 
contradictory,  but  the  one  does  not  necessarily  negate  the  other.  Plato  can  argue  that  the 
senses  are  not  sufficient  for  reaching  true  belief,  but  that  in  this  embodied  life  they  are 
necessary.  Plato's  insistence  on  the  fact  that  beliefs  based  on  the  senses  are  insufficient 
for  knowledge  suggests  that  one  should  go  beyond  the  senses.  That  claim,  though,  does 
not  suggest  that  one  is  able  to  completely  dissociate  oneself  from  the  senses9. 
If  Socrates  held  that  the  senses  are  both  necessary  and  sufficient  for  acquiring 
knowledge,  then  he  would  not  be  able  to  avoid  Meno's  paradox.  If  the  senses  were 
both  necessary  and  sufficient  for  knowledge,  then  one  would  either  know  something  or 
not.  But,  the  recollection  argument  refutes  this.  Plato  manages  to  combine  the  role  of 
the  senses  with  a  theory  of  knowledge,  which  is  not  an  empirical  one.  Although  one 
reaches  knowledge  through  recollection,  the  beliefs  that  one  uses  as  a  basis  to  start 
recollecting  are  realised  through  the  senses.  Because  one  is  embodied,  one  needs  to 
start  off  one's  awareness  from  this  world  of  sense-experience. 
Tbus,  the  distinction  between  belief  and  knowledge  is  not  a  sharp  one,  the  same  person 
through  the  same  process  acquires  belief  and  knowledge  but  at  different  stages  of  it; 
through  the.  recollection  process  one  first  acquires  true  beliefs  and  then  knowledge.  It  is 
crucial,  then,  that  in  passing  from  true  beliefs  to  knowledge,  one  is  not  moving  to 
something  altogether  different,  rather  one's  true  beliefs  become  knowledge  through 
I  Thus,  although  Plato,  as  indicated  in  the  Phaedo,  wishes  that  men  could  disregard  the  senses  in  order  to 
reach  knowledge,  this  does  not  mean  that  he  holds  that  sensual  deprivation  is  achievable  in  this  embodied 
life. 
59 further  questioning.  In  that  manner,  Plato  combines  his  epistemology  with  his 
metaphysics  and  his  cosmology. 
Another  question  that  arises  now  in  Meno  is  what  sort  of  beliefs  Plato  had  in  mind  as 
being  able  to  become  knowledge  through  finther  questioning.  It  is  clear  that  for  his 
recollection  theory  Plato  needs  two  kinds  of  beliefs.  As  D.  Scott  says,  'Plato  breaks  our 
thoughts  into  two  components;  those  that  derive  from  perception,  and  those  that  derive 
from  the  memories  of  the  soul"O.  At  the  same  time  one  may  hold  a  number  of  beliefs, 
based  on  sense-perception,  which  are  not  and  will  never  become  knowledge  for  the 
reason  that  they  are  not  innate.  Tbus,  in  this  life  one  may  have  beliefs  that  are  formed 
purely  through  sense  perception  and  beliefs  that  arise  from  the  senses  but  which  are  in 
fact  recollected,  and  which  it  is  possible  to  turn  into  knowledge.  Iberefore,  the 
recollection  process  shows  that  although  some  of  one's  beliefs,  true  or  false,  are  gained 
through  the  senses,  the  beliefs  that  are  of  any  philosophical  value  for  Plato  are  those 
that  are  proven  to  be  true  through  recollection  because  through  it  these  beliefs  have  the 
possibility  to  become  knowledge.  What  this  implies  then  is  the  existence  of  something 
that  is  able  to  acquire  knowledge.  If  we  read  this  in  the  light  of  the  later  dialogues,  we 
will  take  it  to  imply  the  existence  of  the  Forms  and  of  a  soul  able  to  reach  to  these 
Forms.  Hence,  recollection  of  the  Forms  can  prove  something  true,  while  questioning 
helps  one  to  recollect. 
At  this  point  it  may  be  helpful  to  consider  a  passage  near  the  end  of  the  dialogue  which 
may,  seem  to  suggest  that  perception  alone  can  be  enough  for  knowledge.  At  97a 
Socrates  is  facing  a  difficulty  for  the  idea  that  virtue  is  knowledge.  Great  men  seem  to 
"Dominic  Scott,  Recollection  andExperience,  Cambridge  Univ.  Press,  1995,  p.  17. 
60 have  virtue  but  the  fact  that  they  cannot  teach  it  suggests  that  what  they  have  cannot  be 
knowledge.  Socrates  meets  this  point  by  claiming  that  if  we  wanted  to  go  to  Larissa 
true  belief  would  be  as  good  a  guide  as  knowledge.  Similarly,  great  men  may  owe  their 
success  to  true  belief.  If  we  take  this  passage  seriously,  it  would  imply  that  there  is 
some  knowledge  that  is  based  wholly  on  sense  perception  and  does  not  require 
recollection  of  a  previous  existence.  This  does  not  create  difficulties  for  the  main 
argument  of  the  Meno.  Socrates  could  claim  to  have  shown  that  knowledge  of  what 
virtue  is  and  knowledge  of  mathematical  truths  could  not  be  derived  solely  from 
perception.  There  are  therefore  forms  of  knowledge  that  require  recollection  of  our 
previous  existence,  which  in  turn  implies  a  distinction  between  soul  and  body.  This 
argument  would  not  be  undermined  by  the  assumption  that  there  are  other  forms  of 
knowledge  that  do  not  require  pre-existence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  road  to  Larissa 
example  does  suggest  more  general  problems  for  Plato's  epistemology.  One  would  be 
that  of  distinguishing  between  knowledge  and  belief  in  cases  like  this.  Perception  itself 
cannot  provide  the  sole  criterion  since  someone  who  made  the  trip  to  Larissa  a  long 
time  ago  may  be  a  less  reliable  guide  than  someone  who  has  not  been  there  hitnselý  but 
has  carefully  questioned  other  travellers.  A  more  serious  problem  is  that  the  admission 
that  there  is  knowledge  of  particulars,  such  as  the  road  to  Larissa,  seems  to  contradict- 
the  Republic's  claim  that  knowledge  is  of  the  Forms.  It  looks  as  though  the  only  way 
Plato  could  solve  this  would  be  by  distinguishing  genuine,  scientific'  knowledge  from 
what  passes  for  knowledge  in  ordinary  life.  He  would  have  to  accept  that  on  talking 
about  someone  knowing  the  road  to  Larissa,  he  was  using  the  word  in  a  loose  popular 
sensell. 
"  It  should  be  noted  here  that  in  the  Republic  Plato  takes  a  stronger  view,  namely  that  the  only  kind  of 
knowledge  possible  is  that  of  the  Forms,  especially  of  the  good,  and  such  knowledge  is  never  actually 
realised  in  this  human  life.  The  significance  of  it  will  be  examined  in  the  analysis  of  the  Republic. 
61 One  of  the  issues  that  arise  from  the  recollection  argument  is  the  question:  'when  does 
recollection  occur'.  D.  Scott  argues  that:  'if  Meno  sees  the  boy  recollecting  false 
judgements,  Socrates'  program  is  completely  ruined.  If  we  can  derive  from  within 
ourselves  false  as  well  as  true  judgements,  we  shall  need  to  decide  which  are  which. 
But  how  are  we  to  make  this  decision?  Is  there  to  be  another  process  of  recollection  to 
help  us  find  out?  If  so,  we  have  an  infinite  regress  on  our  hands  02 
. 
One  way  to 
overcome  this  problem  is  by  claiming  that  if  something  is  not  a  genuine  recollection,  it 
can  be  proven  as  false  by  further  questioning,  There  is,  in  other  words,  a  kind  of 
coherence  in  true  recollection.  It  is  important,  though,  that  Plato's  recollection  theory 
shows  that  it  is  the  beliefs  themselves  that  turn  into  knowledge.  After  the  slave-boy 
example,  Socrates  argues  that:  'the  man  who  does  not  know  has  within  himself  true 
opinions  about  the  things  that  he  does  not  know'  (85c).  Socrates  concludes  that:  'These 
opinions  have  now  just  been  stirred  up  like  a  dream,  but  if  he  [the  slave-boy]  were 
repeatedly  asked  these  same  questions  in  various  ways,  you  know  that  in  the  end  his 
knowledge  about  these  things  would  be  as  accurate  as  anyone's"  (85c-d).  This  provides 
Socrates  with  an  answer  to  Meno's  dilernm  :  we  can  search  for  things  we  do  not  know 
if  we  have  true  beliefs  about  them. 
To  prove  that  even  indirect  reliance  on  the  senses  is  unnecessary  for  Plato's  argument  in 
the  Meno,  Vlastos  has  argued  against  the  claim  that  the  knowledge  aroused  in  the  slave 
boy  is  empirical.  This  claim  is  of  course  different  from  the  one  I  have  made.  To  say 
that  a  form  of  knowledge  is  empirical  is  to  say  that  sense  perception  is  both  necessary 
and  sufficient  for  that  form  of  knowledge.  All  I  have  argued  is  that  sense  perception 
plays  an  essential  role  in  arousing  the  beliefs  that  become  knowledge.  I  have  not 
suggested  that  sense  perception  is  sufficient  for  knowledge  or  that  it  is  essential  to  its 
'2Scott,  1995,  pp.  37-38 
62 justification.  Vlastos  asks  us  to  imagine  a  situation  where  the  slave-boy  is  able  to  add 
two  numbers  at  a  time  but  can  do  so  only  when  the  numbers  are  no  greater  than  10. 
Socrates  asks  him  to  add  13  to  7.  By  simplifying  the  number  13  to  10  +3  and  by 
adding  3  to  7,  instead  of  asking  how  much  is  13  +7  he  asks  the  boy  how  much  is  10  + 
10.  Vlastos  holds  that  the  boy,  then,  can  give  the  answer.  He  argues  that  his  example 
could  actually  replace  the  one  provided  by  Plato  without  affecting  the  purpose  of 
13 
Plato's  argument 
Vlastos'  argument  is  that  the  boy  would  have  reached  the  correct  answer  through 
recollection,  but  without  using  the  senses.  Although  on  Vlastos'  example,  the  answer 
to  the  question  'what  is  13+7?  '  does  not  directly  start  off  through  the  senses,  on  Plato's 
own  example,  recollection,  as  a  process,  begins  with  the  use  of  the  senses.  If  Plato  had 
wished  to  avoid  giving  the  impression  that  the  process  of  recollection  must  involve 
sense  perception,  he  could  have  used  an  example  of  this  kind.  The  fact  that  he  chose 
not  to  suggests,  at  the  very  least,  that  he  was  not  worried  about  giving  this  impression. 
Moreover,  the  fact  that  the  particular  arithmetical  problem  described  by  Vlastos  could 
he  handled  without  reference  to  sense  perception,  does  not  disprove  the  claim  that  sense 
perception  plays  an  essential  role  in  the  recollection  of  mathematical  truths.  Plato  could 
have  argued  that  we  learn  to  count  by  counting  perceptible  objects.  Thus,  without 
perception  we  could  not  grasp  what  the  numbers  are;  we  could  not  recollect  the 
numbers.  Once  we  have  recovered  knowledge  of  the  numbers,  there  is  no  further  need 
for  perception. 
Vlastos  argues  that  reliance  on  the  evidence  of  the  senses  is  not  a  general  feature  of  the 
'recollecting'  envisaged  by  Plato  but  is,  at  most,  a  special  feature  of  the  example  of  it  he 
13  G.  Vlastos,  'Anamnesis  in  the  Meno',  Dialogue  4  (1965)  145-146. 
63 happened  to  use  in  the  Meno  14 
. 
My  disagreement  with  Vlastos'  view  is  based  on  the 
examples  of  recollection  that  Plato  provides  us  with,  both  here  in  the  Meno  and  in  the 
recollection  argument  of  the  Phaedo  (74c-75e).  There  is  no  doubt  that  in  the  Meno  he 
used  the  senses  as  a  preliminary  part  of  the  process  of  recollection.  For  instance,  when 
Socrates  talks  about  the  four-foot  square  he  points  to  the  diagram  that  he  draws  and  the 
slave-boy  can  see  (83  c-d).  Plato  uses  phrases  like:  'On  this  line  we  have  a  square  that 
0  is  four  times  bigger,  do  we  notT 
'OU'XII  aITO'  PEV  TaU'nl!  g  TETpa7TXdcFiov;  9  (830),  or 
'Now  this  four-foot  square  is  based  on  this  line  here,  half  the  lengthT  'TETpa7rouv  6E 
dTTO'  TfiS  TIPICEa5  TaUTqCII  TOUTtF;  9  (836),  or  'The  line  on  which  the  eight-foot  square  is 
based  must  then  be  longer  than  this  one  of  two  feet,  and  shorter  than  that  one  of  four 
feet?  -  It  must  be.  '  'AE7  dpa  6V  TOO  O'KTCO'TrO5O5  xwpipou  ypappýv  PEIýCL)  pEv  Elvai  TfiCBE  TTI 
Tfi5  617TO505,  EXaTTCa  66  Tfig  TETPdIT0605.  -  AE71.9  (83d4-6).  This  language  suggests 
that  he  relies  on  the  fact  that  the  boy  can  see  the  diagrams.  Thus,  according  to  J.  Klein 
the  passage  under  discussion  reads  as  'the  size  of  this  space  here  [pointing  to  figure  1] 
is  two  feet  long.  What  will  be  that  of  the  other  space  which  is  doubleT  (82e).  Again: 
land  if  you  don't  want  to  count,  just  show  from  what  line  [the  double  square  will 
result]'  (84a)  15.  Similarly,  Guthrie  argues  that:  'what  shows  the  slave-boy  his  errors, 
and  the  right  answers,  is  not  so  much  Socrates'  questions  as  the  diagrams  themselves. 
When  the  square  on  the  three-foot  side  is  drawn,  he  can  see  at  once  that  it  contains  nine 
square  feet,  not  eight'  16 
. 
Such  a  display  of  language  then,  explicitly  shows  that  Socrates 
uses  diagrams  so  as  to  enable  the  slave-boy  to  recollect.  Thus,  although  the  senses  are 
not  a  reliable  source  for  knowledge,  the  recollection  process  begins  with  the  use  of  the 
senses;  the  senses  are  the  means  to  start  the  process  of  recollection. 
"Vlastos,  1965,  pp.  148-149. 
15J.  Klein,  A  Commentary  On  Plato's  Meno,  Univ.  of  North  Carolina  Press,  1965,  p.  10  1. 
"Guthrie,  1986,  p.  109. 
64 Vlastos'  second  example  is  what  he  refers  to  as  a  'familiar  conundrum'  by  which  a  man 
replies  when  asked  what  is  his  relation  to  the  subject  of  a  portrait.  The  answer  provided 
is'  Brothers  and  sisters  have  I  none;  but  this  man's  father  is  my  father's  son.  Vlastos 
argues  then  that:  'Had  Plato  used  an  example  of  this  sort;  in  the  Meno,  no  one  would 
have  even  dreamed  of  saying  that  the  recollecting  process  gets  results  by  relying  on  the 
evidence  of  the  senses'  17 
.I  would  like  to  raise  two  objections  to  this  point.  Firstly  it 
should  be  noted  that  Plato  did  use  the  senses  as  part  of  his  argument,  here  again, 
therefore,  it  is  idle  to  speculate  about  the  implication  of  an  example  he  did  not  use. 
Secondly,  Vlastos  does  not  describe  this  example  in  sufficient  detail  to  explain  how  it 
might  be  relevant  to  the  specific  problems  of  the  Meno.  He  does  not  give  us  an 
imaginary  dialogue  between  Socrates  and  the  slave  boy  using  this  example.  Neither 
does  it  make  it  clear  quite  how  the  example  would  relate  to  the  recollection  theory.  He 
may  be  relying  on  the  modem  assumption  that  logical  truths  can  be  assimilated  to 
mathematical  truths.  This  would  indeed  imply  that  if  the  slave-boy  could  be  brought  to 
understand  logical  truths  without  perception,  he  could  come  to  acquire  knowledge  of 
mathematical  truths  in  the  same  way.  But  this  line  of  argument  would  not  be  open  to 
Plato  because  he  did  not  have  the  concept  of  a  logical  truth.  A  more  Platonic  way  of 
putting  the  point  might  be  to  suggest  that  Socrates  use  the  conundrum  to  remind  the 
slave-boy  of  the  forms  'father',  'son',  'brother'  and  'sister'.  But  Socrates  could  argue 
that  solving  the  conundrum  requires  that  one  already  have  recollected  these  forms  and 
that  this  recollection  required  perception.  To  put  it  in  another  way,  it  is  easier  to  see  the 
conundrum  as  part  of  the  questioning  that  turns  belief  into  knowledge  rather  than  as 
part  of  the  process  of  recollection. 
17VIastos,  1965,  p.  148. 
65 A  finther  objection  to  my  argument  for  the  senses  would  be  Comford's  view.  He  quite 
rightly  takes  the  Forms  as  Plato's  solution  to  Socrates'  attempt  to  define  universal 
terms;  but  he  says  that  knowledge  of  them  can  not  be  distilled  or  extracted  from  the 
changing  things  of  sense,  but  recovered  out  of  a  memory  always  latent  in  the  soul'8. 
Thus,  on  Cornfbrd'ý  view,  to  suppose  that  sense  perception  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
knowledge  undermines  the  whole  basis  of  Plato's  epistemology.  My  reply  to  this  is  that 
although  knowledge  of  the  Forms  is  always  innate,  the  element  that  triggers  memory  to 
start  recollecting  is  the  senses.  Thus,  although  what  the  slave-boy  recollects  is  not 
given  by  the  senses,  the  senses  nevertheless  play  as  essential  a  part  in  the  process  as 
they  would  if  the  knowledge  of  the  Forms  was  'extracted'  from  the  senses. 
Consequently,  although  Plato's  ultimate  goal  in  the  Meno  is  to  prove  that  deductive 
knowledge  is  free  from  dependence  on  sense-experience,  19  one  can  see  that  sense- 
experience  is  Plato's  starting  point. 
One  has  to  note  here  that  I  do  not  claim  that  in  this  dialogue  Plato  was  interested  in 
describing  exactly  the  role  of  the  senses.  But  if  Plato  did  not  take  into  account  the  role 
of  the  senses  in  a  more  detailed  way  that  is  because  he  did  not  need  to  for  the  purposes 
of  the  Meno.  I  do  not  wish  to  claim  that  the  senses  are  essential  for  the  possession  of 
knowledge,  what  I  claim  is  that  they  play  an  essential  role  in  the  process  of  acquiring 
knowledge.  In  this  life  one  would  not  be  able  to  acquire  knowledge  at  all  if  one  would 
not  take  into  consideration  the  role  of  the  senses  20 
.  In  other  words,  the  senses  are 
treated  as  means  for  achieving  a  ftulher  end. 
"F.  M.  Comford,  'Anamnesis',  in  Brown,  M.  (ed),  Plato's  Meno,  New  York,  1971,  pp.  119-120 
19VIastos,  1965,  p.  161. 
20This  point  will  be  pursued  finther  in  Phaedo  and  in  Timaeus. 
66 The  question  that  arises  now  is  whether  Plato  was  aware  of  the  importance  of  sense- 
experience  in  the  process  of  recollection.  The  arguments  I  have  used  suggest  that  J.  T. 
Bedu-Addo  is  correct  when  he  disputes  the  view  that  in  the  first  part  of  the  slave-boy 
experiment  Socrates  could  have  dispensed  completely  with  sensible  diagrams.  In  his 
own  words,  Socrates  seems  to  consider  that  sensible  diagrams  are  an  indispensable  aid 
in  the  boy's  recollection  of  what  the  enquiry  is  about,  the  square  itself". 
Similarly,  he  says  that,  the  slave-boy  experiment,  with  its  conspicuous  use  of  sensible 
diagrams,  is  Plato's  way  of  preparing  his  readers  for  what  is  to  come  in  the  Phaedo;  that 
sensible  particulars  are  images  of  Forms,  and  that  we  obtain  all  our  conceptions  of  the 
Forms  from  no  other  source  than  from  sense-cxpcrience  (Phaedo  75a)22.  Furthermore 
Addo  argues  that  what  Plato  says  in  the  Phaedo  is  that  careful  questioning  indicates  that 
knowledge  is  innate  and  can  be  recollected,  but  that  this  is  so  is  shown  most  clearly 
when  visible  aids  are  introduced  to  supplement  this  questioning.  Thus,  the  Phaedo 
indicates  that  Plato  in  the  Meno  was  conscious  of  the  importance  of  sense-experience  in 
the  process  of  recollection  23 
.  While  we  do  not  need  to  accept  the  implication  that  the 
Meno  is  designed  as  a  preparation  for  the  Phaedo,  Bedu-Addo  is  clearly  right  to  point 
out  that  in  both  dialogues  recollection  is  triggered  by  sense  perception.  The 
resemblance  between  the  two  dialogues  on  this  respect  can  hardly  be  a  pure 
coincidence. 
21J.  T.  Bedu-Addo,  'Sense  Experience  And  Recollection  In  Plato's  Meno',  American  Journal  of 
Philology  104  (1983)  238. 
22Bedu-Addo,  p.  240. 
23Bedu-Addo  p.  243. 
67 Virtue  and  Knowledge 
This  interpretation  is  confirmed  by  the  last  part  of  Meno  where  Socrates  discusses  again 
the  issue  of  whether  virtue  can  be  taught.  Since,  he  claims,  we  do  not  know  either  what 
it  is  or  what  qualities  it  possesses,  he  proposes  to  investigate  whether  it  is  teachable  or 
not  by  means  of  a  hypothesis.  The  first  question  then  is:  'Among  the  things  existing  in 
the  soul,  what  sort  is  virtue,  that  it  should  be  teachable  or  noff  (87b-c).  He  asks  in 
other  words,  what  sort  of  attribute  of  the  soul  virtue  must  be,  if  it  is  to  be  teachable.  In 
posing  this  question  he  makes  it  clear  that  being  teachable  and  being  recollectable  come 
to  the  same  thing.  Meno  readily  agrees  that  if  virtue  is  knowledge,  it  will  be  teachable, 
while  if  it  is  some  other  kind  of  thing  it  will  not  be  teachable.  Socrates  claims  that  all 
things  either  benefit  or  harm  us,  because  of  the  soul's  direction  (88  c-d),  and  that:  'all 
other  human  activities  depend  on  the  soul,  and  those  of  the  soul  itself  depend  on 
wisdom  if  they  are  to  be  good'  (88d).  Socrates  then  argues  that  virtue  is  a  good  thing 
and  must  therefore  be  beneficial.  So,  he  concludes  that  virtue  must  be  wisdom  and  that 
it  is  therefore  knowledge. 
Socrates'  next  pointý  in  connection  with  his  and  Meno's  original  hypothesis,  is  to  see 
whether  they  would  be  right  to  accept  this  conclusion;  that  virtue  is  knowledge  (89d). 
Socrates  uses  as  a  necessary  condition  for  virtue  to  be  knowledge,  the  fact  that  there 
should  be  -people  who  teach  it  and  people  who  learn  it.  It  should  be  noted,  however, 
that  Socrates'  need  for  such  a  condition  can  be  resolved  by  claiming  that  if  by  teachable 
we  mean  recollectable,  then  the  relation  between  a  teacher  and  a  learner  is  not 
necessary.  At  84c-d  Socrates  explicitly  denies  that  be  is  teaching  the  slave-boy,  so, 
evidently  teaching  is  not  necessary  for  recollection.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  there  are  no 
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taught  -  or  recollected,  it  only  shows  that  it  is  not  in  fact  taught. 
Socrates  then  includes  Anytus  in  the  discussion.  Anytus  holds  that:  'Any  Athenian 
gentleman  he  [Meno]  may  meet,  if  he  is  willing  to  be  persuaded,  will  make  him  a  better 
man  than  the  sophists  would'  (92e).  This  claim  of  Anytus  is  supported  by  his  belief 
that  there  are  many  good  men  in  this  city  [in  Athens].  The  crucial  distinction  made 
here,  is  that  although  Anytus  sees  the  Athenians  as  'good  men'  in  general,  Socrates 
specifies  it;  they  seem  'good  at  public  affairs'  (93a).  What  needs  to  be  noticed,  here,  is 
the  distinction  between  the  general  term  'good'  -  what  Plato  later  will  define  as  the 
Form  of  good  -  and  a  particular  instance  of  goodness;  good  at  public  affairs.  This  is 
significant  since  it  enables  one  to  clarify  what  might  seem  a  contradiction  between  the 
conclusion  that  Socrates  reaches  at  94e:  'Virtue  can  certainly  not  be  taught',  with  his 
earlier  point  that:  'If  virtue  is  a  kind  of  knowledge,  it  is  clear  that  it  could  be  taught' 
(87c).  The  fact  that  there  are  no  teachers  of  virtue  suggests  that  virtue  is  distinct  from 
any  ordinary  TEXV11.  But  Plato  may  be  determining  that  there  is  some  other  kind  of 
knowledge. 
After  stating  again  that  virtue  cannot  be  taught  (96c),  Socrates  claims  that:  'It  is  not 
only  under  the  guidance  of  knowledge  that  men  succeed  in  their  affairs,  and  that  is 
perhaps  why  the  knowledge  of  how  good  men  come  to  be  escapes  us'  (96e).  Then, 
what  Socrates  says  that  is  incorrect  is  his  and  Meno's  agreement  that:  'one  cannot  guide 
correctly  if  one  does  not  have  knowledge'  (97a).  What  Plato  tries  to  show  here  is  that 
for  everyday,  ordinary  activity  one  does  not  need  knowledge  to  be  able  to  guide 
correctly.  This  is  proven  by  his  example  of  the  road  to  Larissa  where  it  is  shown  that 
true  opinion  is  in  no  way  a  worse  guide  to  correct  action  than  knowledge.  Hence,  the 
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former  is  not  stable;  does  not  'remain',  while  the  later  does. 
The  Meno  concludes  with  a  very  important  remark.  When  Socrates  says  that:  'because 
it  cannot  be  taught,  virtue  no  longer  seems  to  be  knowledge'  (99a),  he  is  not  interested 
in  virtue  as  the  Form,  but  in  what  all  men  are  capable  of  possessing;  instances,  true 
opinions  of  virtue.  This  point  becomes  clearer  at  the  very  end  of  the  dialogue:  'Virtue 
would  be  neither  an  inborn  quality  nor  taught,  but  comes  to  those  who  possess  it  as  a 
gift  from  the  gods  which  is  not  accompanied  by  understanding,  unless  there  is  someone 
among  the  statesmen  who  can  make  another  into  a  statesman.  If  there'were  one,  he 
could  be  said  to  be  among  the  living  as  Homer  said  Tiresias  was  among  the  dead, 
namely,  that  "he  alone  retained  his  wits  while  the  others  flitted  about  like  shadows  ...  24 
(99e-100a)25.  Plato's  argument,  then,  points  to  the  fact  that  true  virtue  is  not  simply  a 
TEXvTj  acquired  by  experience,  at  the  same  time  though,  it  is  something  we  reveal  in  on 
everyday  life  as  embodied  beings.  So,  virtue  requires  that  we  are  neither  purely  souls 
nor  purely  matter. 
Thus,  although  the  soul-body  relation  is  not  discussed  at  all  in  the  Meno,  through  the 
recollection  argument  as  well  as  the  belief-knowledge  distinction  Plato  indicates  the 
need  for  an  agent  that  will  be  able  a)  to  combine  the  use  of  the  senses  and  the  actual 
recollection  of  something  other  than  what  is  given  through  the  senses,  and  b)  to  be 
involved  in  both  beliefs  formed  due  to  sense-experience,  and  in  knowledge  acquired  on 
its  own.  The  soul  is  thus  required  if  Plato  wants  to  find  something  able  to  be  in  contact 
with  both  the  Forms  and  the  senses. 
24  Odyssey  x  494-95. 
25This  can  be  used  as  a  comparison  with  Republic  Book  VII  514-517,  the  cave  image. 
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every  day  terms  are  proven  not  to  work.  So,  he  prepares  the  ground  for  Socrates  to 
move  to  a  different  level;  that  of  virtue  as  an  objective  value.  At  the  same  time,  though 
these  two  levels  cannot  be  distinct;  man  needs  to  be  in  contact  with  both.  It  seems  then 
that  we  are  left  perplexed. 
Hence,  although  in  this  dialogue,  Plato  does  not  refer  explicitly  to  the  Forms,  when 
Plato  refers  to  the  soul's  existence  before  birth,  what  the  soul  is  in  connection  with,  is 
something  outside  sense-experience.  At  the  same  time,  although  the  soul  exists 
independently  of  whether  it  is  embodied  or  not,  when  embodied  it  is in  interaction  with 
the  body;  during  this  embodied  life  it  is  the  soul  which  is  capable,  by  using  the  senses, 
to  trigger  its  memory  and  start  recollecting.  In  other  words,  it  is  the  soul  along  with  the 
help  of  the  body  that  enables  one  to  acquire  true  beliefs  and  ultimately  knowledge.  So, 
if  Plato  accepts  man  to  be  the  intermediate  between  the  world  of  the  Forms  and  the 
material  world,  he  needs  to  attribute  to  man  a  soul,  a  soul  able  to  use  sense  perception 
as  the  first  step  to  reach  knowledge  26 
. 
26ThiS  issue  will  be  explained  finther  on  the  chapter  on  Timaeus. 
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To  conclude,  this  chapter  dealt  with  these  two  early  dialogues  of  Plato  so  as  to  show 
that  they  help  as  a  preliminary  illustration  of  Plato's  view  on  the  soul-body  relation  as 
an  interaction.  Although  neither  of  the  above  dialogues  explicitly  refers  to  the  issue  of 
soul-body  interrelation,  both  dialogues  seem  to  stress  the  need  for  a  soul  that  acts  as  the 
agent.  The  soul  is  the  only  one  able  to  combine  this  world  with  whatever  exists  after  or 
beyond  it. 
In  particular,  in  the  Gorgias  a  number  of  passages  raise  questions  about  the  nature  of 
the  soul  and  its  interrelation  with  the  body.  Firstly,  through  the  discussion  on  the  roles 
of  gymnastics  and  law  giving  for  one's  life,  what  is  emphasised  is  the  preservation  and 
enhancement  of  the  equilibrium  for  soul  and  body.  Under  this  spectrum  medicine  and 
judicial  justice  are  discussed;  they  have  to  do  with  restoring  equilibrium  when  it  is 
disturbed.  Moreover,  through  the  distinction  between  real  and  apparent  states  of  health 
for  both  soul  and  body,  Plato  not  only  points  towards  the  existence  of  a  kind  of  order  in 
general,  but  also  indicates  that  there  is  a  relation  between  soul  and  body;  that  of  the 
former  governing  the  latter.  This  notion  is  ffirther  explored  under  the  issue  of 
punishment  where  it  is  indicated  that  the  body  is  punished  for  the  improvement  of  the 
soul.  Finally,  the  self-control  notion,  as  is  further  stressed  through  the  jars  image, 
implies  the  existence  of  a  soul  that  is  complex;  since  in  order  to  talk  of  something  as 
being  organised  or  disorganised,  that  something  must  consist  of  at  least  two  elements. 
In  that  way  Plato  needs  the  soul  to  interact  with  the  body,  due  to  appetites,  but  at  the 
same  time  introduces  the  notion  of  the  soul  itself  being  complex,  which  will  lead  to  his 
tripartite  notion  of  the  soul  in  the  Republic. 
72 In  the  Meno,  now,  Plato's  arguments  not  only  suggest  the  existence  of  a  soul,  but  also 
need  the  soul  to  be  in  close  contact  with  the  body,  on  the  one  hand,  and  able  to  acquire 
knowledge  -  of  the  Forms  -  on  the  other.  In  particular,  the  recollection  argument  shows 
that  the  senses  play  an  essential  role  in  the  slave-boy's  recall.  Although  Plato  does  not 
yet  attribute  sense-experience  to  the  soul,  it  is  evident  that  even  if  one's  beliefs  about 
ethical  or  mathematical  notions  are  innate,  in  this  life  they  are  not  realised  until  one  uses 
perception.  In  other  words;  although  Plato  states  that  it  is  the  soul  that  is  in  contact  with 
the  beliefs  when  disembodied,  he  also  needs  the  soul,  when  embodied,  to  start  from  the 
senses  and  reach  knowledge.  Hence,  although  the  soul  is  something  distinct  from  the 
body;  capable  of  existing  in  an  independent  way,  it  is  still  operating  along  with  the 
body;  the  body  is  the  recipient  of  any  sensory  stimulus,  which  the  soul  categorises 
through  recollection.  Thus,  the  importance  of  the  uses  of  the  senses  within  the 
recollection  argument  lies  on  the  fact  that  the  senses  show  that  a  particular  relation  is 
required  between  the  soul  and  the  body. 
If  my  hypothesis  that  recollection  as  a  process  necessarily  starts  from  a  sensory  stimulus 
is  correct,  then,  the  gap  between  the  body,  through  which  the  senses  are  realised,  and 
the  soul,  that  recollects,  cannot  be  a  wide  one.  Plato  through  the  recollection  argument 
argues  for  a  soul  that  is  in  contact  both  with  this  sensory  world  and  with  a  world 
before/after  death.  This  is  not  achievable  though  if  we  are  talking  about  a  completely 
immaterial  soul  that  happens  to  be  'placed'  in  a  body.  Plato  faced  the  same  difficulty 
that  of  relating  an  immaterial  soul  to  a  body  in  the  Gorgias,  but  there  the  problems  that 
arose  were  of  an  ethical  nature.  The  question  then  of  how  the  soul  relates  to  the  body, 
that  is  found  in  both  the  dialogues  discussed  as  well  as  in  the  Phaedo  dialogue  that 
follows,  Plato  is  set  to  solve  in  the  Republic  and  the  Timaeus. 
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Plato's  Phaedo,  since  it  involves  more  than  one  notion  of  the  soul,  is  one  of  the  most 
controversial  dialogues  for  the  body-soul  relation  in  Plato.  As  a  result,  searching  for  a 
coherent  view  about  the  body-soul  relation  seems  rather  unpromising.  What  I  intend  to 
achieve  in  this  chapter  is  precisely  to  point  out  the  different  notions  of  the  soul  and  to 
give  a  particular  interpretation  of  the  soul-body  relation  as  it  emerges  from  the  Phaedo. 
The  main  goal  therefore  will  be  to  show  that  the  different  concepts  of  soul  invoked  in 
Phaedo  indicate  that  the  relation  between  soul  and  body  cannot  be  as  simple  as  one 
might  understand  it  to  be  from  a  first  reading  of  the  dialogue.  A  traditionally  dualistic 
view  of  the  relation  between  body  and  soul  cannot  adequately  incorporate  Plato's  view 
about  body  and  soul.  Thus,  the  emphasis  will  be  laid  on  showing  that  Plato  requires  a 
relation  that  in  a  sense  goes  beyond  one  that  treats  soul  and  body  as  separate  substances 
that  happen  to  be  together. 
Socrates,  in  order  to  answer  Cebes  and  Simmias'  point  regarding  the  issue  of  death,  he 
is  set  to  defend  his  view  that  death  is  the  separation  of  soul  and  body  (64c).  He  thus 
states  that  'a  man  who  has  truly  spent  his  life  in  philosophy  is  probably  right  to  be  of 
good  cheer  in  the  face  of  death  and  to  be  very  hopeful  that  after  death  he  will  attain  the 
greatest  blessings  yonder'  (63e).  He,  thus,  moves  to  his  next  point;  namely,  that  the 
body  is  a  hindrance  to  the  search  for  knowledge.  The  body  is  'an  obstacle  when  one 
associates  with  it  in  the  search  of  knowledge'  (65b).  Hence,  he  argues  that:  'the  soul 
reasons  best  when  none  of  these  senses  troubles  it...  but  when  it  is  most  by  itself,  taking 
leave  of  the  body  and  as  far  as  possible  having  no  contact  or  association  with  it  in  its 
search  for  reality'  (65c).  In  other  words,  Socrates  claims  that  the  philosopher  should 
welcome  death  because  he  seeks  true  wisdom,  which  is  knowledge  of  the  Forms  (65d- 
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66a).  This,  in  effect,  sets  out  the  view  of  the  soul  that  Socrates  is  to  defend  in  much 
more  detail.  So  far  as  we  are  concerned  it  implies  that  body  and  soul  are  distinct,  that 
they  are  capable  of  independent  existence,  that  the  soul  alone  can  achieve  genuine 
knowledge,  and  that  the  sensations  and  feelings  of  the  body  can  be  a  hindrance  to 
knowledge. 
The  Cyclical  Argument 
When  Socrates  is  challenged  to  defend  the  claim  that  the  soul  exists  and  possesses 
intelligence  after  death  (70b),  the  first  argument  he  offers  is  the  so-called  'cyclical 
argument'.  To  show  that  the  souls  of  men  who  have  died  exist  in  the  underworld,  he 
refers  to  an  'ancient  theory':  'souls  arrive  in  the  underworld  from  this  life  and  then 
again  they  arrive  here  from  the  dead'  (70c).  The  concept  of  a  cycle,  from  being  bom  to 
being  dead  and  then  reborn,  reminds  us  the  Heraclitean  idea  that  there  is  an  absolute 
continuity  of  change  in  everything;  'Upon  those  that  step  into  the  same  rivers  different 
and  different  waters  flow...  They  scatter  and  ...  gather  ...  come  together  and  flow 
away...  approach  and  depart'  (Arius  Didymus  ap.  Eusebium  P.  E.  xv,  20,  K.  R.  S.  12)1. 
Plato  could  also  be  influenced  by  the  Pythagorean  eschatology  according  to  which  the 
soul  is  not  only  subject  to  death  and  rebirth,  but  it  is  also  liable  to  judgemene.  This  is  a 
repeatedly  used  idea  in  Plato's  eschatological  myths. 
Presumably  under  the  influence  of  the  above  views,  Plato  aims  to  prove  the  soul's 
existence  both  before  birth  and  after  death.  As  Gallop  points  out,  this  commits  him  to 
'For  the  Heraclitean  idea  of  the  necessity  of  change  in  order  to  achieve  total  balance  in  the  world;  see 
Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  pp.  193-195. 
2  For  the  Pythagorean  view  see  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  pp.  235-238. 
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the  possibility  of  the  soul's  separate  existence  3,  or  as  Socrates  puts  it:  'if  it  is  true  that 
the  living  come  back  from  the  dead,  then  surely  our  souls  must  exist  there,  for  they 
could  not  come  back  if  they  did  not  exist'  (70c-d).  In  order  to  prove  that  life  comes 
from  death  and  death  from  life,  Socrates  first  argues  that  all  things  come  to  be  from 
their  opposites.  This  alludes  directly  to'the  Heraclitean  doctrine  of  opposites;  fragments 
like  'the  path  up  and  down  is  one  and  the  same'  (Plutarch  Cons.  ad  Apoll.  10,106e,  K. 
FL  S.  200)  indicate  the  connection  between  opposites  that  was  important  for  Heraclitus' 
view  of  the  world4.  Plato,  then,  being  influenced  by  the  above  mentioned  view, 
examines:  'whether  those  that  have  an  opposite  must  necessarily  come  to  be  from  their 
opposite  and  from  nowhere  else'  (70e).  To  illustrate  this  point,  Socrates  uses  pairs  of 
opposites  such  as  'the  beautiful'  and  'the  ugly',  'the  just'  and  'the  unjust'.  In  the  same 
way  that  what  becomes  smaller  must  previously  have  been  larger  so  the  better  must 
come  from  the  worse  and  the  more  just  from  the  more  unjuse.  In  each  case,  there  are 
two  kinds  of  change.  For  example  between  larger  and  smaller  there  is  increase  and 
diminution  (71b).  Socrates  develops  this  point  by  means  of  a  parallel  between  'living' 
and  being  awake',  and  'being  dead'  and  'sleeping' 
(71c).  Socrates  gives  to  Cebes  one  of  the  above  pairs  along  with  the  two  processes 
involved,  and  asks  Cebes  to  provide  the  other  pair  and  its  processes.  The  opposites  are: 
being  dead  and  being  alive,  and  they  come  to  be  from  one  another;  from  being  alive 
'  D.  Gallop,  Plato:  Phaedo,  Clarendon  press,  Oxford  1975,  p.  104. 
4  See  further  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  pp.  188-190. 
5  Although  Plato  introduces  his  argument  about  opposites  with  the  examples  of  'the  beautiful'  and  'the 
ugly',  'the  just'  and  'the  unjust',  he  goes  on  to  illustrate  it  with  comparatives.  The  examples  used  are  the 
following:  A)  Ile  smaller  comes  to  be  from  the  larger.  B)  The  weaker  comes  to  be  from  the  stronger.  Q 
The  swifter  comes  to  be  from  the  adjectives  actually  strengthens  Plato's  argument:  'Socrates  could  hardly 
infer  from  a  thing's  coming  to  be  weak  that  it  must  previously  have  been  strong,  for  it  might  have  been 
neither.  But  he  can  plausibly  argue  that  if  a  thing  comes  to  be  weaker  (than  it  was  before),  it  must 
previously  have  been  stronger  (d=  it  is  now)'.  But,  as  Gallop  himself  states,  no  argument  relying 
entirely  upon  comparatives  could  support  the  claim  that  'all  things  come  to  be  in  this  way,  opposites  from 
opposites'  (71  a),  since  there  are  some  opposites  (odd  and  even)  which  have  no  comparatives. 
76 comes  being  dead,  and  from  being  dead  comes  being  alive  (71d).  Thus,  Socrates 
concludes  firstly  that:  'living  creatures  and  things  come  to  be  from  the  dead'  (71d),  and 
secondly  that:  our  souls  exist  in  the  underworld'  (71e).  Having  argued  then  for  the  one 
of  the  processes;  the  process  of  dying,  Socrates  provides  Cebes  with  the  second*  one; 
coming  to  life  again  (71e).  Since  Socrates  and  Cebes  agreed  that:  'the  living  come  from 
the  dead  in  this  way  no  less  than  the  dead  come  from  the  living'  they  think  that  the 
above  is:  '  ...  a  sufficient  proof  that  the  souls  of  the  dead  must  be  somewhere  whence 
they  come  back  again'  (72a).  There  is  a  striking  parallel  here  with  Heraclitus'  fragment 
88:  'And  the  same  thing  there  exists  in  us  living  and  dead  and  the  waking  and  sleeping 
and  young  and  old;  for  these  things  having  changed  round  are  those,  and  those  having 
changed  round  are  these'  (K.  R.  Sc.  202). 
One  difficulty  that  arises  from  these  examples  is  how  to  defme  the  opposites:  as 
contrary  or  as  contradictory  objects.  Gallop  argues  that  the  opposites  that  Plato  uses 
should  be  treated  as  contrary  opposites  rather  than  contradictory.  In  other  words,  they 
may  not  be  truthfuRy  asserted  of  a  subject  at  the  same  time,  but  they  may  both  trutllfiiUy 
be  denied.  This  is  relevant  to  the  argument  about  'living'  and  'dead'.  Gallop  holds 
that  'living'  and  'dead'  may  both  be  truthfully  denied  of  a  subject.  Thus  to  say  that 
something  is  not  alive  does  not  imply  that  it  is dead.  We  cannot  therefore  infer  that  the 
living  come  from  the  dead.  He  uses  the  example  of  'married'  and  'divorced'  as  an 
analogy  to  living  and  dead.  He  argues  that  just  as  someone  not  yet  married  cannot  be 
divorced,  so  something  not  yet  living  cannot  be  dead.  Tbus,  although  living  and  dead 
are  in  a  sense,  opposites,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  living  must  come  from  the  dead. 
Gallop,  1975,  p.  7. 
77 Although  I  agree  with  Gallop  that  the  Tving'  and  'dead'  opposites  should  be  treated  as 
contrary  opposites  I  think  that  when  Plato  talks  about  the  living  coming  from  the  dead, 
T'-j 
he  has  in  mind  a  picture  of  afterlife  within  which  the  souls  are  not  completely  reduced 
to  nothing.  But  such  an  explanation  of  'living'  and  'dead'  brings  up  another  problem 
for  Plato,  namely  that  of  begging  the  question.  If  'living'  and  'dead'  are  not 
contradictory  opposites,  and  the  not  yet  living  is  not  dead,  Plato's  argument  is  shown  to 
be  fallacious  because  it  could  be  possible  for  something  to  be  neither  living  nor  dead. 
So,  Plato  begs  the  question  to  which  he  is  supposed  to  be  giving  an  answer. 
In  order  to  prove  that:  'the  souls  of  men  who  have  died  exist  in  the  underworld'  (70c), 
Plato  makes  an  important  addition.  He  argues  that  there  should  be  a  process  of 
becoming  from  each  opposite  into  the  other.  He  says:  '...  between  each  of  those  two 
pairs  of  opposites  there  are  two  processes:  from  one  to  the  other  and  then  again  from 
the  other  to  the  first;  between  the  larger  and  the  smaller  there  is  increase  and 
decrease...  "  (71b).  The  example  that  Plato  uses  is  a  parallel  between  'living'  and 
'being  awake',  and  'being  dead'  and  'sleeping'  (71c).  Socrates  gives  to  Cebes  one  of 
the  above  pairs  along  with  the  two  processes  involved,  and  asks  Cebes  to  provide  the 
other  pair  and  its  processes.  The  opposites  are  being  dead  and  being  alive,  and  from 
being  dead  comes  being  alive  (71d).  Thus,  Socrates  concludes  firstly  that:  'living 
creatures  and  things  come  to  be  from  the  dead'  (71  d),  and  secondly  that:  'our  souls  exist 
in  the  underworld'  (71e).  Having  argued  then  for  the  one  of  the  processes-;  the  process 
of  dying,  Socrates  provides  Cebes  with  the  second  one;  coming  to  life  again  (71e). 
Since  Socrates  and  Cebes  agreed  that:  'the  living  come  from  the  dead  in  this  way  no 
less  than  the  dead  from  the  living'  they  think  that  the  above  is  '...  a  sufficient  proof  that 
the  souls  of  the  dead  must  be  somewhere  whence  they  come  back  again'  (72a).  It 
should  be  pointed  out,  though,  that  the  process  of  coming-to-be  seems  to  introduce  a 
78 finther  argument  to  show  that  the  living  are  born  from  the  dead  7.  Gallop's  objection  to 
Plato  is  that:  'from  a  thing's  coming  to  be  alive,  the  proper  inference  is  not  that  it  was 
previously  dead,  but  that  it  did  not  exist  previously  at  all'.  He  further  argues  that:  'the 
sense  of  'come  to  be  alive'  required  for  the  argument  is  not  that  in  which  a  living  thing 
comes  into  being,  but  that  in  which  a  soul  'becomes  incarnate'  in  a  living  body.  Yet  it 
cannot  do  this  unless  it  already  exists  before  birth  or  conception.  And  whether  it  does 
so  or  not  is  just  what  is  at  issue's.  Thus  Plato's  argument,  as  was  shown  before,  is 
fallacious.  The  point  that  is  of  interest  for  this  thesis,  however,  is  not  so  much  whether 
Plato's  argument  is  fallacious  or  not,  but  rather  that  in  fact  it  implies  the  inherent 
Platonic  belief  that  the  soul  exists  before  being  incarnated.  This  in  turn  implies  that, 
whatever  the  soul  is,  it  is  capable  of  existing  in  complete  independence  from  any  body. 
Plato,  thus,  seems  to  treat  the  soul's  connection  to  any  particular  body  as  a  contingent 
and  temporary  matter. 
Plato  then  introduces  a  finther  point  of  argument  in  favour  of  the  circularity  of  the  two 
processes  of  becoming:  'If  the  two  processes  of  becoming  did  not  always  balance  each 
other  as  if  they  were  going  round  in  a  circle,  but  generation  proceeded  from  one  point  to 
its  opposite  in  a  straight  line  and  it  did  not  turn  back  again...  all  things  would  ultimately 
have  the  same  form,  be  affected  in  the  same  way,  and  cease  to  become'  (72b).  In 
particular,  Plato  wants  to  argue  that  if  everything  that  partakes  life  were  to  die  and 
remain  in  that  state  and  not  come  to  life  again,  everything  would  ultimately  have  to  be 
dead  and  nothing  alive  (72c-d).  If  that.  were  the  case:  'Even  if  the  living  came  from 
another  source,  and  not  all  that  Iived  died,  how  could  all  things  avoid  being  absorbed  in 
deathT  (72d).  If  we  assume  that  there  is  a  finite  number  of  souls  T  or  a  finite  quantity 
7  Gallop,  1975,  p.  109. 
8  Gallop,  1975,  pp.  109-110. 
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of  material  out  of  which  souls  are  to  be  made  -  then  Plato  would  be  right.  If  that  were 
the  case,  it  would  follow  that  either  souls  pass  from  one  body  to  another  or  that  there 
will  come  a  point  when  there  are  no  more  souls  waiting  to  come  into  life.  One  could  of 
course  argue  against  Plato's  conclusion  by  saying  either  that  souls  do  not  have  to  be 
created  out  of  anything,  or  by  taking  a  materialistic  view;  arguing  that  coming  to  life 
and  dying  are  physical  processes  which  simply  involve  the  rearrangement  of  material 
elements".  But  neither  position  seems  to  express  Plato's  view.  Although  in  the  Phaedo 
he  is  not  concerned  with  such  implications,  in  later  dialogues  he  seems  aware  of  them 
and  tries  to  present  a  view  where  the  soul  could  be  treated  as  finite  immaterial 
4substance'lo. 
The  upshot  of  this  is  that  the  cyclical  argument  commits  Plato  to  saying  that  the  soul 
can  exist  separately  from  the  body,  but,  unforttmately,  does  not  provide  us  with  a  clear 
view  of  what  is  the  nature  of  the  soul  that  reincamates.  Moreover,  he  says  nothing 
conceming  its  embodfinent,  whether,  and  how,  the  soul  is  supposed  to  interact  with  the 
body.  He  does  not  even  explain  what  comprised  the  personality  of  each  individual, 
whether  the  soul  is  the  person  or  the  combination  of  a  particular  body  to  the  soul.  It  is 
made  clear,  though,  that  the  soul  cannot  be  identified  with  any  particular  body.  It 
mostly  seems  to  suggest  a  view  of  'soul'  as  a  substance  of  which  there  is  a  finite 
quantity,  and  is  reincarnated.  Plato's  first  argument  thus  seems  to  be  incomplete.  The 
unanswered  questions  seem  to  be  picked  up  in  the  next  argument  of  the  Phaedo. 
9PIato  solves  the  above  vagueness  in  the  Timaeus  where  the  souls  are  created  by,  the  demiurge  but  not  out 
of  the  same  matter  as  the  body  and  the  lower  parts  of  soul. 
"Namely,  in  the  Republic  he  holds  that  the  souls  arc  reincarnated,  but  only  the  souls  of  the  laymen,  not 
the  philosophers'.  In  the  Timaeus  -  where  the  soul  is  part  of  the  universe  -  all  souls  are  made  by  the 
demiurge  and  arc  as  many  as  the  stars. 
80 r 
The  Recollection  Argument 
The  main  objective  of  this  thesis  is  to  evaluate  the  relation  of  body  and  soul  as  it  stands 
for  Plato.  Therefore,  the  analysis  and  interpretation  of  the  recollection  argument  is  of 
major  importance  because  it  links  the  theory  of  Forms  with  the  notion  of  the 
immortality  of  the  soul;  it  is  supposed  to  show  that  we  existed  before  birth.  What 
makes  this  evident,  is  that  there  is  something  which  we  know  and  which  we  could  not 
have  learned  after  birth;  namely  the  Forms.  Another  important  feature  of  the  argument 
is  that  it  implies  the  need  for  a  particular  relation  between  the  world  of  the  senses  and 
that  of  the  Forms.  This  in  turn  has  certain  implications  for  the  relation  between  body 
and  soul. 
The  argument  begins  with  the  claim  that:  'if  it  is  true  that  learning  is  no  other  than 
recollection;  ...  we  must  at  some  previous  time  have  learned  what  we  now  recollect. 
This  is  possible  only  if  our  soul  existed  somewhere  before  it  took  on  this  human  shape. 
so,  ...  the  soul  is  likely  to  be  something  immortal,  (72e-73a).  The  first  point  of 
reference  to  support  the  above-mentioned  claim  is  the  argument  that:  'when  men  are 
interrogated  in  the  right  manner,  they  always  give  the  right  answer...  they  could  not  do 
this  if  they  did  not  possess  the  knowledge  and  the  right  explanation  inside  them.  17hen 
if  one  shows  them  a  diagram  or  something  else  of  that  kind,  this  will  show  most  clearly 
that  such  is  the  case'  (73a-b).  This  argument  directly  refers  back  to  Meno  (Meno  Me 
where  the  slave-boy  is  shown  to  recollect  through  the  use  of  diagrams.  Its 
significance  then  has  to  do  with  the  assumption  of  acquisition  of  knowledge  before 
birth,  but  even  more  so  with  the  implication  of  the  role  of  the  senses  after  birth.  As  was 
argued  in  the  analysis  of  the  Meno,  for  one  to  recollect  in  this  life  what  one  once  knew, 
one  has  to  start  from  the  senses.  The  senses  are  the  necessary  means  in  this  life  for 
81 r  recollection.  Evidence  for  this  interpretation  will  be  provided  by  my  analysis  of  the 
recollection  argument  as  Plato  sets  it  up. 
The  recollection  argument  does  not  only  seek  to  prove  the  soul's  existence  before  birth, 
but  it  also  implies  a  specific  definition  of  knowledge.  That  is,  it  makes  both  a 
metaphysical  and  an  epistemological  point.  The  fact  that  within  the  recollection 
argument  Plato  implies  a  particular  definition  of  knowledge  is  shown  in  the  following 
passage.  When  Plato  says:  'a  man  sees  or  hears  or  in  some  other  way  perceives  one 
thing  and  not  only  knows  that  thing  but  also  thinks  of  another  thing  of  which  the 
knowledge  is  not  the  same  but  different,  are  we  not  right  to  say  that  he  recollects  the 
second  thing  that  comes  to  mindT  (73c-d),  he  implies  that  there  are  two  different  kinds 
of  knowledge,  one  coming  directly  from  sense  perception,  the  other  emerging  through 
means  different  to  the  senses.  The  following  examples  illustrate  recollection  not  only 
from  like  things  but  also  from  unlike,  for  example:  a)  the  recollection  of  a  man  on 
seeing  his  lyre,  b)  the  recollection  of  Cebes  on  seeing  Simmias,  c)  the  recollection  of 
Simmias  himself  on  seeing  a  picture  of  Simmi  s  (73d-e).  Plato  argues  that  in  the  case 
of  recollection  from  like  things,  one  should  'consider  whetherthe  similarity  to  that 
which  one  recollects  is  deficient  in  any  respect  or  complete'  (74a).  The  argument 
proceeds  with  the  aff=ation  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  an  absolute  equality,  the 
Equal  itself.  The  crucial  question  then  is:  'Whence  have  we  acquired  the  knowledge  of 
it?  '  (74b).  Therefore,  the  distinction  is  made  between  things  that  sometimes  appear 
equal  and  sometimes  unequal,  and  Equality  itself.  'Do  not  equal  stones  and  sticks 
sometimes,  while  -remaining  the  same,  appear  to  be  equal  to,  one  and  unequal  to 
another?  ",  "dp'  OU'  MeOt  PEV  1001  Kal  gýXa  EVIOTE  TaýTd  6VTa  TCý  pEv  Tica  ý=E`ral,  Tfý 
o5;  1(74b).  The  precise  meaning  of  this  sentence  is  unclear.  It  could  read  either  'seems 
equal  to  one  person  and  not  to  another',  or  'seems  equal  to  one  thing  but  not  to 
82 another"  1.  Since  the  text  itself  is  ambiguous,  either  interpretation  is  possible.  I  am 
inclined  to  hold,  though,  the  second  one,  because  it  seems  to  fit  better  with  what 
follows.  The  next  question  that  Socrates  asks  is  whether  the  equals  themselves  have 
ever  appeared  unequal  to  Simmias,  or  Equality  to  be  Inequality  (74c).  If  Plato  wanted 
to  argue  for  the  first  alternative,  that  of  equal  stones  and  sticks  appearing  equal  to  one 
person  and  not  to  another,  he  would  have  formed  the  question  that  follows  in  a  different 
way.  Namely,  if  the  former  question  had  been  a  matter  of  different  perspectives, 
similarly  the  latter  would  have  been  too.  Thus,  since  Socrates  does  not  challenge 
Simmias'  second  answer,  one  can  assume  that  Plato  must  have  had  in  mind  the  second 
reading  of  the  74b  passage12.  The  importance  of  this  passage  for  this  thesis,  though, 
lies  mainly  in  the  relation  that  Plato  portrays  between  particular  cases  of  equal  sticks 
and  stones  and  the  Form  of  Equality. 
With  the  use  of  this  example,  Plato  shows  both  that  equal  things  and  the  Equal  itself  are 
not  the  same,  and  that,  at  the  same  time,  one  has  grasped  the  knowledge  of  equality 
from  the  equal  things.  He  argues:  'But  it  is  definitely  from  the  equal  things,  though 
they  are  different  from  the  Equal,  that  you  have  derived  and  grasped  the  knowledge  of 
equality'  (74c).  Thus,  not  only  is  one  provided  with  two  kinds  of  knowledge.  -  one 
concerning  the  equal  things  and  the  other  having  to  do  with  Equality  -  but  also  with  the 
need  for  a  kind  of  relation  between  the  two.  This  is  implicit  in  Plato's  claim  that  from 
the  former,  one  can  reach  the  latter.  This  need  is  fin-ther  emphasised  by  the  realisation 
"  There  is  also  a  variant  reading,  which  would  give  the  meaning  'seems  equal  at  one  time  but  not  at 
another'.  See  fin-ther  R.  S.  Bluck,  'Plato's  Form  of  Equal',  Phronesis  4,  no.  I  (1959)  5.11.  On  the 
general  ambiguity  concerning  'a6Ta  Ta  Tica'  see  for  example  David  ApollonL  'Notes  and  Discussions: 
A  Note  on  Auta  Ta  Isa  at  Phaedo  74',  Journal  of  the  History  ofPhilosophy  27  (1989)  127-134;  Richard 
P.  Haynes,  'The  form  of  equality,  as  a  set  of  equals:  Phaedo  74b-c,  Phronesis  9  (1964)  17-26;  K  W. 
Mills,  'Plato's  Phaedo,  747-6%  Phronesis  2,  no.  1  (1957)  128-147;  Nicholas  D.  Smith,  'The  Various 
Equals  at  Phaedo  74b-c,  Journal  ofthe  History  ofPhilosophy  18  (1980)  1-7. 
12  The  second  reading,  'seems  equal  to  one  thing  but  not  to  another',  is  also  supported  by  evidence  found 
in  the  Symposium  and  the  Republic.  See  finther  David  Bostock,  Plato's  Phaedo,  Clarendon  Press, 
oxford  1986,  pp.  72-78,  and  Gallop,  1975,  pp.  120-123. 
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that  equal  things  fall  short  of  Equality:  'Whenever  someone,  on  seeing  something, 
realises  that  that  which  he  now  sees  wants  to  be  like  some  other  reality  but  falls  short 
and  cannot  be  like  that  other  since  it  is  inferior,  the  one  who  thinks  this  must  have  prior 
knowledge  of  that  which  he  says  it  is  like,  but  deficiently  so'  (74d-e).  It  should  be 
noted  here  that  Plato  explicitly  states  that  since  one's  sense  perception  makes  him 
realise  that  evenything  perceived  through  the  senses  is  striving  to  reach  that  which  is 
Equal  but  falls  short  of  it,  the  knowledge  of  the  Equal  itself  must  have  been  possessed 
before  one  began  to  see,  hear,  or  perceive  in  any  way  (75b).  What  Plato  indicates  then, 
is  that  sense  perception  is  not  adequate  to  provide  one  with  knowledge  thus  one  needs 
something  more.  This  is  the  path  through  which  Plato  reaches  the  conclusion  that:  a) 
firstly  one  had  knowledge  of  all  things  to  which  one  can  attach  the  word  'itself  before 
birth,  b)  secondly  lost  it  at  birth,  c)  and  later  through  the  use  of  the  senses  one  recovered 
the  knowledge  he  had  before  (75d-e).  Plato's  argument  seems  to  indicate  that  in  order 
to  be  able  to  recollect  one  must  use  his  senses;  recollection  would  not  be  possible 
without  the  use  of  the  senses.  The  process  he  describes  is  one  that  makes  it  'possible 
for  someone  to  see  or  hear  or  otherwise  perceive  something,  and  by  this  to  be  put  in 
mind  of  something  else  which  he  had  forgotten  and  which  is  related  to  it  by  similarity  or 
difference'  (76a).  'A  point  to  note  here  is  the  ambiguity  created  from  the  above  phrase. 
As  I  read  the  text  it  says  that  the  use  of  the  senses  starts  one  recollecting;  it  does  not 
suggest  that  anything  other  than  the  senses  can  trigger  off  recollection.  What  Plato 
seems  to  have  in  mind  here  is  that  through  the  use  of  the  senses,  which  is  what  man 
always  does  in  this  life,  there  are  times  that  ones  starts  of  the  process  of  recollection; 
namely,  there  can  be  no  other  way  to  start  recollecting. 
The  last  claim  made  is  that  our  souls  acquire  the  knowledge  of  the  Forms  before  birth: 
'Then  before  we  began  to  see  or  hear  or  otherwise  perceive,  we  must  have  possessed 
84 knowledge  of  the  Equal  itself  if  we  were  about  to  refer  our  sense  perceptions  of  equal 
ob  .  ects  to  it,  and  realised  that  all  of  them  were  eager  to  be  like  it,  but  were  inferior.  ' 
(75b).  The  argument  continues,  'but  we  began  to  see  and  hear  and  otherwise  perceive 
right  after  birth...  we  must  then  have  acquired  the  knowledge  of  the  Equal  before  this' 
(75b-c).  This  is  how  Plato  concludes  that  our  souls  must  have  existed  before  they  were 
in  the  form  of  man  and  they  had  intelligence:  '...  our  souls  also  existed  apart  from  the 
body  before  they  took  on  human  form,  and  also  they  had  intelligence'  (76c).  This  is 
then  how  Plato  treats  the  recollection  argument. 
In  order  to  interpret  the  argument  analysed  above,  one  has  to  consider  two  main  points: 
a)  the  notions  that  Plato  accepts  as  already  presupposed,  and  b)  the  difficulties  created 
by  these  assumptions.  The  first  point  that  Plato  seems  to  take  for  granted  is  the 
existence  of  the  Forms.  When  Socrates  asks  Simmias:  '...  the  Equal  itself.  Shall  we  say 
that  it  exists  or  noff  Simmias'  answer  is:  'Indeed  we  shall  ...  most  definitely"  '...  al)T6 
T67CYOV  #3pb  TI  ElVal  ý  PT15EV;  "  64)CSPEV  PEVTOI  Vý  At",  iiýlj  0  lililmaS,  BaupaaTcSS  yE.  ' 
(74a-b).  Since  Plato's  concern  is  to  show  that  the  world  of  the  senses  is  not  adequate 
for  knowledge,  this  is  an  important  prerequisite  for  his  theory.  For  Plato,  then,  to  start 
thinking  of  such  a  case,  he  must  at  least  consider  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of 
something  beyond  the  senses  to  enable  one  to  attain  knowledge.  This  was  already 
presupposed  when  he  said  that:  'For  if  it  is  impossible  to  attain  any  pure  knowledge 
from  the  body,  then  one  of  two  things  is  true:  either  we  can  never  attain  knowledge  or 
we  can  do  so  after  death.  Then  and  not  before,  the  soul  is  by  itself  apart  from  the  body' 
(66e-67a). 
Plato's  claim  is  quite  complicated  at  this  stage  and  needs  special  attention;  the  first 
implication  is  that  if  one  does  not  recognise  the  Forms,  one  would  not  be  able  to  attain 
85 knowledge.  If  the  senses  cannot  provide  one  with  the  certainty  required  for  knowledge, 
and  if  there  is  nothing  else  to  compare  the  information  that  one  gets  from  the  senses 
with,  then  knowledge  would  not  be  possible.  Therefore  the  existence  of  the  Forms  is 
necessary  for  one  to  have  knowledge.  But,  this  presupposition  of  Plato  creates 
difficulties  for  the  validity  of  the  recollection  argument:  If  the  body  is  the  part  of  man 
that  deals  with  the  senses,  and  if  the  information  provided  by  the  senses  is  not  adequate 
for  knowledge,  then  one  needs  another  element;  the  soul,  that  will  enable  him  to  attain 
knowledge.  It  is  implied  then  that  the  soul  exists  as  something  different  from  the  body. 
At  this  point,  then,  I  am  faced  with  what  is  most  probably  the  greatest  difficulty  in 
Phaedo;  Plato  is  faced  with  the  fallacy  of  circular  argument.  In  the  Recollection 
argument  Plato  wants  to  prove  the  soul's  existence  before  birth  through  the  help  of  the 
Forms,  but  as  was  pointed  out  above  one's  awareness  of  the  Forms'  existence  can  come 
only  through  the  soul;  to  know  the  Forms  one  should  be  able  to  detach  oneself  from 
anything  material,  and  that  implies  the  existence  of  the  soul  separate  from  the  body. 
This  is  so,  because  as  Plato  argued  earlier,  66e-67a,  either  we  can  never  attain 
knowledge  or  we  can  do  so  after  death.  Thus,  only  the  soul  is  able  to  know  the  Forms 
and  only  after  death.  The  way  the  Forms  are  presented  by  Plato,  as  being  completely 
distinct  from  the  material  world,  makes  it  impossible  for  'one,  in  this  life,  to  have 
knowledge  13 
. 
Whether,  thus,  one  is  able  to  know  the  Forms  in  this  life,  is  a  question 
that  remains  unanswered. 
The  first  question  that  should  be  examined,  then,  within  the  recollection  argument  is 
what  is  the  particular  relation  between  sense  perception  and  knowledge.  If  one  takes 
recollection  as  a  process,  the  role  of  the  senses  within  it  is  crucial  14 
.  The  notion  of 
"  As  Bostock  aigues  (p.  90),  'it  is  we  who  want  to  know  what  the  Form  is,  and  we  who  should  therefore 
like  the  particulars  to  tell  us.  But  that  they  can  not  do,  simply  because  they  are  not  the  form. 
14A  similar  point  is  held  in  the  Meno. 
86 recollection,  the  remembering  act,  seems  to  indicate  the  existence  of  a  different  kind  of 
knowledge,  it  implies  a  mental  activity  that  is  distinct  from  the  acquisition  of  anything 
through  the  senses;  the  knowledge  of  the  Forms.  On  the  other  hand,  when  Plato  refers 
to  seeing  a  lyre,  seeing  Simmias,  seeing  the  picture  of  a  horse  or  seeing  the  picture  of 
Simmias,  he  talks  about  knowledge  that  comes  straight  from  empirical  means;  the 
senses.  Hence,  there  is  an  important  transition  made  within  the  recollection  process;  the 
senses  are  necessary  as  the  stimuli  to  recollect,  but  they  do  not  provide  one  with 
knowledge  of  the  fmal  recollected  object.  Because  recollection  involves  being 
reminded  of  something  by  perceiving  something  else,  in  order  to  be  able  to  recollect, 
one  needs  the  senses  as  a  starting  point.  Hence,  the  distinction  made  by  Plato  between 
two  different  kinds  of  knowledge  is  important:  'When  a  man  sees  or  hears  or  in  some 
other  way  perceives  one  thing  and  not  only  knows  that  thing  but  also  thinks  of  another 
thing  of  which  the  knowledge  is  not  the  same  but  different,  are  we  not  right  to  say  that 
he  recollects  the  second  thing  that  comes  to  mindT  (73c).  Here  Plato  makes  an  explicit 
distinction  between  the  knowledge  which  one  acquires  by  perceiving  something, 
empirical  knowledge,  and  the  knowledge  which  comes  to  one's  mind  by  thinking 
something. 
It  should  be  noted  here  then,  that  recollection  is  to  be  seen  as  a  process,  and  that  the 
senses  are  the  means  that  trigger  off  this  process.  Therefore,  the  important  point  for  this 
thesis  is  that  recollection  cannot  be  achieved  without  the  necessary  stimuli  provided  by 
the  senses.  This,  though,  does  not  mean  that  recollection  is  achieved  by  the  use  of  the 
senses  alone.  Statements  like  that  would  not  be  meaningful  for  Plato,  since  his  main 
87 concern  is  to  show  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  knowledgels.  Following  Plato's 
examples  closely,  one  can  see  the  difficulty  that  arises  in  distinguishing  two  kinds  of 
knowledge.  For  instance,  Gallop  argues  that  in  the  cases  of  a)  seeing  a  man's  lyre  and 
remembering  the  man,  and  b)  seeing  a  picture  of  Simmias  and  being  reminded  of 
Simmias,  the  question  that  arises  is  whether  the  thing  thought  of  and  the  thing  perceived 
are  objects  of  'another  knowledge'.  In  the  case  of  recognising  the  lyre,  he  argues 
whether  'recognising'  consists  merely  in  recognising  the  instrument  as  a  lyre,  or  as  its 
owner's  lyre.  If  one  recognises  the  lyre  as  its  owner's  lyre,  he  argues,  then  one  must  be 
already  thinking  of  the  boy  [the  owner]  in  recognising  the  lyre  as  his.  The  same  point  is 
made  for  the  example  of  Simmias  and  his  picture.  In  recognising  the  picture  as  one  of 
him,  it  seems  that  one  should  necessarily  be  thinking  of  Simmias  himself.  Gallop  then 
raises  the  question  whether  the  thing  thought  of  and  the  thing  perceived  are  in  this  case 
objects  of  'another  knowledge'  16 
,  and  claims  that  this  bears  on  the  latter  suggestion  that 
sensible  equals  'remind'  us  of  Equality.  His  claim  then  is  that  the  Form  and  its 
instances  would  not  then  be  objects  of  'another  knowledge'  and  the  conditions  for  our 
being  reminded  of  the  former  by  the  latter  would  not  be  met. 
Gallop's  objection  can  be  met,  though,  if  one  brings  in  mind  Plato's  examples: 
'-whenever  they  see  a  lyre 
...  that  their  beloved  is  accustomed  to  use,  they  know  the 
lyre,  and  the  image  of  the  boy  to  whom  it  belongs  come  into  their  mind'  (73d). 
Likewise,  Plato  argues  that  by  'seeing  a  picture  of  Simmias,  recollect  Simmias  himself 
(73e).  Therefore,  Gallop  seems  to  disregard  Plato's  emphasis  on  the  role  of  the  senses. 
Plato  is  not  distinguishing  between  recognising  the  lyre  and  thinking  of  its  owner,  nor 
15SCott  (1995,  p.  62,  and  notes  9&10)  argues  that  although  perception  is  necessary  condition  for  thinking 
of  the  Form,  we  need  not  -  and  should  not  -  take  this  as  saying  that  perception  instils  knowledge  of  the 
Form,  merely  that  use  of  the  senses  is  a  necessary  condition  for  gaining  knowledge,  i.  e.  that  to  start  the 
process  ofL  we  must  have  our  memories  jogged  by  sensible  stimuli. 
16  Gallop,  1975,  p.  116,  note  on  73c4-dI  1. 
88 does  he  distinguish  between  recognising  Simmias'  picture  as  his  and  recollecting 
Simmias.  What  he  is  distinguishing  between,  is  seeing  the  lyre  and  the  picture,  which  is 
knowledge  acquired  from  perceiving  the  empirical  data,  and  being  reminded  of  the 
lyre's  owner  and  of  Simmias  himself;  the  acquisition  of  a  particular  reasoning  that  goes 
beyond  sense-percepiion. 
The  recognition  of  the  lyre,  as  the  owner's  lyre,  as  well  as  the  recognition  of  Simmias' 
picture  as  his,  can  be  taken  as  belonging  a  step  further  from  the  sense  perception  within 
the  recollection  process.  The  sense-stimuli  provide  one  with  one  kind  of  knowledge 
while  the  recognition  along  with  the  recollection  provides  one  with  another.  If  I  were 
to  analyse  Plato's  examples,  two  points  would  be  of  importance.  Firstly,  by  looking  at 
the  example  of  being  reminded  of  Simmias  by  his  lyre,  there  seem  to  be  three  stages;  a) 
pure  sense  perception,  I  see  something,  b)  conceptualisation  -  that  is  a  lyre,  and  C) 
recollection  -  that  is  Simmias'  lyre.  The  same  stages  apply  to  the  example  of  seeing 
Cebes  and  being  reminded  of  Simmias.  Presumably,  though,  Plato  really  thinks  that  the 
conceptualisation  involves  recollection  of  the  Form.  Bostock,  in  an  attempt  to  explain 
the  workings  of  the  recollection  argument,  brings  forth  a  distinction  between 
description  and  evaluation  so  as  to  argue  that,  terms  such  as  'good'  or  'just,  or 
'beautiful'  cannot  be  terms  whose  meaning  is  given  directly  by  paradigrn  examples.  He 
thus,  states  that,  to  this  extent,  it  seems  to  him  that  Plato  was  entirely  right  17 
.  Bostock, 
though,  does  not  commit  himself  in  accepting  that  we  must  have  born  with  an 
understanding  of  the  relevant  concepts".  In  other  words,  he  does  not  want  to  commit 
himself  on  whether  Plato  was  right  to  claim  that  in  this  world  our  sole  source  of 
knowledge  is  perception.  I  would  like  to  argue  though,  that  Bostock  here  pays  no 
17  Bostcwk,  p.  109. 
'a  Bostock,  P.  109. 
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attention  to  the  fact  that  what  Plato  seems  to  be  thinking  as  a  solution,  is  the 
introduction  of  the  Forms.  Thus,  although  Plato  does  not  himself  provide  us  with  a 
process  that  involves  the  three  stages,  sense  perception,  conceptualisation  and 
recollection,  he  seems  to  have  something  like  it  in  mind.  The  introduction  of  the 
Forms,  thus,  is  Plato's  solution  to  making  the  transition,  from  the  one  stage  to  thenext, 
possible.  Unfortunately,  though,  the  recollection  argument  does  not  by  itself  explain 
the  relation  between  the  knowledge  gained  through  the  senses  and  that  obtained  through 
reasoning.  What  it  states  is  that  from  the  senses  one  can  reach  the  object  of  reasoning. 
But  even  this  statement  is  quite  vague,  since  the  only  thing  that  one  knows  is  that  the 
senses  act  as  the  stimuli  for  recollection.  What  one  needs  therefore,  is  a  common 
element,  something  that  would  make  it  possible  to  combine  sense  perception  and 
reasoning. 
This  need  for  a  combination  between  sense  perception  and  reasoning  is  further 
emphasised  by  Plato's  claim  that  knowledge  of  the  Forms  in  this  life  is  derived  and 
grasped  from  particulars.  He  argues  that:  'it  is  definitely  from  the  equal  things,  though 
they  are  different  from  that  Equal,  that  you  have  derived  and  grasped  the  knowledge  of 
equality'  (74c).  Similarly:  'Then  surely  we  also  agree  that  this  conception  of  ours  [the 
Equal]  derives  from  seeing  or  touching  or  some  other  sense-perception,  and  cannot 
come  into  our  mind  in  any  other  way,  for  all  these  senses...  are  the  same'  (75a).  Plato 
firstly  takes  as  given  the  existence  of  the  Form  of  Equality:  '...  we  say  that  there  is 
something  that  is  the  Equal  itself'  (74a),  and  argues  that:  'From  seeing  sticks  or  stones 
or  some  other  things  that  are  equal,  we  come  to  think  of  that  other  [Equality]  which  is 
different  from  them'  (74b),  and  insists  that  one  grasps  knowledge  of  the  Forms  from 
particulars.  When  he  asks:  'When  have  we  acquired  the  knowledge  of  it?  '(74b),  one 
must  keep  in  mind  both  Plato's  concern  with  the  way  in  which  one  gets  knowledge  of 
90 the  Forms  in  this  life,  as  well  as  with  the  significance  of  the  role  of  the  senses  to  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge  of  the  Forms.  Socrates  says  that  we  acquire  knowledge  of  the 
Forms  through  the  senses,  and  Gallop  suggests  two  interpretations.  The  first  is  that  we 
acquired  the  concept  of  Equality  from  sensible  equals.  But  he  objects  that  this  would  be 
a  jejune  answer  to  a  complex  empirical  question;  'Much  more  would  need  to  be  said 
about  how  we  learned  to  compare  and  measure  sensible  things  in  order  to  judge  them 
equal'19.  The  second  interpretation  is  that  Socrates  is  talking  about  the  philosophical 
clarification  of  concepts.  To  this  Gallop  objects  that  his  insistence  that  we  could 
acquire  knowledge  of  the  Form  'Equal'  only  from  sensing  particular  equals  must  seem 
surprising  'in  view  of  his  continual  disparagement  of  the  senses  20 
.  He  appears  to  see 
the  senses  as  'nothing  but  a  hindrance  in  the  quest  for  Forms,  21 
-  The  solution  that  I 
intend  to  propose  in  this  thesis  could  be  seen  as  a  way  to  escape  the  above  two 
difficulties.  By  sensing  the  particulars  one  can  indeed  acquire  knowledge  of  the  Forms, 
but  in  an  indirect  way.  The  recollection  argument  provides  one  with  the  opportunity  not 
to  disparage  the  senses  and  at  the  same  time  not  to  accept  them  as  both  the  necessary 
and  sufficient  means  to  knowledge  of  the  Forms.  The  sensing  of  the  particulars  enables 
one  to  start  the  process  of  recollection;  they  do  not  immediately  provide  one  with 
knowledge  of  the  Forms.  Thus,  by  seeing  equal  sticks  or  stones,  one  can  recollect  the 
Fonn  of  Equality.  It  should  be  pointed  out,  though,  that  since  one  needs  sense 
perception  to  gain  knowledge  of  the  Forms,  Plato's  theory  needs  an  element  able  to 
make  the  transition  from  sensing  particulars  to  knowing  the  Forms.  If  then,  as  it  was 
indicated,  it  is  the  soul  that  has  knowledge,  then  it  is  the  soul  that  must  have  sense 
perception,  which  will  enable  it  to  recollect  the  Fonns. 
19  Gallop,  1975,  p.  121. 
"  Gallop,  ibid. 
21  Gallop,  ibid. 
91 Taking  the  soul  as  the  common  element,  though,  would  require  a  particular  notion  of 
the  soul:  one  needs  to  accept  that  the  soul  is  the  only  medium  for  one  to  attain 
knowledge;  it  is  necessary  for  the  soul  to  be  in  direct  relation  with  the  Forms.  This  is  so 
because  the  Forms  are  for  Plato  the  existences  that  are  unchangeable,  whereas 
everything  in  this  world  is  changeable.  This  is  also  the  reason  why  for  Plato  the  soul 
should  be  immortal:  'we  must  then  have  acquired  the  knowledge  of  the  Equal  before 
this...  It  seems  then  that  we  must  have  possessed  it  before  birth'  (75c).  At  the  same 
time,  the  soul  is  that  which  during  this  life  recollects:  'It  was  seen  to  be  possible  for 
someone  to  see  or  hear  or  perceive  something,  and  by  this  to  be  put  in  mind  of 
something  else  which  he  had  forgotten  and  which  is  related  to  it  by  similarity  or 
difference.  One  of  two  things  follow, 
...  either  we  were  bom  with  the  knowledge  of  it, 
and  all  of  us  know  it  throughout  life,  or  those  who  later 
...  are  learning,  are  only 
recollecting,  and  learning  would  be  recollection'  (76a).  The  recollection  process,  then, 
indicates  the  direct  relation  between  the  soul  and  the  Forms  as  well  as  the  relation 
needed  between  the  soul  and  the  senses,  which  by  extension  requires  a  specific  relation 
of  interdependence  between  the  soul  and  the  body. 
The  Afrinity  Argument 
The  affinity  argument  is  introduced  by  Plato  to  answer  Cebes'  fear  that  even  if  the  soul 
exists  before  we  are  born,  it  might  still  be  destroyed  when  we  die.  As  Socrates  puts  it, 
he  fears  that:  'The  wind  would  really  dissolve  and  scatter  the  soul  as  it  leaves  the  body' 
(77d-e).  This  is  the  third  argument  of  Plato  in  favour  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  To 
begin  with,  Socrates  distinguishes  that  which  is  composite  and  therefore  liable  to  be 
split  up,  from  that  which  is  non-composite  and  not  likely  to  be  split  up  (78c).  The 
second  point  made,  is  to  recognise  that:  'The  things  that  always  remain  the  same  are 
92 most  likely  not  to  be  composite,  whereas  those  that  vary  from  one  time  to  another  and 
are  never  the  same,  are  composite'  (78c).  He  thus  moves  to  the  Forms  and  argues  that 
the  equal  itself,  the  beautiful  itself,  each  thing  in  itself,  the  real,  cannot  be  affected  by 
change  (78d).  On  the  other  hand,  the  beautiful  particulars  do  not  ever  remain  the  same 
as  themselves  or  in  relation  to  each  other  (78e). 
The  second  difference  introduced,  then,  between  Forms  and  particulars  is  that  the 
particulars  could  be  touched,  seen,  perceived  by  the  senses,  but  the  Forms  can  only  be 
grasped  by  the  reasoning  power  of  the  mind,  they  cannot  be  seen;  are  invisible  (79a). 
So,  Plato  assumes  two  kinds  of  existence:  the  visible  and  the  invisible.  The  invisible 
always  remains  the  same,  whereas  the  visible  changes  (79a). 
Plato's  argument,  then,  to  separate  the  Forms  from  the  particulars  is  based  on  three 
characteristics  for  each:  the  Forms  are  unchangeable,  non-composite,  and  invisible, 
while  the  particulars  are  liable  to  change,  composite,  and  visible.  The  difference 
between  Forms  and  particulars,  based  on  the  above  attributes,  is  essential  for  the 
distinction  between  body  and  soul.  Plato  needs  the  Forms  as  existences  separate  from 
anything  visible  so  as  to  argue  in  favour  of  the  soul's  being  indestructible.  He  believes 
I 
that  man  is  both  body  and  soul:  'One  [part]  of  ourselves  is  body  another  [part]  is  soul' 
4wf-I-%%-09A%I  aXXO  TI  TipcA)v  allTCA)V  TO  pEv  acalia  ECTI,  TO  6E  q/UXTI;  "  (79b).  This  presupposition,  then, 
that  one  part  of  man  is  body  and  the  other  soul,  although  taken  for  granted,  can  be 
explained.  Gallop  says  that:  'The  assumption  that  we  are  part  body  and  part  soul...  is 
simply  posited  and  accepted  without  demur  922 
.  In  order  to  show  that  the  soul  is 
indestructible,  he  has  to  show  that  there  is  something  beyond  the  physical,  material,  and 
2'Gallop,  1975,  p.  140. 
93 therefore  visible  world.  By  this  argument  Plato  does  not  only  recognise  two  parts  in 
humans,  but  he  also  claims  that  they  belong  to  different  existences;  the  body  is  visible 
and  therefore  it  belongs  to  the  visible  class  of  existence,  while  the  soul  is  invisible  and 
therefore  more  like  the  invisible  realm,  that  of  the  Forms  (79b-c).  It,  thus,  plays  an 
essential  role  in  establishing  Plato's  view  of  soul  and  body.  Although  the  phrasing: 
6more  like  the  invisible'  is  quite  vague23,  Plato's  interest  is  to  distinguish  effectively  the 
soul  from  the  body,  and  as  a  result  prove  its  immortality.  Plato  implies  then  that  if  the 
only  kind  of  destruction  is  being  broken  up,  and  the  soul  by  being  akin  to  the  Forms  is 
not  composite,  the  soul  is  indestructible  and  therefore  immortal. 
Emphasis  then  is  placed  on  the  soul  itself.  In  particular,  Plato  distinguishes  between  the 
soul  being  by  itself,  and  the  soul  being  embodied:  '-when  the  soul  makes  use  of  the 
body  to  investigate  something,  be  it  through  hearing  or  seeing  or  some  other  sense...  it 
is  dragged  by  the  body  to  the  things  that  are  never  the  same,  and  the  soul  itself  strays 
and  is  confused  and  dizzy,  as  if  it  were  drunk 
.... 
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Kai  auTil  TrXavaTai  Kai  TapaTTETal  Kai  Et  tyyta  coaTrEp  pE  uouca,  ...  '  (79c).  On  the 
contrazy,  'when  the  soul  investigates  by  itself,  it  passes  into  the  realm  of  what  is  pure, 
ever  existing,  immortal  and  unchanging,  and  being  akin  to  this,  it  always  stays  with  it 
whenever  it  is  by  itself...  its  experience  then  is  what  is  called  wisdom'  (79d).  In  that 
way  Plato  concludes  that:  'The  soul  resembles  the  divine  and  the  body  resembles  the 
mortal'  (80a).  By  distinguishing,  however,  between  the  soul  being  by  itself  and  the 
soul  being  embodied,  Plato  needs  to  provide  one  with  a  specific  relation  between  body 
and  soul.  In  other  words,  for  the  soul  to  be  affected  by  the  body  one  needs  the  soul  and 
23  Gallop,  ibid. 
94 the  body  to  be  distinct,  but,  more  importantly,  one  needs  to  establish  an  interrelation 
between  the  two.  As  presented  by  Plato,  the  soul  cannot  just  happen  to  be  embodied; 
such  an  embodiment  cannot  be  seen  as  just  an  imprisonment.  When  embodied,  the  soul 
is  affected  by  the  body  and  that  cannot  be  achieved  unless  it  is  in  a  close  relation  to  the 
body.  Plato  argues  that  the  embodied  soul  uses  the  senses  and  that  results  in  its  being 
distracted.  Such  a  point,  though,  raises  the  question  of  how  the  soul  can  be  unchanging. 
He  parallels  this  state  of  the  soul  with  the  state  of  drunkenness,  and  such  a  metaphor 
implies  that  the  body's  influence  on  the  soul  is  a  negative  one.  What  should  be  noticed, 
though,  is  firstly  that  Plato  does  not  tell  one  explicitly  what  is  that  makes  the  soul 
distracted  by  the  body,  and  secondly  how  is  the  soul  able  to  use  the  senses,  if  the  senses 
are  bodily,  and  the  soul  is  not.  He  does  not  explain  in  other  words,  the  specific  relation 
between  body  and  soul.  Since  soul  is  said  to  be  distracted  by  thý  body  -  due  to  the  use 
of  the  senses  -  the  soul  needs  to  be  in  close  relation  to  the  body. 
What  is  discussed  next  is  the  soul  when  it  is  by  itself.  In  that  state  the  soul  is  in  contact 
with  a  different  realm,  that  of  the  Forms,  which  results  in  its  being  wise.  Indeed,  part  of 
Plato's  argument  may  be  that  in  order  to  know  the  Forms  our  souls  must  belong  in  the 
6  924  same  realm  . 
Our  souls  cannot  therefore  be  capable  of  distraction.  The  statement 
that  the  soul  is  wise  when  in  association  with  the  Forms  suggests  that  Plato  must  have 
believed  that  the  senses  are  a  hindrance  for  the  soul  to  acquire  wisdom  25 
.  It  seems  to 
stress  the  point  that  no  one  is  wise  while  embodied,  which  is  to  say  while  using  the 
senses  (66a  and  79c).  Such  a  claim  could  be  supported  if  one  bring  forward  the 
24VVhat  seems  to  be  implied  here  is  the  notion  of  'like  knows  like'.  Taking  that  for  granted,  if  the  Forms 
belong  in  a  different  order  of  being,  then  what  knows  them  must  at  least  have  access  to  this  order. 
'  Bostock  (p.  98)  makes  a  similar  point;  he  argues  that  the  role  of  the  Form  is  to  be  a  clear  and  - 
unambiguous  example  of  X,  an  example  that  is  not  also  an  example  of  non-X.  He  thus  argues  that  Plato 
supposes  that  if  all  ordinary  sensible  examples  are  thus  ambiguous,  then  an  unambiguous  example  would 
have  to  be  non-sensible. 
95 example  of  the  Line  used  in  the  Republic.  In  this  example,  Plato  divides  between  two 
kinds  of  things;  nmnely,  the  visible  and  the  intelligible  (509d).  But,  such  an  inference 
seems  to  contradict  what  is  said  in  the  recollection  argument,  where  the  senses  are  not  a 
hindrance  but  a  means  to  knowledge.  Perhaps  this  discrepancy  could  be  resolved  if  one 
takes  wisdom  to  mean  ultimate  knowledge.  On  the  other  hand,  knowledge  through 
recollection  would  be  knowledge  gained  in  this  life,  and  somewhat  inferior.  This  is  so 
because  in  this  life  the  soul,  when  recollecting,  uses  the  particulars  as  stepping  stones  to 
the  Forms  but  is  not  in  direct  contact  to  the  Forms. 
A  further  argument  used  by  Plato  to  hold  that  the  soul  is  more  like  the  divine,  is  that  of 
the  soul  being  the  ruler  of  the  body  'when  the  soul  and  the  body  are  together,  nature 
orders  the  one  to  be  subject  and  to  be  ruled,  and  the  other  to  rule  and  be  master.  Then, 
again,  which  do  you  think  is  like  the  divine  and  which  like  the  mortaW  (80a).  The 
reply  then  is  that:  "Obviously,  Socrates,  the  soul  resembles  the  divine,  and  the  body 
resembles  the  mortal"  (80a8-9).  Having  established  then  that:  Me  soul  is  most  like  the 
divine,  deathless,  intelligible,  uniform,  indissoluble,  always  the  same  as  itselt  whereas 
the  body  is  most  like  that  which  is  human,  mortal,  multiform,  unintelligible,  soluble, 
and  never  consistently  the  same'  (80a-b),  Plato  asks  if  the  soul,  being  of  this  kind,  will 
be  scattered  and  destroyed  on  leaving  the  body  (80d).  What  should  be  noted  here  is  the 
implication  that  the  soul  ruling  the  body  has  for  the  relation  of  the  two.  If  the  soul  rules 
the  body,  they  must  obviously  be  connected.  The  significance  for  this  thesis,  then,  lies 
on  the  particular  way  that  soul  and  body  are  connected.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  one  takes 
I 
the  language  of  ruling  literally,  it  implies  that  the  body  understands  and  obeys  the 
commands  of  the  soul.  This  would  imply  that  the  body  is  not  unthinking  matter  but 
shares  an  understanding  with  the  soul.  On  the  other  hand,  the  case  could  be  that  the 
soul  is  not  so  much  the  source  from  which  the  principles  that  govern  the  body  arise,  but 
96 it  is  those  principles.  What  I  would  like  to  argue,  though,  is  that  Plato's  idea  is  that  soul 
and  body  are  actively  involved.  Although  such  a  notion  is  problematic,  it  enables  one 
to  see  how  Plato  moves  from  it  to  a  more  elaborate  notion  of  interaction  between  the 
parts  of  the  soul  and  the  body,  without  having  to  hold  that  body  is  anything  more  than 
matter26. 
Plato,  then,  divides  souls  into  those  that  are  pure  and  those  that  are  impure  after  death. 
If  the  soul  is  pure  and  drags  nothing  bodily  with  it,  it  can  be  happy,  and  truly  spend  the 
rest  of  time  with  the  gods  (8  1  a).  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  soul  is  impure,  having  always 
been  associated  with  the  body,  it  becomes  heavy  and  is  dragged  back  to  the  visible 
region  (8la-c).  Plato  seems  to  introduce  here  a  distinction  between  souls  that  are 
mainly,  if  not  utterly,  involved  in  reasoning,  in  knowing  the  Forms,  and  in  souls  that  are 
so  much  influenced  by  the  bodily  needs  that  do  not  aspire  to  the  Forms.  So  far,  Plato 
talked  about  a  soul  being  deathless,  intelligible,  uniform,  indissoluble,  always  the  same 
as  itself  (80a8-9),  but  the  distinction  between  pure  and  impure  souls  suggests  otherwise. 
In  order  to  be  able  to  distinguish  between  pure  and  impure  souls,  Plato  at  least  seems  to 
commit  himself  to  a  view  of  the  soul  according  to  which  the  soul  is  not  indissoluble  and 
not  always  the  same  to  itself.  It  seems  that  here  Plato  is  constructing  a  view  of  the  soul 
similar  to  the  one  presented  in  later  dialogues  where  the  soul  is  presented  as  being 
composite.  The  composite  soul  can  partially  answer  the  question  'what  does  Plato 
mean  by  pure/  impure  soul.  The  composite  embodied  soul  could  be  seen  as  impure 
because,  being  associated  with  the  body,  it  is  involved  in  activities  other  than  reasoning. 
But  for  a  soul  that  is  simple,  there  are  no  criteria  offered  for  distinguishing  between 
pure  and  impure  souls.  Even  if  we  accept  that  Plato  could  define  a  pure  soul  as  a  soul 
that  concentrates  on  the  pursue  of  knowledge,  and  an  impure  one  as  a  soul  that  is 
I'Tbis  idea  will  be  explored  in  the  Republic  and  the  Timaeus. 
97 satisfied  with  the  experiences  gained  through  the  senses,  the  question  that  remains 
unanswered  is  whether  it  is  possible  to  talk  of  a  pure  soul  in  this  human  life.  The 
evidence  provided  in  the  Recollection  argument  would  seem  to  suggest  that  there  could 
never  be  a  pure  soul  within  this  realm. 
Plato  argues  ftuther  that  the  pure  soul  moves  to  a  different  realm;  that  of  the  gods,  while 
the  impure  soul,  due  to  its  association  with  the  body,  is  'imprisoned'  again  in  a  body 
(81c).  He  therefore  distinguishes  between  the  souls  of  the  philosophers  -  who  have  as 
little  contact  with  the  body  as  possible  -  and  the  souls  of  ordinary  men  -  who  according 
to  Plato  are  bewitched  by  the  bodily,  desires  and  pleasures.  Moreover,  the  souls  of 
'inferior'  men  are  reincarnated  according  to  their  character:  '...  they  are  then  ... 
boundto 
such  characters  as  they  have  practised  in  their  life'  (8  1  e). 
The  distinction  between  the  soul's  purity  and  impurity  after  death  is  another  important 
point  for  the  relation  between  body  and  soul.  Plato  argues  that  the  soul  is  impure 
because  of  its  association  with  the  body.  What  is  not  explained,  though,  is  how  the  soul 
can  be  affected  by  the  body.  Although  Plato's  talk  is  metaphorical  and  it  is  difficult  to 
see  its  literal  meaning,  Plato  is  facing  the  need  to  establish  a  close  relation  between  soul 
and  body,  and  this  is  essential  for  this  thesis.  This  need  will  lead  to  the  notion  of 
interrelation  of  soul  and  body  in  the  Timaeus  where  he  not  only  refers  to  the  soul  being 
impure,  but  also  shows  exactly  how  the  soul  can  be  affected  by  its  embodiment. 
The  distinction,  now,  between  the  philosopher  and  ordinary  men  is  based  upon  how 
'close  an  association  there  is  between  the  soul  and  the  body.  Plato  goes  on  in  showing 
the  role  that  philosophy  plays  for  men.  After  having  distinguished  between  'lovers  of 
learning'  and  ordinary  men,  Plato  says  that  philosophy  enables  the  soul  to  understand 
98 that  the  soul  is  tied  up  to  the  body:  Me  lovers  of  learning  know  that  when  philosophy 
gets  hold  of  their  soul,  it  is  imprisoned  in  and  clinging  to  the  body,  and  that  it  is  forced 
to  examine  other  things  through  it  as  through  a.  cage  and  not  by  itself,  and  that  it 
wallows  in  every  kind  of  ignorance'  'YIYV6CYKOUCI  YC'(p,  ý8  '05,01  ýAopaeits  O'TI 
irapaXapoýca  all'TCSV  'V  0  'V  ý  ýIXOCOýIa  dTEXVC35  &acF.  F&,  uZMYEV  TCý  cxýpaTl  Kal  TTI  Xn 
irpoamo,  U)YAFIRM  avaYKa;  opEvijv  6s  rASGITEP  61a  EIPYP05  81(1  T06TOU  CKOTr6c6al  Ta 
W  OVTa  aMa  11)  a6  )v  61  aiýýg,  Kal  Ev  iTdaq  dpaeiq  KuXiv6oupEvnv'  [my  italics]  (82e).  TI  T11  I 
But,  according  to  Plato,  the  worst  thing  about  this  restraint  is  that  the  soul  examines 
things  outside  itself-,  it  is involved  with  desires:  'Philosophy  sees  that  the  worst  feature 
of  this  imprisonment  is  that  it  is  due  to  desires,  so  that  the  prisoner  himself  is 
contributing  to  his  own  incarceration  most  of  all' 
4Ka'I  TOU-  EIPYP09  T7)V  661VOTTIT(X 
KaTl6o5cya  O*TI  61'  i'Trieuptas  EaTiv,  65  av  paMaTa 
dTO'g  6  WEIIEVOS  CrUXX4TrTC,  3P  ETTI 
T09  Mickt'  (82e).  Although  the  language  in  82e  is  complex,  Plato  seems  to  argue 
that  the  soul  is  tied  up  -  diadedeme/nhn  -  and  glued  or  fastened  - 
TrPOCrKEKO)ATIIIEVTIV  -  to 
the  body.  It  seems,  then,  as  if  the  soul  sees  reality  as  though  through  bars  of  a  cage  - 
Bia  Eipypou  -  knowing  that  it  is  the  cause  of  its  own  binding.  Such  imagery,  thýs, 
implies  that  the  soul  is  not  merely  imprisoned  to  the  body  like  a  prisoner  in  a  cell,  but 
rather  that  the  body  distorts  the  soul's  judgement;  it  is  the  desires  that  'bind'  or 
I  imprison'  the  soul. 
Therefore,  the  role  of  philosophy  is  to:  'persuade  the  soul  to  withdraw  from  the  senses, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  not  compelled  to  use  them,  and  bids  the  soul  to  gather  itself  together  by 
itself,  to  trust  only  itself  and  whatever  reality  existing  by  itself,  the  soul  by  itself 
understands,  and  not  consider  as  true  whatever  it  examines  by  other  means,  for  this  is 
different  in  different  circlim  tances  and  is  sensible  and  visible,  whereas  what  the  soul 
itself  sees  is  intelligible  and  invisible'  (83b).  In  other  words,  philosophy  persuades  the 
99 soul  to  'gather  itself  by  itself  otherwise  it  -  by  experiencing  pleasure  or  pain  -  is  welded 
to  the  body  (83d).  This  seems  to  imply  that  if  Plato  held  soul  and  body  to  be  distinct, 
then  he  wouldn't  need  to  argue  in  favour  of  philosophy.  On  the  contrary  Plato  says  that 
the  soul,  when  not  concentrating  on  philosophy,  is  made  corporeal  (83d).  Since  'it  [the 
soul]  is  always  full  of  body  when  it  departs,  so  that  it  soon  falls  back  to  a  body  and 
grows  with  it....  '  (83d-e),  the  soul  seems  unable  to  reach  a  pure  state.  It  should  also  be 
mentioned  here  that  Plato  could  not  treat  the  soul  as  something  completely  non- 
physical,  because  if  he  did  he  wouldn't  be  able  to  hold  that  the  souls  of  ordinary  men 
are  'full  of  body'.  The  Affinity  argument  finishes  with  Plato's  claim  that:  'The  soul  of 
the  philosopher  achieves  a  calm  from  such  emotions  [pleasures  and  pains];  it  follows 
reason  and  ever  stays  with  it  contemplating  the  true,  the  divine  which  is  not  the  ob  ect 
of  opinion'  (84a).  What  such  a  quotation  indicates,  then,  is  not  that  soul  and  body  are 
completely  separate  from  each  other,  but  rather  that  the  soul  is  able  to  concentrate  on 
itself.  This  is  how  Plato  says  that  one  'should  live 
...  and  after  death,  arrive  at  what  is 
akin  and  of  the  same  kind'  (84b).  Plato  concludes  that:  '...  after  such  nurture  there  is  no 
danger  that  one  should  fear  that,  on  parting  from  the  body,  the  soul  would  be  scattered 
and  dissipated  by  the  winds  and  no  longer  be  anything  anywhere'  (84b). 
Simmias'  and  Cebes'  Objections 
Following  the  Affinity  argument,  are  Simmias'  and  Cebes'  objections.  Simmias 
discusses  the  soul  as  being  parallel  to  the  attunement  of  a  lyre  (85e  ff.  ),  and  Cebes 
compares  it  with  the  weaver  of  a  series  of  cloaks  (87a-88b).  Both  objections  have  to  do 
with  the  fact  that  the  soul  although  it  was  shown  to  exist  prior  to  death,  can  perish  at 
100 death". 
To  show  the  inadequacy  of  Socrates'  argument  he  argues  that:  '...  a  harmony  is 
something  invisible,  without  body,  beautiful  and  divine  in  the  attuned  lyre,  whereas  the 
lyre  itself  and  its  strings  are  physical,  bodily,  composite,  earthly  and  akin  to  what  is 
mortal'  (85e-86a).  Simmias,  then,  uses  the  characteristics  attributed  to  the  soul  in  the 
afrmity  argument  to  draw  a  parallel  between  the  soul  and  harmony  or  attunement.  He 
ftuther  argues  that  someone  who  accepts  the  affinity  argument,  would  also  be  obliged  to 
hold  that;  if  the  lyre  is  destroyed,  'the  harmony  must  still  exist  ...  because  it  would  be 
impossible  for  the  lyre  and  the  strings,  which  are  mortal,  still  to  exist  when  the  strings 
are  broken,  and  for  the  harmony,  which  is  akin  and  of  the  same  nature  as  the  divine  and 
immortal,  to  be  destroyed  before  that  which  is  mortal...  '  (86a-b).  The  argument,  thus,  is 
that  the  properties  ascribed  earlier  to  the  soul  -unseen,  incorporeal,  and  divine  -  belong 
also  to  the  attunement.  But  just  as  an  attunement  does  not  outlast  lyre  and  strings,  so 
the  soul's  possession  of  these  properties  need  not  entail  that  it  outlasts  the  body. 
Simmias  goes  on  to  claim  that:  '...  as  the  body  is  stretched  and  held  together  by  the  hot 
and  the  cold,  the  dry  and  the  moist,  and  other  such  things,  and  our  soul  is  a  mixture  and 
harmony  of  those  things  when  they  are  mixed  with  each  other  in  due  measure'  (86b-c). 
Simmias  here  implies  that  the  soul  is  the  balance  needed  among  the  physical  elements 
of  the  body.  In  that  way,  he  presents  the  parallel  between  soul  and  harmony  as  a  direct 
one.  The  soul  is  a  'mixture'  of  the  basic,  physical  elements,  and  harmony  is  a  mixture 
of  notes.  He  thus  claims  that:  'if  then  the  soul  is  a  kind  of  harmony,  when  our  body  is 
relaxed  or  stretched  without  due  measure  by  diseases  and  other  evils,  the  soul  must 
immediately  be  destroyed...  '  (86c).  There  are  two  main  points  that  should  be  raised 
27  Gallop,  1975,  p.  146. 
101 here;  firstly,  although  it  is  tempting  to  suppose  that  Sinunias  brings  forth  a  Pythagorean 
view,  as  Bostock  rightly  points  OUj28'  this  can  be  challenged  if  one  bears  in  mind  that 
the  Pythagoreans  also  believed  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  It  should  be  noted  then 
that  although  the  Pythagoreans  may  have  combined  the  notion  of  harmony  to  the 
reincarnation  of  the  soul,  there  is  no  evidence  that  in  fact  they  treated  the  soul  as 
harmony  or  as  harmonious  29.  At  best,  one  can  argue  that  taken  Pythagoras'  view  of  the 
world  as  exhibiting  order,  harmonia,  and  his  belief  that  the  soul  is  part  of  the  world,  one 
could  hold  that  the  two  views  can  be  combined,  as  F.  M.  Comford  argues,  the  same 
order  that  is  found  on  a  large  scale  in  the  universe  could  be  found  on  a  small  scale  in 
individualS30.  Therefore,  as  Bostock  quite  rightly  argues,  it  would  be  more  plausible  to 
draw  a  parallel  between  a  man's  health  and  attunement,  rather  than  between  the  soul 
and  attunemen0l. 
The  second  point  is  that  for  a  parallel  between  soul  and  attunement  to  work,  the  soul 
will  have  to  consist  in  a  balance  or  harmony  among  the  elements  of  something.  Plato 
nowhere  in  the  dialogue  suggests  such  a  view.  On  the  contrary,  according  to  the 
Affinity  argument,  in  order  for  the  soul  to  be  immortal,  Plato  needs  the  soul  to  be 
simple,  non-composite,  and  distinct  from  the  body.  Having  said  that,  though,  one 
cannot  but  ask  how  Plato's  argument  would  hold  against  the  attunement  parallel  if  the 
soul  were  composite  32 
.A  possible  answer  to  such  a  question  would  have  to  be  that  the 
soul  although  composite  involves  more  than  a  mixture  of  bodily  elements.  The  fact  that 
28  Bostock  (123)  does  not  want  to  commit  himself  in  such  a  view,  because,  as  he  says,  maybe  such  a 
belief  was  held  by  some  Pythagoreans.  The  same  point  is  held  by  Gallop,  1975,  p.  148. 
2'There  is  reasonable  ground  to  claim  that  Simmias'  view  actually  goes  beyond  the  Pythagorean  view  of 
harmony.  See  further  F.  M.  Cornford,  'Mysticism  and  Science  in  the  Pythagorean  Tradition,  Classical 
Quarterly  16  (1922)  145-148;  IL  B.  Gottschalk,  'Soul  as  Harmonia',  Phronesis  16,  pp  192-193. 
30  Cornford,  1922,  pp  142-143. 
31  Bostock,  p.  124 
32  The  composite  soul  is  discussed  in  later  Platonic  dialogues;  the  dialogues  that  I  will  examine,  which 
involve  such  a  view,  are  the  Republic,  the  Phaedrus  and  the  Timaeus. 
102 Plato  does  not  see  the  soul  as  depending  on  the  combination  of  material  elements  is 
made  evident  by  the  view  of  soul  as  it  is  presented  in  the  recollection  argument  and  is 
also  held  in  the  Republic  and  Timaeus.  Plato  presents  the  soul,  or  part  of  it,  as 
something  that  has  the  ability  to  know  the  Forms.  To  know  the  Forms  requires  the  soul 
to  be  something  other  than  the  body.  The  theory  of  Forms  requires  the  soul  to  be  in 
contact  with  this  physical  world,  and  therefore  with  the  body,  but  at  the  same  time  it 
requires  that  the  soul  has  the  ability  to  know  the  Forms;  a  kind  of  knowledge  that 
cannot  come  from  this  world.  Although  such  a  view  creates  various  problems  for  Plato, 
the  point  that  cannot  be  refuted  is  that  if  one  combines  the  recollection  argument  with 
the  afflinity  argument,  the  attunement  parallel  is  weakened. 
Another  objection  to  S  immias'  point  is  that  harmony  is  explicitly  dependent  on  the  lyre, 
whereas  the  soul,  in  Plato's  view,  is  not  dependent  on  the  body;  rather,  the  body  in 
order  to  be  alive  depends  on  the  soul.  Thus,  even  if  the  soul  is  not  separate  from  the 
body,  Plato  nowhere  holds  that  it  is  a  result  of  the  body" 
.  So,  although  the  soul's 
possession  of  the  previously  mentioned  properties  need  not  entail  that  soul  outlasts 
body,  at  the  same  time,  the  possession  cannot  by  itself  indicate  that  the  soul  will  be  lost 
after  the  body's  destruction,  just  like  harmony  will  be  lost  after  the  destruction  of  the 
lyre. 
The  dialogue  continues  with  the  presentation  of  Cebes'  objection.  Cebes  holds  that 
although  the  argument  sufficiently  proved  the  soul's  existence  before  its  being 
embodied,  it  did  not  prove  its  existing  somewhere  after  our  death  (87a).  To  explain  this 
point,  Cebes  uses  the  example  of  the  old  weaver:  '...  as  if  one  said  at  the  death  of  an  old 
331.  C.  Plato  rejects  any  view  of  the  soul  as  supervenient  on  the  body. 
103 weaver  that  the  man  had  not  perished  but  was  safe  and  sound  somewhere,  and  offered 
as  proof  the  fact  that  the  cloak  the  old  man  had  woven  himself  and  was  wearing  was 
still  sound  and  had  not  perished...  But...  That  does  not  mean  that  a  man  is  inferior  and 
weaker  than  a  cloak.  The  image,  then,  is  that  the  weaver  wears  out  many  cloaks.  But 
the  fact  that  one  cloak  still  exists  when  he  dies,  does  not  prove  that  he  still  exists. 
Similarly,  even  if  the  soul  outlasts  any  particular  body,  that  does  not  prove  that  it  is 
immortal'  (87b-d).  Cebes  thus  concludes:  "we  cannot  trust  this  argument  and  be 
confident  that  our  soul  continues  to  exist  somewhere  after  our  death"  (87e-88a).  Cebes 
therefore  needs  a  further  premise  in  order  to  be  able  to  hold  that  the  soul  survives  bodily 
death.  '...  But  if  having  granted  all  this,  one  does  not  further  agree  that  the  soul  is  not 
damaged  by  its  many  births  and  is  not,  in  the  end  altogether  destroyed  in  one  of  those 
deaths,  he  might  say  that  no  one  knows  which  death  and  dissolution  of  the  body  brings 
about  the  destruction  of  the  soul,  since  not  one  of  us  can  be  aware  of  this'  (88a-b). 
Socrates'  task,  then,  would  be  to  prove  that  the  soul  is  altogether  immortal  (88b). 
Socrates'  Reply  to  Simmias 
Socrates'  first  point  against  Simmias'  harmony  argument  is  to  ask  both  Simmias  and 
Cebes  whether  they  accept  the  recollection  theory.  Both  Simmias  and  Cebes  reaffhm 
that  they  accept  that  'learning  is  recollection'  and  that  'our  soul  must  of  necessity  exist 
elsewhere  before  us,  before  it  was  imprisoned  in  the  body'  (9le-92a).  What  is  worth 
noticing,  at  this  point,  is  the  emphasis  that  Plato  places  on  the  acceptaneq  of  the 
recollection  argument.  This  emphasis  is  significant  since  it  implies  the  deep  belief  of 
Plato  on  the  notion  that  souls  exist  independently  of  the  body. 
Hence,  since  Sinimias  accepts  the  above,  Socrates  is  able  to  bring  forward  the  first 
104 counterexample  against  the  harmony  argument.  If  Simmias  holds  that:  'a  harmony  is  a 
composite  thing  and  that  the  soul  is  a  kind  of  harmony  of  the  elements  of  the  body'  he 
cannot  maintain  that:  'a  composite  harmony  existed  before  those  elements  from  which  it 
had  to  be  composed'  (92b).  Socrates,  in  other  words,  argues  that  Simmias'  claim  is 
laiat: 
PIA  harmony  is  a  composite  thing. 
P2  The  soul  is  a  kind  of  harmony  of  the  elements  of  the  body. 
P3  A  composite  harmonY  cannot  exist  before  the  elements  that  it  is  composed  of. 
This  would  imply  the  conclusion: 
//C  Soul  cannot  exist  before  body. 
But,  as  Simmias  has  already  agreed,  according  to  the  recollection  argument  the  soul 
exists  before  the  body. 
In  that  way,  Plato  shows  that  the  harmony  theory  is  in  conflict  with  the  recollection 
theory.  Socrates  shows  that  soul  cannot  be  harmony,  since  harmony  cannot  exist  prior 
to  its  instruments,  whereas  soul  can  exist  prior  to  body.  In  Socrates'  own  words:  'A 
harmony  is  not  like  that  to  which  you  compare  it,  ...  the  harmony  is  composed  last  of 
all,  and  is  first  to  be  destroyed'  (92b-c).  Simmias,  then,  abandons  the  harmony  theory 
because  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  recollection  theory. 
The  next  difference  between  harmony  34  and  soul,  as  Socrates  clearly  shows  to  Simmias, 
is  that  harmony  is  directed  by  the  elements  it  is  composed  of  (93a).  Socrates  shows 
such  a  point  by  arguing  that  'Po  you  think  it  is  natural  for  a  hannony,  or  any  other 
composite  to  be  in  different  state  from  that  of  the  elements  of  which  it  is  composedT 
(92e-93a).  He,  thus,  forces  Simmias  to  admit  that  harmony  and  the  elements  it  is 
347be  Greek  word  translated  as  either  harmony  or  attimement  is  appow  a. 
105 composed  of  have  to  be  in  the  same  state.  Such  a  point  Will  become  clear  later  at  94b. 
The  next  argument  of  Plato  against  the  harmony  theory  is  considered  to  be  complicated 
and  not  easy  to  be  analysed  35 
.  Socrates  asks:  'Does  not  the  nature  of  each  harmony 
depend  on  the  way  it  has  been  harmonised?  '  (93a).  Since  Simmias  says  that  he  does  not 
understand  Socrates'  question,  Socrates  asks:  'Will  it  not,  if  it  is  more  and  more  fully 
harmonised,  be  more  and  more  fully  a  harmony,  and  if  it  is  less  and  less  harmonised,  it 
will  be  less  and  less  fiilly  a  harmony'  (93a-b).  And  this  is  another  difference  between 
harmony  and  soul,  since  the  above  does  not  apply  to  soul.  One  cannot  say  that:  '...  one 
soul  is  more  and  more  fully  a  soul  than  another,  or  is less  and  less  fully  a  soul,  even  to 
the  smallest  extent'  (93b).  The  problem  with  the  above  distinction  is  that  one  cannot 
say  explicitly  what  it  is  meant  by  a  harmony  if  it  is  more  or  less  harmonised,  being  more 
or  less  a  harmony36  .  The  importance,  though,  for  this  thesis  is  that  the  souls  do  not 
admit  of  degrees.  Souls  can  be  distinguished  into  those  that  have  intelligence  and  virtue 
and  are  good,  and  those  that  have  folly  and  wickedness  and  are  bad  (93c).  Socrates 
states  that  the  good  souls  are  harmonious  while  the  bad  ones  are  inharmonious.  Those 
who  claim,  then,  that  soul  is  harmony  must  say  either  that  there  can  be  a  harmony  of  a 
harm  ony,  or  that  being  a  soul  is  a  matter  of  degrees  -  that  one  can  be  more  or  less  of  a 
soul.  But,  since  neither  of  these  suggestions  is  acceptable,  the  soul  as  harmony  theory 
has  to  be  re  .  ected.  Plato's  statement  that  good  souls  contain  attunement,  and  bad  souls 
contain  nonattimement  (93c3-8)  would  be  incompatible  with  Simmias'  attunement 
theory,  but  also  with  Plato's  suggestion  that  soul  is  non-composite  37 
. 
Gallop  further 
claims:  'if  attunement  or  non-attunement  can  be  obtained  only  by  that  which  is 
35According  to  Gallop  (1975,  p.  157),  the  section  that  follows,  namely,  93al  1-94b3  is  extremely  difficult, 
and  its  analysis  Ternains  highly  problematic. 
36Gallop,  1975,  pp.  159-160. 
37Gallop,  1975,  p.  161. 
106 composite,  they  would  require  a  different  account  of  the  soul  from  that  which  the 
Phaedo  suggests'38  . 
What  should  be  taken  under  consideration,  next,  is  that  Plato  elsewhere  in  the  Phaedo 
treats  the  soul  as  being  incomposite.  For  example,  in  the  recollection  theory  an  in  the 
affinity  argument.  The  harmony  argument,  on  the  other  hand,  shows  that  Plato  could 
not  speak  of  the  soul  as  being  harmonious  unless  it  was  composite.  But  could  Plato 
hold  that  the  soul  is  composite  without  abandoning  his  idea  that  the,  soul  is  distinct  from 
the  body?  A  solution  to  such  a  problem  would  be  viable  if  Plato  held  two  different 
views  on  what  is  composite.  Thus,  the  soul  could  be  composite  without  being  the 
mixture  of  hot,  cold,  dry  or  moist  as  Simmias  holds.  The  soul  is  composite  at  both  the 
Republic  and  the  Timaeus.  Gallop  says  that  Plato  recognises  and  tries  to  resolve  the 
conflict  between  the  doctrine  of  a  composite  soul  and  that  of  immortality  at  Republic 
39  611alO-612a7  .  What  I  would  like  to  addto  it  is  that  the  wayPlato  treats  the  soul  in 
the  Timaeus  -  as  being  composite  and  being  able  to  achieve  harmony  -  indicate  finther 
that  he  did  not  disregard  the  harmony  theory  altogether. 
Socrates'  last  point  against  harmony  (94b-95a)  is  related  to  the  point  made  earlier  -  that 
harmony  is  directed  by  its  elements  (93a).  '  Here  again  Plato  argues  that  the  soul  rules 
man  and  that  it  opposes  the  affections  of  the  body  (94c).  Plato,  here,  attributes  to  the 
body  qualities  like  thirst  and  hunger.  What  this  concept  implies  is  that  the  soul  is 
considered  as  only  the  reasoning  element.  Tbus,  as  Gallop  states,  the  harmony  differs 
from  the  soul  in  -that  'a  lyre's  attunement  depcnds  wholly  upon  the  state  and 
relationship  of  its  material  components,  whereas  they  in  no  way  depend  upon  it.  The 
38Gallop,  ibid. 
39Gallop,  ibid. 
107 causal  relation  is  in  one  direction  only.  By  contrast,  the  soul  is  not  only  acted  upon  by 
the  bodily  elements,  but  acts  upon  them.  This  is  the  point  at  which  the  attunement 
theory  breaks  down.  '40.  What  should  be  stressed  once  more,  though,  is  that,  what 
I 
would  follow  from  Plato's  argument  is  that  the  soul  is  not  an  attunement  of  bodily 
feeling,  not  that  it  is  not  an  attunement  at  all4l. 
Socrates'  Reply  to  Cebes 
Socrates  summarises  Cebes'  objection.  He  says  that  Cebes  thinks:  '...  the  soul  must  be 
proven  to  be  innnortal  and  indestructible...  to  prove  that  the  soul  is  strong,  that  it  is 
divine...  all  this...  does  not  show  the  soul  to  be  immortal  but  only  long-lasting'  (95c). 
Socrates  then  treats  Cebes'  objection  as  requiring  an  'investigation  of  the  cause  of 
generation  and  destruction'  (96a).  Socrates  thus  refers  to  'natural  science'  which 
enables  one  to  find  the  'causes  of  everything'  (96a).  The  important  question  raised  here 
is  whether  people  think  with  their  blood  or  air  or  fire  or  none  of  these  and  whether  the 
brain  provides  people  with  their  senses  (96b),  and  whether:  '...  the  brain  provide  our 
senses  of  hearing  and  sight  and  smell,  from  which  come  memory  and  opinion,  and  from 
memory  and  opinion  which  has  become  stable,  comes  knowledgeT  '6  6  iYKE#XO!; 
9%I- E=V 
6  TC(5  aitaffilcrEis  napiXCAW  TOO  dKOUEIV  Kai  opaV  Kall  &#a'tvec0ai,  &  TOUTCOV  6i 
yI,  yVOITO  11VTI'PYI  Kali  66ga,  EK  5E  PV11'PTIS  Kal  6o'gTjs  XaPOURS  T6  ý11EPIE71V,  .  KaTa  TaOTa 
yiyvcaOai  Ema-rýpqv;  '  (96b).  These  questions  are  important  for  this  thesis  since 
Socrates  is  clearly  raising  the  possibility  of  a  materialistic  account  of  the  human  mind. 
Realising  that  he  did  not  know  the  cause  of  things,  Socrates  moves  into  providing  one 
'Gallop,  1975,  p.  167. 
41GaHop,  ibid.  For  an  analysis  of  soul  as  harmonious  see  further  the  Timaeus  image  of  soul's  circles. 
108 with  another  method:  'I  do  not  any  longer  persuade  myself  that  I  know  why  a  unit  or 
anything  else  comes  to  be,  or  perishes,  or  exists  by  the  old  method  of  investigation,  and 
I  do  not  accept  it  but  I  have  a  confused  method  of  my  own'  (97c).  Plato  in  that  way 
introduces  a  teleological  explanation;  namely,  the  idea  of  everything  being  done  for  the 
good.  Socrates  says  according  to  Anaxagoras'  doctrine:  'it  is  Mind  that  directs  and  is 
the  cause  of  everything',  '...  voG!  g  iaTtv  o  6taKOC111CSV  TE  Kal  -rrdv-rcav  alIT105"  (97c). 
What  Socrates  is  looking  for  in  Anaxagoras"  saying  is  to  see  how  anything  that  comes 
to  be  or  perishes  does  so  for  the  best  (97d).  Socrates'  objection  to  Anaxagoras  is  that 
although  he  uses  'Mind'  as  directing  everything,  he  brings  in  other  'causes  than  that  it 
was  best  for  them  to  be  as  they  are'  (98b).  Anaxagoras,  according  to  Socrates,  'made 
no  use  of  Mind,  nor  gave  it  any  responsibility  for  management  of  things,  but  mentioned 
as  causes  air  and  ether  and  water  and  many  other  strange  things'  (98b-c).  Socrates, 
hence,  cannot  accept  this  doctrine,  because  he  finds  it  inconsistent.  Socrates  believes 
that  once  Anaxagoras  'had  given  the  best  for  each  as  the  cause  for  each  and  the  general 
cause  of  all'  (98b),  he  should  have  gone  on  'to  explain  the  common  good  for  all'.  Tbus, 
Socrates  is  looking  for  something  that  would  enable  him  to  explain  everything 
according  to  what  is  best  for  them.  It  is  crucial  then  to  notice  that  Socrates  here  seems 
to  almost  equate  the  claim  that  the  universe  is  directed  by  vo0s  to  the  claim  that 
everything  is  directed  to  the  best.  This,  in  turn,  points  toward  a  notion  that  the  fact  that 
we  have  mind  implies  that  our  actions  must  be  explained  by  reference  to  what  we  think 
as  good.  There  is  then  a  parallel  between  human  action  and  the  universe.  The  human 
mind  is  seen  as  either  having  something  analogous  to  the  divine  vous,  or  as 
participating  in  the  divine  vo5s  that  governs  the  universe.  Such  a  view  is  important 
since  it  seems  to  raise  questions  about  the  relation  of  the  hinnan  soul  and  this  voGs.  It 
looks  as  though  the  soul  is  identified  with  that  element  of  vo5s  that  is  in  humans. 
109 Furthermore,  although  there  is  no  implication  that  mind  must  be  separate  from  body, 
Socrates  argues  strongly  that,  bodily  explanations  are  inadequate.  To  explain  this  point, 
Socrates  uses  the  example  of  himself  sitting  in  prison;  Socrates'  argument  is  that  the 
reason  he  is  in  prison  is  not  because  of  his  body;  due  to  the  way  it  consists  of  bones  and 
sinews  (98c-d).  Socrates  says  that:  'these  sinews  and  bones  could  long  ago  have  been 
in  Megara  or  among  the  Boetians,  taken  there  by  "my"  belief  as  to  the  best  course,  if  I 
had  not  thought  it  more  right  and  honourable  to  endure  whatever  penalty  the  city 
ordered  rather  than  escape  and  rim  away'  (99a).  Thus,  Socrates'  concern  is  about  the 
'true  cause'.  It  is  important  to  note,  here,  that  due  to  the  ambiguity  of  the  textý  there  are 
two  ways  to  read  the  above  quotation.  Tirstly,  following  the  above  translation  of 
Grube,  the  distinction  between  a  physical  cause  and  a  teleoldgical  explanation  seems  to 
be  quite  straightforward.  Secondly,  if  one  looks  at  the  Gallop's  translation  -  'these 
sinews  and  bones  would  long  since  have  been  off  in  Megara  or  Boetia,  impelled  by 
their  [my  italics]  judgement  of  what  was  best...  '  -  the  text  is  taken  as  literally  implying 
f  42.  that  the  body  can  have  belie  s  7bus,  the  ambiguity  is  apparent.  I  would  like  to  hold 
that  although  the  text  is  not  taken  literally,  it  does  suggest  that  what  we  would  think 
best  can  be  determined  by  whether  we  are  dominated  by  the  body  or  not.  Socrates' 
main  purpose  is  to  explain  things  in  terms  of  the  best.  Hence,  he  provides  one  with  the 
distinction  between  a  physical  efficient  cause,  and  a  teleological  explanation  that 
derives  from  something  different;  namely  thinking.  In  turn,  such  a  distinction  implies 
the  recognition  of  both  a  soul  and  a  body  within  men.  This  is  also  shown  later  on  the 
dialogue  where  Plato  does  not  disregard  the  role  of  the  bones  and  the  sinews  altogether, 
he  truly  recognises  that  they  are  necessary,  but  he  places  emphasis  to  the  point  that  they 
cannot  act  as  the  cause  of  Socrates'  actions:  'If  someone  said  that  without  bones  and 
sinews  and  all  such  things,  I  should  not  be  able  to  do  what  I  decided,  he  would  be  right, 
42Gallop,  1975,  p.  51. 
110 but  surely  to  say  that  they  are  the  cause  of  what  I  do,  and  not  that  I  have  chosen  the  best 
course,  even  though  I  act  with  my  mind,  is  to  speak  very  lazily  and  carelessly'  (99a). 
Socrates  would  not  be  able  to  act  out  his  decision  without  his  body  -  for  example,  if  his 
body  had  a  severe  handicap.  But,  what  is  of  importance,  as  it  was  pointed  out  earlier,  is 
that  the  decision  is  not  made  by  the  body.  The  key  distinction  then  is  between  a  cause 
and  that  without  which  it  could  not  be  a  cause.  Thus,  Plato's  voý!;  is  distinct  from  the 
body  due  to  its  teleological  function. 
Thus,  having  established  that  his  interest  lies  in  finding  'the  real  cause'  (99b),  Socrates 
claims  that  he:  'must  take  refuge  in  discussions  and  investigate  the  truth  of  things  by 
means  of  words'  (99e).  When  Socrates  talks  about  'the  real  cause',  it  seems  that  he 
wants  to  explain  things  in  non-physical  terms;  but,  in  order  to  do  so,  he  needs  to 
incorporate  in  his  doctrine  an  entity  which  will  be  able  to  see  what  is  the  best.  One 
could  argue  that  Socrates'  insistence  on  the  'real  cause',  on  finding  what  is  the  best; 
what  is  the  ultimate  good  for  everything  individually  and  collectively,  implies  that  he 
wants  to  explain  everything  in  terms  of  intentionality.  He  wants  to  separate  reason 
explanations  from  causal  explanations.  The  former  is  based  on  the  soul's  beliefs, 
intentions,  while  the  latter  is  based  on  bodily  elements.  Although,  then,  an  intentional 
explanation  may  not  be  incompatible  with  physicalism,  Plato's  view  implies  a  separate 
status  for  the  reasoning  element  of  the  soul.  An  intentional  explanation  is  part  of  a 
wider  pattern  of  a  teleological  explanation  for  the  universe  as  a  whole.  Such  an 
explanation  is  bound  up  with  the  Forms  and  in  particular  the  Form  of  the  good.  As 
Plato  has  already  argued,  one's  knowledge  of  the  Forms  presupposes  that  there  is 
ill something  in  one  that  belongs  to  the  realms  of  the  FormS43.  Plato,  then,  recognises  that 
he  starts  with  the  hypothesis  about  the  existence  of  the  Forms:  '...  assume  the  existence 
of  a  Beautiful,  itself  by  itself,  of  a  Good  and  a  Great  and  all  the  rest'  (100b).  Having 
got  Cebes'  agreement  on  the  above  hypothesis,  Socrates  states  that  the  cause  that 
something  is,  for  example,  beautiful  is  because  it  shares  in  beauty:  '...  if  there  is 
anything  beautiful  besides  the  Beautiful  itself,  it  is  beautiful  for  no  other  reason  than 
that  it  shares  in  that  Beautiful  and  I  say  so  with  everything'  (100c).  So,  for  Plato  the 
'cause'  of  something  being  beautiful  is  that  it  shares  in  that  Beautiful.  Cebes  then 
agrees  with  Socrates  that:  '...  it  is  through  beauty  that  all  beautiful  things  are  made 
beautiful...  '  (100e),  and  such  a  relation  between  the  Form  of  something  and  particular 
things  applies  also  to  big  things,  small  things,  and  the  like. 
The  Final  Argument 
Plato  in  the  final  argument,  now,  shows  a  difference  between  the  Forms  and  particulars: 
i...  not  only  Talhiess  itself  is  never  willing  to  be  tall  and  short  at  the  same  time,  but  also 
that  the  tallness  in  us  will  never  admit  the  short,  or  be  overcome,  but  one  of  two  things 
happens:  either  it  flees  and  retreats  whenever  its  opposite,  the  short,  approaches,  or  it  is 
destroyed  by  its  approach'  (102e).  Although  such  a  statement  seems  to  contradict  the 
previous  claim  that  opposites  come  to  be  from  opposites,  Plato  clarifies  it  by 
distinguishing  between  things  with  opposite  qualities  and  the  opposite  itself.  In  Plato's 
words:  'we  were  talking  of  things  that  have  opposite  qualities  and  naming  these  after 
"'Tbe  relation  between  the  soul  and  the  Forms  is  another  indication  that  the  soul  should  be  a  separate 
entity.  In  order  for  one  to  know  the  Forms,  one  needs  something  beyond  the  bodily,  and  this  is  the  soul. 
In  other  words,  the  soul  functions  as  the  element  that  bridges  the  gap  between  the  physical  world  and  the 
Forms.  It  should  be  stressed  here  that  the  existence  of  the  Forms  is  of  necessity  taken  for  granted. 
112 them,  but  now  we  say  that  these  opposites  themselves,  from  the  presence  of  which  in 
them  the  things  got  their  name,  never  can  tolerate  the  coming  to  be  from  one  another' 
(103  b-c). 
Having  established  that  'an  opposite  will  never  be  opposite  to  itself'  (103c),  Plato  uses 
two  examples  to  clarify  his  point:  The  first  deals  with  the  opposites  of  hot  and  cold  and 
fire  and  snow.  Hot  is  something  other  than  fire  and  cold  is  something  other  than  snow, 
but  fire  will  never  admit  cold,  nor  will  snow  admit  hot.  The  second  example  is  that  of 
Odd  and  number  three  and  Even  and  number  two.  Plato  says  that:  'that  is  the  nature  of 
three  and  of  five,  and  of  half  of  all  the  numbers;  each  of  them  is  odd,  but  it  is  not  the 
Odd.  Then  again,  two  and  four  and  the  whole  other  column  of  numbers;  each  of  them, 
while  not  being  the  same  as  the  Even,  is  always  even'  (I  04a-b).  Plato  by  showing  that 
three  could  never  admit  of  the  Even  (104e)  generalises  and  claims  that:  'Not  only  does 
the  opposite  not  admit  its  opposite,  but  that  which  brings  along  some  opposite  into  that 
which  it  occupies,  that  which  brings  this  along  will  not  admit  the  opposite  to  that  which 
it  brings  along'  (105a).  Such  a  statement  is  then  crucial  for  Plato's  analysis  of  the  soul 
that  follows.  Socrates  asks:  '...  what  is  it  that,  present  in  a  body,  makes  it  living?  ' 
(105c).  The  answer  that  he  gets  is  'a  soul'  (105c).  According,  then,  to  the  example  of 
three  and  Odd,  Socrates  investigates  the  nature  of  the  soul: 
PI  Whatever  the  soul  occupies,  it  brings  life  to  it  (105  d). 
P2  The  soul  will  never  admit  the  opposite  of  that  which  it  brings  along  [i.  e.  life]  (I  05d). 
HC  Therefore,  the  soul  does  not  admit  death  (105e). 
Thus,  Plato  proves  that  'the  soul  is  deathless'  (I  05e).  Plato,  now,  shifts  the  argument  in 
showing  the  soul  to  be  indestructible.  Socrates  argues  that:  'if  the  uneven  were  of 
necessity  indestructible,  surely  three  would  be  indestructible'  (105e-106a).  The  same 
claim  is  made  for  the  non-hot,  and  the  non-cold  (I  06a).  Plato  then  asks:  'must  then  the 
113 same  not  be  said  of  the  deathless?  If  the  deathless  is  also  indestructible,  it  is 
impossible  for  the  soul  to  be  destroyed  when  death  comes  upon  it'  (I  06b). 
The  argument  seems  to  be  as  follows: 
PI  The  presence  of  soul  makes  a  body  alive  (105c). 
P2  So,  whenever  a  soul  enters  a  body,  it  is  accompanied  by  life. 
P3  The  soul  cannot  admit  the  opposite  of  what  accompanies  it. 
P4  The  opposite  of  life  is  death  (105d). 
HC  I  So,  the  soul  cannot  admit  death  (105e). 
//C  II  So,  the  soul  is  deathless. 
//C  III  So,  the  soul  is  immortal. 
There  are  two  objections  that  can  be  raised  here.  Firstly,  the  first  two  premises  show 
that  soul  brings  life  to  the  body.  A  body  that  has  soul  cannot,  therefore,  be  dead.  But  it 
does  not  follow  that  soul  must  itself  be  alive.  One  could  argue  that  souls  could  neither 
be  alive  nor  be  dead.  One  could  also  ob  ect  to  the  passage  from  deathless  to  immortal.  j 
Saying  that  the  soul  cannot  admit  death  means  only  that  so  long  as  the  soul  exists,  it 
cannot  be  dead,  but  that  does  not  imply  that  a  soul  cannot  cease  to  exist. 
Such  a  claim,  therefore,  is  essential  for  trying  to  understand  what  notion  of  the  soul 
Plato  is  taking  under  consideration.  Firstly,  Plato  seems  to  have  in  mind  that  soul  is 
analogous  to  'Ihe  largeness  that  is  in  us'.  But,  such  a  view  is  very  confusing.  On  the 
one  hand,  it  could  suggest  that  the  soul  is  a  property-instance.  This  would  imply  that  to 
have  a  soul  is  simply  to  possess  a  property.  But,  such  a  view  could  not  hold  that  the 
soul  is  a  separate  entity  from  the  body,  or  that  it  is  able  to  survive  death,  two  notions 
114 that  are  of  importance  for  Plato".  Thus,  the  status  of  property-instances  within  Plato's 
theory  of  Forms  is  very  obscure.  Some  of  the  phrasing  might  suggest  that  'the 
largeness  that  is  in  one  is  a  'portion'  of  the  Form  of  largenesS45.  If  one  was  to  fliink 
towards  that  direction,  two  points  are  insinuated:  A)  Each  soul  is  a  portion  of  Soul.  In 
that  way  soul  is  treated  as  a  kind  of  'stuff'  that  each  possesses  a  portion  of.  B)  Soul  is  a 
Form  or  like  a  Form.  But  these  ideas  do  not  seem  to  connect  very  well.  Although  Plato 
sometimes  seems  to  think  of  soul  as  'stuff,  he  is  more  inclined  to  think  of  human  souls 
as  containing  a  particle  of  divine  reason.  But,  that  would  imply  that  neither  soul  nor 
reason  could  be  a  Form.  They  have  to  be  what  knows  the  Forms. 
Secondly,  the  fmal  argument  seems  also  to  show  traces  of  the  notion  that  soul  is 
analogous  to  heat.  Among  Plato's  predecessors  there  was  a  widespread  idea  that  the 
hot,  the  cold,  the  dry  and  the  moist  were  power-stuffs.  The  fire  is  by  itself  hot  and 
makes  other  things  feel  hot,  in  much  the  same  way  that  water  is  both  moist  itself  and 
makes  other  things  moist.  It  would  not  be  unnatural  then  to  think  of  soul  in  that  way, 
but  that  view  would  be  very  difficult  to  reconcile  with  other  Platonic  ideas,  particularly 
the  view  that  soul  belongs  to  the  realm  of  the  Forms  which  is  distinct  from  the  physical 
realm.  Overall,  the  final  argument  does  not  -seem  to  suggest  a  single  coherent  view  of 
the  soul,  but  rather,  as  has  been  shown,  suggests  a  number  of  different  and  probably 
incompatible  views. 
Plato's  Myth 
Plato  finishes  his  argument  with  a  myth  that  includes  the  two  key  ideas  throughout 
44  A  property  instance  cannot  exist  without  that  of  which  it  is  a  property.  For  example  my  smallness 
cannot  exist  when  I  cease  to  exist  any  more  than  it  can  when  I  have  grown  tall. 
'Parmenides  13  1  a-e  seems  designed  to  refute  this  view  of  Forms  and  particulars. 
115 Plato's  dialogues;  namely,  the  notion  that  soul  is  immortal,  and  the  notion  that  the  soul 
is  the  bearer  of  moral  characteristics.  The  myth  reads:  'now  that  the  soul  appears  to  be 
immortal,  there  is  no  escape  from  evil  or  salvation  for  it  except  by  becoming  as  good 
and  wise  as  possible,  soul  goes  to  the  underworld  possessing  nothing  but  its  education 
and  upbringing,  which  are  said  to  bring  the  greatest  benefit  or  harm  to  the  dead  right  at 
the  beginning  of  the  journey  yonder  (107d).  What  is  of  interest,  at  this  point,  is  that 
again  Plato  puts  forward  a  notion  of  the  soul  that  implies  it  is  influenced  by  the 
embodied  life.  Moreover,  Plato  distinguishes  between  the  well-ordered  souls  and  those 
souls  that  are  attached  to  the  body  and  therefore  face  difficulties  in  leaving  the  bodily 
forin  (10ga-b).  In  particular,  he  describes  in  detail  the  'fate'  of  the  souls  in  the 
underworld.  Firstly,  the  dead  are  judged  according  to  their  penalties  in  their  embodied 
lives.  The  souls  are  separated  into  those  committing  incurable  and  those  committing 
curable  crimes  (I  l3e),  which  determine  the  punishment  that  will  be  imposed  upon 
them.  On  the  other  hand,  those  who  'have  lived  an  extremely  pious  life  are  freed  and 
released  from  the  regions  of  the  earth  as  from  prison;  they  make  their  way  up  to  a  pure 
dwelling  place'  (1  14c).  This  category  incorporates  the  philosophers.  Such  a  point  is 
made  clear  when  Plato  says  that:  'those  who  have  purified  themselves  sufficiently  in 
philosophy  live  in  the  future  altogether  without  a  body'  (I  14c)  implying,  in  other 
words,  the  distinction  between  souls  reincarnated  and  the  philosophers'  souls. 
After  clarifying  that  the  above  described  situation  may  not  be  exact,  Plato  claims:  'that 
is  the  reason  why  a  man  should  be  of  good  cheer  about  his  own  soul,  if  during  life  he 
has  ignored  the  pleasures  of  the  body  and  its  ornamentation  as  of  no  concern  to  him 
but  has  seriously  concerned  himself  with  the  pleasures  of  learning,  and  adomed  his  soul 
not  with  alien  but  with  its  own  ornaments,  namely,  moderation,  righteousness,  courage, 
freedom  and  truth,  and  in  that  state  awaits  his  journey  to  the  underworld'  (I  14e-  I  15a). 
116 Finally,  the  dialogue  concludes  with  Socrates  advising  his  interlocutors  to  take  good 
care  of  themselves  (I  15d),  and  he  makes  the  important  remark  about  him  leaving  this 
world:  '...  after  I  have  drunk  the  poison  I  shall  no  longer  be  with  you  but  will  leave  you 
to  go  and  enjoy  some  good  fortunes  of  the  blessed'  (I  15b).  So,  Socrates  says  to  Crito 
that:  'You  must  be  of  good  cheer  and  say  you  are  burying  my  body,  and  bury  it  in  any 
way  you  like  and  think  most  customary'  (115d-116a).  After  the  above  instructions 
Socrates  drinks  the  poison.  His  death  follows. 
Conclusion 
Trying  to  establish  what  is  the  particular  notion  of  the  soul,  and  consequently  the 
relation  between  soul  and  body,  with  which  Plato  is  concerned  in  the  Phaedo,  proves  to 
be  a  very  challenging  task.  The  Phaedo,  as  one  of  the  main  dialogues  of  Plato  dealing 
with  the  soul,  involves  a  lot  of  arguments  that  are  not  always  valid,  coherent,  or  easy  to 
explain.  It  is  generally  treated  as  the  dialogue  with  the  most  clearly  dualistic 
orientation.  Due  to  Plato's  insistence  on  proving  the  soul's  irmnortality,  the  dialogue  is 
thought  to  emphasise  the  separation  of  the  soul  from  the  body.  In  this  chapter,  though, 
an  attempt  was  made  to  show  that  the  separation  between  soul  and  body  couldn't  be  a 
sharp  one  because  of  the  relation  between  the  senses  and  knowledge.  Although  Plato 
does  not  present  one  with  a  specific  view  of  the  soul,  throughout  his  arguments  he 
implies  that:  a)  a  soul  is  required  to  be  separate  from  the  body,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
know  the  Forms,  and  b)  at  the  same  time,  the  soul  is  interdependent  with  the  body  when 
in  the  form  of  man. 
117 The  central  doctrine  of  the  Phaedo  can  be  traced  mainly  in  the  recollection  and  the 
affmity  arguments.  Both  arguments  imply  that  the  soul  belongs  in  the  world  of  the 
Forms.  This  would  suggest  a  view  of  the  body  as  the  soul's  prison  from  which  it  must 
escape.  So,  the  message  of  the  Phaedo  may  seem  to  be  very  dualistic:  Soul  and  body 
are  utterly  distinct  and  belong  to  different  reahns.  The  salvation  of  the  soul  lies  in 
disregarding  the  body.  But,  even  within  the  recollection  and  affinity  arguments,  there 
are  elements  that  indicate  that  this  view  is  not  entirely  accurate:  A)  Firstly,  recollection 
comes  about  through  the  senses.  This  implies  that  the  senses  play  an  important  role  in 
the  salvation  of  the  soul.  But  the  senses  involve  the  body.  So  it  seems  that  body  and 
soul  cannot  be  utterly  separate,  and  that  soul  needs  the  body  in  working  out  its  own 
salvation.  B)  Secondly,  moral  evil  comes  from  the  body.  The  bad  person  is  the  one 
whose  soul  is  too  closely  attached  to  the  body  and  which  allows  its  opinions  to  be 
shaped  by  the  body.  But  the  soul  is  also  the  bearer  of  moral  responsibility  and  must 
suffer  punishment  for  the  misdeeds  committed  while  it  was  in  the  body.  So,  again  the 
extreme  dualistic  body-as-prison  view  seems  misleading.  Q  Tbirdly,  the  discussion  of 
Anaxagoras'  view  suggests  a  view  of  soul  as  divine  vo5s.  This  may  be  associated  with 
the  recollection  and  the  affinity  arguments,  but  leaves  unsolved  problems  about  soul 
and  body.  Socrates  draws  a  parallel  between  a)  the  relationship  of  Mind  to  the  world  in 
Anaxagoras  and  b)  the  relation  of  himself  to  the  body.  This  might  seem  to  suggest  that 
Socrates  identifies  himself  with  his  soul  and  regards  that  as  voug. 
Additionally  there  are  elements  in  the  Phaedo  that  do  not  fit  at  all  with  the  recollection 
and  the  affinity  arguments.  The  cyclical  argument  seems  to  reflect  a  view  of  the  soul  as 
something  that  has  to  be  constantly  recycled,  that  notion  seems  to  imply  that  the  soul's 
embodiment  is  an  accidental  event.  It  could  also  be  seen  as  holding  that  the  soul  is 
118 really  the  person,  the  self,  as  it  stands  though,  the  cyclical  argument  is incomplete.  The 
fmal  argument,  now,  seems  to  reflect  several  different  views  of  the  soul:  as  a  property- 
instance,  seen  as  something  that  brings  life  to  the  body,  and  as  a  Form  or  like  a  Form 
due  to  the  soul's  contact  with  the  Form  of  life  (105c).  Soul  as  stuff  or  as  power  does 
not  make  much  sense  of  personal  immortality.  If  the  soul  is  like  a  portion  of  a  Form, 
one  faces  the  same  difficulty  along  with  problems  concerning  the  dividing  up  of  a 
Form.  Both  views  seem  inconsistent  with  the  central  views  of  the  soul  being  influenced 
by  the  body,  or  of  the  soul  as  a  bearer  of  moral  responsibility.  Hence,  the  Phaedo 
demonstrates  the  difficulty  of  finding  an  acceptable  account  of  soul  and  body  rather 
than  providing  one  with  a  solution.  What  does  seem  to  become  apparent,  though,  in  the 
Phaedo  is  that  Plato  treats  perception  as  a  kind  of  'ladder',  as  the  necessary  means  to 
acquiring  Knowledge. 
This  notion  of  perception  being  the  stepping-stone  to  knowledge,  this  gradual  progress 
from  the  bodily  to  the  spiritual,  is  a  common  theme  in  Plato"s  dialogue.  It  is  implied  in 
the  Symposium,  and  it  is  made  explicit  in  the  Republic  and  the  Timaeus.  It  is 
interesting,  thus,  to  compare  the  account  of  the  soul  in  the  Phaedo  with  the  account 
S  OSiUM46  implicit  in  the  YMP  .  where  different  aspects  of  love  are  treated  as  the  necessary 
means  to  reaching  love  of  Beauty  and  the  Good.  Love  of  Beauty  and  the  Good  is 
treated  as  equivalent  to  knowledge  of  Beauty  and  the  Good. 
Although  philosophical  commentary  on  this  dialogue  tends  to  concentrate  on  Socrates' 
speech,  it  is  important  to  see  it  in  the  context  of  the  dialogue  as  a  whole.  As  1. 
Sykoutris  holds,  Socmtes'  narration  is  not  the  last  step  to  a  series  of  speeches  towards 
46"Me  Symposium  seems  to  belong  chronologically  to  the  middle  dialogues. 
119 truth,  but  rather  a  reconstruction  in  which  the  previous  speeches  are  used  only  as  the 
basic  materia  l47.  Phaedrus,  who  speaks  first,  emphasises  the  notion  of  living  well.  He 
holds  that  love  provides  the  guidance  needed  if  we  are  to  live  well  (178c-d).  Thus, 
although  when  Phaedrus  talks  about  love  he  has  in  mind  sexual  attraction,  he  indicates 
that  love  is  a  tool  that  can  help  men  'gain  virtue  and  blessedness  whether  alive  or  dead' 
(I  80b).  Interpreting  this  notion  one  can  see  that  love,  which  could  be  characterised  as  a 
strong  desire,  helps  us  acquire  knowledge  of  the  Form  of  Beauty  and  the  Good,  a  claim 
made  later  by  Diotima.  in  206a.  Next,  Pausanias'  speech  stresses  the  fact  that  heavenly 
love  is  not  simply  a  bodily  attraction,  but  is  expressed  as  an  attachment  and  a 
partnership.  for  life  (183e-184a).  This  idea,  too,  will  be  finther  explored  in  Diotima's 
speech  through  the  notion  of  'being  pregnant'  in  soul  (209a).  Giving  birth  to  ideas  is  a 
step  closer  to  actually  attaining  knowledge  of  Beauty  and  the  Good.  Eryximachus,  now, 
although  he  treats  love  as  that  which  holds  the  basic  elements  of  the  body  together", 
argues  that  love  is  something  more  than  the  physical  attraction  of  two  human  beings. 
He  argues  that  love  should  be  treated  as  a  universal  phenomenon  (186b).  This  idea, 
then,  of  broadening  the  notion  of  love  will.  be  used  by  Diotima  so  as  to  indicate  that  the 
true  purpose  of  love  is  to  attain  absolute  beauty.  The  issue  that  Aristophanes 
underlines,  is  the  issue  of  'becoming  whole'.  He  argues  that  love,  which  is  the  desire  to 
become  whole,  leads  humans  to  happiness  (193d).  This  is  another  point  that  will  be 
chosen  by  Diotima  to  elaborate  on.  She  argues  that:  'a  lover  does  not  seek  the  half  or 
the  whole,  unless,  it  turns  out  to  be  good  as  well'  (205e).  In  other  words,  Plato  points 
out  that  humans  do  not  look  for  what  belongs  to  them  in  general,  but  they  look  for  the 
good  (205e-206a).  The  final  speaker  before  Socrates  is  Agathon.  Agathon's  speech 
"I  Sykoutris,  TTXýTCOVOI;  IUIITr&tov,  Athens  1949,  pp.  78-79  [my  translation]. 
.  49  TjjiS  idea  alludes  to  the  Presocratics.  The  notion  of  a  principle  of  all  things  was  a  common  one;  for 
Tbales  this  principle  is  water,  for  Anaximander  is  apeiron,  for  Heraclitus  is  fire  and  for  Empedocles  there 
are  four  elements  within  a  cycle  of  change  characterised  by  love  and  strife.  See  further  Kirk,  Raven  and 
Schofield. 
120 does  not  provide  material  that  will  be  used  by  Diotima,  but  it  does  provide  us  with  the 
grounds  for  contrast  the  commonly  praised  characteristics  of  a  man  within  the  Athenian 
society,  and  Socrates'  notion  of  what  is  beautiful  and  good.  The  contrast  becomes 
obvious  later  in  Alcibiades'  praise  to  Socrates  (212e  ff.  ),  where  Plato  once  more  praises 
the  beauty  of  soul  over  that  of  the  body  -  through  the  image  of  Silenus  (215a-b), 
through  direct  reference  to  Socrates'  behaviour  (216e);  through  his  words  and  deeds 
(21ge-219a).  Alcibiades,  thus,  emphasises  the  importance  of  love  as  presented  by 
Diotima,  as  Sykoutris  argues,  the  speech  of  Alcibiades  does  not  therefore  depart  from 
the  theme  of  the  dialogue,  but  it  is  the  natural  and  completely  necessary  continuation  to 
the  subject.  It  is  the  climax  of  the  Symposium  were  the  revelations  of  Diotima  become 
alive  in  Alcibiades'  memories,  the  words  become  deeds,  love,  thus,  becomes  the  human 
soul's  major  drama". 
Going  back,  though,  to  the  ascent  to  reaching  knowledge  of  Beauty,  one  sees  that  this 
ascent  is  important  because  it  indicates  a  gradual  progress  from  something  bodily  to 
something  spiritual.  In  particular,  it  indicates  that  in  order  for  one  to  reach  knowledge 
of  Beauty,  one  has  to  start  from  observing  beautiful  things,  realising  that  there  must  be 
something  beyond  them,  and  thus  reach  Beauty.  Thus,  as  A.  -  W.  Price  says:  'it  is  the 
physical  beauty  of  the  loved  one,  which  is  the  starting  point  of  the  ascent  (210a),  that 
first  reminds  the  lover  of  Beauty  itself,  which  is  the  apex  of  the  ascent'  (2  1  Oe-21  I  e)  50 
. 
It  should  be  noted  here,  then,  that  when  Plato  talks  about  the  first  stages  of  the  above- 
mentioned  ascent,  he  talks  about  humans  as  placing  emphasis  in  different  aspects  of 
their  characters.  The  body,  therefore,  is  not  treated  as  something  disconnected  from  the 
character.  This  becomes  obvious  if  we  look  at  the  dialogue  itself.  The  ascent  starts 
49  See  Sykoutris,  pp.  145-146. 
50  A.  W.  Price,  'Loving  Persons  Platonically',  Phronesis  26  (1981)  28. 
121 according  to  Diotima  by  coming  closer  to  4KaXa  ocz'paTa'  (210a),  the  word  'KaXa' 
means  both  beautiful  and  good,  with  all  the  connotations  that  refer  to  someone's 
character  rather  than  simply  to  his  body.  Thus,  from  the  first  level  of  the  ascent  the 
emphasis  is  placed  on  the  person  as  a  whole,  body  and  soul5l.  In  fact  the  two,  soul  and 
body,  seem  to  be  inseparable  52 
.  We  thus  move  through  the  different  levels  to  the 
Beauty  and  the  Good  itself  (211  c). 
This  ascent,  then,  is  parallel  to  the  approach  of  acquiring  knowledge  in  the  recollection 
argument  in  the  Phaedo.  In  the  recollection  argument  one  is  reminded  of  a  Form  by 
looking  at  particular  instances  of  that  Form:  "But  it  is  definitely  from  the  equal  things 
though  they  are  different  from  the  Equal,  that  you  have  derived  and  grasped  the 
knowledge  of  equality"  (74c).  Thus,  again  by  seeing  an  instance  of  something  one  is 
able  to  think  of  the  Form.  In  the  recollection  argument,  Plato  shows  that  in  this  life  to 
reach  knowledge,  one  has  to  start  from  the  instances  provided  by  the  senses.  In  a 
similar  manner,  in  the  Symposium,  in  order  to  reach  the  'mystery  of  love',  in  order  to 
reach  the  Beauty  and  the  Good,  one  starts  from  loving  another  human  being,  first  due  to 
physical  attraction  and  then  due  to  attraction  to  his  soul.  Plato,  in  other  words, 
recognises  stages  in  achieving  the  ultimate  beauty  and  good.  The  same  idea,  though, 
that  of  recognising  that  in  order  to  achieve  happiness  one  has  to  pass  a  number  of 
stages,  is further  explored  in  later  dialogues.  This,  as  we  shall  see,  becomes  apparent  in 
the  Republic,  in  the  example  of  the  ascent  from  the  cave  to  the  sun,  and  in  the  Timaeus 
in  the  example  of  the  function  and  purpose  of  eyesighel. 
51Sykoutris  (p.  174,  n.  2)  notes  that  the  word  'ccýpa`ra'  is  used  by  the  ancient  Greeks  to  refer  to  persons 
or  individuals. 
52  Ile  differentiation  between  soul  and  body  will  follow  in  a  higher  level  of  the  ascent. 
53  See  further  the  relevant  passages  in  the  chapters  where  the  Republic  and  the  Timaeus  are  discussed. 
122 The  Tripartite  Notion  of  the  Soul  in  the  Republic 
The  Republic  can  be  read  with  the  emphasis  being  placed  on  its  political  ideas,  on 
epistemology,  or  -  as  in  this  thesis  -  on  the  doctrine  of  the  soul.  As  it  is  understood, 
such  a  diversity  of  issues  may  raise  conflicting  views.  The  focus,  though,  for  this  thesis 
is  the  developments  that  the  Republic  offers  in  relation  to  Phaedo  concerning  the  soul- 
body  relation.  In  particular,  through  the  tripartite  notion  of  the  soul,  Plato  shows  that 
the  relation  between  the  tripartite  soul  and  the  body  has  to  be  that  of  mutual  interaction 
and  interdependence.  The  tripartite  soul  enables  Plato  to  escape  the  problems  that  the 
simple  soul  of  the  Phaedo  faces.  Hence,  what  will  become  manifest,  as  early  as  from 
book  IV,  is  that  Plato  has  already  in  mind  the  notion  that  the  soul  is  complex  and  at  the 
same  time  one.  This  point,  in  turn  is  important  because  of  the  bearing  it  has  on  the 
soul-body  relation. 
Republic  IV 
In  book  IV  of  the  Republic  Plato  uses  the  analogy  between  city  and  soul  to  search  for 
justice.  Commentators,  who  have  discussed  the  analogy,  have  concentrated  largely  on 
the  issue  ofjustice.  In  particular,  it  has  been  argued  by  some  that  Plato's  doctrine  of  the 
tripartite  soul  was  designed  primarily  to  show  that  the  same  account  of  justice  could  be 
found  in  the  soul  as  in  the  state.  What  this  chapter  proposes  to  do,  though,  is  to  show 
that  by  introducing  the  three  parts  of  the  city,  Plato  provides  one  with  a  kind  of  model 
for  the  soul.  As  the  city  is  presented  as  a  unity,  being  one  in  its  complexity,  the  soul  can 
be  seen  as  both  one  and  tripartite. 
Plato  in  determining  the  structure  of  a  just  city  wants  to  establish  a  criterion  for  the  just 
soul.  From  the  beginning  of  book  IV  of  the  Republic,  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  city 
123 as  a  whole;  Plato  wants  not  to  'make  any  one  group  outstandingly  happy  but  to  make 
the  whole  city  so,  as  far  as  possible'  (420b).  Such  a  notion  -  quite  apart  from  the 
political  significance  that  it  bears  -  is  of  importance  for  the  analogy  to  the  soul.  The 
soul  will  also  be  treated  in  a  holistic  way;  the  interest  is  on  the  whole  soul,  not  on 
individual  parts  i.  e.,  the  well  being  of  the  soul  does  not  consist  in  each  part  doing  well 
in  isolation.  The  same  notion  is  explored  in  Plato's  example  of  a  statue  in  order  to 
show  how  the  guardians  should  be  treated:  'You  mustn't  expect  us  to  paint  the  eyes  so 
beautifully  that  they  no  longer  appear  to  be  eyes  at  all,  and  the  same  with  the  other 
parts.  Rather  you  must  look  to  see  whether  by  dealing  with  each  part  appropriately,  we 
are  making  the  whole  statue  beautiffil.  Similarly,  you  mustn't  force  us  to  give  our 
guardians  the  kind  of  happiness  that  would  make  them  something  other  than  guardians' 
(420c-d).  What  the  analogy  with  the  statue  suggests,  is  that  the  city  is  treated  as  a  unity 
also.  Plato  seems  to  imply  here  that  by  taking  care  of  the  city  as  a  whole,  by 
establishing  a  just  city  its  individuals  will  be  happy  to  a  certain  degree  determined  by 
nature.  Therefore,  each  part  finds  its  own  welfare  in  fiilfilling  its  role  as  part  of  a  large 
whole.  Taking  such  a  notion  into  the  account  of  the  soul,  Plato  will  not  simply  be 
concerned  to  show  that  the  soul  has  parts,  but  he  will  also  be  concerned  to  show  that  it 
is  a  unity  that  has  to  be  achieved;  it  is  not  something  given  to  the  soul. 
Hence,  concerning  the  city,  Plato  emphasises  on  the  role  of  education  and  upbringing. 
He  says:  '...  each  of  the  other  citizens  is  to  be  directed  to  what  he  is  naturally  suited  for, 
so  that,  doing  the  one  work  that  is  his  own,  he  will  become  not  many  but  one,  and  the 
whole  city  will  itself  be  naturally  one  not  many'  (423d).  Plato  here  seems  to  have  in 
mind  a  different  sense  of  oneness  from  that  in  the  Phaedo  where  the  soul  is  by 
definition  simple.  His  view  seems  to  be  that  the  soul  is  complex  but  if  it  becomes  a 
124 unity,  the  whole  city  will  benefit.  Tbus,  at  425c  he  talks  of  the  'single  newly  finished 
person'  as  the  outcome  of  education. 
Plato  continues  by  claiming  that  the  city  he  described  is  wise  because  '...  it  has  good 
judgement'  (428b).  By  arguing,  now,  that  good  judgement  is  a  kind  of  knowledge 
(428b),  Plato  defines  guardianship  as  some  knowledge  that  judges  about  the  whole  city: 
'I...  some  knowledge  possessed  by  some  of  the  citizens  in  the  city  we  just  founded  that 
doesn't  judge  about  any  particular  matter  but  about  the  city  as  a  whole  and  the 
maintenance  of  good  relations,  both  internally  and  with  other  cities'  (428c-d).  As  will 
be  shown  later  on,  this  is  an  essential  point  for  one's  understanding  of  the  analogy 
between  city  and  soul.  The  guardians  judge  what  is  best  for  the  city  internally  and 
externally;  similarly,  the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is  the  one  that  judges  what  is  best  for 
itself  and  for  the  other  two  parts. 
Plato,  now,  tries  to  fmd  in  the  city  wisdom,  courage,  moderation  and  justice.  In 
particular,  he  refers  to  moderation  as  a  kind  of  order:  'Moderation  is  surely  a  kind  of 
order,  the  mastery  of  certain  kinds  of  pleasures  and  desires.  People  indicate  as  much 
when  they  use  the  phrase  self-control  and  other  similar  phrases...  '  'K6cpos  TrO6  TIS,  4V 
6'  jyca',  ý  cca#ocrUVTJ  CIOTIV  Kal  ý5ovc3v  TIVCaV  Kal  EITIBUPICSV  iYKPdWa,  GS'S  ýacl 
KPEITTCA3  6ý  aLToG  dmýaIVOVTES  OýK  016'  O*'VTIvaTP6TrOV,  Kall  aXXa  a"TTa  TMOTa 
cacTrEp  iXvq  aýýs 
MYETat'  (430e).  Plato  raises  here  though  a  very  interesting  point;  he 
says:  'Yet  isn't  the  expression  self-control  ridiculous?  The  stronger  self  that  does  the 
controlling  is  the  same  as  the  weaker  self  that  gets  controlled,  so  that  only  one  person  is 
referred  to  in  all  such  expressions'  (43  Oe43  I  a).  This  point  indicates  a  particular  view 
about  the  personal  identity  issue.  Plato's  notion  is  that  there  is  only  one  person  that 
does  the  controlling  and  is  controlled.  What  should  be  emphasised  then  is  that  Plato 
125 does  not  treat  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  as  alien  to  the  true  self.  His  position  here  is 
thus  different  from  that  in  the  Phaedo  where  the  desires  are  attributed  to  the  body  m 
which  the  soul  -  the  true  self  -  is  imprisoned.  Plato's  conception,  of  recognising  only 
one  person  that  does  the  controlling  and  is  controlled,  further  indicates  that  there  is  a 
natural  hierarchy  among  the  parts  of  the  soul.  '  This  is  expressed  as  follows:  '...  in  the 
soul  of  that  very  person,  there  is  a  better  part  and  a  worse  one  and  that,  whenever  the 
naturally  better  part  is  in  control  of  the  worse,  this  is  expressed  by  saying  that  the 
person  is  self-controlled  or  master  of  himself  (43  1  a)'. 
Next,  Plato  distinguishes  between  desires  that  are  diverse,  and  those  that  are  'simple, 
measured,  and  directed  by  calculation  in  accordance  with  understanding  and  correct 
belief  (43lb-c)2  - 
Hence,  Plato  argues  that  '...  the  desires  of  the  inferior  many  are 
controlled  by  the  wisdom  and  desires  of  the  superior  few'  (431c-d),  and  such  a  city  is 
'...  in  control  of  itself  and  of  its  pleasures  and  desires  ...  and,  therefore,  also  moderate' 
(43ld-e).  The  emphasis  then  is  placed  on  moderation  being  spread  throughout  the 
whole  city  and,  likewise,  throughout  the  whole  soul.  Such  a  state  is  achieved  through 
unanimity  or  agreement  among  the  parts  -  of  the  soul  or of  the  city  -  as  to  which  should 
rule. 
Plato,  then,  applies  the  talk  about  the  city  to  the  soul:  'So,  let's  apply  what  has  come  to 
light  in  the  city  to  an  individual,  and  if  it  is  accepted  there,  all  will  be  well'  (434d).  He 
continues:  'then  a  just  man  won't  differ  at  all  from  a  just  city  in  respect  to  the  form  of 
justice;  rather,  he'll  be  like  the  city'  (435a-b),  and  'a  city  was  thought  to  be  just  when 
'The  issue  of  hierarchy  among  the  soul's  parts  will  be  discussed  later  in  relation  to  44le  and  it  is  also 
seen  in  book  IX  of  the  Republic. 
'A  similar  distinction  is  made  at  the  beginning  of  book  M  57  1  a-b. 
126 each  of  the  three  natural  classes  within  it  did  its  own  work3,  and  it  was  thought  to  be 
moderate,  courageous,.  and  wise  because  of  certain  other  conditions  and  states  of  theirs' 
(435b).  Thus,  the  argument  continues  by  asking  about  the  parts  of  the  soul  with  which 
we  learn,  get  angry,  and  desire  the  pleasures  (436a).  Plato's  concern  here  is  to 
determine  '...  whether  these  parts  are  the  same  or  different'  (436b).  In  order  to  do  so, 
he  introduces  an  axiom:  'It  is  obvious  that  the  same  thing  will  not  be  willing  to  do  or 
undergo  opposites  in  the  same  part  of  itself,  in  relation  to  the  same  thing,  at  the  same 
time'  (436b).  For  example,  it  is  impossible  for  'the  same  thing  to  stand  still  and  move 
at  the  same  time  in  the  same  part  of  itself  (43  6c).  If  someone  stands  still  while  moving 
his  head  and  arms,  one  ought  to  say  not  that  he  is  both  moving  and  standing  still  but 
that  'one  part  of  the  person  is  standing  still  and  another  part  is  moving'  (436c). 
This  principle  is  then  applied  to  the  appetites:  'Then  won't  we  say  that  there  is  a  class 
of  things  called  appetites  and  that  the  clearest  examples  are  hunger  and  thirstT  (437d). 
Plato  here  points  out  that:  '...  thirst  itself  will  never  be  for  anything  other  than  what  it  is 
in  its  nature  to  be  for,  namely,  drink-itself,  and  hunger  for  food'  (437e).  Plato  clarifies 
these  points  about  thirst  and  hunger  by  comparing  knowledge  itself  with  a  particular 
kind  of  knowledge,  knowledge  of  something.  The  text  reads:  'Knowledge  itself  is 
knowledge  of  what  can  be  learned  itself  (or  whatever  it  is  that  knowledge  is  oO,  while  a 
particular  sort  of  knowledge  is  of  a  particular  sort  of  thing'  (438c).  Plato,  thus,  returns 
to  the  example  of  thirst:  'hence  the  soul  of  a  thirsty  person,  insofar  as  he's  thirsty, 
doesn't  wish  anything  else  but  to  drink...  '  (439a-b)  and  '...  if  something  draws  it  back 
when  it  is  thirsting,  wouldn't  that  be  something  different  in  it  from  whatever  thirsts  and 
drives  it  like  a  beast  to  drink?  '  (439b).  In  that  way  Plato  separates  between  rational 
calculation  -  being  unwilling  to  drink  -  and  feelings  -being  thirsty.  As  Stalley  points 
3Doing  one's  own,  which  is  the  best,  is  a  notion  ex  lored  also  in  book  K  585d-e.  M out,  Plato  does  not  say  explicitly  that  being  unwilling  to  drink  is  equivalent  to  not  being 
thirsty  nor  does  he  say  anything  that  implies  this.  What  he  does  say  is  that  being 
unwilling  to  drink  is  the  opposite  or  contrary,  'ivdvTtov'  of  being  thirsty4,  in  other 
words,  there  is  a  positive  desire  not  to  drink.  By  implication,  Plato  distinguishes 
between  the  desire  for  a  drink  and  the  desire  for  a  good  drink.  The  first  could  be 
characterised  as  an  impulse,  while  the  second  is  a  reasonable  judgement.  In  that  way 
Plato  does  not  hold  the  idea  that  'all  desires  are  for  the  good',  which,  in  tun,  requires 
more  than  one  part  in  us;  a  part  that  involves  the  impulse  of  drink  and  another  one  for 
making  a  judgement  whether  a  drink  is  for  the  good.  Subsequently,  Plato  talks  as 
though  there  are  different  parts  within  the  soul:  'Isn't  it  that  there  is  something  in  their 
soul,  bidding  them  to  drink,  and  something  different,  forbidding  them  to  do  so,  that 
overrules  the  thing  that  bidsT  (439c).  Following  Stalley's  argument,  Plato's  language 
here  suggests  very  strongly  that  he  sees  this  as  a  case  in  which  there  are  two  distinct 
entities,  not  as  one  in  which  something  is  affected  in  two  different  respects5.  Thus, 
Plato  concludes:  'We'll  call  the  part  of  the  soul  with  which  it  calculates  the  rational  part 
and  the  part  with  which  it  lusts,  hungers,  thirsts,  and  gets  excited  by  other  appetites  the 
irrational  appetitive  part,  companion  of  certain  indulgences  and  pleasures'  'To'  pEv  4 
XOYI;  ETat  XOYICFTIKO'V  7TPO(3CXYOPEUOVTES  TTIS  q/V)(fiS,  T6  SE  4  EPQ-(  TE  Kai  ITE14  Kalt  6iqifl 
Kai  ITEPI  Tas  a)Aas  EmOuptas  E'lTTOTITai  dX6YIGT6V  TE  Kal  ETrIeUP71TIK6V,  TrxTlpca'GEC#3'V 
TIVCaV  Kai  ý60VC3V  ETC61POV'  (439d).  Hence,  Plato  makes  it  clear  that  although  there  are 
different  elements  involved  in  mental  conflict,  they  are  nevertheless  parts  of  a  single 
thing;  namely,  the  soul.  Although  the  argument  for  the  soul's  division  looks  plausible, 
it  is  difficult  to  make  sense  of  something  non-physical  having  parts.  A  further  difficulty 
is  that  it  depends  on  physical  analogies.  Some  scholars  have  thought  that  Plato  really 
4  R.  F.  StalleY,  "Plato's  Argument  for  the  Division  of  the  Reasoning  and  Appetitive  Elements  witym  the 
Soul',  Phronesis  20  (1975)  120. 
5Stalley,  1975,  p.  116. 
128 wants  to  make  a  distinction  between  motivations,  but  436a  and  the  language  used  in  the 
argument  rules  this  out.  So,  one  is  left  with  the  puzzle  of  how  something  non-physical 
can  have  parts.  What  is  more,  one  of  the  parts  -  the  appetitive  -  is  described  in  terms 
that  link  it  closely  to  the  body.  These  difficulties  could  be  solved  if  the  parts  of  the  soul 
had  physical  locations.  Unfortunately,  such  a  solution  is  not  provided  in  the  Republic. 
A  question  that  could  be  raised  then  is  whether  we  can  infer  that  Plato  was  thinking  of 
the  soul's  parts  as  being  spatially  located  or  not.  Although  there  are  no  direct 
references  where  the  soul's  parts  are  located  in  particular  parts  of  the  body,  the  fact  that 
Plato  does  not  deny  such  a  possibility  may  be  seen  as  indicating  that  he  have  not 
worked  out  the  details  for  such  an  argument.  This  is  clearly  argued  at  length  in  the 
Timaeusý 
Tben,  Plato  introduces  the  third  part  of  the  soul;  the  spirited  part,  by  which  'we  get 
angry'  (439e).  Although  Plato  does  not  analyse  at  any  length  the  role  of  the  spirited 
part,  it  is  implied  that  without  it  Plato  would  not  be  able  to  argue  for  a  unified, 
harmonious  soul.  The  appetites  are  described  as  being  opposite  to  reason,  and  reason 
does  not  have  any  emotional  force  over  the  desires.  Thus,  in  a  case  of  two  conflicting 
points,  the  spirit  functions  as  the  part  that  is  able  to  help  reason  overcome  desires.  Plato, 
thus,  has  proven  that  there  are  in  the  soul  three  different  parts  just  as  there  are  in  the 
city:  'We  are  pretty  much  agreed  that  the  same  number  and  the  same  kinds  of  classes  as 
are  in  the  city  are  also  in  the  soul  of  each  individual'  (441c).  The  spirit,  thus,  unlike 
some  scholars  who  hold  that  spirit  was  introduced  purely  to  prove  an  analogy  between 
city  and  soul,  is  treated  as  essential  for  Plato's  moral  psychologY7.  What  should  be 
noted,  though,  is  that  the  presence  of  the  spirited  part  creates  a  further  complexity 
'rbe  soul's  parts  are  spatially  located  within  the  bodily  fimne  in  the  Timaeus. 
'Another  point  supporting  the  view  that  the  role  of  the  spirit  goes  beyond  the  political  analogy  is  that  it  is 
referred  to  in  the  Phaedrus  and  the  Timaeus  where  no  political  issues  are  discussed. 
129 regarding  the  nature  of  a  soul,  since  it  is  far  from  clear  how  it  fits  into  the  soul-body 
dichotomy.  It  is  unclear  because  although  the  desires  could  be  treated  as  bodily,  and 
reason  as  immaterial,  the  spirited  part  can  be  seen  as  belonging  to  neither  or  both. 
What  remains,  now,  to  be  discovered  is  what  makes  a  soul  just:  'And  we  surely  haven't 
forgotten  that  the  city  was  just  because  each  of  the  three  classes  in  it  was  doing  its  own 
work'  (441  d),  and  'Then  we  must  also  remember  that  each  one  of  us  in  whom  each  part 
is  doing  its  own  work  will  himself  be  just  and  do  his  own'  (44  1  d-e).  In  like  manner, 
Plato  argues  that:  'isn't  it  appropriate  for  the  rational  part  to  rule,  since  it  is  really wise 
and  exercises  foresight  on  behalf  of  the  whole  soul,  and  for  the  spirited  part  to  obey  and 
be  its  allyT  (441e).  What  one  should  note  at  this  point,  is  that  Plato  not  only  talks 
about  the  different  parts  of  the  soul,  but  most  importantly  presupposes  a  hierarchy 
within  the  soul.  The  reasoning  part  is  rightfully  ruling  the  other  parts  since  it  is  the  only 
one  that  can  'exercise  foresight'  for  the  whole  soul.  In  other  words,  reason  knows  what 
is  best  not  only  for  itself,  it  is best  for  the  soul  as  a  whole,  and  therefore  for  the  other 
two  parts  each  in  its  own  ývays.  As  Peters  puts  it,  according  to  Plato,  reason  must  grasp 
the  good  of  the  soul,  understood  both  collectively  and  distributively,  in  order  to  govern 
well9.  In  a  similar  manner,  Stocks  maintains  that  in  the  perfect  life  there  is  still  triplicity 
of  function  though  there  is  unity  of  direction  or  motive.  Thus  the  three  forms  are  no 
longer  alternatives:  '...  they  are  all  present  together,  united  for  the  first  time  after  a 
fashion  which  is  described  by  the  metaphor  of  ruler  and  subject"O.  Plato's  view  is, 
thus,  that  the  soul  is  a  natural  unity  in  the  sense  that  it  becomes  a  unity  when  each  of  its 
parts  functions  correctly.  But  this  unity  is  not  automatic.  If  the  parts  do  not  fiinction 
correctly,  then  the  soul  is  'pulled  apart',  and  we  have  three  competing  elements  rather 
37be  issue  of  'hierarchy'  within  the  soul  is  seen  throughout  the  Republic. 
9james  Robert  Peters,  'Reason  and  Passion  in  Plato'sRepublic',  Ancient  Philosophy  9  (1990)  p.  175. 
10J.  L.  stocks,  'Plato  and  the  Tripartite  Soul',  Mind  24  (1915)  215. 
130 than  a  single  unified  personality.  This  indicates  that  if  this  order  is  maintained  the  soul 
is  just.  If  I  may  compare,  now,  the  above  passage  with  425c,  here  also  Plato  seems  to 
imply  that  only  the  just  soul  is  truly  one. 
Plato,  though,  faces  here  a  major  problem  for  the  whole  of  the  Republic  regarding  the 
soul-body  relation;  he  does  not  distinguish  clearly  the  relation  between  the  three  parts  of 
the  soul  and  the  body.  In  other  words,  he  does  not  clarify  in  what  way  and  how  far  the 
parts  of  the  soul  are  affected  by  the  body.  He  does  argue  that  the  rational  and  the 
spirited  part  -  when  properly  nurtured  -  will  govern  the  appetitive  part.  But  at  the  same 
time  he  says  that:  'they'll  watch  over  it  to  see  that  it  isn'tfilled  [my  italics]  with  the  so- 
called  pleasures  of  the  body  and  that  it  doesn't  become  so  big  and  strong  that  it  no 
longer  does  its  own  work  but  attempts  to  enslave  and  rule  over  the  classes  it  isn't  fitted 
to  rule,  thereby  overturning  everyone's  whole  life,  '0  T71PýCYETOV  Pý  TCý  TripTAadat 
TC3V  Mpli  TO'  CCSPa  KaXOUPEVCA)V  ýBOVCSV  TrOXý  KC('1  ICVPOV  YEVOPEVOV  OUK  a5  Ta  a6TOG 
TrpCiTTU,  aXXa  KaTa6ouXcS'acxc6a1  Kalt  JpXEIV  iTrIXEIPTICTO  CSV  Oý  TrpOa6Kov  aU'TCý  YiVEI, 
Kai  aupTravTa  Tov  plov  TrdvTcav  dva`rpi",  $  (442a-b).  Such  a  quotation  suggests  that 
although  the  appetites  are  part  of  the  soul,  there  is  a  special  relation  between  them  and 
the  body,  which  can  affect  the  other  parts  of  the  soul.  Plato's  phrasing  of  'filling  up' 
the  appetitive  part  with  the  pleasures  of  the  body  suggests  that  the  appetitive  part  of  the 
soul  cannot  be  separated  completely  from  the  body.  A  difficulty  that  is  raised  here  is 
that  Plato  does  not  have  a  clear  view  regarding  the  variety  of  desires  that  are  included 
under  the  appetitive  part.  The  problem  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  Plato  treats  the 
desire  for  drink  and  the  desire  for  money,  in  a  very  general  way,  under  the  same  part. 
While  the  desire  for  drink  is  clearly  bodily,  the  desire  for  money  is  not. 
131 Plato  concludes  his  discussion  of  justice  by  stating  what  the  just  man  does;  a)  he  is 
concerned  with  what  is  truly  himself  and  his  own  (443d),  b)  he  puts  himself  in  order;  he 
harmonises  the  three  parts  of  himself  (443d),  and  c)  he  brings  together  those  parts;  he 
becomes  entirely  one,  moderate  and  harmonious.  Although  the  443d  passage  can  not 
be  taken  literally  since  it  seems  to  confuse  the  self  with  his  reasoning  part  and  at  the 
same  time  to  consider  the  self  as  something  altogether  different  to  its  parts,  if  one  looks 
at  the  city  a  helpful  parallel  can  be  drawn.  One  might  talk  of  the  city  pursuing,  or 
failing  to  pursue,  the  right  values,  setting  itself  in  order  or  uniting  itself  The  point 
I 
would  not  be  that  particular  parts  did  these  things,  nor  that  each  part  separately  did  the 
same  thing.  Rather,  when  the  city  acts  as  a  whole,  each  part  plays  its  appropriate  role. 
Similarly,  the  talk  of  the  soul  putting  itself  in  order  is  not  equIvalent  to  saying  that 
reason  brings  the  other  elements  to  order.  Each  part  plays  a  role  in  the  reorganisation  of 
the  soul.  Thus,  although  it  seems  that  Plato  identifies  the  reasoning  part  with  the  true 
self,  in  fact  his  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  unity  achieved  due  to  reason  being  in  control 
over  the  other  two  parts.  He  has  already  claimed  that  reason  is  the  one  that  rules 
naturally,  so  by  claiming  now  that  the  just  man  brings  the  parts  of  the  soul  together,  he 
underlines  the  importance  of  the  self  being  a  unity.  Because  the  soul  of  the  just  man  is 
properly  ordered,  the  man  as  a  whole  is  truly  one  and  harmonious. 
After  having  argued  for  the  just  city  and  the  just  man,  Plato  moves  to  the  discussion  of 
injustice.  He  argues:  'Surely,  it  must  be  some  kind  of  civil  war  between  the  three  parts, 
a  meddling  and  doing  of  another's  work,  a  rebellion  by  some  part  against  the  whole 
soul  in  order  to  rule  it  inappropriately'  (444b).  The  above  quotation  indicates  that  since 
injustice  is  a  matter  of  inappropriate  ruling,  thenjustice  is  appropriate  ruling.  The  point 
that  should  not  be  overlooked  is  that  Plato's  talk  about  a  'rebellion'  is  metaphorical.  A 
literal  rebellion  implies  that  the  rebels  have  a  reasoning  capacity,  which  by  definition 
132 the  two  lower  parts  of  the  soul  are  lacking.  One  could  hold  here,  then,  that  Plato's 
emphasis  is  placed  on  one  part  doing  the  work  of  another,  which  would  disturb  the 
presupposed  hierarchy.  Hence,  the  notion  of  rebellion  is  a  rather  misleading  one.  In 
truth,  what  Plato  has  in  mind  is  not  that  the  appetites  literally  'take  control'  on  ruling 
the  soul,  but  rather  that  the  appetites  are  allowed  to  distort  reason's  judgements.  But 
what  exactly  does  Plato  have  in  mind  with  this  notion  of  distorting  reason's  judgement, 
and  what  does  it  entail?  Perhaps  it  would  be  helpful  to  remember  Plato's  example  of 
thirst.  Thirst  is  obviously  an  appetite,  and  as  such  it  is  'a  companion  to  indulgences  and 
pleasures'  (439d).  Usually,  then,  it  is  reason  that  determines  whether  one  should  fulfil 
that  appetite.  There  are  cases  though  where  the  appetite  is  so  strong,  or  the  reason  is  so 
weak,  that  the  person  does  not  employ  reason  but  follows  the  appetites.  In  that  sense, 
the  presupposed  correct  hierarchy  is  lost. 
Plato,  then,  introduces  an  analogy  between  the  effect  of  healthy  and  unhealthy  things  on 
the  body  and  that  ofjust  and  unjust  actions  on  the  soul:  'Because  just  and  unjust  actions 
are  no  different  for  the  soul  than  healthy  and  unhealthy  things  are  for  the  body'  (444c). 
Tie  analogy  is  stated  as  follows:  'To  produce  health  is  to  establish  the  components  of 
the  body  in  a  natural  relation  of  control  and  being  controlled,  one  by  another,  while  to 
produce  disease  is  to  establish  a  relation  of  ruling  and  being  ruled  contrary  to  nature' 
(444d).  'Then,  isn't  to  produce  justice  to  establish  the  parts  of  the  soul  in  a  natural 
relation  of  control,  one  by  another,  while  to  produce  injustice  is  to  establish  a  relation  of 
ruling  and  being  ruled  contrary  to  natureT  (444d).  What  is  emphasised,  then,  is  that  for 
both  health  and  justice  there  is  a  natural  relation  among  the  parts  involved,  while 
disease  and  injustice  is  a  disturbance  of  that  relation.  The  idea  of  the  natural  order 
within  the  soul  is  here  taken  for  granted.  This  notion  is  further  explored  through  the 
notion  that  each  one  should  do  what  is  the  natural  work  for  him.  As  Stalley  argues, 
133 justice  in  the  state  is  fmally  discovered  to  be  a  matter  of  each  man  doing  his  own 
thing...  So  an  important  part  of  Plato's  defence  of  justice  is  the  claim  that  it  is  the 
natural  state  both  in  cities  and  in  individuals".  Therefore,  Stalley  concludes  that  in 
Plato's  view  justice  and  health  are  genuinely  alike  in  that  they  both  exemplify  the 
fundamental  natural  order  of  the  universe  12 
. 
Two  points  need  to  be  stressed  here. 
Firstly,  the  analogy  between  the  body's  health  or  its  disease  and  the  soul's  justice  or 
injustice  alone  does  not  indicate  a  connection  between  mental  and  physical  health.  An 
important  distinction  on  the  way  mental  health  differs  from  physical  health  is  that  the 
establishment  of  the  body's  parts  in  a  relation  of  control  is  not  done  by  any  of  those 
parts,  but  from  something  else;  the  person.  On  the  other  hand,  the  establishment  of  the 
parts  of  the  soul  in  a  relation  of  control  is  done  by  the  soul  as  a  whole.  The  Republic 
itself,  then,  does  not  provide  one  with  the  necessary  argument  in  holding  that  the 
relation  between  them  [mental  and  physical  health]  is  closer  than  a  mere  analogy. 
Book  IV  concludes  with  the  question  whether  it  is  more  profitable  to  act  justly,  or  to  act 
unjustly  (444e-445a).  Plato  states:  'So  even  if  someone  can  do  whatever  he  wishes, 
except  what  will  free  him  from  vice  and  injustice  and  make  him  acquire  justice  and 
virtue,  how  can  it  be  worth  living  when  his  soul  -  the  very  thing  by  which  he  lives  -  is 
ruined  and  turmoilT  (445b).  The  problem  that  should  be  raised  here  is  that  of  a 
different  notion  of  the  soul  than  the  one  presented  earlier  in  the  book.  In  particular, 
Plato  refers  here  to  the  soul  as  the  life  principle.  What  he  confuses  then,  is  the  soul  as  a 
moral  agent  -  doing  what  is  best,  what  is  directed  by  reason  -  with  the  soul  as  the 
element  that  brings  life  to  whatever  it  occupies.  The  worthy  life  is  different  from  life,  a 
notion  that  although  Plato  seems  to  recognise,  he  often  merges.  In  other  words,  he 
"See  Stalley,  1975,  p.  112. 
12Stalley,  1975,  p.  113. 
134 moves  from  the  notion  of  a  worthy  life  to  the  notion  of  life  without  paying  much 
attention  to  the  moral  and  metaphysical  consequences  of  that  assimilation. 
135 Republic  IX 
In  book  IX  of  the  Republic  Plato  refers  to  the  tyrannical  man  -  both  in  his  private  and 
his  public  life  -  and  compares  him  with  the  other  types  of  men.  Although  such  a 
discussion  might  seem  not  to  have  any  bearing  on  this  thesis,  I  want  to  argue  that  the 
discussion  in  this  book  has  important  implications  for  Plato's  view  of  the  soul  and  its 
relation  to  the  body.  In  particular,  the  issues  that  arise  are  the  following:  a)  the  question 
of  whether  man  is  in  control  over  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  as  something  external,  or 
the  three  parts  of  the  soul  are  aspects  of  the  man.  In  other  words,  how  is  one  to 
interpret  Plato's  metaphorical  talk  about  what  constitutes  a  person.  b)  How  far  the 
parallelism  between  city  and  person  influences  Plato's  ethical  view  about  the  soul's 
hierarchy.  c)  What  kind  of  view  of  the  soul  arises  from  Plato's  discussion  about  the 
pleasures  corresponding  to  the  three  parts  of  the  soul,  along  with  his  talk  of  pleasure 
and  pain.  Finally,  d)  how  is  the  issue  of  injustice,  and  the  imagery  of  the  beast,  the  lion, 
and  the  human  to  relate  to  the  soul-body  question. 
Plato's  account  of  the  tyrannical  man  is  based  on  the  distinction  -  already  mentioned  in 
554a  and  559d  -  between  two  types  of  desires  the  necessary  and  the  unnecessary.  At 
571b  Plato  finther  distinguishes  the  unnecessary  desires  into  those  that  are  lawless  and 
those  that  are  lawful:  'some  of  our  unnecessary  pleasures  and  desires  seem  to  me  to  be 
lawless.  They  are  probably  present  in  everyone,  but  they  are  held  in  check  by  the  laws 
and  by  the  better  desires  in  alliance  with  reason'  (571b).  What  such  a  distinction 
indicates  is  that  for  Plato  there  is  a  standard,  by  which  desires  are  to  be  judged,  he 
considers  the  desires  of  which  reason  approves  best  and  the  ones  that  are  contrary  to 
reason,  worse.  He  claims  that  the  worse  desires  are  those  that  awake  in  sleep,  when  the 
rest  of  the  soul  rests:  'Then  the  beastly  and  savage  part,  full  of  food  and  drink,  casts  off 
136 sleep  and  seeks  to  find  a  way  to  gratify  itself  You  know  that  there  is  nothing  it  won't 
dare  to  do  at  such  a  time,  free  of  all  control  by  shame  or  reason'  (571c).  This  passage 
raises  important  questions  since  Plato  apparently  refers  to  dreams  and  implies  that  there 
are  unconscious  desires,  but  it  is  not  clear  how  he  could  account  for  the  unconscious13. 
Since,  within  Plato's  theory,  reason  cannot  be  identified  with  consciousness  14  the 
conscious/unconscious  distinction  cannot  fit  his  tripartite  notion  of  the  soul.  Plato's 
primary  concern  is  to  distinguish  appetites  from  reason  as  well  as  from  the  body; 
appetites  are  not  directly  linked  to  the  body,  and  at  the  same  time  they  are  something 
other  than  reason.  In  that  way,  Plato  is  able  to  describe  the  healthy  and  moderate  man 
as  placing  emphasis  on  the  elevation  of  reason.  Before  going  to  sleep:  '...  he  rouses  his 
rational  part  and  feasts  it  on  fine  arguments  and  speculations;  second,  he  neither  starves 
nor  feasts  his  appetites,  so  that  they  will  slumber  and  not  disturb  his  best  part...  third,  he 
soothes  his  spirited  part  in  the  same  way'  (57ld-572a).  Plato,  here,  not  only  recognises 
three  parts  in  the  soul  that  have  to  be  interrelated,  but  also  argues  that  the  appetites  and 
the  spirited  parts  can  disturb  the  rational  part  of  man  from  getting  on  'with  its 
investigations'  (572a).  Moreover,  the  claim  that  the  reasoning  part  needs  to  be  left 
alone,  pure  and  by  itself  (572a),  implies  both  that  it  has  the  potential  to  do  so,  and  that  it 
is,  in  practice,  disturbed  by  the  other  two  parts. 
In  Plato's  view,  the  tyrannical  man  is  one  whose  reason  is  disturbed  by  the  other  parts; 
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he  is  full  of  intense  desires,  shameless  and  without  moderation:  'then  this  leader  of  the 
soul  adopts  madness  as  its  bodyguard  and  becomes  frenzied.  If  it  finds  any  beliefs  or 
desires  in  the  man  that  are  thought  to  be  good  or  that  still  have  some  shame,  it  destroys 
131t  should  be  noticed  that  the  emphasis  will  not  be  placed  on  whether  Plato  had  any  notion  of  the 
unconscious  mind. 
"The  desires  of  appetite  and  spirit  generally  appear  conscious  and  there  is  no  suggestion  that  those  who 
are  dominated  by  their  lower  elements  lapse  into  the  unconscious. 
137 them  and  throws  them  out,  until  it's  purged  him  of  moderation  and  filled  him  with 
imported  madness'  (573a-b).  The  implication  is  again  that  'originally,  a  person  is  good 
and  moderate.  But,  although  man  is  naturally  good  and  moderate,  and  therefore 
governed  by  reason,  the  desires  are  able  to  influence  him  in  such  a  degree  so  that  he  is 
destroyed,  he  becomes  corrupt.  It  should  be  stated  here  that  Plato  must  have  had  in 
mind  that  something  better  could  not  develop  out  of  something  worse;  thus  he  talks 
about  'decline'  of  the  natural  goodness  and  moderation  of  man  due  to  desires.  Hence, 
the  effect  of  desires  on  the  person  is  partially  held  responsible  for  the  person's 
development.  What  one  should  notice  here  is  Plato's  distinction  between  bad  habits 
acquired  from  outside,  and  those  emerging  from  within,  those  that  are  shaped  by  the 
environment,  and  those  that  are  so  due  to  nature.  But  such  a  distinction,  indicates  that 
the  person  is  affected  both  from  external  and  inner  influences;  the  desires,  that  are 
distinct  from  reason  and  the  body  but  at  the  same  time  connected  with  both,  are  liable 
for  the  whole  person's  condition.  Such  a  point  reveals  that  the  person  cannot  be 
identified  with  the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul,  but  must  be  something  more  composite". 
Plato's  account  of  the  tyrannical  man,  therefore,  is  important  because  it  indicates  a 
presupposed  idea  about  the  definition  of  the  'healthy'  man;  there  should  be  a  certain 
hierarchy  within  the  soul;  reason  has  to  be  in  control,  while  the  appetitive  and  the 
spirited  parts  can  achieve  only  partial  satisfaction.  The  emphasis,  then,  lies  on 
moderation.  Plato,  as  regards  desires,  is  not  thinking  of  maximising  uncontrolled 
"This  point  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  relation  to  the  image  of  the  beast  the  lion  and  the  human 
in  588c-d. 
138 satisfaction,  but  rather  satisfaction  of  the  desires  that  are  good".  Such  a  point,  again, 
implies  a  need  for  a  hierarchy  within  the  soul. 
The  above  issue  of  hierarchy  is  finther  examined  through  the  city-person  analogy:  'And 
won't  the  relations  between  the  cities  with  respect  to  virtue  and  happiness  be  the  same 
. yrrannical  man:  'if  man  as  those  between  the  menT  (576c).  Thus,  Plato  says  about  the  V 
and  city  are  alike,  mustn't  the  same  structure  be  in  him  too?  And  mustn't  his  soul  be 
full  of  slavery  and  unfreedom,  with  the  most  decent  parts  enslaved  and  with  a  small 
part,  the  maddest  and  most  vicious,  as  their  masterT  (577d).  And  he  concludes:  'Then 
a  tyrannical  soul  -  I'm  talking  about  the  whole  soul  -  will  also  be  least  likely  to  do  what 
it  wants  and  forcibly  driven  by  the  strings  of  a  dronish  gadfly,  will  be  full  of  disorder 
and  regret'  (577d-e).  An  issue  that  arises  here  is  that  of  what  exactly  Plato  had  in  mind 
when  he  claimed  that  the  tyrannical  man  is  not  doing  what  he  wants.  For  Plato,  what 
anyone  really  wants  has  to  be  what  is  good  for  him.  Based  on  that,  he  then  argues  that 
the  tyrannical  man  is  not  doing  what  he  as  a  whole  person  wants,  but  what  the  distorted 
self  makes  him  believe  that  he  wants.  This  point  can  be  seen  also  in  Gorgias;  Socrates 
denies  that  orators  and  tyrants  'do  what  they  want'  (467b),  they  simply  do  what  seems 
fit.  Plato's  argument  could  be  read  in  the  following  way: 
P.  1  If  someone  does  A  for  the  sake  of  B,  it  is  not  A  which  he  really  wants  but  B. 
P.  2  People  do  things  that  are  not  good  themselves  for  the  sake  of  the  good. 
//C  I  So,  if  someone  does  something  that  is  not  good  itself,  what  he  really wants  is  the 
good. 
X2  So,  if  someone  does  something  thinking  it  good,  when  it  is  in  fact  bad,  he  is  not 
doing  what  he  really  wants. 
16,  Ms  will  be  also  seen  in  relation  to  Plato's  argument  for  the  most  just  and  happy  man  in  580b-c.  Ile 
notion  that  complete  satisfaction  of  desires  is  not  good  is  further  explored  in  Philebus  where  it  is  argued 
that  goodness  comes  with  limit,  Philebus  24e-29c. 
139 The  Gorgias  example  although  complicated,  points  out  that  for  Plato  what  one  wants  is 
something  different  from  what  seems  fit  for  him  to  do.  In  other  words,  both  in  the 
Gorgias'  text  and  here  Plato  takes  for  granted  that  what  one  wants  is  what  is  good.  It  is 
implied,  thus,  not  only  that  the  tyrant  lacks  the  soul's  natural  order,  but  also  that  the 
tyrant's  soul,  because  does,  not  do  what  is  really  good,  only  what  seems  good,  does  not 
do  what  it  really  wants.  Plato  presupposes  here  that  the  true  soul  is  the  soul  that  is  ruled 
by  reason,  where  the  other  parts  achieve  partial  satisfaction.  For  Plato,  the  lower  parts 
of  the  soul  are  seeking  what  is  good  for  them,  but  they  can  only  achieve  that  when  they 
are  under  the  direction  of  reason  17 
. 
Similarly,  Schiller  argues:  Me  soul  of  the  Republic 
is  not  pictured  as  an  entity  imprisoned  in  the  body,  but  rather  as  the  seat  of  all  the 
activities  of  the  body"s. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  tyrannical  soul,  and  the  tyrant  as  a  person  -  since  he  does  not 
function  correctly  -  is  less  truly  a  man  than  the  one  who  does".  Ile  tyrant,  like  the  city, 
must  always  be  poor  and  unsatisfiable,  full  of  fear  and  find  more  wailing,  groaning, 
lamenting  and  grieving  than  in  any  other  soul  and  city  (578a).  The  discussion  about  the 
tyrant  concludes  with  a  very  important  passage:  'The  most  just,  and  the  most  happy  is 
the  most  kingly,  who  rules  like  a  king  over  himself,  and  that  the  worst  the  most  Unjust 
and  the  most  wretched  is  the  most  tyrannical,  who  tyrannises  himself  and  the  city  he 
rules'  (580b-c).  This  shows  Plato's  argument  to  be  that  the  reason  should  act  as  the 
king  of  the  soul.  The  emphasis  is  again  placed  on  the  hierarchical  order  of  the  soul. 
171his  notion  is  discussed  finther  in  relation  to  586d-e. 
I  8J.  Schiller,  'Just  Men  and  Just  Acts  in  Plato's  Republic',  Journal  of  The  History  ofPhilosophy  6  (1968) 
P.  5- 
I'Such  a  view  though  faces  the  paradox  of  claiming  that  the  tymnnical  man  is  not  a  true  man,  which  most 
of  all  creates  a  serious  personal  identity  issue  for  Plato.  It  is  as  if  he  implies  a  particular  definition  of  man 
in  which  the  tyrant  cannot  fit  into. 
140 This  point  is  also  used  by  Schiller.  He  argues  that:  'It  is  absurd  to  ask  why  a  just  soul  is 
more  Worthwhile  than  an  unjust  one  because,  by  definition,  a  just  soul  is  one  in  which 
the  rational  element  is  in  control  over  the  other  elements,  and  thus,  is  able  to  fulfil  all  its 
functions  adequately  20 
. 
Hence,  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  presupposed  notion  of 
how  a  man  should  be  in  order  to  be  considered  just.  In  other  words,  the  soul's  natural 
hierarchy  is  essential  not  only  for  saying  what  constitutes  a  just  man,  but  for  what 
constitutes  a  man2l.  The  tyrannical  man,  then,  is  treated  as  someone  who  lacks  a 
unified  personality.  Thus,  Plato's  argument  seems  to  be  that  the  true  self  is  not  the 
reason.  Rather,  we  acquire  a  single  identity  when  our  whole  nature  is  organised  under 
the  control  of  reason. 
From  this  point,  580d,  until  588b  Plato  is  concerned  with  the  pleasures  corresponding 
to  the  three  parts  of  the  soul:  'it  seems  to  me  that  there  are  three  pleasures 
corresponding  to  the  three  parts  of  the  soul,  one  peculiar  to  each  part,  and  similarly  with 
desires  and  kinds  of  rule'  (580d).  He  distinguishes  three  parts  of  the  soul:  the  money- 
loving  paA22,  the  honour-loving  part,  and  the  learning-loving  and  philosophical  (58  1  a- 
b).  Each  part,  now,  rules  some  people's  souls  (58lb-c).  Thus,  the  person  is 
characterised  according  to  which  part  of  his  soul  rules  the  whole  soul.  Such  a  notion 
again  indicates  that  each  individual  part  of  the  soul  is  capable  of  affecting  the  soul  as  a 
whole,  which  in  turn  requires  a  certain  interrelation  between  each  of  the  soul's  parts  and 
the  whole  soul.  Plato's  argument  continues;  there  are:  'also  three  forms  of  pleasure  one 
assigned  to  each  of  them  [three  types  of  people]'  (581c).  Moreover  'since  there  is  a 
20Schiller,  p.  II 
21A  similar  point,  regarding  the  analogy  between  a  just  city  and  a  just  man  is  made  in  Republic  IV  443e- 
444a. 
22plato's  talk  of  the  money-loving  part,  is  confusing  since  Plato  attributes  more  to  the  appetites  tl=  what 
we  get  from  the  body.  A  possible  explanation  of  what  Plato  means  is  not  that  we  have  an  appetite  for 
money,  but  that  appetites  motivate  the  man  to  pursue  money. 
141 dispute  between  the  different  forms  of  pleasure  and  between  the  lives  themselves,  not 
about  which  way  of  living  is  finer  or  more  shameful  better  or  worse,  but  about  which  is 
more  pleasant  and  less  painful,  how  are  we  to  know  which  of  them  is  speaking  most 
trulyT  (581e).  What  Plato  wants  to  achieve  here  is  to  establish  criteria  for  judging 
something  to  be  more  truly  pleasant  than  something  else  is.  In  Plato's  own  words:  'how 
are  we  to  judge  things  if  we  want  to  judge  them  well?  Isn't  it  by  experience,  reason, 
and  argumentT  6TIVI  Xpý  KpivEc6al  Ta  PE)AOVTa  KaXCS!  g  KPIOýcrEc6aq  dp'  OýK  E111TEIPIQ( 
I  #OV'GE1  Kai  X'  ;'  (582a).  TE  Kai  T)  OYCI? 
The  argument  continues:  'A  philosopher  has  of  necessity  [my  italics]  tasted  the  other 
pleasures  since  childhood,  but  it  isn't  necessary  for  a  profit-lover  to  taste  or  experience 
the  pleasure  of  learning  the  nature  of  the  things  that  are  and  how  sweet  it  is'  (582b). 
And  Plato  concludes:  'Then  a  philosopher  is  far  superior  to  a  profit-lover  in  his 
experience  ofboth  theirpleasures  [my  italics]',  'TToXu'  d'pa  &#Epsl  TOO  YE  ýIXOKEPSOOS 
6  ýJXOC405  EpTrElpiq(  apýOTEPCJV  TCSV  ýSOVCSV'  (582b).  A  difference  between  the 
Phaedo  and  the  Republic  seems  to  be  raised  here.  In  the  Phaedo  the  philosopher  is 
represented  as  needing  to  be  disassociated  from  the  body,  from  anything  physical: 
'Philosophy  then  persuades  the  soul  to  withdraw  from  the  senses  in  so  far  as  it  is  not 
compelled  to  use  them  and  bids  the  soul  to  gather  itself  together  by  itself,  to  trust  only 
itself  and  whatever  reality,  existing  by  itself,  the  soul  by  itself  understands,  and  not  to 
consider  as  true  whatever  it  examines  by  other  means,  for  this  is  different  in  different 
circumstances...  whereas  what  the  soul  itself  sees  is  intelligible  and  invisible'  (Phaedo 
83b).  This  need  for  the  soul  to  be  essentially  disembodied  is  somehow  unavoidable  in 
Phaedo  since  Plato  presents  a  simple  soul  being  placed  in  a  body.  What  should  be 
noticed,  though,  is  that  Plato  in  the  Phaedo  seems  to  suggest  that  ideally  we  would  turn 
our  backs  completely  on  bodily  desires.  The  Republic,  on  the  other  hand,  seems  to 
142 suggest  that  the  just  man  will  enjoy  these  in  so  far  as  they  are  compatible  with  the  rule 
of  reason. 
Another  striking  point  is  that  the  philosopher  has  necessarily  learned  through 
experience.  As  it  is  said  in  582a,  experience  is  necessary  to  decide  between  lives. 
There  is,  in  other  words,  a  process,  through  experience,  that  the  philosopher  followed, 
in  order  to  achieve  his  present  state  -  that  of  superiority  -  due  to  the  use  of  leaming  the 
nature  of  the  things  that  are'.  This  is  further  developed  in  the  Republic  with  the  notion 
of  the  tripartite  soul.  This  is  seen  when  Plato  says:  'Then,  as  far  as  experience  goes,  he 
[the  philosopher]  is  the  fmest  judge  of  the  three'  (5  82d),  and  is  further  supported  by  the 
next  sentence:  'And  he  alone  has  gained  experience  in  the  company  of  reason'  (582d). 
Plato's  emphasis,  thus,  is  placed  in  the  rule  of  reason,  but  having  passed  through 
experience.  The  implication  then  is  that  both  reason  and  experience  are  necessary  for 
one  to  reach  truth.  Moreover,  the  philosopher's  experience  is  best  exactly  because  of 
the  search  for  truth.  As  J.  L.  Stocks  says,  in  the  Republic  an  attempt  is  made  to  show 
that  in  knowledge  there  is  both  honour  and  profit,  so  that  in  a  sense  exclusive  attention 
to  one  of  these  three  sides  of  our  nature  results  in  the  satisfaction  of  all  three,  while 
exclusive  attention  to  any  other  brings  misery  and  disaster  23 
-  And  he  continues: 
'knowledge  does  bring  with  it  true  pleasure  and  true  honour:  for  the  whole  soul  is 
content  and  at  peace  when  knowledge  is  attained  924  . 
From  583b  onwards,  Plato  presents  one  with  what  he  calls  the  'third  proof,  concerning 
the  just  person's  superiority  over  the  unjust  one.  Plato  holds  that  'apart  from  those  of  a 
knowledgeable  person,  the  other  pleasures  are  neither  entirely  true  nor  pure  but  are  like 
23StoCkS,  p.  211. 
24Stocks,  ibid. 
143 a  shadow-painting'  (583c).  Thus,  he  starts  by  separating  pleasure,  pain,  and  the 
intermediate  feeling,  that  of  calm  of  the  soul  (583c).  Although  it  seems  that  such  a  state 
can  be,  under  certain  conditions,  both  pleasant  and  painful,  in  truth  it  only  appears  to  be 
so.  The  examples  used  by  Plato  are  the  following:  sick  people  say  that:  'nothing  gives 
more  pleasure  than  being  healthy,  but  that  they  hadn't  realised  that  it  was  most  pleasant 
until  they  fell  ill'  (583d).  On  the  other  hand,  'And  haven't  you  also  heard  those  who 
are  in  great  pain  say  that  nothing  is  more  pleasant  than  the  cessation  of  their  suffering?  ' 
(583d).  Plato  continues:  'Then  the  cahn  we  described  as  being  intermediate  between 
pleasure  and  pain  will  sometimes  be  both'  (583e).  He,  then,  asks:  'Then  how  can  it  be 
right  to  think  that  the  absence  of  pain  is  pleasure  or  that  the  absence  of  pleasure  is 
painT  (584a).  Plato  wants  to  show,  here,  that  being  in  the  intermediate  state;  feeling 
neither  pain  nor  pleasure  is different  from  the  true  and  pure  pleasure  of  someone  being 
knowledgeable.  T'hen,  Plato  refers  to  the  pleasures  that  are  not  preceded  by  pain  so  as 
to  show  that  pure  pleasure  is  not  relief  from  pain  and  that  pure  pain  is  not  absence  of 
pleasure  (584b-c).  Plato,  in  order  to  support  finiher  his  argument,  claims  that:  'Is  it  any 
surprise,  then,  if  those  who  are  inexperienced  in  the  truth  have  unsound  opinions  about 
lots  of  other  things  as  well,  or  that  they  are  so  disposed  to  pleasure,  pain  and  the 
intermediate  state  that,  when  they  descend  to  the  painful,  they  believe  truly  and  are 
really  in  pain,  but  that,  when  they  ascend  from  the  painful  to  the  intermediate  state,  they 
firmly  believe  that  they  have  reached  fulfilment  and  pleasureT  (584e-585a).  Tlerefore, 
the  emphasis  is  placed  again  on  the  'inexperienced'  having  'beliefs'  which  are  not  true. 
The  argument  that  follows,  585b-e,  seems  odd  because  it  interrupts  the  main  line  of 
argument  and  seems  to  involve  a  different  view  of  the  soul  and  its  pleasures:  'And 
aren't  hunger,  or  thirst,  and  the  like  some  sort  of  empty  states  of  the  bodyT  (585b),  and 
'Aren't  ignorance  and  lack  of  sense  empty  states  of  the  soulT  (585b).  The  argument 
144 continues,  'And  wouldn't  someone  who  partakes  of  nourishment  or  strengthens  his 
understanding  be  filledT  (585b).  The  crucial  question,  then,  asked  by  Plato  regards 
'which  kinds  [of  filling  up]  partake  more  of  pure  being'  (585b).  Plato  claims  that: 
'That  which  is  related  to  what  is  always  the  same  is  far  more  [true]'  (585c).  Similarly, 
he  asks:  'And  isn't  it  generally  true  that  the  kinds  of  filling  up  that  are  concerned  with 
the  care  of  the  body  share  less  in  truth  and  being  than  those  concerned  with  the  care  of 
the  soulT  (585c-d).  The  argument,  then  implies  that  the  soul  has  an  ontological  priority 
over  the  body  because  it  is  in  contact  with  the  Fonns.  It  is,  thus,  close  to  the  Phaedo 
doctrine.  But  this  notion  does  not  fit  at  all  well  with  the  tripartite  doctrine  assumed  in 
the  rest  of  book  IX.  Although  it  wants  to  stress  the  soul's  superiority  over  the  body,  in 
fact  it  is  only  able  to  stress  the  reason's  superiority  over  the  other  parts  of  the  soul  and 
the  body.  Although  throughout  the  Republic  Plato  emphasises  the  importance  of  the 
hierarchy  among  the  three  parts  for  the  person's  benefit  in  fact  here  he  places  emphasis 
to  the  reasoning  part  having  priority  over  anything  else.  In  a  sense,  Plato  moves  from 
his  claim  of  hierarchy  among  the  soul's  elements  to  the  metaphysical  point  of  reason 
being  superior  due  to  being  able  to  know  the  Forms. 
Plato  concludes  to  the  above:  'Therefore,  those  who  have  no  experience  of  reason  or 
virtue,  but  are  always  occupied  with  feasts  and  the  like,  are  brought  down  and  then  back 
up  to  the  middle,  as  it  seems,  and  wander  in  this  way  throughout  their  lives  never 
reaching  beyond  this  to  what  is  truly  higher  up,  never  looking  up  at  it  or  being  brought 
up  to  it,  and  so  they  aren't  filled  with  that  which  really  is  and  never  taste  any  stable  or 
pure  pleasure'  (585e-586a). 
Despite  the  discrepancies  in  the  argument,  it  is  clear  that:  a)  firstly,  Plato  associates 
reason  and  virtue  with  truth,  and  b)  secondly,  he  takes  the  existence  of  objective  truth 
145 for  granted,  he  talks  about  the  'stable  and  pure  pleasure',  the  existence  of  something 
that  really  is.  Moreover,  this  objective  truth  can  be  reached  only  through  reason,  and 
only  then  one  is  able  to  'taste  any  stable  or  pure  pleasure'  (586a).  The  argument 
implied  then  is: 
PI  There  is  something  that  really  is,  the  objective  truth. 
P2  This  objective  truth  is  reached  only  by  reason. 
P3  Objective  truth,  when  reached,  gives  one  stable  or  pure  pleasure. 
//C  Reason  is  a  source  of  pure  and 
;  table  pleasure. 
'Mus,  Plato  offers  an  image  of  the  way  men  who  are  driven  by  their  appetites  act:  'For 
the  part  that  they're  trying  to  fill  is  like  a  vessel  full  of  holes,  and  neither  it  nor  the 
things  they  are  trying  to  fill  it  with  are  among  the  things  that  are'  (586b).  In  this 
respect,  there  is  a  contrast  with  the  Gorgias.  It  resembles  the  Gorgias  in  using  the 
leaky  jars  idea,  but  it  also  introduces  the  idea  of  true  pleasures.  in  Gorgias  the  relevant 
passage  reads:  '...  part  of  the  souls  of  fools  where  their  appetites  are  located  is  their 
undisciplined  part,  one  not  tightly  closed,  a  leaking  jar,  as  it  were'  (Gorgias  493b),  and 
I...  the  uninitiated  ones  would  be  the  most  miserable.  They  would  carry  Water  into  the 
leaking  jar  using  another  leaking  thing,  a  sieve'  (Gorgias  493b).  As  in  Gorgias,  Plato's 
emphasis  here  is  placed  on  the  role  of  the  appetites.  In  particular,  the  appetites  are 
presented  as  being  unlimited  and  dissociated  from  reason.  Moreover,  both  in  the 
Gorgias  493b  and  in  the  Republic  586b  the  language  of  'filling'  and  'emptying'  implies 
that  Plato  treats  the  appetites  in  a  rather  physicalistic  way,  due  to  their  close  relation  to 
the  body. 
What  is  striking,  though,  about  the  above  argument  is  that  of  the  reference  to  the  'things 
that  are'  (586b).  It  implies  that  Plato  has  in  mind  a  model,  a  particular  idea  of 
146 permanency.  In  other  words,  Plato  has  in  mind  the  Forms.  Ile  existence  of  the  Forms, 
being  presupposed,  is  necessary  for  Plato  to  hold  that  there  is  an  objective  truth. 
Plato  continues  his  argument:  'Then  can't  we  confidently  assert  that  those  desires  of 
even  the  money-loving  and  honour-loving  parts  that  follow  knowledge  and  argument 
and  pursue  with  their  help  those  pleasures  that  reason  approves  will  attain  the  truest 
pleasures  possible  for  them,  because  they  follow  truth,  and  the  ones  that  are  most  on 
their  own,  if  indeed  what  is  best  for  each  things  is  most  its  ownT  (586d-e).  Thus,  the 
distinction  between  the  desires  that  follow  reason,  and  those  that  are  on  their  own, 
becomes  more  evident. 
A  problem  to  notice  here  is  what  Plato  means  with  the  sentence  'if  indeed  what  is  best 
for  each  thing  is  most  its  own'  (586e).  Does  Plato  argue  here  that  what  is  best  for  the 
appetites  is  most  their  own  or  does  'own'  means  what  is  most  appropriate  to  them?  It 
seems  as  if  there  is  a  discrepancy  here  between  the  appetites'  own  -  their  own  fulfilment 
-  and  what  is  best  for  them.  Such  an  inconsistency  could  be  overcome  if  one  assume 
that  for  Plato  there  is  no  possibility  for  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  to  exist 
independently.  Although  the  appetites,  and  the  spirit,  could  theoretically  achieve 
complete  satisfaction,  that  would  ultimately  lead  to  the  soul's  destruction,  due  to  the 
whole  soul  becoming  disorderly. 
Thus,  Plato  says:  'when  the  entire  soul  follows  the  philosophic  part,  and  there  is  no  civil 
war  in  it  each  part  -of  it  does  its  own  work  exclusively  and  is  just,  and  in  particular  it 
enjoys  its  own  pleasures,  the  best  and  truest  pleasures  possible  for  it'  (586e-587a). 
What  is  again  underlined  here  is  the  relation  of  each  part  of  the  soul  to  the  philosophic 
part  and  therefore  to  the  truth.  The  best  pleasures  for  each  part  have  to  be  related  to 
147 knowledge,  the  philosophic  part  and  therefore  to  truth.  As  regards  the  above  quotation, 
R.  W.  Hall  writes:  the  proper  functioning  of  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  which  results  in 
each  part  attaining  its  proper  virtue  as  well  as  the  whole  soul's  gaining  justice  implies 
that  the  individual  knows  how  each  part  should  function  in  relation  to  itself  and  to  the 
other  parts.  Through  'knowledge  how',  the  rational  element  4T6  XOYICITIKOV'  guides  the 
proper  functioning  of  the  lower  elements  so  that  each  part  Mfils  its  function,  gains  its 
appropriate  pleasure,  and  contributes  to  the  well  being  of  the  whole  25 
.  Also  concerning 
the  point  of  the  soul  achieving  its  best  through  hierarchy;  with  the  philosophic  part 
being  'in  control',  J.  R.  Peters  claims;  Plato  asserts  unequivocally  that  the  philosopher 
will  in  fact  aim  at  the  harmony  and  fulfilment  of  the  entire  SOU126  .  He  further  supports 
his  point  by  saying  that,  even  though  their  [the  lower  elements']  pleasures  are  inferior  to 
reason's  own,  for  its  part,  reason  accepts  the  limitations  of  being  connected  to 
temporally  bound  desires  and  seeks  to  transform  the  entire  system  of  psychic  impulses 
into  a  unified  organism.  As  part  of  this  system,  reason  pursues  the  complete  unity  of 
the  whole  personalitY27.  Peters'  analysis  helps  one  to  see  more  clearly  that  Plato's  talk 
of  unity  also  gives  rise  to  a  particular  notion  of  personal  identity.  In  detail,  reason's 
pursuing  what  is  best  for  the  whole,  suggests  that  the  person  cannot  be  something 
distinct  from  the  unity  of  the  soul's  parts. 
Plato  continues  by  comparing  the  life  of  a  tyrant  to  that  of  a  king  (587b-e),  and 
concludes  that:  'Then  if  a  good  and  just  person's  life  is  that  much  more  pleasant  than 
the  life  of  a  bad  and  unjust  person,  won't  its  grace,  fineness,  and  virtue  be  incalculably 
greaterT  (588a).  In  that  way,  Plato  returns  to  the  original  discussion  about  inj  ustice; 
'Since  we've  reached  this  point  in  the  argument,  let's  return  to  the  first  things  we  said 
`F-  W.  Hall,  'Justice  and  the  Individual  in  the  Republic',  Phronesis  6,  no.  10  959)  p.  154. 
26Peters,  p.  18  1. 
"Peters,  ibid. 
148 injustice  profits  a  completely  unjust  person  who  is  believed  to  be  just'  (588b).  Thus, 
Plato  wants  to  fashion  '...  an  image  of  the  soul  in  words'  (588b).  This  image  follows: 
'...  fashion  a  single  kind  of  multicoloured  beast  with  a  ring  of  many  heads  that  it  can 
grow  and  change  at  will  -  some  from  gentle,  some  from  savage  animals'  (588c),  then, 
'...  fashion  one  other  kind,  that  of  a  lion,  and  another  of  a  human  being.  But  make  the 
first  much  the  largest  and  the  other  second  to  it  in  size'  (588d).  The  argument 
continues:  'Now  join  the  three  of  them  into  one,  so  that  they  somehow  grow  together 
naturally'  (5  8  8d),  and  finally,  'Then  fashion  around  them  the  image  of  one  of  them,  that 
of  a  human  being  so  that  anyone  who  sees  only  the  outer  covering  and  not  what's  inside 
will  think  it  is  a  single  creature,  a  human  being'  (588d-e). 
The  image  could  be  read  as  saying  that  the  beast  with  the  many  heads  is  the  appetitive 
part  of  the  soul,  and  it  is  many-headed  exactly  because  the  appetites  are  multiform. 
Another  point  indicating  that  the  beast  is  the  appetites,  is  that  it  is  said  to  'grow  and 
change  at  will'  which  indicates  an  irregular,  disorderly  growth  similar  to  the  unlimited 
appetites.  The  lion,  now,  has  to  be  the  spirited  part  of  the  soul  since  it  alludes  to  power 
and  honour-loving  inclinations.  The  third  element,  that  of  the  human  being,  needs  to  be 
examined  in  a  more  detailed  way.  In  particular,  Plato  uses  the  word  'human  being', 
avepconoT,  in  588d,  588e,  589a,  and  in  589b.  What  such  a  use  could  indicate  then  is 
that  a)  Plato  falls  into  a  fallacy  of  including  in  the  hypothesis  what  he  wants  to  prove. 
He  talks  of  'the  human  being  within  the  human  being',  'TOý  a'VOpCA3'TroU  0  EVT6T 
jvepcaTro!  gl  (589a)  while  he  wants  to  defme  what  man  is.  If  man  here  means  a  whole 
human  being,  with  a  three-part  soul,  Plato  would  be  faced  with  an  infinite  regress.  B) 
An  alternative  could  be  that  Plato  has  a  different  view  of  'human  being'  in  mind  than 
the  one  that  he  stated.  The  Complex  creature  represents  what  a  human  being  is  in  this 
149 life,  while  one  can  assume  that  the  'man'  is  the  most  distinctively  human  element,  the 
one  that  survives  death. 
The  fust  altemative  seems  to  be  such  an  obvious  problem,  that  it  would  be  difficult  for 
one  to  accept  that  Plato  did  not  notice  it.  The  second  alternative,  though,  unfortunately 
requires  one  to  assume  more  than  what  is  actually  given  in  the  text.  Plato's  talk  about 
the  'human  being  within  this  human  being'  (589a)  is  crucial.  Plato  argues:  'But,  on  the 
other  hand,  wouldn't  someone  who  maintains  that  just  things  are  profitable  by  say'  g, 
first,  that  all  our  words  and  deeds  should  insure  that  the  human  being  within  this  human 
being  has  the  most  control;  second,  that  he  should  take  care  of  the  many-headed  beast 
as  a  farmer  does  his  animals,  feeding  and  domesticating  the  gentle  heads  and  preventing 
the  savage  ones  from  growing;  and  third,  that  he  should  make  the  lion's  nature  his  ally, 
care  for  the  community  of  all  his  parts,  and  bring  them  up  in  such  a  way  that  they  will 
be  friends  with  each  other  and  with  himself?  '  (589a-b).  The  emphasis  is  placed  on  the 
'human  being'  part  to  control  the  'beast'  part  and  the  'lion'  part.  Plato's  image  of  the 
'himan  being'  taking  care  of  the  gentle  'heads'  and  keeping  under  control  the  savage 
ones  reminds  one  of  the  passage  where  Plato  describes  the  healthy  and  moderate  man 
going  to  sleep  (57ld-572b).  What  is  to  be  assumed  here  is  that  Plato  when  he  talks 
about  the  'human  being'  implies  the  rational  part  of  man,  reason.  In  turn,  such  an 
assumption  implies  that  Plato  takes  reason  to  be  the  true  self  At  the  same  time,  though, 
it  is  indicated  that  the  human  being  is  all  three  parts;  thus  the  image  of  the  beast.  As  it 
was  stated  above,  this  claim  might  seem  to  contradict  the  one  that  reason  is  the  true  self, 
but  such  a  contradiction  is  avoided  if  Plato  presupposes  that  the  true  self  is  different 
when  in  itself  and  when  in  this  form  of  life. 
150 In  other  words,  Plato  needs  to  hold  that  the  image  of  the  beast,  the  lion,  and  the  human 
being  form  a  human  being  in  this  life.  Such  a  claim  could  be  supported  if  one  bore  in 
mind  Schiller's  point  about  how  the  picture  of  the  just  composite  beast  refers  to  man;  it 
has  the  appearance  of  a  man  but  in  which  the  growth  of  all  elements  is  fostered.  The 
just  man  is  a  man,  not  a  congeries  of  dissociated  desires.  As  such  he  realises  the 
advantages  of  a  man,  because  this  is  precisely  what  it  means  to  be  juses.  At  the  same 
time,  reason  remains  the  most  important  partý  the  part  that  is  able  to  exist  outside  this 
human  form.  A  notion  like  that  implies  that  the  appetites  and  the  spirit  are  parts  of  a 
human  being  as  long  as  it  is  embodied,  and  the  true  human  being  is  reason  but  not  as 
disconnected  from  the  lower  parts.  What  should  be  stressed  here,  though,  is  that 
although  the  above  argument  seems  plausible,  it  is  inconsistent  with  what  Plato  holds 
elsewhere  -in  the  dialogue.  In  the  Republic,  as  in  the  Phaedrus,  where  the  emphasis  is 
placed  on  Plato's  moral  psychology,  the  tripartite  soul  is  not  treated  as  able  to  be 
separated. 
Plato  concludes  book  IX  by  summarising  what  a  person  should  do  in  order  to  attain  the 
best  nature  of  his  soul:  'Then  won't  a  person  of  understanding  direct  all  his  efforts  to 
attaining  that  state  of  his  soul?  First,  he'll  value  the  studies  that  produce  it  and  despise 
the  others'  (59lb-c),  'second,  he  won't  entrust  the  condition  and  nurture  of  his  body  to 
the  irrational  pleasure  of  the  beast  within  or  turn  his  life  in  that  direction,  but  neither 
will  he  make  health  his  aim  or  assign  first  place  to  being  strong,  healthy,  and  beautiful, 
unless  he  happens  to  acquire  moderation  as  a  result'  (591c).  Such  a  person  would:  '... 
always  cultivate  the  hannony  of  his  body  for  the  sake  of  the  consonance  in  his  soul' 
(591c-d). 
2gSchiller  p.  II- 
151 Republic  X 
In  the  middle  books  of  the  Republic  Plato  makes  it  clear  that  the  senses  are  not  a  source 
of  knowledge.  He  contrasts  the  philosopher  with  the  lover  of  sensory  experience,  and 
the  intelligible  world  with  the  visible  world.  The  objects  of  sight  stand  to  the  Forms  as 
reflections  and  shadows  do  to  physical  objects.  At  the  same  time,  although  Plato  talks 
about  the  importance  of  the  soul's  unity,  by  describing  the  soul  as  having  three 
elements,  he  gives  very  little  indication  of  how  the  senses  are  related  to  the  soul.  Some 
light  is  cast  on  this  question,  through  the  discussion  of  art  in  the  first  part  of  book  X.  In 
the  first  part  of  that  discussion  Plato  attacks  imitative  art  because  it  produces  only 
imitations  of  imitations,  and  is  thus  far  from  the  truth.  But  at  602c  the  attention  shifts  to 
the  question  'on  which  part  of  the  person  imitation  exercises  its  power'. 
In  other  words,  Plato  wants  to  establish  which  part  of  the  person  is  the  one  affected  by 
painting  and  poetry.  Although  Plato  does  not  explain,  at  the  moment,  the  emphasis  is 
going  to  be  on  the  different  parts  of  the  soul.  Plato  starts  by  talking  about  deceiving 
appearances  that  cause  confusion  in  the  soul.  He  says:  '...  something  looks  crooked 
when  seen  in  water  and  straight  when  seen  out  of  it,  while  something  else  looks  both 
concave  and  convex  because  our  eyes  are  deceived  by  its  colours,  and  every  other 
similar  sort  of  confusion  is  clearly  present  in  our  soul'  (602c).  One  should  notice,  here, 
the  talk  about  one  being  confused  by  the  senses.  In  particular,  the  eyes  can  give  false 
information  and  so  confuse  the  soul.  Plato  does  not  specify  though  where  the  source  of 
confusion  arises;  is  it  because  the  eyes  themselves  just  perceive  something  but  the 
understanding  of  the  truth  of  that  thing  depends  on  something  more  than  mere  sight, 
namely  reason?  The  role  of  sense  perception  is  also  analysed  in  the  Theaetetus.  Tbcre 
152 Plato  holds  that  sense-perception  cannot  provide  one  with  truth:  'Perception...  has  no 
share  in  the  grasping  of  truth...  '  (Theaetetus  186e). 
In  the  Republic,  Plato  continues  by  saying  that:  '...  it  is  because  they  exploit  this 
weakness  in  our  nature  that...  painting,  conjuring,  and  other  forms  of  trickery  have 
powers  that  are  'little  short  of  magical'  (602d).  The  implication  here  is  that  the  soul  is 
confused  when  affected  by  appearances.  But,  although  the  soul  is  influenced  by 
perception,  Plato  does  not  yet  clarify  the  required  distinction  between  sensation  and 
judgement.  Such  a  differentiation  is  important,  since  it  points  towards  a  body-soul 
relation  that  can  not  be  sharply  dualistic.  By  referring  to  Theaetetus,  again,  one  could 
argue  that  through  Plato's  treatment  of  the  notion  of  perception,  one's  understanding  of 
the  body-soul  relation  becomes  clearer.  Firstly,  Plato  argues:  '...  soul  or  whatever  one 
ought  to  call  it,  which  all  these  converge  -  something  with  which,  through  those  things, 
if  they  were  instruments,  we  perceive  all  that  is  perceptible'  (Theaetetus  184d).  It  is 
indicated  here,  then,  that  one  perceives  with  the  soul  through  the  instruments  of  the 
body,  which  in  turn  shows  that  the  soul  is  in  close  relation  to  the  body.  A  difference, 
though,  that  should  be  of  interest  is  that  in  the  Republic  the  soul  is  composite  while  in 
the  Theaetetus  it  is  not.  This  difference  is  crucial  for,  although  in  the  Theaetetus  the 
relation  between  soul  and  body  is  that  of  interrelation,  in  the  Republic,  where  the  soul  is 
tripartite,  the  relation  between  soul  and  body  becomes  more  complicated.  The 
reasoning  of  the  Theaetetus  is  the  following:  a)  one  uses  the  senses,  which  are  bodily 
(I  84e),  b)  all  the  senses  converge  to  the  soul,  and  it  is  implied  that  c)  the  soul  elaborates 
them;  is  the  part  of  man  that  does  the  thinking.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Republic, 
plato  still  tries  to  specify  which  part  of  the  soul  is  affected  by  appearances  and  which  is 
not.  This  is  why  he  introduces  calculating,  measuring,  and  weighing:  'And  don't 
measuring,  counting,  and  weighing  give  us  most  welcome  assistance  in  these  cases,  so 
153 that  we  aren't  ruled  by  something's  looking  bigger,  smaller,  more  numerous,  or  heavier, 
but  by  calculation,  measurement  or  weighing?  '  (602d). 
Thus,  Plato  infers  that:  'and  calculating,  measuring,  and  weighing  are  the  work  of  the 
rational  part  of  the  soul'  (602d-e).  This  notion  by  itself  implies  that  there  should  be  at 
least  another  part  of  the  soul.  Then  Plato  states  that,  since  it  is impossible  'for  the  same 
thing  to  believe  opposites  about  the  same  thing  at  the  same  time'  (602e),  then  'the  part 
of  the  soul  that  forms  a  belief  contrary  to  the  measurements  couldn't  be  the  same  as  the 
part  that  believes  in  accord  with  them'  (602e-603a).  In  the  Theaetetus,  now,  Plato 
differentiates  the  soul  investigating  by  itself  from  the  soul  investigating  through  the 
bodily  powers:  '...  while  the  soul  considers  some  things  through  the  bodily  powers, 
there  are  others  which  it  considers  alone  and  through  itself  (7heaetetus  185e).  What, 
then,  remains  constant  to  both  the  Republic  and  the  Theaetetus,  is  the  permanence  of 
reason.  In  the  Timaeus,  Plato  indicates  again  that  soul  and  body  are  in  a  relation  of 
interdependence  by  referring  to  the  example  of  the  usefulness  of  the  eyes:  '...  our  sight 
has  indeed  proved  to  be  a  source  of  supreme  benefit  to  us,  in  that  none  of  our  present 
statements  about  the  universe  could  ever  have  been  made  if  we  had  never  seen  any 
stars,  sun  or  heaven.  As  it  is,  however,  our  ability  to  see  the  periods  of  day-and-night, 
of  months  and  of  years,  of  equinoxes  and  solstices,  has  led  to  the  invention  of  number, 
and  has  given  us  the  idea  of  time  and  opened  the  path  to  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  the 
universe'  (Timaeus  47a-b). 
In  the  Republic  it  is  inferred  not  only  that  there  is  a  need  for  at  least  two  parts  of  the 
soul,  but  also  that:  'the  part  that  puts  its  trust  in  measurement  and  calculation  is  the  best 
part  of  the  soul'  (603a).  In  other  words,  it  is  taken  for  granted  that  the  rational  part  of 
the  soul  is  superior.  What  I  would  like  to  point  out,  though,  is  that  when  Plato  talks 
154 about  'the  best  part'  he  is  making  this  assumption  based  on  the  part's  participation  in, 
on  contact  with  the  truth.  That  is  why  he  then  claims:  'Tberefore,  the  part  that  opposes 
it  [measurement]  is  one  of  the  inferior  parts  in  us'  (603a).  What  should  be  discussed, 
then,  is  the  particular  view  of  the  soul  that  is implied  from  the  above.  The  first  point  of 
consideration  would  have  to  be  the  role  of  perception  in  the  Republic.  It  was  already 
said  that  in  the  Yheaetetus  and  the  Timaeus  perception  is  connected  with  the  body29.  In 
the  Republic,  though,  Plato  does  not  clarify  to  which  part  of  the  soul  perception 
belongs.  Moreover,  he  seems  to  talk  as  though  there  are  just  two  parts  of  the  soul,  the 
rational  and  the  irrational3o.  Although  Plato  implies  that  perception  belongs  to  the 
lower  part,  he  does  not  explain  how  the  soul  -  as  a  whole  -  can  be  affected  by  the 
senses.  In  other  words,  if  the  soul  is  essentially  non-bodily,  and  the  senses  are  bodily, 
there  can  be  no  other  way  for  the  soul  to  be  influenced  by  the  senses,  unless  it  is  in  a 
close  relation  to  the  body.  A  similar  conclusion  came  forward  in  the  Phaedo 
discussion,  in  the  analysis  of  the  recollection  argument,  where  it  was  shown  that  Plato 
must  have  had  in  mind  a  kind  of  process,  a  step  by  step  explanation  of  how  one  reaches 
to  knowledge  from  perception.  Plato  distinguished  between  seeing  something  -  the 
lyre,  which  is  perceptible  -  and  being  reminded  of  its  owner  -  which  is  the  acquisition  of 
a  particular  reasoning  that  goes  beyond  sense  perception.  The  recognition  of  the  lyre, 
as  the  owner's  lyre,  can  be  taken  to  be  a  step  finiher  from  sense  perception.  Tbus,  for 
the  soul  to  be  influenced  by  the  senses,  the  soul  has  to  be  in  close  relation  to  the  body. 
29'j-he  Yheaetelus'  view  has  to  do  with  an  interreMon  between  a  simple  soul  and  the  body;  while  the 
7-1maeus  recognises  three  parts  in  the  soul,  but  they  are  made  along  with  the  body  by  the  lower  gods  and 
am  located  in  the  body. 
30Talking  vaguely  of  the  'irrational'  part  enables  Plato  to  avoid  associating  perception  specifically  with 
either  appetite  or  spirit  It  thereby  helps  to  conceal  the  fact  that  perception  has  no  clear  place  in  the 
tripartite  soul  as  presented  in  the  Republic. 
155 The  next  move  of  Plato.  's,  is  to  check  whether  what  he  said  about  imitation  applies  also 
to  the  imitations  we  hear;  namely  poetry  (603b).  The  first  point  to  note  is  that  since 
poetry  imitates  either  pleasure  or  pain,  it  is  said  to  be  far  from  truth.  The  role  of  poetry 
then  is  to  encourage  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  by  appealing  to  emotions  (603e-608a). 
So,  again  we  have  a  distinction  between  the  rational  soul  and  the  irrational  elements 
including  desire,  emotion,  and  sensation.  These  are  all  treated  as  part  of  the  soul 
though  of  course  they  are  all  closely  connected  with  the  body. 
From  this  point  onwards,  Plato  is  concerned  to  prove  that  'Our  soul  is  immortal  and 
never  destroyed'  (608d).  This  notion,  though,  creates  various  problems  for  Plato  since 
the  notion  of  being  indestructible  becomes  involved  in  the  question  what  exactly  is  a 
soul.  Plato  begins  with  the  assumption  that:  'the  bad  is  what  destroys  and  corrupts,  and 
the  good  is  what  preserves  and  benefits'  (608e).  The  argument,  then,  begins  with  the 
question  whether  there  is  a  good  and  a  bad  for  everything  (608e).  By  clarifying  that, 
Plato  asks:  'And  when  one  of  these  [badness,  sickness]  attaches  itself  to  something, 
doesn't  it  make  the  thing  in  question  bad,  and  in  the  end,  doesn't  it  disintegrate  it  and 
destroy  it  whollyT  (608e),  and  he  adds:  'if  they  don't  destroy  it,  nothing  else  will,  for 
the  good  would  never  destroy  anything,  nor  would  anything  neither  good  nor  bad' 
(609a-b).  Plato,  then,  goes  on  to  say:  '...  if  we  discover  something  that  has  an  evil  that 
makes  it  bad,  but  isn't  able  to  disintegrate  and  destroy  it,  couldn't  we  infer  that  it  is 
naturally  incapable  of  being  destroyedT  (609b).  Plato  here  talks  about  intrinsic  evils 
that  they  are  the  only  ones  able  to  desuW  the  thing  that  possesses  them.  This  implies 
that  external  evils  are  not  in  a  position  to  destroy  anything.  And  that,  in  turn,  implies 
that  the  soul  can  only  be  destroyed  by  its  own  evils,  not  by  the  body's  evils.  Although 
the  idea  that  each  thing  has  its  own  proper  evil  sounds  odd,  it  would  seem  plausible  to 
ancient  Greeks  who  noticed  that  things  tend  to  decay,  rot  or  rust  away  with  no  obvious 
156 external  cause.  Influenced  by  this  way  of  thinking  Plato  can  hold  that  things  can  be 
destroyed  by  their  intrinsic  evils.  This  view  fits  also  with  the  Timaeus'  view3l  that 
I 
things  left  to  themselves  turn  to  disorder  and  chaos. 
To  prove  that  the  soul's  intrinsic  evil  cannot  destroy  it,  Plato  argues:  'What  about  the 
soul?  Isn't  there  something  that  makes  it  bad?  Certainly  all  the  things  we  were 
mentioning  injustice,  licentiousness,  cowardice,  and  lack  of  learning'  (609b-c).  He, 
therefore,  asks:  'Does  any  of  these  disintegrate  and  destroy  the  soulT  (609c), 
...  'Do 
injustice  and  the  other  vices  that  exist  in  a  soul  -  by  their  very  presence  in  it  and  by 
attaching  themselves  to  it  -  corrupt  it  and  make  it  waste  away  until,  having  brought  it  to 
the  point  of  death,  they  separate  it  from  the  bodyT  (609d).  Plato  assumes  here  that 
what  applies  to  natural  things  must  also  apply  to  the  immaterial  soul.  He  also  assumes 
that  the  soul's  evils  are  not  enough  to  destroy  it.  These  assumptions  are  made  plausible 
under  certain  conditions;  it  should  be  taken  for  granted  that,  in  the  case  of  the  soul,  the 
evils  that  are  natural  to  it  are  not  able  to  destroy  itý2.  Moreover,  one  is  faced  here  with  a 
distinction  between  the  'substance'  disintegration  of  the  soul  that  separates  it  from  the 
body,  and  the  spiritual  disintegration.  Plato's  claim  is  that  physical  things  can  be 
destroyed  as  a  result  of  internal  defects.  The  defects,  vices  of  the  soul,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  not  defects  on  its  structure.  The  soul  by  definition  is  not  material;  thus,  its 
evils  cannot  destroy  it,  and  it  cannot  be  pulled  apart.  The  argument  that  is  implied, 
then,  is  the  following: 
PI  If  something's  intrinsic  evil  cannot  destroy  it,  nothing  can. 
P2  The  intrinsic  evil  of  the  soul  is  injustice. 
P3  Injustice  cannot  destroy  the  souL 
"See  further  Timaeus  33a. 
32  This  is  so  according  to  609a. 
157 //C  Soul  cannot  be  destroyed  by  anydiing. 
Thus,  Plato  restates:  '...  For  if  the  soul's  oum  evil  and  badness  isn't  enough  to  destroy 
it,  an  evil  appointed  for  the  destruction  of  something  else  will  hardly  kill  it'  (610e). 
From  the  above  Plato  concludes:  'Now  if  the  soul  isn't  destroyed  by  a  single  evil, 
whether  its  own  or  something  else's  then  clearly  it  must  always  be'  (6  1  Oe-61  I  a).  What 
is  now  added  to  this  argument  is  the  claim  that:  '...  if  it  is  so,  then  you  realise  that  there 
would  always  be  the  same  souls'  (61  la).  What  Plato  probably  implies  here  is  that  there 
always  be  the  same  number  of  souls,  a  notion  that  will  appear  also  in  the  Timaeus  33 
. 
Plato,  then,  says:  'It  isn't  easy  for  anything  composed  of  many  parts  to  be  immortal  if  it 
34  Got  isn't  put  together  in  the  finest  way,  yet  this  is  how  the  soul  now  appeared  to  us'  .U 
ý46tov,  ýv  6  iyca',  at'Biov  dvai  CPMETOV  TE  EK  1TOXXCSV  Kal  Pý  T6  KaWlaTTI  KEXPTIPEVOV 
cruveicv,  65  v0v  ýýriv  ri;  ýavq  ý  tpuX,  4.  '  (61  1b),  and  'Yet  our  recent  argument  and  others 
as  well  compel  us  to  believe  that  the  soul  is  immortal'  (611  b). 
There  are  two  possible  interpretations  of  this  passage.  -  The  first  being  that  the 
composite  soul  cannot  be  immortal,  which  in  turn  implies  that  the  true  soul  must  be  the 
reason.  J.  Adam,  for  example,  argues  that  according  to  the  theory  which  is  rather 
suggested  (612a)  than  fully  worked  out  in  this  chapter,  the  so  called  lower  'parts'  are 
not  of  the  essence  of  soul  at  all,  but  only  incidental  to  its  association  with  body,  and 
33  See  Timaeus  41  d-e.  The  same  notion  is  implied  in  Phaedo  70c-72e. 
34Paul  Shorey  translates  this  controversial  passage,  61  lb,  as:  'It  is  not  easy,  said  1,  for  a  flag  to  be 
immortal  that  is  composed  of  many  elements  not  put  together  in  the  best  way,  as  now  appeared  to  us  to 
be  the  case  with  the  soul'. 
158 consequently  perishable  35 
.  For  the  alternative  view,  611  b  says  that  'it  is  hard  for 
something  composite  to  be  immortal  unless  it  is  put  together  in  the  best  way'.  This 
leaves  open  the  possibility  that  the  composite  soul  is  immortal.  Looking  at  the  text  for 
evidence  as  to  what  was  Plato's  notion  of  the  soul's  true  nature,  is  not  an  easy  task. 
This  is  so,  since  it  contains  an  implicit  contradiction  between  his  belief  that  a)  what  is 
composite  cannot  be  immortal,  and  his  conviction  that  b)  the  soul  that  survives  has  a 
moral  character  and  is  liable  to  punishment.  This  can  be  true  only  if  the  soul  after  death 
includes  the  lower  elements.  I  would  be  inclined  to  argue  that,  at  this  point,  Plato  is 
faced  with  an  inconsistency  that  is  at  the  heart  of  his  account  of  the  soul.  The 
inconsistency  then,  is  present  throughout  book  X.  In  particular,  the  notion  that  the 
soul's  unity  is  something  that  one  has  to  strive  for,  as  well  as  the  idea  -  within  the  myth 
of  Er  -  that  after  death  the  soul  chooses  the  type  of  person  or  animal  that  it  will  become 
in  its  next  incarnation,  indicate  that  the  soul's  true  nature  cannot  be  a  simple  one. 
Moreover,  the  Phaedrus  indicates  that  Plato  had  in  mind  a  soul  that  is  naturally 
composite.  In  the  Phaedrus,  Plato  likens  the  soul  to  the  "natural  union  of  a  team  of 
winged  horses  and  their  charioteer"  (246a).  This  likeness  implies  that  the  soul  is 
naturally  tripartite.  Furthermore,  Plato  talks  about  the  4soul's  steersman'  (247c-d),  this 
image  in  tam  implies  not  only  that  the  soul  is  composite,  but  also  that  the  reasoning 
element  is  responsible  for  the  condition  of  the  soul  as  a  whole  36 
35  J.  Adam,  The  Republic  of  Plato  2  Cambridge,  1965,  p.  427,  n.  12.  On  the  same  interpretation  see 
further  Francis  Macdonald  Comford  (The  Republic  ofPlato,  Oxford  University  Press,  1945,  p.  345):  'We 
are  th;  nking  just  now  of  the  soul  as  composed  of  a  number  of  parts  not  put  together  in  the  most 
satisfactory  way;  and  such  a  composite  thing  could  hardly  be  everlasting';  see  also,  Julia  Annas,  An 
introduction  to  Plato's  Republic,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1981,  p.  346;  S.  Halliwell,  Plato  Republic  10, 
Aris  and  Phillips  1988,  pp.  79  and  164;  G.  M.  Grube,  Plato's  7hought,  London,  Methuen,  1935,  pp.  138. 
139.  B.  Jowctt  and  L.  Campbell  bring  forth  both  views;  see  B.  Jowett,  L.  Campbell,  Plato's  Republic, 
Oxford,  1894,  p.  463.  On  the  view  that  the  composite  soul  survives  see  further  T.  M.  Robinson,  'Soul  and 
Immortality  in  Republic  X',  Phronesis  12  (1967),  especially  pp.  149-150. 
36  On  the  image  of  the  charioteer  and  his  horses  see  further  Phaedrus  246a-248e. 
159 The  Timaeus,  now,  provides  us  with  a  more  coherent  view  regarding  the  nature  of  the 
soul.  The  reasoning  part  of  the  soul,  like  the  World-Soul,  is by  nature  immortal,  but  at 
the  same  time  it  has  to  be  placed  in  a  body  and  so  acquire  two  more  parts:  the  appetitive 
and  the  spirited.  The  main  addition  to  the  Republic,  then,  is  that  the  lower  elements  of 
the  soul  are  linked  to  the  body  and  therefore  mortal  (42a-b,  69c-70e).  Plato  holds,  thus, 
that  the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is  immortal,  while  the  embodied  soul  contains  both 
immortal  and  mortal  elements:  'weave  what  is  mortal  to  what  is  immortal,  fashion  and 
beget  living  things'  (41d).  Thus,  the  Timaeus  favours  the  view  that  it  is  the  reason  that 
is  immortal.  What  should  be  emphasised  though  is  that  after  the  first  incarnation  the 
reasoning  element  is  linked  to  the  lower  elements  and  consequently  to  the  body  in  a 
way  that  enables  it  to  be  distorted.  In  other  words,  the  Timaeus  takes  the  immortal  soul 
to  be  the  reasoning  faculty.  Treating  the  immortal  soul  as  a  faculty  of  reason,  enables 
Plato  to  hold  the  idea  that  reason  can  be  distorted,  without  being  faced  with  the 
inconsistency  of  the  Republic  37 
. 
Returning  to  61  1b,  it  should  be  noted  that  although  Plato  argues  that  the  soul  cannot  be 
destroyed  by  the  body's  evils,  he  mentions  nothing  about  whether  the  body's  evil  can  in 
any  way  affect  the  soul.  This  point  is  essential  for  one's  understanding  of  the  relation 
between  body  and  soul.  It  allows  the  soul  to  be  influenced  by  either  its  intrinsic  evils  or 
the  evils  of  the  body,  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  keeps  its  immortality.  This  is  achieved  by 
taking  for  granted  that  the  soul  cannot  be  destroyed  by  its  natural  evils,  and  therefore 
cannot  be  destroyed  by  external  evils  either.  And  at  the  same  time,  by  not  eliminating 
the  possibility  of  the  soul  being  affected  by  either  internal  or  external  evils.  This  point 
has  also  an  important  bearing  on  Plato's  view  of  the  afterlife.  As  will  be  discussed 
37PIato's  notion  of  the  soul  in  the  Timaeus  will  be  analysed  further  in  the  following  chapter.  Plato  is  able 
to  treat  the  immortal  soul  as  a  reasoning  faculty  because  of  a)  the  link  between  reason  and  the  circular 
motions,  and  b)  the  abandonment  of  the  idea  of  punishment. 
160 later,  on  the  analysis  of  the  myth  of  Er,  this  open  possibility,  of  the  soul  being 
influenced,  can  be  used  as  an  explanation  of  the  different  characters  of  the  souls  after 
death. 
The  description  of  the  soul  in  its  purest  state,  61  lb-e,  is  of  interest  because  it  again 
refers  to  the  soul  as  being  akin  to  the  Forms,  and  at  the  same  time,  it  doesn't  present  the 
soul  as  being  necessarily  simple  as  is  implied  in  the  Phaed038  .  The  soul  being 
presented  as  composite  can  be  further  argued  through  Plato's  phrasing  'its  whole  being' 
(611  e).  To  talk  about  the  soul's  whole  being  implies  a  composite  being.  He  continues 
by  saying  that  in  order  to  determine  the  soul's  true  nature,  one  would  be  able  to 
'determine  whether  it  has  many  parts  or  just  one  and  whether  or  in  what  manner  it  is  put 
together.  But  we've  already  given  a  decent  account,  I  think,  of  what  its  condition  is, 
and  what  parts  it  has  when  it  is  immersed  in  human  life'  (612a).  This  last  quotation 
implies  further  that  Plato  has  in  mind  a  view  of  the  soul  independently  of  the  body  and 
another  view  of  the  soul  while  in  human  form.  Although,  as  was  said  previously,  it  is 
difficult  for  Plato  to  be  coherent  in  holding  both  that  the  soul  is  composite  and 
immortal,  he  seems  to  argue  for  both.  Plato  can  argue  that  the  soul,  while  on  its  own,  is 
irnmortal,  and  while  embodied,  is  composite,  but  for  the  argument  to  be  complete,  he 
needs  to  show  how  the  disembodied  soul  is  different  to  the  embodied  one.  Such  an 
attempt  is  made  in  the  myth  of  E?  9. 
"Phaedo  78c. 
31jt  is  also  of  importance  to  my  analysis  of  the  Timaeus. 
161 The  Myth  of  Er 
Plato  concludes  book  X  of  the  Republic  by  telling  a  myth  of  judgement.  These  last 
pages  of  the  Republic,  although  a  myth,  make  some  important  points  about  the  soul- 
body  relation.  In  particular,  Plato  uses  the  myth  so  as  to  show  that  a)  the  soul  survives 
death,  and  b)  it  is  affected  by  its  embodiment,  and  is  therefore  different  from  the  soul  as 
pure  reason  depicted  in  the  earlier  dialogues.  Such  a  notion  is  implied  so  that  it  enables 
Plato  to  establish  the  importance  of  being  just;  it  points  towards  the  importance  of 
moral  choice.  According  to  the  myth,  Er  was  thought  to  be  dead  and  so  prepared  for 
the  funeral,  but  after  twelve  days  he  revived.  Thus,  he  described  what  he  saw  in  the 
underworld:  'He  said  that,  after  his  soul  had  left  him,  it  travelled  together  with  many 
others  until  they  came  to  a  marvellous  place,  where  there  were  two  adjacent  openings  in 
the  earth,  and  opposite  and  above  them  two  others  in  the  heavens,  and  between  them 
judges  sat'  (614b-c).  After  the  judges'  decision,  the  just  souls  go  upwards,  into  the 
heavens  (614c),  while  the  unjust  travel  downward  (614c).  Er,  thus,  acts  as  a  messenger: 
he  said  that  'the  souls  were  departing  after  judgement  through  one  of  the  openings  in 
the  heavens  and  one  in  the  earth,  while  through  the  other  two  souls  were  arriving' 
(614d).  The  souls  that  came  up  from  earth  were  covered  with  dust  and  dirt,  while  the 
souls  that  came  down  from  the  heavens  came  down  pure  (614d-e).  This  account  might 
seem  useful  for  one's  understanding  of  the  souls'  constitution.  It  might  be  taken  as 
implying  that  the  souls  when  in  this  state  of  disembodiment  are  pure,  but  the  souls  that 
come  from  the  earth,  that  where  recently  embodied,  are  carrying  with  them  the 
influences  of  such  an  embodiment. 
The  myth  continues  with  the  emphasis  being  placed  on  the  penalties  of  the  unjust:  'For 
each  in  turn  of  the  unjust  things  they  have  done  and  for  each  in  turn  of  the  people  they 
162 had  wronged,  they  paid  the  penalty  ten  times  over,  once  in  every  century  of  their 
journey.  Since  a  century  is  roughly  the  length  of  a  human  life, 
...  they  paid  a  tenfold 
penalty  for  each  injustice'  (615a-b).  Similarly,  Plato  talks  about  the  penalties  inflicted 
to  tyrants.  Although  one  is  not  presented  with  details,  the  main  point  seem  to  be  that 
tyrants  are  the  most  unjust,  and  therefore  incapable  'to  go  up'  (615e).  The  first  point 
that  should  be  noticed  here  is  Plato's  argument  that  the  unjust  are  to  be  punished.  Since 
Plato  is  not  talking  about  a  physical  punishment,  one  must  assume  that  the  soul  is 
punished  for  its  previous  embodied  life.  At  the  same  time  it  is  implied  that  the  soul  is 
in  a  position  to  benefit  from  punishment.  The  notion  of  punishment,  then,  shows  that 
the  soul  is  not  pure  reason,  if  it  were  it  wouldn't  bear  any  responsibility  for  what  the 
person  did  in  his  embodied  life.  In  other  words,  we  could  argue: 
PI  the  souls  of  the  unjust  are  punished  in  afterlife  according  to  their  wrongdoings  while 
embodied. 
P2  Pure  reason  is  not  affected  by  embodiment. 
//C  Therefore,  soul  is  not  pure  reason. 
It  is  interesting  to  notice  here  that  the  punishments  inflicted  on  the  souls  depend  on  the 
severity  of  their  wrongdoings,  and  that  the  tyrants  are  considered  to  be  the  worse 
sinners  and  therefore  incurable.  Such  a  point  might  mean  that  the  tyrants'  souls  while 
embodied  were  so  corrupt  that  it  is  impossible  for  them  now  to  reform;  they  arc  no 
longer  in  a  position  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong,  and  thus  they  can  not  easily 
improve  themselves. 
The  next  point  of  the  myth  is  to  unravel  the  pattern  of  the  souls'joumey:  'Each  group 
spent  seven  days  in  the  meadow,  and  on  the  eighth  they  had  to  get  up  and  go  on  a 
journey.  On  the  fourth  day  of  thatjoumey  they  came  to  a  place  where  they  could  look 
down  from  above  on  a  straight  column  of  light  that  stretched  over  the  whole  of  heaven 
163 and  earth.  After  another  day,  they  came  to  the  light  itself'  (616b).  In  a  like  manner, 
Plato  presents  a  picture  of  a  spindle  and  eight  whorls:  '...  eight  whorls  altogether  lying 
inside  one  another,  with  their  rims  appearing  as  circles  from  above,  while  from  the  back 
they  formed  one  continuous  whorl  around  the  spindle...  '  (616d-e)  and  'The  spindle 
itself  turned  on  the  lap  of  necessity...  And  there  were  three  other  beings  sitting  at  equal 
distances  from  one  another,  each  on  a  throne.  These  were  the  Fates,  the  daughters  of 
Necessity:  Lachesis,  Clotho,  and  Atropos'  (617b-c).  These  final  lines  about  the  Fates 
are  an  important  addition  to  the  myth  because  they  are  going  to  be  in  juxtaposition  to 
the  individual  soul's  choice.  The  Fates  are  considered  the  ones  to  regulate  the  past,  the 
present,  and  the  future  respectively  (617c). 
The  souls'  next  step,  then,  is  to  present  themselves  to  Lachesis  who  tells  them  that  they 
are  entering  'the  new  beginning  of  another  cycle,  that  will  end  in  death  (617d).  As 
Armas  says,  'what  death  reveals  to  Er  is  that  he  and  everybody  else  is  on  a  cycle  of  birth 
and  rebirth;  there  is  no  fmal  judgement'40 
. 
This  is  an  issue  that  will  be  discussed  in 
detail  concerning  Plato's  view  of  the  soul  of  the  philosopher.  What  is  of  interest  here, 
though,  is firstly,  as  H.  S.  Thayer  says,  that  'there  is  no  choice  about  whether  to  choose 
or  not;  the  souls  must  make  a  choice'41  ,  and  this  is  so  of  necessity,  determined  by  the 
Fates.  Secondly,  the  souls  are  to  choose  their  daemon  or  guardian  spirit  themselves. 
'Your  daemon  or  guardian  spirit  will  not  be  assigned  to  you  by  lot;  you  will  choose 
him'  (617d).  Consequently,  the  main  interest  here  is  on  the  issue  of  personal  choice. 
The  souls  are  responsible  for  the  choices  they  make;  'The  responsibility  lies  with  the 
one  who  makes  the  choice;  the  god  has  none'  (617e).  As  Thayer  says,  'in  the  myth  the 
operation  of  choice  is  portrayed  as  directed  to  a  "life"  (bios),  a  network  or  pattern  of 
40julia  Annas,  'Plato's  Myths  of  Judgement',  Phronesis  27  (1982)  p.  13  1. 
41H.  S.  Thayer,  'The  Myth  Of  Er',  Histo?  y  ofPhilosophy  Quarterly  5  (1988)  p.  372. 
164 contained  and  ensuing  actions  942 
.  Thayer  further  claims  that  it  is  taken  for  granted  that 
choice  is  possible.  He,  moreover,  argues  that  Plato  departs  from  a  tradition  in  Greek 
thought  -  according  to  which  the  gods  in  various  ways  and  degrees  cause  moral 
blindness  and  evil  in  human  conduct  -  by  stating  the  fact  of  choice  and  assigning 
responsibility  to  the  one  who  chooses,  rather  than  to  divine  agencieS43.  The  choice, 
thus,  lies  on  the  soul.  The  soul  is  responsible  for  the  life  it  chooses. 
The  process  followed  then  is  like  this:  the  lots  are  thrown  to  everyone  to  choose,  and 
then  the  models  of  lives  are  presented  to  the  souls  (617e-618a).  An  interesting  detail 
here  is  that  the  models  of  lives  are  far  more  than  the  souls  present  (618a).  This  is  of 
importance  for  it  makes  the  scope  of  choice  wider  and  therefore,  more  fair.  Another 
interesting  point  is  that,  for  the  first  time,  Plato  includes  in  the  models  those  of 
animals44.  What  should  also  be  noted  is  Plato's  claim  that  '...  the  arrangement  of  the 
soul  was  not  included  in  the  model  because  the  soul  is  inevitably  altered  by  the  different 
lives  it  chooses'  (618b).  Thayer  notes  that  'the  soul  itself,  before  choosing  a  life,  is 
unqualified  and  simply  "a  pure  choosee,.  The  choice  is  of  a  life-pattern:  and  once  the 
choice  is  made  the  choosing  soul  and  the  character  or  quality  of  the  life  it  selects  are 
fUSed'45. 
On  the  other  hand,  J.  Annas  believes  that  one  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  his  life  and 
so  either  punishment  or  reward  in  the  afterlife  is  of  no  point.  Therefore,  she  argues  that: 
'However,  to  the  extent  that  my  present  life  is  the  product  of  past  lives  and  their 
afterlife  requitals,  it  becomes  hard  for  me  to  think  seriously  that  I  should  be  rewarded  or 
'2,  lliayer,  p.  370. 
43Tbayer,  p.  371. 
4'This  point  is  also  discussed  in  the  Timaeus  42c  and  91  e. 
45Tbayer,  p.  372. 
165 punished.  A  conviction  that  the  responsibility  for  my  character  and  actions  does  not  go 
back  to  me  and  then  stop,  but  can  be  traced  in  large  part  to  previous  lives  which  I  do  not 
remember  is  bound  to  undercut  the  feeling  that  I  am  responsible  for  what  I  have 
done'46.  Thus,  Annas'  argument  is  that  one  does  not  have  control  over  what  one  does. 
Annas  further  argues  that  'the  free  choice  of  the  souls  between  lives  can  have 
significance  for  me  only  if  there  is  some  way  in  which  the  free  choice  of  my  life  by  a 
soul  on  the  cycle  of  rebirths  implies  that  within  my  life  I  have  freedom  to  choose  and  so 
am  truly  responsible  for  what  I  choose  to  do.  Yet  this  seems  not  to  be  the  case'47  .  In 
other  words,  Annas  argues  that  the  souls  do  not  choose  a  character,  rather  they  choose  a 
fully  worked-out  blueprint,  so  there  is  nothing  that  the  souls  could  have  done  to  alter 
it".  It  should  be  noticed  here,  though,  that  Plato's  major  concern  is  to  show  why  one 
should  choose  the  just  life.  The  myth  enables  him  to  show  a  further  benefit  due  to  such 
a  choice.  Even  if  we  assume  that  what  a  soul  chooses  is  a  fully  worked-out  life,  there  is 
still  room  for  improvement.  To  choose  wisely,  for  instance,  can  make  an  important 
difference  on  the  life  that  one  is  assigned  with.  Thus,  despite  the  reincarnations,  Plato 
holds  that  the  core  of  the  personality;  the  reasoning  element,  remains  the  same;  he 
implies  that  the  soul  is  the  reason.  It  seems  then  that  what  Plato  argues  for  is  that  the 
soul  is  in  d  position  to  make  itself  better.  The  soul  is  affected  by  the  embodiments,  but 
that  does  not  mean  that  it  has  no  control  over  them.  Plato's  claim  implies  that  despite 
the  choice,  the  embodied  life  -  whatever  that  may  be  -  is  ultimately  going  to  affect  the 
soul's  development.  But  the  important  point  is  that  there  is  always  the  possibility  of 
change  no  matter  how  bad  or  good  a  choice  is.  Plato,  thus,  says  to  Glaucon  that  '... 
each  of  us  must  neglect  all  other  subjects  and  be  most  concerned  to  seek  out  and  learn 
46Annas,  1982,  p.  132. 
47AnnaS,  1982,  p.  133. 
4SMnaS,  1982,  p.  134. 
166 those  that  will  enable  him  to  distinguish  the  good  life  from  the  bad  and  always  to  make 
the  best  choice  possible  in  every  situation'  (618b-c).  This  advice  of  Plato's,  in  a  way, 
verifies  the  element  of  personal  choice.  By  making  oneself  more  aware  of  what  is  good 
and  what  is  bad,  one  will  make  the  best  choice. 
Hence,  Plato  continues:  'And  from  all  this  he  will  be  able,  by  considering  the  nature  of 
the  soul,  to  reason  out  which  life  is better  and  which  worse  and  to  choose  accordingly, 
calling  a  life  worse  if  it  leads  the  soul  to  become  more  unjust,  better  if  it  leads  the  soul 
to  become  more  just,  and  ignoring  everything  else'  (618d-e).  At  this  point,  the 
emphasis  is  placed  on  choosing  the  just  life.  What  is  the  crucial  addition,  though,  is  to 
choose  the  just  life  through  reason,  to  choose  the  just  life  is  not  a  matter  of  inclination 
or  urge,  it  is  a  reasoning  process.  This  does  not  mean  though  that  reason  is  pure;  the 
judgement  of  reason  is  presumably  corrupted  by  the  influences  of  the  lower  soul  in 
previous  lives.  Plato's  claim  is  then  that  'we  must  always  know  how  to  choose  the 
mean  in  such  lives  and  how  to  avoid  either  of  the  extremes,  as  far  as  possible,  both  in 
this  life  and  in  all  those  beyond  it.  This  is  the  way  that  a  human  being  becomes 
happiest'  (619a-b).  Thus,  the  essential  point  here  is  not  only  the  personal  choice  it  is 
the  best  choice  possible.  This  is  accented  by  the  following:  'There  is  a  satisfactory  life 
rather  than  a  bad  one  available  even  for  the  one  who  comes  last,  provided  that  he 
chooses  it  rationally  and  lives  it  seriously'  (619b). 
After  the  example  of  a  soul  choosing  a  tyrannical  life,  Plato  refers  specifically  to  those 
who  pursue  philosophy:  'However,  if  someone  pursues  philosophy  in  a  sound  manner 
when  he  comes  to  live  here  on  earth  and  if  the  lottery  doesn't  make  him  one  of  the  last 
to  choose,  then,  given  what  Er  has  reported  about  the  next  world,  it  looks  as  though  not 
only  will  he  be  happy  here,  but  his  journey  from  here  to  there  and  back  again  won't  be 
167 along  the  rough  underground  path,  but  along  the  smooth  heavenly  one'  (619d-e).  The 
emphasis  is  placed  again  on  the  use  of  reason;  one  who  pursues  philosophy  is  in  a 
condition  to  choose  more  wisely  and  therefore  better  than  those  who  do  not  pursue  it, 
are.  An  interesting  point  raised  by  Annas,  here,  is  that  Plato  does  not  allow  to  the 
philosopher  to  escape  reincarnation.  As  Annas  puts  it:  'Even  if  in  some  unexplained 
way  a  good,  innocent  soul  always  avoided  a  bad  choice  of  life,  it  is  still  condemned  to 
endless  embodiment,  and  so  there  is  no  final  judgement  and  permanent  reward.  Life 
and  judgement,  life  and  judgement  keep  on  coming  endlessly  round'49.  Although  such 
an  example  could  create  a  difficulty  for  Plato,  it  can  also  be  overcome  by  establishing 
Plato's  goal.  Plato's  goal  -  at  this  case  -  is  not  to  talk  about  ultimate  judgement  and 
reward,  but  the  circle  of  the  soul  in  a  better  way;  the  soul  by  following  a  philosophical 
way  of  life  is  benefited  despite  the  reincarnations.  As  Annas  recognises,  'the  myth 
serves  as  a  symbolic  expression  of  the  Republic's  main  moral  argument.  For  the 
original  demand  was  that  justice  be  shown  to  benefit  the  agent  both  in  being  the  kind  of 
thing  it  is  and  for  its  intrinsic  consequences,  rewards  being  left  out  of  the  account'so. 
Book  X  concludes  with  Plato  arguing  that  '...  if  we  are  persuaded  by  me,  we'll  believe 
that  the  soul  is  immortal  and  able  to  endure  every  evil  and  every  good,  and  we'll  always 
hold  to  the  upward  path,  practising  justice  with  reason  in  every  way  ...  like  victors  in  the 
games  who  go  around  collecting  their  prizes  -  we'll  receive  our  rewards.  Hence,  both 
in  this  life  and  on  the  thousand-year  journey  we've  described,  we'll  do  well  and  be 
happy'  (621c-d).  These  last  words  of  the  Republic  show  that  what  Plato  has  in  mind  is 
to  show  that  the  best  life  is  the  just  life;  that  justice  is  beneficial  both  for  its 
consequences  and  for  itself 
'"Annas,  1982,  p.  136. 
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168 Conclusion 
To  conclude,  the  emphasis  in  the  chapter  based  on  the  Republic  is  placed  on  the 
introduction  of  the  notion  of  the  tripartite  soul  because  of  the  solutions  that  it  provides 
to  Phaedo's  ethical  considerations.  In  other  words,  one  of  Plato's  main  difficulties  in 
the  Phaedo  is  that  by  presenting  a  soul  as  being  simple  and  therefore  separate  from  the 
body,  he  is  not  able  to  give  an  adequate  ethical  theory  respecting  the  soul's 
improvement.  Although  the  emphasis  placed  in  Phaedo  proves  Plato's  seriousness 
about  the  soul's  immortality,  at  the  same  time  Plato  insists  on  the  notion  of  the  care  of 
the  soul  which  itself  proclaims  a  moral  theory  that  would  allow  the  soul  to  change;  to 
become  either  better  or  worse.  That  point,  in  turn  needs  a  soul  that  will  not  be 
completely  separate  from  the  body. 
Another  point  in  the  Phaedo  is  that  the  soul,  being  pure  reason,  tries  to  reach 
knowledge  without  being  distracted  by  the  body.  The  question  that  arises  from  such  a 
view  is  that  if  the  soul  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  body,  why  is  the  soul  affected  by  it, 
why  does  the  soul  have  to  struggle  to  be  left  pure?  It  is  implied  here  that  the  relation 
between  soul  and  body  cannot  be  that  of  a  sharp  dualism.  In  other  words,  if  the  soul  is 
simply  reason,  Phaedo  can  not  give  an  adequate  account  of  the  relation  between  soul 
and  body  regarding  its  epistemology.  This  is  an  issue  that  Plato  seems  to  realise  even 
within  the  Phaedo;  in  the  recollection  argument  the  role  of  the  senses  is  important  for 
one  to  achieve  knowledge,  but  it  is  not  solved. 
A  finther  difficulty  that  Plato  faces  in  the  Phaedo  is  that  the  philosopher  is 
distinguished  from  the  other  humans  in  that  he  lives  a  life  of  practising  death.  He  treats 
sense-experience  as  a  hindrance  to  his  development,  he  is  not  interested  in  anything 
169 bodily,  he  rather  he  strives  to  achieve  immortality.  Such  a  notion  contradicts  Plato's 
moral  beliefs.  Plato,  wants  to  show  that  one's  moral  advancement  depends  on  how 
much  the  soul  is  affected  by  the  body,  the  bodily  sense  organs  provide  the  first  step  for 
one  to  achieve  knowledge,  but  at  the  same  time,  Plato  refers  to  the  philosopher  as  if  he 
can  dissociate  himself  from  anything  bodily.  An  apparent  contradiction  that  can  be 
solved  if  one  accepts  that  the  soul-body  relation  cannot  be  that  of  a  sharp  dualism. 
These  are  the  problems  that  the  tripartite  soul  of  the  Republic  is  set  to  solve. 
Hence,  in  the  Republic,  Plato  introduces  the  notion  of  the  tripartite  soul.  The  first  thing 
that  is  achieved  by  this  notion  of  the  soul  is  that  the  soul-body  relation  is  no  longer 
sharply  dualistic.  Even  as  early  as  in  book  IV,  through  Plato's  talk  about  the  education 
of  the  guardians,  one  sees  that  what  Plato  aims  for  is  a  balance  within  the  soul.  Plato, 
throughout  the  Republic,  wants  to  achieve  a  kind  of  unity  within  the  soul's  parts  as  well 
as  between  soul  and  body.  The  three  parts  of  the  soul  enable  Plato  to  talk  about  the 
soul's  improvement  or  decline.  By  starting  from  the  assumption  that  there  are  different 
motivations  for  different  things,  Plato  tries  to  locate  them  in  different  parts  of  the  soul. 
This  move  enables  him  to  have  conflicting  drives  in  the  soul.  By  dividing  the  soul  in 
three  parts,  he  is  able  to  locate  in  the  soul  various  Motivations  that  could  not-  be 
included  under  the  simple  soul  of  the  Phaedo5l.  So,  the  tripartite  theory  of  the  soul 
provides  the  means  for  an  ethical  view  to  be  held,  and  as  a  result,  for  a  closer  relation 
between  soul  and  body  to  be  achieved.  In  particular,  in  order  to  hold  that  the  body  is 
able  to  affect  the  soul,  the  soul  has  to  be  something  more  than  reason.  Plato's  ethical 
point  in  the  Republic,  therefore,  is  that  the  soul  can  be  improved  or  degraded  according 
to  the  influences  that  it  has  from  the  body.  These  influences,  now,  are  not  straight  from 
"This  notion  arises  from  Plato's  belief  that  two  opposite  things  cannot  be  derived  from  one  and  the  same 
source  at  the  same  time. 
170 the  body  to  reason,  rather  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul;  appetites  and  spirit,  which  are  in 
close  connection  to  the  body,  are  the  ones  that  can  alter  the  soul's  character.  Through 
the  tripartite  soul  then,  Plato  is  in  a  position  to  hold  that  a  person  is  not  simply  reason, 
something  that  was  implied  in  the  Phaedo,  but  rather  that  a  human  being  is  a  unity; 
consists  necessarily  of  the  soul  as  a  whole;  being  tripartite,  and  the  body. 
This  theory,  however,  faces  a  number  of  problems.  One  difficulty  is  that  the  relation 
between  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  and  the  body  has  to  be  illustrated  in  detail52.  J. 
Schiller  correctly  says  that  the  soul  of  the  Republic  is  not  pictured  as  an  entity 
imprisoned  in  the  body,  but  rather  as  the  seat  of  all  the  activities  of  the  bod?  3.  The 
distinction  that  is  proposed  here,  then,  is  that  between  the  soul's  imprisonment  in  the 
body,  and  the  embodiment  of  the  soul.  In  the  first  place  the  soul  is  seen  as  something 
completely  different  from  the  body,  that  was  accidentally  put  in  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  notion  of  embodiment  leaves  open  the  possibility  of  mutual  interdependence 
especially  between  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  and  the  body.  Although  the  Republic 
does  not  provide  one  with  the  necessary  information  for  such  a  notion  to  be  accepted  in 
full,  the  notion  of  the  tripartite  soul  is  an  improvement  over  the  Phaedo,  where  the  soul 
was  thought  to  be  simple. 
An  extension  to  the  above  problem  is  that  neither  in  the  Phaedo  nor  in  the  Republic 
does  Plato  give  an  adequate  account  of  how  reason  and  perception  interact.  But,  in  the 
Repuhlic,  the  problem  is  at  least  taken  under  considerýtion.  Plato  tries  to  show  that  man 
is  in  a  position  to  synthesise  his  knowledge  of  the  Forms  with  the  data  that  he  gets  from 
52Tbis  is  done  in  the  Timaeus,  where  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  are  spatially  located  within  the  body's 
framework  (Timaeus  69d-70a). 
"Schiller,  P.  S. 
171 the  senses.  Reason  and  perception  are  related;  and  this  is  so  due  to  the  soul's  nature. 
This,  I  shall  show,  is  indicated  by  a)  Plato's  cave  image,  b)  his  talk  of  which  part  is 
influenced  from  imitation  in  book  X,  and  c)  from  his  notion  on  punishment  in  the  myth 
of  Er,  conceming  afterlife. 
Firstly,  the  cave  image,  along  with  the  significant  political  connotations,  points  towards 
an  ftnportant  epistemological  issue;  as  J.  Malcohn  says  it  represents  the  educational 
progress  of  the  SOU154;  it  shows  the  necessity  of  having  reason  in  a  close  relation  to 
perception.  What  is  of  interest,  thus,  is  the  ascent  from  the  cave  to  the  sun  as  well  as 
the  descent  back  to  the  cave.  The  ascent  shows  how  one  can  reach  knowledge  by 
passing  through  the  perceptions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  descent  is  of  importance  too 
since  it  indicates  why  reason  cannot  be  left  by  itself-,  it  implies  the  significance  of  the 
notion  of  the  soul  as  a  unity. 
In  detail,  then,  the  first  state  in  the  cave  presents  one  with  the  image  of  the  prisoners 
who  are  tied  down  and  are  able  to  see  only  the  shadows:  'the  prisoners  would  in  every 
way  believe  that  the  truth  is  nothing  other  than  the  shadows  of  those  artefacts...  '  (515c). 
These  are  the  men  that  consider  appearances  to  be  the  truth;  they  form  false  beliefs 
based  only  on  sense-perception,  reason  has  no  role  to  play  yet.  The  image's  next  stage 
is  that  of  the  gradual  adjustment  when  one  looks  up  towards  the  light:  'When  one  of 
them  [the  prisoners  in  the  cave]  was  freed  and  suddenly  compelled  to  stand  up,  turn  his 
head,  walk,  and  look  up  toward  the  light,  he'd  be  pained,  and  dazzled  and  unable  to  see 
the  things  whose  shadows  he'd  seen  before'  (515c).  Plato  continues  in  a  like  manncr: 
'And  if  someone  compelled  him  to  look  at  the  light  itself,  wouldn't  his  eyes  hurt,  and 
IJ.  Malcolm,  'The  Line  and  the  Cave',  Phronesis  7  (1962)  p.  39. 
172 wouldn't  he  turn  around  and  flee  towards  the  things  he  is  able  to  see,  believing  that 
they're  already  clearer  than  the  ones  he's  being  shown'  (515d-e).  What  should  be  noted 
here  is  that  Plato  realises  that  such  a  process  is  not  an  easy  one. 
Plato  argues,  thus,  that  after  different  stages  in  his  way  upwards  towards  the  sun,  one  is 
able  to  see  the  things  in  the  world  above,  and  ultimately  the  sun  itself.  'Finally,  he'd  be 
able  to  see  the  sun,  not  images  of  it  in  water  or  some  alien  place,  but  the  sun  itself,  in  its 
own  place,  and  be  able  to  study  it'  (516b).  This  is  then  the  process  from  the  cave 
upwards  to  the  sun.  Trying  to  apply  it  to  the  soul's  progress  towards  knowledge  then, 
one  sees  that  Plato  does  not  give  one  an  absolute  jump  from  perception  to  knowledge; 
he  assumes  that  there  is  a  continual  Progress  of  how  one  is  to  attain  knowledge.  This 
point  is  of  essence  since  it  indicates  a  complex  relation  between  soul  and  body. 
Perception  is  not  treated  as  completely  bodily,  and  therefore  having  nothing  to  do  with 
knowledge;  rather,  one  needs  perception  so  as  to  reach  knowledge.  Plato  in  the  cave 
image,  hence,  claims  that  for  one  to  reach  knowledge,  one  has  to  start  by  the  senses.  As 
A.  S.  Ferguson  says,  the  prisoner  who  is  dragged  from  his  spectacle  (the  cave)  to  the 
sunlight  is like  a  soul  that  is  turned  from  dnai&ucla  to  knowledge".  Ferguson  further 
argues  that  dnai&uTot  or  #povE5,  upon  being  faced  with  the  problems  of 
mathematics,  as  Plato  conceives  it,  pass  through  a  stage  of  aTropta  and  unbelief  before 
they  learn  to  apprehend  the  Forms56.  Such  a  notion  is  important  if  one  bears  in  mind 
that  Plato's  emphasis  is  on  the  progress  from  sense  perception  to  knowledge.  Thus  the 
cave  image,  like  Meno's  slave  example,  the  recollection  argument  of  the  Phacdo,  and 
Socrates'  speech  in  the  Symposium,  is  Plato's  way  of  showing  that  to  achieve 
knowledge  one  has  to  pass  through  perception.  The  same  kind  of  continuity  is  pointed 
51A.  S.  Ferguson,  'Plato's  Simile  of  Light  Again,  Classical  L?  Uarlerly  28  (1934)  p.  202. 
36Ferguson,  p.  204. 
173 out  in  the  example  of  the  divided  line  (509d  ff.  ).  Although  the  line  does  not  have  a 
progress,  it  does  suggest  that  there  is  a  kind  of  continuity  among  the  different  sections. 
This  can  be  supported  by  the  general  claim  that  Plato  refers  to  one  line  for  both  the 
visible  and  the  intelligible.  Although  he  wants  to  stress  the  difference  between  the  two 
main  divisions,  the  visible  from  the  intelligible,  he  argues  that  man,  at  least  in  principle, 
is  able  to  move  from  the  one  to  the  other.  That  there  is  continuity  within  the  divided 
line  is  further  indicated  through  Plato's  example  of  mathematics.  Plato  argues  that 
when  people  use  'geometry,  calculation,  and  the  like'  (5  1  Oc),  'although  they  use  visible 
figures  and  make  claims  about  them,  their  thought  isn't  directed  to  them  but  to  those 
other  things  that  they  are  like'  (5  1  Od).  The  claim  thus  is  that  there  cannot  be  completely 
distinct  stages  among  the  line  because  even  those  stages  that  involve  knowledge 
presuppose  perception.  Thus,  as  Plato  says:  'This,  then,  is  the  kind  of  thing  that,  on  the 
one  hand  I  said  is  intelligible,  and,  on  the  other,  is  such  that  the  soul  is  forced  to  use 
hypotheses  in  the  investigation  of  it,  not  travelling  up  to  a  first  principle...  but  using  as 
images  those  very  things  of  which  images  were  made  in  the  section  below,  and  which, 
by  comparison  to  their  images,  were  thought  to  be  clear  and  to  be  valued  as  such' 
(511  a). 
Returning  to  the  cave  image  then,  the  descent  from  the  sun  back  to  the  cave  is 
significant  for  it  implies  that  in  this  embodied  life  reason  cannot  exist  by  itself.  In  other 
words,  the  man  has  to  function  as  a  unity  not  only  for  the  individual's  sake  but  also  for 
the  whole  of  the  state.  In  particular,  Plato  says  that  the  one  that  has  seen  the  sun,  has 
achieved  knowledge  of  the  Forms,  has  to  return  to  the  cave  to:  'spread  happiness 
throughout  the  city  by  bringing  the  citizens  into  harmony  with  each  other  through 
persuasion  and  by  making  them  share  with  each  other  the  benefits  that  each  class  can 
confer  on  the  community'  (519e).  If  one  applied,  again,  such  a  talk  to  the  soul,  one 
174 could  argue  that  [if  one  assume  that  reason  is  the  part  of  the  soul  that  achieves 
knowledge  of  the  Forms]  Plato's  claim  is  that  in  this  embodied  life  reason  cannot  be  by 
itself,  it  has  to  work  along  with  the  lower  parts  so  as  to  achieve  unity.  That  Plato  has  in 
mind  the  soul's  unity  can  be  fiather  supported  by  Ferguson's  argument.  He  maintains 
that  the  allegory  is  an  experience,  'Tra'Oog'  of  changing  from  firelight  to  fiill  sun  and 
back  to  firelight,  which  is  applied  to  illustrate  the  gulf  between  7Ta  i  5c  ia  and  d  Tra  i  6cua  ia 
(514a)  and  to  show  that  the  gulf  may,  with  difficulty,  be  bridged  57 
Secondly,  in  book  X  Plato  tries  to  show  that  the  lower  part  of  the  soul  is  the  one 
confused  when  affected  by  appearances.  The  complication  created  then  is  that  Plato 
does  not  provide  one  with  the  particular  relation  between  reason  and  perception,  and  he 
cannot  therefore  provide  one  with  the  specific  relation  required  between  the  tripartite 
soul  and  the  bodyss.  If  perception  is  bodily,  and  reason  is  completely  separate  from 
perception,  appearances  cannot  affect  reason.  But,  when  Plato  talks  about  the  soul,  he 
talks  about  three  parts  being  interconnected  with  each  other,  and  the  whole  being 
interrelated  to  the  body,  in  such  a  way  that  perception  and  reason  have  to  be  combined. 
Finally,  in  the  myth  of  Er  Plato's  talk  about  punishment  indicates  that  there  is  a  close 
relation  between  reason  and  perception.  If  the  soul  after  death  is  reason  alone,  then 
when  Plato  talks  about  the  punishment  of  a  wicked  soul,  he  cannot  refer  to  physical 
punishment,  the  soul  cannot  suffer  physically.  So,  what  Plato  says  indicate  that  reason 
in  a  way  is  influenced  by  the  perceptions  the  person  had  while  embodied,  and  that 
results  in  the  soul  being  judged  accordingly,  otherwise,  to  talk  about  the  soul's  rewards 
or  punishment  after  death  would  have  been  meaningless.  The  myth  of  Er,  then, 
57  Ferguson,  p.  209. 
58See  further  the  discussion  for  book  X  of  the  Republic. 
175 intended  to  summarise  the  message  of  the  Republic.  It  is  designed  to  emphasise  the 
notion  of  choice,  a  notion  that  suggests  parallels  with  previous  passages. 
Another  question  that  arises  is  that  of  how  the  three  parts  of  the  soul  are  interrelated, 
and  what  bearing  such  a  relation  has  on  the  soul.  In  other  words  the  relation  among  the 
soul's  parts,  leaves  one  perplexed  about  the  soul's  true  nature  and  its  immortality. 
Tliroughout  the  Republic  the  soul  is  presented  to  be  tripartite  with  the  reason  as  the  part 
which  ought  to  be  in  control.  At  the  same  time,  though,  the  reasoning  part  can  be,  and 
sometimes  is,  influenced  by  the  lower  parts.  Thus,  the  soul  is  presented  as  being 
necessarily  tripartite.  Although  it  is  made  clear  that  the  soul,  while  embodied,  cannot 
be  other  than  tripartite,  in  the  afterlife  the  soul  still  remains  simple.  What  is,  though, 
implied  by  'simple'  here  is important  for  the  soul's  immortality.  As  T.  M.  Robinson 
argues;  'although  J.  Adam  may  be  right  in  arguing  that  Plato  seems  to  imply  that  the 
I 
soul  in  its  true  nature  is  'monoeides',  this  is  not  to  say  that  such  a  soul  is  simply  the 
,  59  logistikon  .  The  main  difference  hence  between  the  soul  in  afterlife  in  the  Republic 
and  that  in  the  Phaedo  is  that  in  the  Republic  what  survives  is  the  reasoning  part  shaped 
by  the  influences  of  the  embodiment.  In  other  words,  what  is  immortal  is  one's 
character.  This  point  again  is  not  discussed  in  detail,  but  it  is  mentioned  in  book  X,  in 
the  myth  of  Er. 
Finally,  if  one  wants  to  have  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  soul-body  relation,  as  it  is 
presented  by  Plato,  one  has  to  progress;  to  move  from  the  Republic  to  the  Timaeus. 
This  is  of  necessity  since  as  it  was  shown  although  the  Republic  is  an  advancement  to 
the  Phaedo's  idea  of  soul-body  relation,  it  is  not  yet  complete  as  a  view.  In  particular, 
59T.  M.  Robinson,  'Soul  and  Immortality  in  Republic  X',  Phronesis  12  (1967)  p.  ISO. 
176 although  the  soul  is  shown  to  be  tripartite,  it  is  not  yet  explained  in  what  way  something 
immaterial  -  the  soul  -  can  be  connected  to  something  material  -  the  body.  In  like 
manner,  the  soul  is  presented  to  be  composite  and  at  the  same  time  immortal;  a  notion 
that  as  it  stands  is  not  accurate;  Plato  himself  does  not  give  us  a  sufficient  answer  to  the 
above  contradiction.  Moreover,  Plato  presents  one  with  a  view  of  the  soul  as  the  bearer 
of  one's  moral  character,  both  in  this  embodied  life  and  after  death,  which  in  turn 
implies  that  the  soul  -  in  whatever  state  of  being  -  cannot  be  purely  reason.  Finally,  he 
presents  the  philosopher  as  somehow  superior  to  the  rest  of  human  kind,  but  at  the  same 
time  cannot  release  him  from  the  ongoing  circle  of  reincarnations.  These  are  then 
issues  for  which  the  Timaeus  is  set  to  provide  answers. 
177 Timaeus 
Introduction 
In  order  to  understand  Plato's  notion  of  the  soul  in  the  Timaeus,  we  need,  I  believe,  to 
investigate  four  main  issues.  These  are:  a)  Plato's  teleology  as  it  appears  within  the 
creation  story,  b)  The  relation  of  World-Soul  to  World-Body,  and  the  association 
between  the  World-Soul  and  reason,  c)  The  afflinity  between  the  created  world  and  the 
human  being,  including  that  between  the  World-Soul  and  the  human  soul  and  d)  The 
human  soul-body  relation. 
Doctrine  of  Creation 
To  begin  with,  Plato's  teleology  becomes  apparent  in  the  creation  story,  which  includes 
the  creation  of  the  World-Soul  as  well.  as  the  human  soul.  The  account  of  the  universe'S* 
creation  is  based  on  the  notion  that  everything  created  must  have  a  cause'.  In  Plato's 
own  words:  'Now  everything  that  comes  to  be  must  of  necessity  come  to  be  by  the 
agency  of  some  cause,  for  it  is  impossible  for  anything  to  come  to  be  without  a  cause' 
(28a).  Through  his  imagery  of  the  demiurge  early  in  the  dialogue  (30a),  Plato  attempts 
to  give  an  account  of  how  the  world  came  to  be.  Thus,  within  the  creation  story,  the 
demiurge  creates  the  universe  -  which  is  comprised  of  the  World-Soul  and  the  World. 
body  -  by  giving  order  to  materials  that  already  exist.  The  demiurge  means  to  create  a 
universe  that  would  be  a  good,  orderly  one.  'The  god  wanted  everything  to  be  good  and 
nothing  to  be  bad  as  far  as  that  was  possible,  and  so  he  took  over  all  that  was  visible  - 
not  at  rest  but  in  dissonant  and  disorderly  motion  -  and  brought  it  from  a  state  of 
disorder  to  one  of  order,  because  he  believed  that  order  was  in  every  way  better  than 
'As  G.  E.  F-  Lloyd  argues  ('Plato  As  A  Natural  Scientist',  Journal  ofHellenic  Studies  88  (1968)  pp.  82, 
84  and  90),  Plato's  main  motive  for  doing  what  we  should  call  cosmology  and  natural  science  (physics 
and  biology)  is  to  reveal  the  operations  of  reason  in  the  world. 
178 disorder'  (30a).  Thus,  the  demiurge  is  said  to  take  over  materials  that  were  already 
present.  As  F.  M.  Cornford  puts  it:  'Plato's.  Demiurge  like  the  human  craftsman  in 
whose  image  he  is  conceived,  operates  upon  materials  which  he  does  not  create  [my 
italics],  and  whose  inherent  nature  sets  a  limit  to  his  desire  for  perfection  in  his  work  t2  . 
This  is  also  how  H.  J.  Easterling  reads  the  text:  'At  the  cosmic  level  the  doctrine  of  the 
Timaeus  is  that  in  the  act  of  creation  -  whether  this  was  an  actual  event  or  not  -  the 
demiurge  took  in  hand  and  worked  upon  a  substratum  which  was  not  created  by  him  but 
was  already  in  existence,  exhibiting  disorderly  motion  and  other  properties  of  its  own'. 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  demiurge  works  on  pre-existing  materials. 
Plato,  thus,  in  order  to  explain  philosophically  the  workings  of  the  universe  presupposes 
the  existence  of  a  cause,  and  the  notion  that  this  cause  is  an  agent  that  acts  for  the  best. 
It  seems  as  though  Plato  presupposes  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  agent  so  as  to  put 
the  materials  already  present  in  nature  in  order,  and  thus  provide  us  with  the  ordered 
universe  that  we  have.  In  other  words,  Plato's  belief  in  the  necessity  of  the  existence  of 
the  demiurge,  is  based  on  one  of  his  fundamental  convictions  that  both  the  universe  and 
human  action  cannot  be  explained  in  purely  physical  terms;  they  must  have  a  'telos'. 
The  notion  of  'telos'  within  Plato's  creation  talk,  thus,  is  of  prime  importance  -for  it 
shows  why  Plato  uses  the  derniurge  as  his  agent.  Still,  in  talking  about  Plato's 
teleology,  one  firstly  has  to  pay  attention  to  a  very  important  divergence  in  the  meaning 
applied  to  the  word  'cause'.  The  modem  conception  of  'cause',  which  derives  from 
Newton,  assumes  that  the  word  'cause'  indicates  the  relation  between  two  events;  one 
event  causes  another.  Such  a  relation  is  generally  explained  in  terms  of  strict  physical 
2  F.  M.  Comford,  Plato's  Cosmology,  London  1935,  p.  37. 
3H.  J.  Easterling,  'Causation  In  the  Timaeus  and  Laws  X',  Eranos  65  (1967)  p.  32. 
179 laws.  On  the  other  hand,  in  older  views  the  idea  of  a  'cause'  is  less  precise.  The  word 
aition  is  used  in  an  unrestricted  way  to  include  anything  that  may  be  cited  in 
explanation  of  an  event  or  of  something's  existence.  Aristotle  argues  that  the  soul  is  the 
cause  or  source  of  the  living  body,  and  explains  the  different  senses  of  the  word  cause. 
The  soul  for  Aristotle  is  a)  the  source  or  origin  of  movement,  b)  the  end  (the  telos),  and 
c)  the  essence  of  the  whole  living  body4.  Plato's  model,  now,  in  the  Timaeus  is  that 
things  come.  to  a  state  of  relative  order  out  of  a  state  of  relative  disorder  so,  later  in  the 
dialogue,  he  speaks  of  two  main  'causes'  in  nature;  namely  Reason  and  Necessity.  In 
this  early  section  of  the  dialogue,  the  demiurge  apparently  embodies  Reason  5  and  the 
elements  that  lack  order  embody  Necessity.  It  is  thus  consistent  with  the  passage  where 
Timaeus  says:  'For  this  ordered  world  is  of  mixed  birth:  it  is  the  offspring  of  a  union  of 
Necessity  and  Intellect.  Intellect  prevailed  over  Necessity  bj  persuading  it  to  direct 
most  of  the  things  that  come  to  be  toward  what  is  best...  '  (48a).  Although  Plato's  talk  is 
mythological,  it  is  indicative  of  what  he  thought  about  the  workings  of  nature:  The 
universe  is  necessarily  an  ordered  one.  This  is  so  because  the  Forms  act  as  a  model.  In 
Timaeus'  words:  'whenever  the  craftsmaný  (671ptoupyo'5)  looks  at  what  is  always 
changeless  and,  using  a  thing  of  that  kind  as  his  model,  reproduces  its  form  and 
character,  then,  of  necessity,  all  that  he  so  completes  is  beautiful'  (28a-b).  In  such  a 
manner,  Plato  not  only  presupposes  the  existence  of  a  rational,  good  demiurge,  but  he 
also  presupposes  the  existence  of  the  realm  of  the  Forms,  that  is  treated  as  a  pattern,  as 
a  model  for  the  creation  of  the  world.  The  realm  of  the  Forms  is:  'that  which  is 
changeless  and  is  grasped  by  a  rational  account,  that  is,  by  wisdom'  (29a).  The 
4  See  further  Aristotle  De  Anima  book  11,  chapter  2,4  1  Sb5-10.  It  should  be  pointed  out,  though,  Ithat 
Aristotle  does  not  recognise  a  universal,  World-Soul  like  Plato. 
5H.  -G.  Gadamer  (Dialogue  and  Dialectic:  Eight  Hermeneutical  Studies  on  Plato,  trans.  by  P.  Christopher 
Smith,  Yale  University  Press,  1980,  p.  163),  thus,  rightly  states  that  'the  demiurge  in  the  Timaeus 
symbolises  nothing  more  than  the  conversion  of  a  condition  of  disordered  movement  into  a  condition  of 
order'. 
6As  far  as  the  creation  myth  is  concerned,  the  existence  of  the  craftsman  is  taken  for  granted. 
180 existence  of  the  raw  materials,  found  in  a  state  of  disorder,  is  also  taken  for  granted. 
The  assumption  that  the  Forms  and  the  'raw'  materials  by  themselves  -  without  an  agent 
-  would  never  be  able  to  provide  one  with  a  universe  is  implicit  in  this  whole  account. 
The  Forms  and  the  raw  materials  are  necessary  for  the  formation  of  the  universe,  but 
they  could  not  bring  it  into  existence  without  an  agent.  The  act  of  creation  requires  an 
agent  that  possesses  reason,  and  neither  the  Forms  nor  the  'raw'  materials  are  treated  as 
agents  that  possess  reason. 
Thus,  as  far  as  the  creation  myth  is  concerned,  the  existence  of  the  craftsman  is  taken 
for  granted.  There  are,  though,  a  number  of  questions  that  arise  from  such  a  claim.  To 
what  extent  are  the  demiurge  and  the  creation  story  to  be  taken  as  mythological?  What 
are  the  points  within  the  myth  that  Plato  treats  as  conveying  philosophical  truths? 
Although  the  existence  of  the  derniurge  as  the  creator  and  craftsman7  of  the  world 
cannot  be  proven,  Plato  has  serious  reasons  to  treat  both  the  demiurge  and  the  creation 
story  as,  at  least,  approximating  to  truth  as  much  as  possible.  Firstly,  regarding  the 
derniurge,  as  Giovanni  Reale  says,  'the  Demiurge  or  supreme  intelligence  is  he  who 
fully  actualises  the  One  and  Measure  at  all  levels  of  reality  and  SO  is  measure  in  the 
personal  sense.  The  Good-One  is  Measure  as  the  supreme  model;  the  Demiurge  is 
Measure  as  the  perfect  way  to  make  that  model  actual's.  If  my  reading  of  Reale  is 
correct,  he  seems  to  argue  that  the  fundamental  truth  that  Plato  seems  to  convey  here  is 
that  measure  is  imposed  on  disorder,  on  chaos;  the  universe  is  structured  for  the  Good, 
in  an  orderly  way.  The  question  thus  is  not  whether  the  demiurge  exists  or  not  but 
7  John  Sallis  (Choroloýy  on  Beginning  in  Plato's  Timaeus  Indiana  University  Press,  1999,  P.  52)  argues 
that  according  to  Plutarch  (Plato  Quest  IL  1)  Plato's  demiurge  is  both  a  maker  and  a  father. 
'  Giovanni  Reale,  'Plato's  Doctrine  of  the  Origin  of  the  World,  With  Special  Refcrence  to  the  Timaeus', 
in  T.  Calvo  -  L.  Brisson  (eds),  Interpreting  the  Timaeus  -  Critias  Proceedings  of  the  IV  Symposium 
platonicum,  1997,  p.  161. 
181 rather  why  Plato  introduces  a  demiurge9.  The  answer  is  provided  by  the  text.  For  Plato 
to  introduce  reason  to  the  world,  an  agent  is  required  who  would  act  upon  mindless 
matter  and  bring  order  to  it.  Hence,  although  the  demiurge  and  the  creation  story  as 
described  by  Timaeus  are  parts  of  a  myth,  a  likely  mythos  -a  point  that  is  admitted  by 
Timaeus  before  he  starts  the  narrative  (29c-d)1O  -  Plato  treats  them  as  essential  elements 
in  the  search  for  truth  rather  than  as  alternatives  to  the  truth.  In  other  words,  the  whole 
dialogue  uses  the  mythological  and  the  philosophical  as  tools  for  an  account  of  the 
world's  creation.  Thus,  Christopher  Gill  argues  that,  'as  regards  the  genesis  (coming  to 
be  or  becoming)  of  the  universe,  we  must  be  content  if  we  can  achieve  'likelihood',  and 
so  the  status  of  the  account  is  presented  as  being,  at  best,  a  'likely  story'  (eikos  mythos 
29d2)"'.  John  Sallis  follows  a  similar  line  of  thought.  He  treats  the  Timaeus' 
discourse  as  'a  likely  discourse,  but  only  provided  one  understands  likely  by  reference, 
not  to  some  abstract  concept  of  probability,  but  to  the  character  of  that  which  the  likely 
discourse  is  about,  its  character  as  a  likeness,  an  image'  12 
.  Having  shown,  thus,  the  way 
the  whole  dialogue  is  to  be  interpreted,  there  remains  to  separate  the  particular  parts  of 
the  creation  story  that  are  obviously  mythological,  from  those  that  can  help  as  tools  in 
conveying  the  truth.  These  will  be  indicated  accordingly  as  the  creation  story 
progresses. 
'  E.  R.  Dodds  ('Plato  and  the  Irrational',  Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies  65  (1945)  p.  23)  argues  that  it  is 
Plato's  religious  feeling  that  created  the  figure  of  the  benevolent  and  mighty  (though  not  omnipotent) 
Father-god,  father  and  maker  of  gods  and  men  and  of  the  world  itself. 
1OIn  29c-d  Timaeus  claims  that  'if  we  can  come  up  with  accounts  no  less  likely  than  any,  we  ought  to  be 
content,  keeping  in  mind  that  both  L  the  speaker,  and  you,  the  judges,  are  only  human.  So,  we  should 
accept  the  likely  tale  on  these  matters'.  He  thus  indicates  that  although  the  account  is  mythological,  they 
should  accept  it  as  a  possible  one. 
II  Christopher  Gill, 'Plato  on  Falsehood  -  not  Fiction',  in  C.  Gill  -  T.  P.  Wiseman  (eds),  Lies  and  Fiction 
in  the  Ancient  World,  University  of  Exeter  Press,  1993,  pp.  58-59. 
"  See  Sallis,  p.  55.  See  also  Kathryn  A.  Morgan,  Myth  and  Philosophyfirom  the  Presocratics  to  Plato, 
Cambridge  University  Press  2000,  p.  277.  - 
182 World-Body  and  World-Soul 
The  universe,  now,  is  made  out  of  World-Soul  and  World-Body.  Thus,  it  is  a  living 
organism  that  is  always  changing.  Timaeus  claims  that  since  it  was  impossible  for  an 
unintelligent  thing  to  be  better  than  anything  that  possesses  intelligence  (30b),  and 
nothing  could  possess  intelligence  except  soul  (30b),  the  demiurge:  'put  intelligence  in 
soul,  and  soul  in  body,  and  so  he  constructed  the  universe...  as  a  truly  living  thing, 
endowed  with  soul  and  intelligence'  (30b-c).  The  original  claim  of  the  above  quotation 
is  that  the  universe  is  intelligent  and  living  exactly  because  it  has  soul.  It  should  be 
noticed,  though,  that  Timaeus  talks  about  a  created  soul.  Such  a  notion,  thus,  implies  a 
revision  from  Plato's  earlier  theory  that  held  not  only  that  soul  is  eternal  but  also  that  it 
is  outside  the  world  of  change  13 
. 
Here,  the  World-Soul  is  created  by  the  demiurge 
precisely  because  he  wants  to  make  a  perfect  world  14 
.A  perfect  world  needs  to  be  self- 
sufficient,  and  in  order  to  be  so,  it  must  contain  a  rational  power  that  can  maintain  its 
order.  Furthermore  it  is  also  important  that  the  world  is  'living'.  If  the  world  is  to  be 
complete,  operating  on  its  own  with  no  external  influences,  it  has  to  be  living.  Thus, 
the  world  is  treated  as  a  living  organism  and  as  such  it  requires  soul.  Hence,  Plato 
assumes  that  the  universe  must  be  perfect  and  unique  by  implying  that: 
PI  nothing  can  be  intelligent,  without  having  soul. 
P2  nothing  can  be  orderly,  without  having  soul. 
P3  nothing  can  be  'living',  without  having  soulls. 
"See  further  Phaedo  66e. 
"Ile  point  that  soul  is  created  but  at  the  same  time  eternal,  will  be  discussed  further  later  on. 
15  The  same  view  is  held  by  Aristotle,  the  soul's  mainfimction  is  that  it  brings  life  to  body.  In  De  Anima, 
Aristotle  says:  'the  soul  must  be  a  substance  in  the  sense  of  the  form  of  a  natural  body  having  life 
potentially  within  it.  '  (DA.  412a  19-21).  He  thus  claims  that  'if,  then,  we  have  to  give  a  general  formula 
applicable  to  all  kinds  of  soul,  we  must  describe  it  as  the  first  grade  of  actuality  of  a  natural  organised 
body,  (DA.  412b  4-7). 
183 P4  The  world  is  intelligent,  orderly,  and  living. 
//C  The  world  has  a  soul. 
Here  again  we  might  question  the  necessity  of  the  demiurge.  Premises  1-3  could  be 
true  independently  of  whether  one  accepts  the  demiurge's  existence  or  not.  So  one 
could  claim  that  Plato  does  not  need  the  demiurge  for  holding  that  anything  intelligent, 
orderly,  living  has  to  have  a  soul.  He  could  have  arrived  at  premise  4  on  empirical 
grounds,  by  observing  the  pattern  in  living  beings  and  in  the  universe.  It  might 
therefore  be  possible  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  World-Soul  on  purely 
empirical  grounds,  but  from  Plato's  point  of  view  it  would  not  be  enough  merely  to  say 
that  the  order  of  the  universe  shows  that  there  is  a  World-Soul.  Plato  believes  that  the 
world  is  as  it  is  because  that  is  best.  He  uses  the  story  of  the  demiurge  to  make  this 
point.  The  universe  is  not  only  orderly  but  can  be  understood  in  teleological  terms.  As 
it  will  be  shown  later  in  the  discussion  by  the  example  of  eyesight,  Plato  thought  that 
'the  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  the  universe',  namely  astronomy,  'has  given  us 
philosophy'  (47a-b).  Thus,  we  have  the  ability  to  observe  the  workings  of  Reason  and 
order  that  take  place  in  the  universe,  and  infer  that  the  World  has  a  World-Soul.  Tbus, 
G.  R.  Carone  argues  that  'from  a  metaphysical  perspective,  and  because  of  its 
ontological  constitution,  the  World-Soul  serves  to  mediate  between  the  indivisible  and 
the  divisible.  This  World-Soul  (or  the  universe  that  it  animates)  is  a  god;  itself  has  a 
mathematical  structure  and  rules  over  the  motions  of  the  divine  stars  and  planets, 
which,  from  an  ethical  perspective,  human  bcings  are  encouraged  to  learn.  This 
learning  of  astronomy  involves  mainly  the  exercise  of  intellectual  functions  and  is  based 
on  the  apprehension  of  mathematical  relationships'  16 
.  Thus  one  of  the  World-Soul's 
`  Gabriela  Roxana  Carone,  'The  Ethical  Function  of  Astronomy  in  Plato's  Timaeus',  in  T.  Calvo  -  L. 
Brisson,  p.  342. 
184 main  function  within  the  universe  is  to  provide  us  with  a  teleological  explanation  of  the 
workings  of  the  universe. 
The  World-Soul,  then,  is  placed  by  the  demiurge  within  and  around  the  World-Body,  a 
placement  that  implies  the  completeness  of  the  universe:  '...  he  who  formed  it  [the 
World-Soul]  went  on  to  fashion  inside  it  all  that  is  corporeal,  and,  joining  centre  to 
centre,  he  fitted  the  two  together.  The  soul  was  woven  together  with  the  body  from  the 
centre  on  out  in  every  direction  to  the  outermost  limit  of  the  universe,  and  covered  it  all 
around  on  the  outside.  And  revolving  within  itself,  it  initiated  a  divine  beginning  of 
unceasing,  intelligent  life  for  all  time'  (36e)  17 
.  Hence,  Plato  takes  for  granted  that  the 
universe  is  the  union  of  World-Soul  and  World-Body,  since,  in  order  for  the  universe  to 
be  complete,  the  demiurge  needs  to  give  it  a  soul.  Plato  assumes  that  orderly  motion 
must  be  the  work  of  reason.  He  therefore  requires  the  World-Soul  to  be  the  seat  of 
reason.  He  also  appears  to  assume  that  reason  (nous)  is  an  activity,  which  must  be 
achieved  by  -  performed  and  sustained  by  -  some  sort  of  agent's.  Since  there  cannot  be 
order  without  reason,  it  follows  that  an  ordered  universe  must  possess  a  rational  soul. 
Plato's  argument,  thus,  could  be  stated  as  follows: 
PI  The  universe  is  complete. 
//C  I  It  cannot  therefore  be  dependent  on  something  outside  itself  (from  1). 
P3  The  universe  is  orderly. 
P4  Order  is  always  the  product  of  reason. 
17  The  use  of  language  here,  that  the  soul  is  woven  to  the  body,  although  obviously  mythological,  shows 
Plato's  attempt  to  indicate  the  interconnection  between  the  World.  Soul  and  the  World-Body  in  order  to 
form  the  world  as  a  whole. 
"Edward  N.  Lee  ('Reason  and  Rotation:  Circular  Movement  as  the  Model  of  Mind  (Nous)  in  Later 
Plato'.  Facets  of  Plato's  Philosophy  supplementary  vol.  11  1976,  p.  89)  holds  that  nous  must  exist  gv 
qmXý  (30b,  37c,  46d)  that  is,  that  nous  is  itself  an  activity,  one  which  must  be  achieved  by  -  performed 
and  sustained  by  -  some  sort  of  agency  or  agent.  In  other  words,  Lee  argues  that  one  cannot  have  reason 
without  soul. 
185 HC  II  The  universe  must  therefore  be  governed  by  reason  (from  3  and  4). 
P5  Reason  must  always  be  in  a  soul. 
P6  The  World-Bo  is  matter. 
X  III  The  universe  therefore  must  have  its  own  rational  soul. 
The  Timaeus,  thus,  combines  two  basic  ideas  concerning  the  soul  which  appear  within 
Plato's  works;  namely,  that  the  soul  is  necessarily  the  seat  of  reason,  and  the  seat  of 
motion19.  This  union  is  achieved  through  the  World-Soul's  construction  out  of  the 
circles  of  the  Same  and  the  Different.  In  particular,  Plato,  through  the  description  of  the 
movements  of  the  circles  in  the  World-Soul,  indicates  that  the  World-Soul  is  the  cause 
of  orderly  movement.  The  demiurge  'made  the  movement  of  the  Same  revolve  toward 
the  right  by  way  of  the  side,  and  that  of  the  Different  toward  the  left  by  way  of  the 
diagonal,  and  he  made  the  revolution  of  the  Same,  i.  e.,  the  uniform,  the  dominant  one  in 
that  he  left  this  one  alone  undivided,  while  he  divided  the  inner  one  six  times,  to  make 
seven  unequal  circles'  (36c-d).  Thus,  Hackforth  argues  that  Plato's  mixture  of  Being, 
Sameness,  and  Difference  described  at  35a  is  clearly  to  be  taken  as  an  analysis  of  the 
cosmic  soul's  faculties  of  cognition  and  motion2o. 
The  movements  of  the  Same  and  the  Different  are  linked  with  the  notion  of  making 
judgements,  a  process  that  involves  reasoning.  In  Timaeus'  words:  'Because  the  soul  is 
a  mixture  of  the  Same,  the  Different,  and  Being,  because  it  was  divided  up  and  bound 
together  in  various  proportions,  and  because  it  circles  round  upon  itself,  then,  whenever 
it  comes  into  contact  with  something  whose  being  is  scatterable  or  else  with  something 
19The  soul  being  the  seat  of  reason  is  held  in  the  Phaedo,  while  the  soul  as  the  seat  of  motion  is held  in 
the  Phaedrus  and  later  in  the  Laws  X.  It  should  be  noted  that  although  both  Plato  and  Aristotle  hold  that 
the  soul  is  the  seat  of  motion,  Plato  treats  the  soul  in  as  a  self-moving  mover.  On  the  other  hand, 
Aristotle  argues  that  the  soul  cannot  'partake  in  movement'  because  if  it  would,  it  would  have  to  have  a 
Z  lace,  something  that  Aristotle  denies  (DA.  406a  20-22).  This  leads  to  two  quite  different  views  on  soul. 
Hackforth,  'Plato's  Cosmogony  (Timaeus  27D  ff.  )',  Classical  Quarterly,  rL  S.  9  (1959)  p.  20. 
186 whose  being  is  indivisible,  it  is  stirred  throughout  its  whole  self  It  then  declares  what 
exactly  that  thing  is  the  same  as,  or  what  it  is  different  from,  and  in  what  respect  and  in 
what  manner,  as  well  as  when,  it  turns  out  that  they  are  the  same  or  different  and  are 
characterised  as  such'  (37a-b).  Thus,  the  World-Soul  is  able  to  combine  opinion  with 
knowledge  21 
. 
In  other  words,  although  the  objects  of  opinion  are  different  from  the 
objects  of  knowledge,  it  is  the  World-Soul  that  can  make  any  judgements  about  them; 
'whenever  the  account  concerns  anything  that  is  perceptible,  the  circle  of  the  Different 
goes  straight  and  proclaims  it  throughout  its  whole  soul.  This  is  how  firm  and  true 
opinions  come  about.  Whenever,  on  the  other  hand,  the  account  concerns  any  object  of 
reasoning,  and  the  circle  of  the  Same  runs  well  and  reveals  it,  the  necessary  result  is 
understanding  and  knowledge'  (37b-C)22.  In  that  manner,  the  World-Soul  is  portrayed 
not  only  as  the  cause  of  orderly  motion,  but  also  as  being  able  to  exercise  reason.  As 
Timaeus  says  'it  is  impossible  for  anything  to  possess  intelligence  apart  from  soul, 
(30b).  Similarly,  in  describing  the  world's  creation,  he  claims  that  the  world  is  'a 
divine  beginning  of  unceasing,  intelligent  life  for  all  time'  (36e),  because  it  has  Soul. 
Tberefore,  the  fact  that  the  World-Soul  is  both  the  seat  of  reason  and  the  cause  of 
motion  shows  why  soul  is  the  cause  of  everything  within  the  ordered  universe. 
Another  point  of  interest  concerning  the  World-Soul  is  that  Plato  treats  it  as  both 
created  and  eternal.  Such  a  notion  is  essential  because  it  indicates  that  since  the  World- 
Soul  is  'made'  and  at  the  same  time  cannot  undergo  any  change,  such  as  those  that 
matter  undergoes,  it  belongs  neither  to  the  realm  of  the  Forms  nor  to  the  constructed 
21  For  Aristotle  the  reasoning  part  of  soul  is  the  one  that  'is  capable  of  receiving  the  form  of  an  object; 
that  is  must  be  potentially  identical  in  character  with  its  object  without  being  the  object'  (DA.  429al5. 
17). 
I  According  to  Gretchen  Reydam-Schils  ('Plato's  World  Soul:  Grasping  Sensibles  Without  Sense- 
Perception',  in  T.  Calvo  -  L.  Brisson,  pp.  262-263)  the  two  fimctions  of  the  World-Soul,  knowledge  and 
opinion,  are  essentially  cognitive.  The  World-Soul  can  have  a  true  grasp  of  the  sensible  realnL 
187 world.  As  Hackforth  argues,  Plato  conceives  this  soul  as  something  which  comes  upon 
the  scene  only  when  the  K6CP05  comes  into  being,  and  only  though  the  action  of  the 
demiurge.  He  then  concludes  that  Soul  makes  its  appearance  in  the  universe,  as  well  as 
in  the  creatures  with  which  the  universe  comes  to  be  populated,  including  the  stars  and 
planets  and  human  kind,  as  a  feature  of  the  &aKOCPTjCIg.  But  not,  like  the  body,  as  the 
result  of  an  ordering  or  re-fashioning  of  a  pre-existent  material  or substrate23.  Thus,  the 
World-Soul  is  already  thought  to  be  between  the  two  realms. 
Being  between  the  two  realms,  though,  does  not  mean  that  it  is  separate  from  them; 
rather,  the  World-Soul  combines  the  two  worlds.  This  is  achieved  through  the  manner 
the  Soul  is  constructed;  it  is  created  as  a  mixture  of  the  two  kinds  of  being,  the  changing 
and  the  unchanging.  The  Soul  consists  of  an  'intermediate  form  of  being'  (35a),  also 
'the  soul  came  to  be  as  the  most  excellent  of  all  the  things  begotten...  '  (37a),  and  '...  the 
soul  is  a  mixture  of  the  Same,  the  Different,  and  Being'  (37b).  But  how  are  we  to 
understand  this  particular  way  of  the  World-Soul's  creation  out  of  the  three  above- 
mentioned  elements?  This  passage  is  generally  characterised  as  a  most  difficult  one  24 
9 
and  various  interpretations  have  been  attempted 
25, 
Without  anyone  being  free  from 
difficulties.  Despite  the  fact  that  we  cannot  have  a  clear  idea  of  what  the  Same,  the 
Different  and  the  Being  entail,  it  is  interesting  to  see  what  we  can  infer  from  them. 
Plato,  thus  far,  has  presented  us  with  a  picture  of  the  World-Soul  as  something  that  is 
created,  eternal,  and  the  cause  of  motion  and  reason  in  the  world.  But  the  question  that 
seems  to  linger  in  our  minds  is  how  can  something  be  both  created  and  eternal.  Within 
the  myth,  Timaeus  argues  that  the  World-Soul  and  the  gods  -  along  with  the  stars  and 
planets  -  will  never  cease  to  exist  because  this  is  the  demiurge's  will.  This  is  a  valid 
23  See  Hackforth,  1959,  p.  20. 
I  See  A.  E.  Taylor,  Commentary  on  Plato's  Timaeus,  Oxford  1928,  p.  106. 
2-5  See  Sallis,  pp.  65-70. 
188 answer  within  the  boundaries  of  mythology,  but  what  happens  when  we  try  to  explain  it 
through  logical  arguments?  Plato's  answer  seems  to  be  that  the  World-Soul  consists  of 
the  above-mentioned  elements.  The  emphasis,  though,  should  be  placed  on  the  element 
of  Being.  Plato  treats  the  intermediate  Being  as  a  necessary  requirement  for  the  World- 
Soul,  and  later  on  for  the  human  soul,  to  be  both  created  and  eternal.  This  assumption 
though,  does  not  actually  explain  what  the  World-Soul's  nature  is;  at  most  it  says  that  it 
is  neither  a  Form,  nor  a  purely  material  entity.  This  view  of  the  World-Soul  can  be 
compared  with  Xenophanes'  notion  of  god.  In  particular,  Xenophanes  held  that  god 
'shakes  all  things  by  the  thought  of  his  mind'  (K.  R.  S.  171,25).  In  other  words,  he 
argues  that  thought  or  intelligence  can  affect  things  outside  the  thinker  without  the 
agency  of  limbs  26 
.  Botýi  the  World-Soul  and  Xenophanes'  god  impose  intelligence  on 
the  world.  Xenophanes'  view  of  god  at  least  shows  that  Plato  is  not  alone  in  the  search 
for  something  to  connect  the  immaterial  to  the  material.  As  Kirk,  Raven,  and  Schof*Ield 
argue,  'Xenophanes'  god  has  a  body  because  totally  incorporeal  existence  was 
inconceivable,  but  that  body  apart  from  its  perceptual  -  intellectual  activity,  was  of 
secondary  importance,  and  so  perhaps  was  its  location'27  . 
But,  although  for  Xenophanes'  theology  the  case  may  be  that  the  god's  spatial  location 
was  of  no  importance,  for  Plato's  cosmology,  the  World-Soul's  spatial  location  is 
essential  for  explaining  its  nature,  and  cannot  be  so  easily  dismissed.  David  Sedley, 
discussing  the  revolutions  of  the  World-Soul,  argues  that  'in  themselves  the  world  soul 
and  its  revolutions  are  incorporeal  (36a6),  but  when  illumination  is  added  the  combined 
effect  is  somediing  bodily.  The  incorporeal  thus  differs  from  the  corporeal,  not  by 
necessarily  being  altogether  non-spatial,  but  by  lacking  essential  characteristics  of  body, 
26  See  Kirk,  Raven,  and  Schofield  p.  170. 
27  See  Kirk,  Raven,  and  Schofield  p.  172. 
189 such  as  visibility  and  tangibility.  There  is  no  reason  why  an  incorporeal  should  not 
have  a  circular  motion,  even  though  its  invisibility  and  intangibility  make  this 
undetectable  to  the  senses'28.  The  World-Soul,  since  is  presented  by  Plato  as  being 
both  immaterial,  and  located  in  space,  is  faced  with  a  discrepancy  that  for  Aristotle  is 
not  solvable.  Aristotle  denies  that  soul  naturally  partakes  of  movement  (DA.  406a2l), 
and  claims  that  'it  is  a  mistake  to  say  that  the  soul  is  a  spatial  magnitude'  (DA.  407a3- 
4).  Tbus  a  characteristic  difference  is  stated  between  the  two  philosophers.  For  Plato 
the  World-Soul  is  the  cause  of  reason  and  motion,  while  itself  being  self-moving.  For 
Aristotle  the  soul  cannot  be  spatially  located  because  it  not  a  matter  but  rather  'a  ratio' 
(414al2). 
Next,  the  World-Body  is  made  by  the  demiurge  to  be  'a  symphony  of  proportion'  (32c). 
This  is  so  due  to  its  being  created  out  of  the  four  primary  elements:  fire,  earth,  water, 
and  air.  'Hence  the  god  set  water  and  air  in  between  fire  and  earth,  and  made  them  as 
proportionate  to  one  another  as  possible,  so  that  what  fire  is  to  air, air  is  to  water,  water 
is  to  earth'  (32b).  Another  interesting  point  here  is  that  the  elements  that  the  demiurge 
uses  for  the  construction  of  the  World-Body,  are  used  completely:  'Now  each  one  of  the 
four  constituents  was  entirely  used  up  in  the  process  of  building  the  world'  (33a),  this  is 
so  because  the  demiurge  wanted  the  world  to  be  'a  single  whole,  composed  of  all 
wholes,  complete  and  free  of  old  age  and  disease'  (33a).  This  is  necessary  because  the 
universe  must  be  complete  and  self-sufficient.  Similarly,  the  point  that  the  World-Body 
is  made  into  a  rounded  shape,  also  indicates  Plato's  need  for  a  complete,  self-sufficient 
universe:  'Ile  appropriate  shape  for  that  living  thing  that  is  to  contain  within  itself  all 
the  living  things  would  be  the  one  which  embraces'within  itself  all  the  shapes  there  are. 
"  See  further  David  Sedley  'Becoming  like  god  in  the  Timaeus  and  Aristotle'.  in  T.  Calvo  -L  Brisson, 
pp.  329-330. 
190 Hence  he  gave  it  a  round  shape...  '  (33b).  Thus,  because  the  universe  is  complete  it  is 
discharged  from  outside  influences  -  unlike  the  human  being. 
The  Created  World  and  the  Human  Being 
In  order  for  one  to  understand  fully  Plato's  notion  of  soul  in  the  Timaeus,  one  has  to 
examine  the  significance  of  the  resemblance  between  the  created  world  and  the  human 
being.  The  first,  rather  general,  point  that  should  be  examined  is  Plato's  insistence  on 
talking  about  a  created  world  that  is  one,  unique,  and  at  the  same  time,  a  diversity  of 
elements.  Treating  the  world  as  such  both  shows  Plato's  belief  about  the  structure  of 
the  world,  and  more  especially  allows  Plato  to  use  it  as  an  example  for  explaining  the 
structure  of  the  human  being.  Plato's  intention  is  to  demonstrate  that  the  human  being 
is  also  created  as  one  and  at  the  same  time  as  having  various  elements  within 
Another  important  characteristic  of  the  world,  which  is  essential  for  the  human  being  as 
well,  is  that  the  world  is  treated  as  a  living  being.  The  soul  is  necessary  for  any  living 
thing,  and  therefore,  as  was  shown  earlier,  since  the  world  is  a  living  being,  consisting 
of  body  and  soul,  and  since  body  is  made  out  of  inert  matter,  it  is  the  World-Soul  that 
makes  the  world  a  living  thing.  But  the  World-Soul  is  the  cause  of  motion  as  well  as  of 
cognition.  Thus,  the  world  is  not  only  'living'  but  also  'intelligent'  due  to  the  existence 
of  the  World-Soul.  Accepting  that  there  is  a  parallel  in  Plato's  way  of  thinking,  the 
claim  that  soul  is  the  cause  of  life  as  well  as  of  motion  and  reason  for  the  world  implies 
that  the  human  being,  which  is  both  soul  and  body,  will  have  the  same  properties.  The 
human  soul,  the  reasoning  part  in  particular,  will  be  considered  as  the  cause  of  motion 
and  cognition,  while  its  body  will  be  the  necessary  matter. 
29This  point  will  be  discussed  in  the  passage  concerning  the  human  soul-body  relation. 
191 Two  additional  points  should  be  considered  here:  Firstly,  as  the  world  is  a  unity  of 
world-body  and  World-Soul,  the  human  being  will  be  a  unity  of  body  and  soul.  Since 
there  is  no  other  way  for  the  world,  there  will  not  be  another  way  of  having  a  human 
being.  As  J.  V.  Robinson  argues,  'if  embodiment  is  good  enough  for  the  World-Soul, 
which  is  in  every  way  better  than  the  human  soul,  then  it  is  good  enough  for  the  human 
SOU1930.  Secondly,  the  idea  that  both  the  World-Soul  and  the  human  soul  are  the  cause  of 
life,  motion  and  reason  plays  an  important  role  in  the  structure  of  both  the  world  and  the 
human  being.  Since  the  World-Soul  is  the  source  of  life,  motion  and  reason,  and  as  a 
result,  there  can  be  no  world  without  a  World-Soul,  it  can  be  inferred  that  neither  can 
there  be  a  human  without  a  soul.  More  importantly,  as  the  World-Soul  governs  the 
universe,  the  human  soul  governs  the  body.  As  J.  V.  Robinson  puts  it,  'since  the  human 
soul  is  presented  as  a  lesser  version  of  the  World-Soul,  and  the  World-Soul  governs  a 
body,  one  would  expect  the  human  soul  to  also  have  this  responsibility.  This 
expectation  is  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  the  Demiurge  created  the  World-Soul  so  that 
the  order  of  the  universe  could  be  maintained  Al 
. 
in  detail,  now,.  a  point  that  is  crucial  for  one's  understanding  of  Plato's  notion  of  the 
soul  concerns  the  similarities  that  can  be  found  between  the  World-Soul  and  the  human 
SOU132  .  The  first  common  characteristic  between  the  World-Soul  and  the  human  one  is 
that  they  are  both  made  out  of  the  same  ingredients.  'He  [the  demiurge]  turned  again  to 
the  mixing  bowl  he  had  used  before,  the  one,  in  which  he  had  blended  and  mixed  the 
30j.  V.  Robinson,  'The  Tripartite  Soul  in  the  Timaeus',  Phronesis  35  (1990)  p.  106. 
31j.  V.  Robinson,  P.  106. 
321t  should  be  acknowledged  that  the  similarity  is  not  between  the  World-Soul  and  the  hurnan  soul  as  a 
whole.  The  World-Soul  is  taken  to  be  both  created  and  eternal.  Likewise.  the  reasoning  part  of  the 
human  soul  is  taken  to  be  both  created,  and  eternal.  Again,  the  World-Soul  as  being  between  the  realm 
of  the  Forms  and  the  created  world,  is  parallel  to  the  reasoning  element  of  the  human  soul,  which  is  the 
only  one  able  to  combine  the  two. 
192 soul  of  the  universe.  He  began  to  pour  into  it  what  remained  of  the  previous  ingredients 
and  to  mix  them  in  somewhat  the  same  way,  though  these  were  no  longer  invariably  and 
constantly  pure,  but  of  a  second  and  third  grade  of  purity';  'aKTIpaTa  8E  OMT1  KaTa 
TaýT&  CýCMUTCZ5,  coAd  5EUTEpa  Kall  TPITa'  (41d).  Thus,  in  describing  the  way  the 
demiurge  creates  the  immortal  part  of  the  human  soul  with  the  same  ingredients  that  he 
used  for  the  World-Soul,  Plato  attributes  to  it  the  same  characteristics  as  in  the  World- 
Soul,  that  of  being  created  and  at  the  same  time  being  eternal. 
This  notion  indicates  that  both  the  World-Soul  and  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul 
belong  neither  to  the  realm  of  the  Forms,  nor  to  the  constructed  world,  exactly  because 
they  are  'made'  and  at  the  same  time  cannot  undergo  any  changes,  similar  to  the  one 
that  matter  undergoes.  Thus,  already  both  the  World-Soul  and  the  reasoning  part  of  the 
human  soul  are  thought  to  be  between  the  two  realms.  Being  between  the  two  realms, 
though,  does  not  mean  that  they  are  separate  from  them;  rather,  they  combine  the  two 
worlds.  What  Plato  tries  to  establish  here  concerning  both  the  World-Soul  and  the 
immortal  part  of  the  human  soul  is  that  although  they  are  an  integral  part  of  the  world 
and  the  human  being  respectively,  they  both  are  not  'immortal',  like  the  Forms.  At  the 
same  time  they  are  not  corporeal,  like  the  World-Body  and  the  human  body.  Tbis,  in 
turn,  shows  that  Plato's  construction  of  both  the  world'and  the  human  beings  does  not 
fall  under  a  mind/body  dualism,  but  rather  a  dualism  of  being  and  becoming  with  soul 
somehow  bridging  the  gap.  Plato,  thus,  tries  to  achieve  a  theory  of  oneness. 
Another  important  point  that  arises  from  the  particular  construction  of  the  World-Soul 
as  weU  as  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  SOU133  is  that  because  they  consist  of  both  the 
Although  Plato  refers  to  the  human  soul  in  a  general  manner,  it  should  be  noted  that  what  he  has  in 
mind  is  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul  that  can  be  compared  to  the  World-Soul. 
193 intermediate  Sameness  and  the  intermediate  Difference  they  are  able  to  combine 
opinion  with  knowledge.  It  is  made  clear  from  the  text  that  the  World-Soul  is involved 
in  both;  '...  whenever  the  account  concerns  anything  that  is  perceptible,  the  circle  of  the 
Different  goes  straight  and  proclaims  it  throughout  its  whole  soul.  This  is  how  firm  and 
true  opinions  come  about.  Whenever,  on  the  other  hand,  the  account  concerns  any 
object  of  reasoning,  and  the  circle  of  the  Same  runs  well  and  reveals  it,  the  necessary 
result  is  understanding  and  knowledge'  (37c).  Thus,  the  World-Soul  is  portrayed  not 
only  as  the  cause  of  any  motion  in  the  physical  realm,  but  also  as  the  only  one  able  to 
exercise  reason.  By  implication,  then,  one  has  to  argue  that  the  immortal  part  of  the 
human  soul  will  be  able  to  exercise  reason  as  well. 
Furthermore,  the  notion  that  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul  is  of  a  lesser  degree 
of  purity  than  the  World-Soul:  'of  a  second  and  third  grade  of  purity',  '@Ad  &6`rEpa 
Ka  I  TP  I  Ta'  (41  d),  is  rather  puzzling.  It  may  indicate  that  although  the  same  ingredients 
are  used,  the  human-soul's  weaknesses  are  due  to  the  way  the  human  being  is 
structured  34 
.  It  is  not  explained,  though,  to  what  extent  these  weaknesses  are  due  to  its 
nature  or  to  its  embodiment.  The  text  seems  to  suggest  that  the  weakness  is  determined 
by  its  elements.  One  could  argue  that  the  elements'  inferiority  makes  the  reasoning  part 
of  the  human  soul  less  able  to  control  its  body,  and  liable  to  be  influenced  by  the  body. 
This  is  so,  because  the  human  being,  which  consists  of  both  the  immortal  part  of  the 
soul  as  well  as  of  body  and  the  mortal  parts  of  the  soul,  is  an  organism  that  is  constantly 
affected  by  its  environment.  Hence,  it  may  seem  that  the  lack  of  purity  comes  before 
the  body's  creation  -  and  as  such  cannot  result  from  the  structure  of  the  human  being. 
In  fact,  though,  the  reasoning  part  of  soul  is  -  in  its  making  -  less  pure  because  it  is 
"  Comford  (1935,  on  41d)  writes  that  the  human  souls  are  inkrior,  because  they  can  do  wrong  of  their 
own  wUls. 
194 going  to  be  placed  in  a  body,  and  has  to  interact  with  the  environment.  The  case  seems 
to  be  that  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul  is  less  pure  than  the  World-Soul  because 
it  will  function  as  part  of  a  complex  whole.  We  are  left  then  perplexed  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  reasoning  part  of  human  soul  in  particular  and  its  relation  to  the  mortal  parts  and 
therefore  the  body.  As  the  reasoning  part  is  portrayed,  although  it  is  immaterial  by 
nature,  also  by  nature  it  is  linked  to  the  mortal  parts  of  the  soul  and  therefore  to  the 
body.  As  Christopher  Gill  puts  it,  'the  psyche,  while  not  itself  physical,  is  integrally 
linked  with  the  body  in  the  universe  as  a  whole  and  in  human  beings.  It  follows  from 
this  that  the  specific  character  of  the  body  necessarily  has  an  effect  on  the  psyche  with 
which  it  is  linked  935  .  The  question  that  remains  unanswered,  though,  is  how  can 
something  immaterial  be  integrally  linked  to  something  material?  Trying  to  answer  this 
I  would  like  to  argue  that  in  Plato's  mind  the  distinction  between  the  two  is  not  sharp. 
Plato  does  hold  that  the  reasoning  part  is  immortal,  and  not  made  out  of  matter,  but  at 
the  same  time  he  holds  that  it  cannot  exist  outside  its  environment,  it  has  to  be  spatially 
located.  The  problem  that  arises  for  us,  the  modem  readers,  is  that  we  are  influenced  by 
the  Cartesian  tradition,  we  equate  reason  to  the  Cartesian  self.  For  Plato,  though,  the 
reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul  is  just  that,  an  essential  but  not  the  only  part  in 
constituting  the  human  being.  At  best,  the  reasoning  part  is  also  the  part  that  makes 
something  living. 
A  further  point  of  interest  is  that  the  reasoning  parts  of  human  souls  are  assigned  to  the 
same  number  of  stars:  '...  he  [the  demiurge]  divided  the  mixture  into  a  number  of  souls 
equal  to  the  number  of  the  stars  and  assigned  each  soul  to  a  star'  (4ld-e).  The  point 
here  seems  to  be  that  the  reasoning  part  of  human  souls,  like  the  World-Soul,  is  treated 
35  Christopher  Gill,  'The  body's  fault?  Timaeus  on  psychic  illness',  in  M.  R.  Wright  (ed),  Reason  and 
Necessity,  Duckworth  and  the  Classical  Press  of  Whales  2000,  p.  64. 
195 as  being  necessarily  spatially  located.  The  claim  that  the  reasoning  part  of  soul  should 
be  located  somewhere,  firstly  to  the  stars  and  then  to  the  human  bodies,  indicates  that  it 
cannot  exist  apart  from  a  body.  What  is  indeterminate,  though,  is  the  difference 
between  being  located  to  a  star  and  being  located  to  a  human  body.  While  in  the  stars, 
they  neither  affect  nor  are  affected  by  the  star;  they  are  in  the  stars  but  do  not  animate  it. 
On  the  other  hand,  that  the  reasoning  parts  of  the  human  souls  are  part  of  the  universe  is 
due  to  them  being  spatially  located  in  the  stars.  The  reason  for  Plato's  view  seems  to  be 
that,  since  the  reasoning  parts  of  the  souls  are  everlasting,  they  must  always  exist.  That 
implies  that  when  one  dies  his  soul  must  either  immediately  move  to  a  new  body,  or  go 
somewhere  else.  Plato  may  have  thought  that  an  immediate  move  to  a  new  body  is 
implausible,  so  he  allocated  the  souls  to  the  stars. 
As  stated  earlier,  the  soul's  purpose  is  to  animate  a  body.  This  holds  both  for  the 
World-Soul  as  well  as  for  the  immortal  part  of  the  human  soul.  What  is  of  interest  is 
that,  by  placing  emphasis  on  the  soul  being  'extended'  in  space,  Plato  implies  not  only 
that  the  world-body  and  the  human  body  require  a  soul,  but  also  that  the  World-Soul 
and  the  human  soul  require  a  body.  This,  in  turn,  shows  Plato's  intention  to  present  a 
view  of  the  soul  that  cannot  be  categorised  as  a  sharp  dualism.  Plato,  thus,  would  have 
to  argue  that  the  human  soul,  while  forming  a  human  being,  is  not  independent  of  the 
human  body. 
Human  soul-body-  relation 
The  passage  at  Timaeus  42b  ff.  is  probably  Plato's  fullest  account  of  the  human  soul- 
body  relation.  Although  there  are  references  to  the  issue  from  Plato's  early  dialogues, 
196 his  view  about  how  the  human  soul  is  related  to  the  human  body  is  nowhere  else  as 
definite  as  it  is  in  the  Timaeus  36 
.  The  progress  found  in  the  Timaeus,  by  comparison 
with  to  the  earlier  dialogues,  consists  in  the  fact  that  in  it,  Plato  not  only  presents  the 
soul  as  having  three  parts,  but  also  gives  a  detailed  physiological  and  psychological 
account  of  the  human  being  as  a  whole. 
Timaeus  describes  the  way  human  beings  were  constructed  as  follows:  He,  firstly, 
refers  to  the  htunan  souls'  initial  birth,  and  their  reincarnations:  'They  would  all  be 
assigned  one  and  the  same  initial  birth,  so  that  none  would  be  less  well  treated  by  him 
than  any  other'  (41e).  The  first  fonn  that  the  demiurge  chooses  for  the  souls  is  that  of 
man.  This  is  done  so  that  everyone  would  be  equal,  and  so  that  their  reincarnations 
would  depend  on  the  way  humans  will  lead  their  lives;  whether  they  live  good,  just 
lives  or  unjust  ones  (42b).  In  a  more  general  way,  Plato  links  his  metaphysics  with  his 
moral  philosophy.  His  theory  of  the  soul  provides  reasons  to  justify  the  choice  of  a 
good,  just  life  over  an  unjust  one.  While  in  the  human  form,  the  human  being  must  live 
well.  'So,  once  the  souls  were  of  necessity  implanted  in  bodies,  and  these  bodies  had 
things  coming  to  them  and  leaving  them,  the  first  innate  capacity  they  would  of 
necessity  come  to  have  would  be  sense-perception,  ...  the  second  would  be  love, 
mingled  with  pleasure  and  pain.  And  they  would  come  to  have  fear  and  spiritedness  as 
well,  ...  And  if  they  could  master  these  emotions,  their  lives  would  be  just,  whereas  if 
they  were  mastered  by  them,  they  would  be  unjust'  (42a-b).  Thus,  in  order  for  the  soul 
to  'return  to  his  dwelling  place  in  his  companion  star,  to  live  a  life  of  happiness  that 
agreed  with  his  character'  (42b),  while  in  the  human  form,  the  human  being  must  live 
well. 
3117he  Republic  is  the  first  dialogue  where  Plato  introduces  the  tripartition  of  the  soul,  but  the  relation 
between  soul  and  body  is  not  clearly  describedL 
197 Two  points  are  important  here;  firstly,  Plato  implies  that  there  is  a  life  after  death  does 
not  talk  simply  about  the  relation  of  this  life  to  the  life  after  death,  but  is  doing  so  for 
every  soul  as  an  individual.  Plato  talks  not  merely  of  'soul'  as  immortal,  but  of 
individual  souls.  Plato's  reference  to  individual  souls  is  fin-ther  stressed  by  his  claim 
that  everyone  has  the  potential  either  to  move  upwards  toward  his  star  or  to  move 
downwards  taking  the  form  of  a  woman  or  an  animal.  He  says:  'But  if  he  failed  in  this 
[to  live  a  good  life],  he  would  be  born  a  second  time,  now  as  a  woman.  And  if  even 
then  he  still  could  not  refrain  from  wickedness,  he  would  be  changed  once  again,  this 
37 
time  into  some  animal  that  resembled  the  wicked  character  he  had  acquired'  (42b  C) 
This  passage,  then,  implies  continuity  between  human  beings  and  animals. 
Secondly,  although  no  specific  details  are  given,  the  implications  about  the  human  soul- 
body  relation  are  of  interest.  This  passage  (42a-c  implies  that  the  human  soul,  in  its 
embodiment  in  a  human  body,  is  not  only  the  part  given  to  the  mortal  gods  by  the 
demiurge,  but  by  necessity,  it  acquires  additional  capacities.  Plato  recognises  that 
emotions  are  acquired  by  the  soul  only  due  to  its  human  nature;  being  in  a  human  body. 
The  human  soul,  thus,  both  affects  and  is  affected  by  its  body.  One's  life  is  shaped 
according  to  one's  actions,  and  one's  actions  have  to  do  with  one's  character,  which  is 
shaped  both  by  one's  given  part  of  the  soul,  but  also  from  the  influences  that  it  receives 
from  the  environment.  Ilis  passage  in  a  way  is  set  to  deal  with  the  idea  that  one's 
character  is  partly  innate  but  also  partly  acquired,  which  in  turn  implies  that  although 
external  factors  help  to  shape  one's  character,  one  is  responsible  for  the  life  one  chooses 
to  five. 
"Ibe  notion  of  acquired  character  and  reincarnation  due  to  that  character,  is  also  seen  in  the  myth  of  Er 
in  Republic  book  X 
198 A  finther  point  of  interest,  then,  is  that  both  the  human  body  and  the  lower  parts  of  the 
soul  are  made  by  the  mortal  gods:  The  demiurge's  last  act  is  that  of  assigning  to  mortal 
gods  the  task  of  'weaving  mortal  bodies'  and  whatever  else  the  human  souls  required: 
'After  the  sowing,  he  handed  over  to  the  young  gods  the  task  of  weaving  mortal  bodies. 
He  had  them  make  whatever  else  remained  that  the  human  soul  still  needed  to  have, 
plus  whatever  goes  with  those  things.  He  gave  them  the  task  of  ruling  over  these  mortal 
living  things  and  of  giving  them  the  finest,  the  best  possible  guidance  they  could  give, 
without  being  responsible  for  any  evils  these  creatures  might  bring  upon  themselves' 
(42d-e).  As  Comford  notes,  the  subordinate  divinities  must  add  the  body  and  those 
mortal  parts  of  the  soul  which  temporary  association  with  the  body  entails  38 
. 
The  creation  of  the  mortal  body,  thus,  is  a  task  for  the  mortal  gods.  The  mortal  gods: 
'borrowed  parts  of  fire,  earth,  water  and  air  from  the  world,  intending  to  pay  them  back 
again,  and  bonded  together  into  a  unity  the  parts  they  had  taken,  but  not  with  those 
indissoluble  bonds  by  which  they  themselves  were  held  together.  Instead,  they 
proceeded  to  fuse  them  together  with  copious  rivets  so  small  as  to  be  invisible,  thereby 
making  each  body  a  unit  made  up  of  all  the  components'  (42e-43a).  Again  two  points 
are  of  significance  in  the  above  quotation;  Firstly,  the  materials  used  by  the  mortal  gods 
are  'borrowed',  and  they  are  going  to  be  'paid  back'.  Ibis  could  only  imply  that  the 
materials  that  constitute  the  body,  'when  the  human  dies,  will  be  returned  to  nature. 
Thus,  for  Plato  the  human  being  when  alive  is  both  soul  and  body,  but  when  it  dies 
what  is  preserved  is  the  soul.  What  this  fin-ther  implies  is  that,  the  lower  parts  of  the 
38See  Comford,  1935,  p.  146. 
199 soul  are  not  part  of  the  immortal  soul"'.  In  that  respect,  the  Timaeus  differs  from  the 
Phaedrus  and  some  passages  of  the  Republic.  Secondly,  the  body's  bonds  are  not  as 
strong  as  that  of  the  soul's  since  there  are  given  by  the  mortal  gods.  Thus,  although  the 
unity  of  the  soul  depends  solely  on  the  demiurge,  the  bonds  of  the  body,  and 
consequently  that  of  the  human  being,  can  be  destroyed  by  various  influences. 
The  body,  then,  is  connected  with  the  soul:  'And  they  went  on  to  invest  this  body  -  into 
and  out  of  which  things  were  to  flow  -  with  the  orbits  of  the  immortal  soul'  (43  a).  The 
description  that  follows  is  that  of  the  soul's  confusion  when  first  embodied.  The  picture 
here  is,  as  Comford  says,  that  of  the  immortal  principle  of  reason  being  plunged  for  the 
first  time  into  the  turbulent  tide  of  bodily  sensation  and  nutritionýo. 
Plato  here  talks  about  human  growth,  and  how  age  determines  a  person's  intelligence. 
When  a  soul  is  first  put  in  a  body,  there  is  a  lot  of  confusion  due  to  the  various 
sensations:  'The  motions  produced  by  all  these  encounters  would  then  be  conducted 
through  the  body  to  the  soul,  and  strike  against  it'  (43c).  'They  mutilated  and  disfigured 
the  circles  in  every  possible  way  so  that  the  circles  barely  held  together  and  though  they 
remained  in  motion,  they  moved  without  rhyme  or  reason,  sometimes  in  the  opposite 
direction,  ... 
'  (43e).  This  passage  indicates  that  the  sensations  have  the  power  to  distort 
the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul;  the  sensations,  which  are  bound  up  with  the  body,  affect 
the  soul.  The  same  point  is  also  made  clear  in  Plato's  talk  about  the  lack  of  rhyme  or 
reason  for  the  human  being  due  to  the  lack  of  unity  among  the  soul's  circles;  where 
these  are  'mutilated  and  disfigured'  (43e).  Thus,  it  becomes  apparent  that  for  Plato  the 
"Aristotle,  although  he  does  not  elaborate  on  the  poinL  seems  to  hold  that  mind  'seems  to  be  widely 
different  kind  of  soul...  it  alone  is  capable  of  existence  in  isolation  from  other  psychic  powers'  (DA. 
413b  25-27). 
'See  Comford,  1935,  p.  147. 
200 reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is  identified  with  the  moving  circles  of  the  soul.  In  turn  the 
notion  that  the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is  linked  to  the  soul's  circles,  implies  that 
whenever  these  circles  are  deformed,  the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is disturbed  by  the 
body's  sensations.  Hence,  the  mutual  dependence  between  human  soul  and  body  is 
proclaimed. 
This  interdependence  between  the  human  soul  and  body  is  further  explored  a  little  later 
in  the  dialogue.  'As  the  stream  that  brings  growth  and  nourishment  diminishes  and  the 
soul's  orbits  regain  their  composure,  resume  their  proper  courses  and  establish 
themselves  more  and  more  with  the  passage  of  time,  their  revolutions  are  set  straight,  to 
conform  to  the  configuration  each  of  the  circles  takes  in  its  natural  course.  They  then 
correctly  identify  what  is  the  same  and  what  is  different,  and  render  intelligent  the 
person  who  possess  them'  (44b). 
Plato's  concern  at  this  point  is  to  show  how  the  soul  was  put  in  the  body.  In  the 
construction  of  the  human  body,  then,  Plato  places  emphasis  on  the  head,  because  it  is 
going  to  be  the  seat  of  the  soul's  immortal  part4l.  Hence,  Plato  claims  that  the  head  is 
the  most  divine  part  of  humans  and  controls  the  rest  of  the  body:  'the  gods  bound  the 
two  divine  orbits  into  a  ball-shaped  body,  the  part  that  we  now  call  our  head.  This  is 
the  most  divine  part  of  us,  and  master  of  all  our  other  parts.  They  then  assembled  the 
rest  of  the  body  and  handed  the  whole  of  it  to  the  head,  to  be  in  its  service'  (44d).  It 
should  be  noted  here  that  the  head  is  of  a  rounded  shape.  In  that  way,  it  is  as  self- 
contained  as  possible. 
4'See  further  Comford,  1935,  p.  1  50. 
201 At  the  same  time,  though,  the  head  exists  within  the  universe  and  so  it  has  to  be  in 
contact  with  it.  As  Tracy  argues,  the  human  head,  unlike  the  cosmic  body,  is  not  unique 
but  exists  within  the  cosmos  and  must  cope  with  the  environment,  it  needs  the  help  of 
other  organs  for  local  motion,  sensation,  respiration,  nutrition,  etc.  This  determines  the 
structure  and  functions  of  the  rest  of  the  body42 
. 
Therefore,  the  gods  have  to  add  to  it 
the  rest  of  the  body  so  as  to  hold  and  support  the  head  (44e-45a)43.  Consequently,  the 
discussion  of  the  construction  of  the  head  is  of  importance  because  it  shows  that  the 
reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is  spatially  located  within  the  head,  within  the  human  frame. 
Plato  says,  then,  that  the  head  is  '...  carrying  at  the  top  the  dwelling  place  of  that  most 
divine,  most  sacred  part  of  ourselves'  (45a).  The  way  the  human  body  is  constructed, 
hence,  is intentional.  The  particular  shape  given  to  the  body  is  thought  of  as  the  best 
one  possible  to  fulfil  the  soul's  needs.  As  Tracy  says,  for  Plato  the  entire  body  is  the 
physical  organ  of  the  rational  soul.  Its  ultimate  purpose  is  to  serve  as  the  mortal 
container  and  vehicle  for  the  immortal  soul,  and  this  TAOC  determines  its  general 
structure44.  So,  Plato  not  only  introduces  a  physiological  account  of  the  human  body 
but  also  the  'cause'  for  it  having  this  specific  structure. 
This  combination  between  physiology  and  teleology  is  best  displayed  in  Plato's  account 
of  the  eyes.  Firstly,  Plato  describes  the  'sensation  of  seeing':  He  talks  about  the  way 
the  light  of  the  eyes  relates  to  that  of  the  environment:  'And  because  this  body  of  fire 
has  become  uniform  throughout  and  thus  uniformly  affected,  it  transmits  the  motions  of 
whatever  it  comes  in  contact  with  as  well  as  of  whatever  comes  in  contact  with  it  to 
and  through  the  whole  body  until  they  reach  the  soul.  This  brings  about  the  sensation 
42  Theodore  James  Tracy,  Physiological  Theory  and  the  Doctrine  ofthe  Mean  in  Plato  and  Aristotle,  The 
Hague,  1969,  p.  102;  also,  on  man  being  influenced  from  the  environment,  see  Harold  W.  Miller, 
'Aetiology  of  disease',  Transactions  ofthe  American  Philological  Association  93  (1962)  p.  179. 
43  See  further,  Comford,  ibid. 
44  See  Tracy,  p.  102. 
202 we  call  "seeing"'  (45c-d).  It  should  be  noted  here  that  the  example  of  the  workings  of 
the  eyes  pays  equal  attention  to  the  physiological,  mechanistic,  and  therefore  necessary 
function  of  the  eyes  as  well  as  to  their  intelligent  purpose. 
Plato,  then,  refers  to  the  above-mentioned  mechanism  of  the  eyes  as:  '...  the  auxiliary 
causes  that  gave  our  eyes  the  power  which  they  now  possess'  (46e),  and  moves  to 
discuss:  '...  that  supreme  beneficial  function  for  which  the  god  gave  them  [the  eyes]  to 
us'  (47a).  He,  thus,  moves  from  the  auxiliary  causes  to  the  intelligent  one;  necessity's 
role  is  a  mechanistic  one,  while  intelligence  is  directed  towards  the  idea  of  achieving  a 
higher  goa145  .  He  says:  'As  my  account  has  it,  our  sight  has  indeed  proved  to  be  a 
source  of  supreme  benefit  to  us,  in  that  none  of  our  present  statements  about  the 
universe  could  ever  have  been  made  if  we  had  never  seen  any  stars,  sun  or  heaven.  As 
it  is,  however,  our  ability  to  see  the  periods  of  day-and-night,  of  months  and  of  years,  of 
equinoxes  and  solstices,  has  led  to  the  invention  of  number,  and  has  given  us  the  idea  of 
time  and  opened  the  path  to  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  the  universe.  These  pursuits  have 
given  us  philosophy...  the  supreme  good  our  eyesight  offers  us'  (47a-b). 
As  Steven  K.  Strange  points  out,  both  necessity  and  intelligence  play  essential  roles 
here:  'One  must  discover  the  operation  of  Necessity  before  gasping  the  work  of 
Reason....  understanding  of  the  divine  causes  can  only  be  obtained  through  grasp  of  the 
lower  kind...  One  must  study  phenomena  through  their  material  causes  to  see  how  these 
are  ordered,  for  only  then  will  one  be  able  to  see  how  they  are  ordered  for  the  best  946  . 
The  notion  that  the  human  being  is  made  with  a  view  to  the  best  shows  further  that  a 
45  See  further  Tracy,  p.  103. 
'Steven  K.  Strange,  'The  Double  Explanation  in  the  Timaeus',  Ancient  Philosophy  5,  no.  1,  p.  30. 
203 mechanistic  explanation  of  the  world  cannot  be  perfeCt47.  Thus,  for  Plato,  the  eyes  are 
the  bodily  organs  that  not  only  enable  one  to  see,  but  also  provide  one  with  the  means  to 
move  from  seeing  to  understandi  ng.  As  Comford  rightly  argues:  'the  account  of 
eyesight  has  brought  us  to  the  point  of  contact  between  the  knowing  soul  and  the 
external  world  of  visible  bodies  '48.  In  other  words,  Plato  shows  that  sight  as  a  sense 
provides  the  soul  with  the  necessary  material  source  to  turn  from  looking  at  the  stars,  to 
the  invention  of  numbers,  and  so  to  a  purely  intelligent  act,  that  of  thinking"  (47b).  As 
Comford  says,  'Plato  singles  out  the  sense  of  sight,  firstly  because  it  is  useful  for 
locomotion,  and  secondly  because  sight  and  hearing  are  the  two  senses  which  above  all 
reveal  the  harmony  of  the  world'so.  It  is  important  to  note,  then,  that  Plato  sees  a  need 
for  both  auxiliary  and  primary  causes.  Human  action  needs  to  be  interpreted  in  terms  of 
reasoning  purposes  as  well  as  in  physical  terms.  As  Comford  asserts,  'we  need  to  study 
all  physical  transactions,  but  they  will  not  reveal  the  true  reason  or  explanation  (diTt'  a) 
of  vision,  the  purpose  it  is  rationally  designed  to  serve.  They  tell  us  "how"  we  see,  but 
not  "why  ..  51.  J.  E.  Boodin  makes  the  same  point,  he  argues  that:  'the  naturalistic  point 
of  view  has  a  place,  though  it  misses  the  main  point  -  that  of  creative  intelligence  in  the 
universe'52  .  It  may  be  tempting  to  take  Plato  to  be  saying  that  reason  explanations  and 
explanations  in  terms  of  physical  causes  are  quite  distinct  so  that  one  could  give  a 
complete  physical  explanation  of  someone's  act  without  invoking  reason,  and  a 
complete  reason  explanation  without  invoking  physical  mechanisms.  But  this  is  not 
Plato's  view.  The  auxiliary  causes  give  one  a  mechanistic  account  and  at  the  same  time 
"in  a  similar  way,  Glenn  R.  Morrow  ('Necessity  and  Persuasion  in  Plato's  Timaeus',  Philosophical 
Review  59  (1950)  p.  148)  says  that  the  man's  soul  is  lodged  in  a  bodily  frame  that  exposes  him  to 
innumerable  distractions  and  passions,  yet  still  provides  means  to  facilitate  the  victory  of  intelligence 
over  disorder. 
48COMford,  1935,  p.  156. 
49PIato's  ultimate  purpose  is  to  pursuit  philosophy.  See  especially  Phaedo  82e,  83b,  Republic  619d-e, 
Timaeus  47b. 
"See  finther  Cornford,  1935,  pp.  15  1  -152. 
51See  Comford,  1935,  p.  157. 
5'J.  E.  Boodin,  'Cosmology  In  Plato's  Tbought',  Mind  39  (193  0)  p.  64. 
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provide  one  with  the  necessary  means  for  reaching  the  primary  function,  the  rational 
account.  The  implication  of  this  seems  to  be  that  reason  can  direct  physical  movements 
in  one  way  or  another  without  violating  nature. 
In  this  way,  Plato  points  out  that  the  human  being,  and  by  implication  the  world,  is 
governed  by  two  causes  necessity  and  intelligence,  with  intelligence  being  the  primary 
one.  The  fact  that  both  the  human  being  and  the  world  as  a  whole  are  treated  as 
combining  reason  and  necessity  is  essential  for  this  thesis  since  it  points  towards  the 
important  notion  that  both  the  human  being  and  the  world  are  neither  Forms  nor  simply 
material. 
Plato  then  attempts  to  re-describe  the  way  the  world  operates:  'For  this  ordered  world  is 
of  mixed  birth:  it  is  the  offspring  of  a  union  of  Necessity  and  Intellect.  Intellect 
prevailed  over  Necessity  by  persuading  it  to  direct  most  of  the  things  that  come  to  be 
toward  what  is  best...  '  (48a).  Although  Plato's  talk  of  Intellect  persuading  Necessity  is 
mythological,  it  is  indicative  of  what  he  thought  about  the  workings  of  nature.  As 
Morrow  states:  'to  say  that  the  cosmos  comes  about  by  persuasion  means  that  it  results 
from  the  workings  of  the  powers  inherent  in  the  materials  of  which  it  consists  in,  each 
of  them  bringing  into  being  the  effects  natural  to  itself,  and  none  of  them  being  under 
any  constraint  by  a  power  outside  nature  53 
.  Thus,  although  both  necessity  and 
intelligence  are  operating  within  the  human  frame  and  within  nature,  intelligence  is 
taken  to  be  of  more  value  since  it  provides  the  purpose  of  everything.  In  regard  to  the 
above  quotation,  Strange  claims  that  although  Reason  and  Necessity  are  co-ordinate 
53  See  further  Morrow,  pp.  156-157. 
205 causes  in  the  making  of  the  world,  reason  is  somehow  prior  or superior  to  Necessity,  ... 
Necessity  counts  as  a  cause  in  so  far  as  it  co-operates  with  Reason's  purposes  54 
. 
Plato, 
then,  introduces  along  with  the  forms  and  matter,  the  receptacle  as  an  important  element 
for  the  world's  creation:  'that  which  keeps  its  own  form  unchangeable,  which  has  not 
been  brought  into  being  and  is  not  destroyed,  which  neither  receives  into  itself  anything 
else  from  anywhere  else,  nor  itself  enters  into  anything  else  anywhere,  is  one  thing... 
The  second  thing  is  that  which  shares  the  other's  name  and  resembles  it.  This  thing  can 
be  perceived  by  the  senses,  and  it  has  been  begotten...  And  the  third  type  is  space, 
which  exists  always  and  cannot  be  destroyed.  It  provides  a  location  for  all  things  that 
come  to  be'  (52a-b).  Hence,  Plato  introduces  a  third  element  that  stands  as  the  only 
possible  medium  to  combine  reason  and  necessity.  This  becomes  obvious  when  Plato 
likens  the  receptacle  to  a  mother:  'It  is  in  fact  appropriate  to  compare  the  receiving 
thing  to  a  mother,  the  source  to  a  father,  and  the  nature  between  them  to  their  offspring, 
(50d). 
The  workings  of  Necessity,  in  nature,  are  best  seen  in  Plato's  discussion  of  perception. 
It  is important  for  this  thesis  to  see  how  Plato  treats  perception,  since  his  view  provides 
us  with  a  clear  notion  of  the  way  perception  is  linked  to  the  reasoning  part  of  man.  This 
in  turn  indicates  the  interdependence  between  the  rational  soul  and  the  rest  of  the 
human  being.  Plato  talks  in  the  following  way  about  sense-perception;  about  how  men 
come  to  characterise  something  as  hot,  cold,  hard,  soft,  heavy  light,  smooth,  rough.  He 
says:  'we  notice  how  fire  acts  on  our  bodies  by  dividing  and  cutting  them.  We  are  all 
well  aware  that  the  experience  is  a  sharp  one...  It  is  this  substance,  more  than  any  other, 
that  divides  our  bodies  throughout  and  cuts  them  up  into  small  pieces,  thereby  giving  us 
the  property  that  we  now  naturally  call  hot'  (6ld-62a).  In  a  similar,  physiological 
I'Sawge,  p.  29.206 manner  the  rest  of  the  bodily  perceptions  are  described,  for  example;  'Hard  we  call 
whatever  our  flesh  gives  way  to;  soft,  whatever  gives  way  to  our  flesh'  (62b).  Then, 
Plato  tries  to  relate  the  above  perceptions  to  pleasures  and  pains.  He  says  that  one  must 
understand  pains  as  'an  unnatural  disturbance  that  comes  upon  us  with  great  force  and 
intensity'  (63d),  while  pleasure  is  the  return  to  the  original  state:  'leading  back  to  the 
natural  state'  (63d). 
The  point  of  interest  in  this  analysis  of  perceptions  is  its  implication  for  the  role  of 
perception  in  the  soul-body  relation.  In  particular,  it  should  be  noted  that  when  Plato 
talks  about  Perception,  he  does  not  attribute  it  to  the  body.  His  point  is  rather  that  the 
various  senses  deliver  perceptions  to  the  human  being,  but  it  is  reason  that  has  to  pass 
judgement  on  them.  In  other  words,  perception  provides  one  with  appearances,  while 
reason  provides  one  with  judgement.  This  is  made  clear  from  what  Plato  implies  earlier 
in  42a-b,  but  also  from  what  he  says  in  61e.  He  says:  'O'TI  PEV  Y&P  O'gý  T1  T6ndeo5, 
TraVTE5  M56'v  alcOavop6a.  ';  'We  are  all  aware  that  the  experience  is  a  sharp  one'55. 
This  sentence  indicates  a  very  interesting  distinction  between  the  perception,  the 
experience  or  pathos  of  something  being  sharp  and  one's  awareness  of  ie  6.  Thus, 
firstly,  one  cannot  have  any  perception  without  having  a  body  to  experience  it  through, 
and  secondly,  perceptions  are  not  merely  bodily,  but  that  they  are  the  means  for  the 
human  being  to  reach  particular  judgements  about  the  world.  Michael  Frede  develops 
this  idea  of  perceptions  not  being  merely  bodily  further  57 
. 
55  Comford  (1935,  p.  259)  translates  the  passage:  "we  are  all  aware  that  the  sensation  is  a  piercing  one". 
56  See  further  Comford,  1935,  p.  261. 
57Nfichael  Frede  (Terception  in  Plato's  Later  Dialogues',  in  G.  Fine  (ed),  Plato  1,  Oxford  Univ.  Press, 
1999)  discusses  perception  mainly  through  the  Theaetetus  where  the  main  issue  is  to  find  a  definition  of 
knowledge. 
207 According  to  Frede,  the  term  'aisthanesthai'  came  to  have  the  meaning  of  sense- 
perception  in  Plato".  He  further  argues  that  'Plato  thinks  that  our  beliefs  and  our 
knowledge  about  the  physical  world  involve  a  passive  affection  of  the  mind,  but  he  also 
thinks  that  they  go  much  beyond  this  passive  affection'59.  This  passive  affection  is 
perception.  The  example  used  by  Frede  is  whether  the  question  whether  A  is  red  or  not, 
can  be  settled  by  perception.  'We  may  be  passively  affected  by  the  colour  red,  but  to 
form  the  belief  that  something  is  red  presupposes  and  takes  a  great  deal  of  activity  on 
the  part  of  the  mind...  Thus,  even  the  simple  judgement  that  something  is  red...  is  not 
given  to  us  by  perception,  but  only  by  reflection  on  what  we  perceive  60 
.  Hence,  the 
point  of  interest  both  for  Frede's  purposes  and  this  thesis'  is  that  perception  is  the 
passive  affection  of  the  soul,  which  by  itself  cannot  yield  knowledge.  At  the  same  time 
though,  for  the  reasoning  part  to  judge  something  as  appearing  to  be  something, 
perception  has  to  come  first.  Thus,  through  the  notion  of  perception,  Plato's  implicit 
distinction  is  not  between  soul  and  body,  but  between  reason  and  the  mortal  elements  of 
the  human  being.  Perception  belongs  to  the  mortal  elements  but  the  judgement  we 
make  on  perceptions  belongs  to  reason. 
The  notion  that  perception  passes  through  the  body,  and  comes  in  contact  with  the 
reasoning  soul  becomes  also  apparent  in  64a  where  Plato  refers  to  pleasure  and  pain. 
'The  most  important  point  that  remains  concerning  the  properties  that  have  a  common 
effect  upon  the  body  as  a  whole,  pertains  to  the  causes  of  pleasures  and  pains  in  the 
cases  we  have  described  as  well  as  all  cases  in  which  sensations  are  registered 
throughout  the  bodily  parts,  sensations  which  are  also  simultaneously  accompanied  by 
pains  and  pleasures  in  those  parts'  (64a). 
"See  fiu-ther  Frede,  1999,  p.  379. 
59  Frede,  ibid. 
'See  Frede,  1999,  P.  382. 
208. The  next  point  of  interest  conceming  the  human  soul-body  relation  is  that  of  the  way 
the  body  and  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  are  constructed.  This  discussion  falls  under 
Plato's  discussion  of  the  co-operation  of  reason  to  necessity.  Plato  once  again  mentions 
that  the  mortal  body  as  well  as  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  are  made  by  the  created  gods: 
'They  imitated  him:  having  taken  the  immortal  origin  of  the  soul,  they  proceeded  next 
to  encase  it  within  a  round  mortal  body  [the  head],  and  to  give  it  the  entire  body  as  its 
vehicle.  And  within  the  body  they  built  another  kind  of  soul  as  well,  the  mortal  kind, 
which  contains  within  it  those  dreadful  but  necessary  disturbances...  '  (69c-d). 
Within  the  detailed  description  of  the  construction  of  the  body  and  the  lower  parts  of 
the  soul,  the  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  the  significance  of  the  localised  placement 
of  the  lower  parts  within  the  body.  Plato  says  that  although,  of  necessity,  the  immortal 
soul  is  related  to  the  body  and  the  mortal  soul,  there  is  still  a  need  to  spatially  separate 
the  divine  soul  from  the  rest.  Thus  '...  they  provided  a  home  for  the  mortal  soul  in 
another  place  in  the  body,  away  from  the  other,  once  they  had  built  an  isthmus  as 
boundary  between  the  head  and  the  chest  by  situating  a  neck  between  them  to  keep 
them  apart.  '  (69e).  Although  at  the  beginning  it  may  seem  that  this  separation  between 
the  immortal  soul  and  the  rest  of  the  soul  along  with  the  body  is  emphasised  merely  so 
as  to  show  that  the  former  is  distinct  in  nature  from  the  latter,  in  fact  Plato's  point  is  to 
stress  the  significant  teleological  priority  of  the  one  over  the  other.  The  immortal  soul 
is  located  in  the  head  and  is  separated  from  the  body,  and  from  the  other  two  parts, 
since  it  is  the  part  that  exercises  reason,  while  the  rest  of  what  comprises  a  human  being 
is  the  necessary  means.  In  a  sense,  the  immortal  part  of  the  soul  is  placed  in  the  body 
but  can  -  at  least  in  principle  -  exist  outside  it,  while  the  mortal  parts  of  the  soul  are 
209 necessarily  embodied;  they  exist  only  as  long  as  the  body  exists.  Thus,  the  immortal 
soul  is  located  in  the  head  so  as  to  minimise  contamination  from  the  mortal  elements. 
Tben,  the  mortal  soul  is  placed  in  the  body:  'Now  the  part  of  the  mortal  soul  that 
exhibits  manliness  and  spirit,  the  ambitious  part,  they  settled  nearer  the  head,  between 
the  midriff  and  the  neck,  so  that  it  might  listen  to  reason  and  together  with  it  restrain  by 
force  the  part  consisting  of  appetites,  should  the  latter  at  any  time  refuse  outright  to 
obey  the  dictates  of  reason  coming  down  from  the  citadel'  (70a).  The  second  part  of 
the  mortal  soul  now  is  located  as  far  from  the  head  as  possible:  'the  part  of  the  soul  that 
has  appetites  for  food  and  drink  and  whatever  else  it  feels  a  need  for,  given  the  body's 
nature,  they  settled  in  the  area  between  the  midriff  and  the  boundary  toward  the  navel.  ' 
(70e). 
Another  point  that  is  worth  noticing  within  the  discussion  of  the  body's  construction  is 
that  of  the  marrow.  It  is  characterised  as  carrying  life's  chains:  'For  life's  chains,  as 
long  as  the  soul  remains  bound  to  the  body,  are  bound  within  the  marrow,  giving  roots 
for  the  mortal  race'  (73b).  What  is  important  is  that  the  marrow  is  to  be  found  both  in 
the  head,  which  contains  the  immortal  part  of  the  soul,  and  in  various  other  parts  of  the 
body;  'Each  living  thing  was  at  its  completion  to  have  a  head  to  function  as  a  container 
for  this  marrow.  That,  however,  which  was  to  hold  fast  the  remaining,  mortal  part  of 
the  soul,  he  divided  into  shapes  that  were  at  once  round  and  elongated,  all  of  which  he 
named  "marrow...  (73d).  This  statement  implies  that  marrow  is  the  component  that 
connects  the  immortal  soul  to  the  mortal  soul.  The  marrow  binds  together  the  soul  as  a 
whole  and  consequently  the  soul  to  the  body.  This  is  made  clear  from  the  following: 
'And  from  these  as  from  anchors  he  put  out  bonds  to  secure  the  whole  soul  and  so  he 
proceeded  to  construct  our  bodies  all  around  this  marrow...  '  (73d). 
210 The  particular  construction  of  the  body  -  and  especially  the  way  the  head  was  covered 
with  'a  sparse  layer  of  bone  and  not  with  flesh  and  sinew'  (75c)  -  explains  also  the 
human  beings'  life  span.  Humans  could  have  had  a  longer  life  span  if  their  heads  had 
been  fleshier,  but  the  particular  construction  of  the  head,  by  allowing  them  to  be  more 
responsive  to  the  various  sensations,  gives  them  a  shorter  but  superior  life.  For,  as 
Plato  says:  '...  there  is  no  way  that  anything  whose  generation  and  composition  are  a 
consequence  of  Necessity  can  accommodate  the  combination  of  thick  bone  and  massive 
flesh  with  keen  and  responsive  sensation.  '  (75a-b).  But  the  body,  is  not  just  the 
container  of  the  soul  anymore,  it  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  formation  and  life  of  a 
human  being. 
Within  the  discussion  of  the  construction  of  the  human  frame  and  its  significance  for 
one's  understanding  of  the  soul-body  relation,  there  is  the  supplementary  issue  of  death. 
Tbroughout  his  dialogues  Plato  holds  that  death  is  the  separation  of  soul  to  bod  Y61  , 
but 
in  the  Timaeus,  a  detailed  rather  physiological  description  is  attempted.  Plato  presents 
us  with  a  natural  process  of  growth  and  decay,  since  the  body  functions  according  to  the 
'interlocking  bonds'  of  life  which  tie  soul  and  body  (8  1  d).  Natural  death,  then,  occurs 
because  the  bodily  bonds  are  loosened,  and  therefore  the  bonds  of  the  soul  are  loosened 
too  and  the  soul  departs:  'Eventually  the  interlocking  bonds  of  the  triangles  around  the 
marrow  can  no  longer  hold  on,  and  come  apart  under  stress,  and  when  this  happens  they 
let  the  bonds  of  the  soul  go.  The  soul  is  then  released  in  a  natural  way,  and  finds  it 
pleasant  to  make  its  flight.  '  (8  1  d-e).  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  death  happens  to  occur 
due  to  a  disease  or  injury  it  is  a  painful  one.  The  original  point,  then,  in  this  dialogue  is 
61  See  further  ApoloSy  40c,  Gorgias  524b,  Phaedo  67d,  andRepublic  614c. 
211 that  Plato  does  not  simply  state  that  death  is  the  separation  of  soul  from  body,  but  he 
also  provides  one  with  an  account  of  how  the  bonds  that  connect  soul  to  body  break  up. 
At  the  same  time,  since  death  is  presented  as  a  process  in  which  both  body  and  soul  are 
involved,  the  role  of  the  soul  is  of  significance.  The  fact  that  Plato  distinguishes 
between  a  natural,  pleasant  death  and  an  unnatural,  untimely,  painful  death  indicates 
that  the  soul  -  being  the  one  that  realises  pleasure  and  pain  -  is  actively  involved  in  the 
process  of  death.  The  account,  then,  is  not  that  of  the  soul  waiting  as  if  from  a  distance 
to  be  released  from  the  body,  like  a  bird  from  its  cage,  but  rather  that  the  processes 
involved  in  dying  also  affect  the  soul.  In  other  words,  what  happens  to  the  soul  during 
dying  is  the  consequence  of  what  happens  to  the  body,  and  the  human  being  dies  as  a 
result  of  the  soul's  release  62 
. 
The  final  point  of  interest  within  the  Timaeus  is  that  of  the  way  the  diseases  of  both 
body  and  soul  are  treated,  as  well  as  the  remedy  suggested  by  Plato.  The  discussion  of 
the  bodily  diseases  is  mainly  physiological;  it  shows  how  the  body  can  get  sick,  but 
what  is  of  interest  for  this  thesis  is  that  Plato  treats  the  diseased  marrow  as  the  worst 
case  of  bodily  disease;  he  says:  'But  the  most  extreme  case  of  all  is  when  the  marrow 
becomes  diseased,  either  as  a  result  of  some  deficiency  or  some  excess.  This  produces 
the  most  serious,  the  most  critically  fatal  diseases,  in  which  all  bodily  processes  are 
made  to  flow  backwards.  '  (84c).  What  should  be  noted,  here,  is  that  Plato  considers  the 
situation  where  the  marrow  is  diseased  as  the  most  serious  one  because  the  marrow  is 
connected  to  the  whole  body.  What  could  be  implied  also  at  this  point  is  that  since  the 
marrow  connects  the  soul  as  a  whole  to  the  body,  its  becoming  diseased  has  an  effect  to 
62Similar  to  Plato's  view,  is  Aristotle's.  He  holds  that  death  is  the  release  of  soul  to  body,  'the  soul  holds 
the  body  together,  at  any  rate  when  the  soul  departs  the  body  disintegrates  and  decays'  (DA.  411  b5).  The 
emphasis  for  both  Plato  and  Axistotle  is  that  one  dies  due  to  the  soul's  departure.  This  follows  because 
both  philosophers  treat  the  soul  as  what  brings  life  to  the  body. 
212 the  human  being  as  a  whole;  since  the  marrow  is  what  holds  body  and  soul  together,  the 
disease  of  the  marrow  is  most  likely  to  cause  death. 
After  the  diseases  of  the  body,  Plato  discusses  those  diseas  sult  from  es  of  the  soul  that  re 
a  bodily  condition.  Plato  recognises  mindlessness  -  aivoiav  -  as  the  soul's  disease,  and 
divides  it  into  two  kinds  namely,  madness  -  paviav  -  and  ignorance  -  apaeiav:  '... 
mindlessness  is  the  disease  of  the  soul,  and  of  mindlessness  there  are  two  kinds.  One  is 
madness,  and  the  other  ignorance'  (86b).  What  is  of  interest  is  that  these  diseases  of  the 
soul  are  due  to  the  body's  condition:  '...  if  the  seed  of  a  man's  marrow  grows  to 
overflowing  abundance  like  a  tree  that  bears  an  inordinately  plentiful  quantity  of  fruit, 
he  is  in  for  a  long  series  of  bursts  of  pain,  or  of  pleasures,  in  the  area  of  his  desires  and 
their  fruition'  (86c).  Moreover,  the  soul's  diseases  are  related  to  excessive  pleasures  or 
pains,  which  in  turn  indicates  the  interdependence  between  soul  and  body. 
As  it  was  discussed  in  the  passage  of  the  construction  of  the  body,  it  is  obvious  that 
Plato  insists  on  relating  the  soul  to  the  body  in  a  way  that  the  condition  of  the  one 
affects  the  condition  of  the  other.  In  particular,  cases  like  madness  and  ignorance  are 
conditions  of  the  diseased  soul,  but  they  refer  to  the  soul  as  a  whole;  the  soul  that  is 
interconnected  to  the  body.  In  other  words,  Plato  does  not  refer  to  the  reasoning  part  of 
the  soul  being  sick  by  its  own  and  on  its  own;  rather  the  soul  becomes  sick  because  it  is 
embodied.  The  picture  drawn  here  seems  to  be  that  of  a  kind  of  circle;  badness  of  the 
soul  leads  one  to  follow  the  wrong  kind  of  life,  this  causes  disruption  of  the  body, 
which,  in  turn,  affects  the  soul.  It  should  be  noted,  then,  that  Plato  does  not  claim  that 
all  diseases  of  the  soul  result  exclusively  from  the  sickness  of  the  body,  his  point  is  that 
due  to  the  embodiment  both  the  soul  and  the  body  affect  each  other. 
213 Furthermore,  the  fact  that  Plato  argues  that  no  one  is  wilfully  evil  (86e)  shows  that  the 
reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is  not  evil  by  itself  In  Plato's  own  words:  'A  man  becomes 
evil,  rather,  as  a  result  of  one  or  another  corrupt  condition  of  his  body  and  an 
uneducated  upbringing.  No  one  who  incurs  these  pernicious  conditions  would  will  to 
have  them.  '  (86e).  Moreover,  Plato  argues  that  there  are  two  causes  for  one's  . 
condition.  These  are  one's  parents  and  teachers:  I...  all  of  us  who  are  bad  come  to  be 
that  way  -  the  products  of  two  causes  both  entirely  beyond  our  control.  It  is  the 
begetters  far  more  than  the  begotten,  and  the  nurturers  far  more  than  the  nurtured,  that 
bear  the  blame  for  all  this'  (87b).  In  that  way  it  can  be  explained  how  one  came  to  lead 
the  particular  life  that  he  leads;  one  can  explain  his  particular  condition  63 
.  What  is 
important,  though,  for  the  Timaeus  is  that  Plato  insists  that  if  one's  way  of  life  affects 
the  balance  between  his  soul  and  body,  then  he  too  is  responsible  for  his  life:  'Even  so, 
one  should  make  every  possible  effort  to  flee  from  badness,  whether  with  the  help  of 
one's  upbringing,  or  to  the  pursuits  or  studies  one  undertakes,  and  to  seize  its  opposite' 
(87b).  So,  from  the  above  quotation,  it  becomes  apparent  not  only  that  the  body  affects 
the  souL  but  also  that  the  souL  the  reasoning  part,  is  able  to  affect  the  body  through  the 
proper  education.  Thus,  although  ultimately  all  diseases  of  the  soul  come  from  its 
embodiment,  the  soul  is  still  able  to  affect  the  body,  and  so  cure  itself. 
The  fact  that  the  soul,  too,  affects  the  body,  leads  then  to  the  discussion  of  'how  to  treat 
our  bodies  and  states  of  mind  and  preserve  them  whole'  (87c).  Plato  says:  'Hence  we 
must  take  it  that  if  a  living  thing  is  to  be  in  good  condition,  it  will  be  well-proportioned' 
(87c).  Plato's  notion  of  proportion,  then,  is  important  since  it  stresses  the  mutual 
dependence  between  soul  and  body;  it  refers  to  the  human  being  as  a  whole.  When 
Plato  says  'In  determining  health  and  disease  or virtue  and  vice  no  proportion  or  lack  of 
"See  further  Republic  424a-b. 
214 it  is  more  important  than  that  between  soul  and  body'  (87d),  he  makes  an  important 
claim  for  the  relation  between  soul  and  body.  It  seems  that  he  does  not  treat  the  issue  of 
health  as  merely  physical  and  the  issue  of  virtue  as  merely  mental,  but  rather  as  the  one 
shaping  the  other".  This,  in  turn,  indicates  that  soul  and  body  are  combined.  In  Plato's 
own  words:  '...  that  combination  of  soul  and  body  which  we  call  the  living  thing'  (87e). 
Thus,  one  can  not  talk  about  the  human  being  without  referring  to  the  combination  of 
soul  and  body.  Moreover,  it  is  of  significance  to  note  that  the  above  mentioned 
combination  is  one  that  involves  due  proportion;  if  one  is  to  be  healthy,  neither  the  soul 
nor  the  body  can  be  more  powerful  than  one  another  (87e-88b)  can.  -  Plato's  suggestion 
then  is  not  to  exercise  the  one  without  the  other.  The  text  reads:  '...  there  is  in  fact  a 
way  to  preserve  oneself,  that  is  not  to  exercise  the  soul  without  exercising  the  body,  nor 
the  body  without  the  soul,  so  that  each  may  be  balanced  by  the  other  and  so  be  sound.  ' 
(88b-c).  What  is  important,  thus,  from  the  above  is  the  assumption  that  Plato's 
treatment  of  the  human  being  as  being  comprised  of  soul  and  body,  is  mostly  developed 
having  in  mind  what  is  the  best  for  the  human  being.  The  notion  of  proportion  between 
soul  and  body  is  not  necessary  only  for  the  composition  of  a  human  being;  it  is  also 
necessary  for  the  human  being  to  lead  a  good  life;  both  healthy  and  virtuous. 
Conclusion 
As  was  shown  in  the  Timaeus  the  relation  between  soul  and  body  is  clearly  one  that 
does  not  fit  within  the  traditional  mind/body  distinction,  it  rather  offers  a  complex 
'Me  analogy  between  health  -  virtue  and  disease  -  vice  is  also  discussed  in  the  Republic  IV  444c-c. 
215 account  of  the  relation  between  soul  and  body.  Although  throughout  Plato's  dialogues 
the  soul-body  relation  is  of  major  concern,  in  the  Phaedo  as  well  as  in  the  Republic 
Plato  is  puzzled  about  how  exactly  soul  and  body  are  related.  In  the  Phaedo  the  picture 
seemed  to  be  that  the  soul  is  separate  from  the  body  (79b-c),  and  one  should  avoid 
anything  bodily  and  concentrate  on  the  soul  by  itself  (80e).  This  was  shown  to  be  the 
case  because  the  soul  was  treated  as  being  simple  and  therefore  akin  to  the  immaterial 
Forms.  Even  within  such  a  picture,  though,  there  were  indications  that  Plato's  view 
could  not  be  that  of  a  strong  dualism  because  although  soul  and  body  were  treated  as 
two  separate  entities,  specific  operations  of  the  human  being  required  soul/body 
interaction.  The  recollection  argument,  for  instance,  implied  that  any  kind  of 
knowledge  in  this  embodied  life  is  'recollected'  through  the  use  of  the  senses  (75e). 
This  in  turn  implied  a  kind  of  interconnection  between  soul  and  body  that  was  not  yet 
clarified  by  Plato's  arguments.  Thus,  one  is  left  perplexed  as  to  what  exactly  was 
Plato's  view  on  the  relation  of  soul  and  body.  In  the  Republic  Plato's  view  progressed 
towards  the  tripartite  notion  of  the  soul;  the  soul  consists  of  three  'parts',  the  rational, 
the  appetitive,  and  the  spirited  (439e-441a).  In  that  way  one  is  not  faced  with  the 
difficulty  found  in  the  Phaedo  as  to  how  something  completely  immaterial,  the  soul, 
can  relate  to  something  material,  the  body.  The  tripartite  soul  is  more  easily  related  to 
the  body,  because  the  lower  parts  of  it  are  closely  related  to  the  body.  The  problem  that 
remains  unsolved,  though,  is  that  although  the  tripartite  soul  requires  a  closer  relation 
between  it  and  the  body,  although  it  is  implied  that  the  tripartite  soul  is  immanent  within 
the  body,  the  particulars  of  such  a  relation  are  hinted  at  rather  than  stated.  This  creates 
a  further  discrepancy;  the  soul  is  clearly  tripartite  while  in  the  human  form,  but  its 
structure  prior  to  and  after  death  is  imprecise.  This  is  so  due  to  Plato's  conviction  that 
the  soul  after  death  retains  its  moral  character,  and  is  punished  or  rewarded  accordingly. 
Such  a  conviction  cannot  stand  if  one  holds  that  the  only  part  of  the  human  soul  that 
216 survives  is  reason.  Reason  alone  cannot  display  any  character  and  cannot  be  affected 
by  being  punished  or  rewarded. 
The  Timaeus,  then,  by  holding  that  the  soul/body  relation  is  a  complex  one,  tries  to 
solve  some  of  the  above  mentioned  difficulties.  This  is  done  though  the  discussion  of  a 
number  of  important  issues.  The  first  issue  that  helps  us  understand  Plato's  view  on 
soul/body  relation,  is  the  resemblance  of  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul  to  the 
World-Soul.  The  likeness  of  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul  to  the  World-Soul  is 
essential  since  it  enables  Plato  to  hold  that  the  reasoning  part  is  created  by  the  derniurge 
and,  therefore,  is  immortal.  The  association  of  the  reasoning  element  of  the  human  soul 
to  the  World-Soul  fiuther  indicates  a  close  relation  between  the  orderly  circles  of  the 
universe  and  the  reasoning  faculty  of  the  human  soul.  At  the  same  time,  this  likeness 
places  emphasis  on  the  reasoning  part  being  spatially  located.  Plato  demonstrated  that 
since  the  rational  part  of  the  human  soul  cannot  exist  without  a  body,  it  has  to  be  united 
with  one  -  either  the  stars  or  a  human  body.  Although,  then,  the  reasoning  part  of  the 
soul  is  not  physical  it  is  located  in  time  and  space  and  is  thus  capable  of  interacting  with 
the  physical  world.  An  example  of  this  interaction  is  seen  in  Plato's  talk  about  the 
reincarnation  of  the  souls.  He  refers  to  reincarnation  as  a  natural  process,  not  as  an 
upgrading  or  decline  towards  something  outside  this  world,  as  he  does  in  the  Republic. 
The  second  advancement  point  to  the  previous  dialogues  is  that  the  reasoning  part  by 
being  spatially  located  is  easier  to  be  linked  with  the  mortal  parts  of  the  soul.  Although 
the  exact  status  of  the  mortal  parts  of  the  human  soul  is  unclear,  they  are  clearly  closely 
bound  up  with  the  body  while  also  able  to  affect  the  reasoning  part.  Because  the 
reasoning  part  is  affected  by  the  body,  it  is  capable  of  being  disrupted  by  the  body  and 
thus  is  capable  of  making  false  judgements.  Thus,  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul 
217 cannot  be  identified  with  reason  as  such.  The  view  of  the  Timaeus  is  better  understood 
if  contrasted  to  those  views  which  see  human  beings  as  having  within  them  a  small  part 
of  incorruptible  divine  reason,  and  which  explain  vice  and  error  by  saying  that  the 
bodily  desires  have  overcome  our  true  nature.  The  latter  view  could  be  read  as  being 
suggested  by  some  passages  in  the  Republic. 
Plato's  main  concern  in  the  Timaeus,  then,  is  to  talk  about  the  human  being,  not  the 
immortal  soul.  Thus,  the  emphasis  on  our  interpretation  of  the  Timaeus  should  be 
placed  on  the  reasoning  part  as  just  that,  a  part  of  the  human  soul.  Plato,  within  the 
description  of  the  human  being,  presents  the  reasoning  part  as  affecting  and  being 
affected  by  the  rest  of  the  human  being,  and  ultimately  seems  to  imply  that  the  soul  that 
survives  death  is  the  reasoning  part  as  it  has  been  shaped  due  to  embodhnent.  Tbus, 
although  it  is  only  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul  that  survives,  this  is  shaped  by 
the  embodiment  in  such  a  degree  that  it  is  not  the  same  as  the  reasoning  part  that  Plato 
described  in  the  begirming  of  the  creation  story.  In  a  sense,  Plato,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
hold  both  that  the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is  immortal,  and  that  there  is  a  complex 
relation  between  the  soul  as  a  whole  and  the  body,  needs  to  abandon  the  idea  of  the  soul 
as  a  whole  being  able  to  exist  independently  of  the  body.  For  Plato's  theory  to  hold, 
Plato  has  to  argue  that  the  human  soul,  qua  human,  cannot  survive  the  body.  The  part 
of  the  human  soul  that  survives  the  body  cannot  characterise  any  individual's  survival. 
Perhaps  Plato  was  more  than  aware  of  such  a  difficulty  and  that  is  the  reason  why  in  the 
Timaeus  he  does  not  refer  to  any  issue  of  punishment  and  retribution  as  he  does  in  the 
Republic  where  he  refers  to  personal  survival65. 
11  Unfortunately  though  this  is  just  a  speculation.  All  the  information  we  get  from  the  Timaeus  is  that 
difficult  to  interpret,  let  alone  understand;  passage  in  41d,  and  the  limited  passage  in  42b-c  where  he  is 
concerned  with  reincarnation. 
218 To  conclude,  although  the  Timaeus  tries  to  combine  the  two  essential  ideas  of  Plato, 
that  of  the  soul's  immortality,  with  that  of  the  soul  acting  as  a  principle  of  life,  order 
and  reason  for  anything  that  animates,  the  important  question  of  what  exactly  is  the  soul 
for  Plato  remains  unanswered.  Although  Plato  came  closer  to  a  satisfactory  analysis  for 
our  modem  standards  of  how  the  complex  human  soul  relates  to  the  human  body,  the 
soul  that  survives  the  human  body  remains  still  something  obscure.  The  Timaeus  then 
faces  a  number  of  problems:  Firstly,  Plato  does  not  explain  the  notion  of  spatial  location 
of  the  soul  as  a  whole  and  especially  of  the  reasoning  part.  Because  of  that,  we  do  not 
have  a  worked  out  view  to  work  with.  The  notion  of  spatial  location,  if  it  were  made 
into  a  fully  worked  out  view,  would  have  been  a  very  powerful  tool  in  interpreting  Plato 
as  a  non-Cartesian  dualist.  Unfortimately,  though,  we  are  left  with  a  notion,  which  at 
best  is  taken  on  faith.  Secondly,  he  insists  that  the  reasoning  part  is  able  to  exist 
independently  of  the  body,  and  thirdly,  he  does  not  distinguish  between  the  reasoning 
part  as  first  created  by  the  demiurge,  before  being  placed  in  a  body,  and  the  reasoning 
part  that  survives  the  body.  The  second  difficulty  is  a  problem  that  is  shared  with 
Aristotle.  For  Plato,  the  insistence  on  the  reasoning  part's  existence,  prior  to  and  after 
the  human  existence,  is  strongly  linked  with  his  epistemology.  Plato's  theory  of 
knowledge  requires  the  existence  of  an  element  that  is  able  to  go  beyond  the  human 
existence.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  he  does  not  explain  the  difference  between  the  initial 
creation  of  the  reasoning  part,  before  it  is  placed  in  a  human  body,  and  the  reasoning 
part  that  survives  death,  creates  difficulties  for  his  theory.  The  reasoning  part,  which  is 
created  in  order  to  be  assigned  to  a  star,  and  then  to  a  human  being,  is  treated  as  being 
pure  reason.  On  the  other  hand,  the  reasoning  part  that  survives  bodfly  death  is 
structured  by  the  embodiment,  it  'carries'  with  it  elements  that  has  acquired  due  to  the 
embodiment.  The  difference,  then,  between  the  two  states  is  that  the  former  has 
219 nothing  to  do  with  notions  of  self,  of  personality,  while  the  latter  does  involve  such 
notions.  It  should  be  noted  though  that  Plato  must  have  been  at  least  aware  of  such  a 
discrepancy  in  his  view.  This  becomes  apparent  if  one  bears  in  mind  that  in  the  Timaeus 
Plato  insisted  on  the  reasoning  part  of  the  human  soul  being  spatially  located,  if  not  in  a 
human  body,  then  to  a  star.  Thus,  his  view  on  the  separate  existence  of  the  soul 
changes  somewhat  from  the  earlier  dialogues.  In  the  Phaedo  he  insisted  on  the  soul's 
ability  to  exist  *independently  of  the  body.  In  the  Republic,  although  the  reasoning 
element  is  part  of  a  tripartite  soul,  is  still  able  to  exist  outside  a  body.  In  the  Timaeus, 
though,  the  reasoning  part,  being  part  of  the  tripartite  soul,  has  to  be  spatially  located. 
Thus,  from  the  image  of  a  soul  that  should  exist  independently  of  a  body,  we  move  into 
a  view  that  the  soul,  the  reasoning  part  has  to  be  spatially  located.  The  Timaeus' 
account  obviously  raises  many  problems  but  it  is  clear  that  Plato  was  engaged  seriously 
with  the  mind/body  problem,  and  he  was  aware  of  its  complexity. 
220 Is  Plato  A  Dualist  ? 
Introduction 
The  main  concern  of  this  chapter  is  to  examine  whether  we  should  place  Plato  under 
the  category  of  dualism',  whether  we  are  right  in  treating  Plato  as  a  dualist.  This 
question  results  from  the  attempt  to  explain  how  the  soul-body  relation  developed 
within  Plato's  dialogues.  As  was  shown  in  the  previous  chapters  and  especially  on  the 
Timaeus,  for  Plato  the  human  being  consists  of  both  soul  and  body.  Seeing,  then,  that 
the  soul's  relation  to  the  body  is  not  a  simple  coexistence,  but  rather  a  complex  two- 
way  interaction,  a  mutual  interdependence,  one  is  fascinated  by  the  particulars  of  such  a 
relation,  which  inevitably  leads  to  the  question  whether  or not  Plato  could  be  treated  as 
a  dualist  of  some  kind.  In  order  to  answer  this  question  in  the  most  adequate  way 
possible,  I  shall  consider  four  main  points:  Firstly,  I  shall  discuss  Descartes'  view  as  the 
most  familiar  form  of  dualism.  Secondly,  I  shall  examine  Aristotle's  notion  of  soul, 
based  on  the  De  Anima.  Thirdly,  I  shall  give  an  analysis  of  what  Plato  says  in  the 
Timaeus  in  so  far  as  it  bears  on  the  question  of  dualism.  Finally,  through  the  indication 
of  the  similarities  and  differences  among  the  three  philosophers,  I  shall  use  Aristotle's 
theory  as  an  intermediate  between  Plato  and  Descartes'  views.  This  investigation  will 
help  in  clarifying  Plato's  view  of  the  soul-body  relationship,  and  thus  enable  us  to  form 
a  clearer  idea  as  to  whether  Plato  should  be  treated  as  a  dualist  or  not. 
Dualism  is  defined  as  follows:  Any  view  that  postulates  two  kinds  of  thing  in  some  domain  is  dualistic. 
The  most  famous  example  of  contrast  is  mind-body  dualism.  The  definition  is  from  The  Oxford 
Dictionary  ofPhilosophy  edited  by  Simon  Blackburn,  Oxford  University  Press,  1996. 
221 Descartes'  Dualism 
To  see  whether  Plato  can  be  treated  as  a  dualist  like  Descartes  2,  one  has  to  start  with 
Descartes'  theory  itself.  For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis  two  Cartesian  texts  will  be 
discussed,  namely,  the  Meditations  and  the  Passions  of  the  Soul.  A  limited  reference 
will  be  also  made  to  the  'Letters  to  Elizabeth  93  .  The  Meditations  and  the  Passions  of 
the  Soul  are  selected  because  they  provide  us  with  in  understanding  of  Descartes'  view 
of  soul-body  relation4.  In  the  former  Descartes  seems  to  adopt  a  rather  simplistic  view. 
Mind  and  body  are  separate  entities.  The  self  is  the  mind  and  the  body  is  the  physical 
mechanism  with  which  it  is  connected.  In  the  latter,  he  provides  us  with  a  more 
complex  account  of  interaction  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  without  deviating, 
though,  from  his  basic  belief  that  the  self  is  a  thinking  thing. 
Descartes  argues  in  his  Meditations  that  his  first  indisputable  belief  is  that  the  mind  is 
the  real  self.  Within  this  general  idea,  he  treats  the  senses  as  an  unreliable  source  for 
knowledge,  'Whatever  I  have  up  till  now  accepted  as  most  true  I  have  acquired  either 
from  the  senses  or  through  the  senses.  But  from  time  to  time  I  have  found  that  the 
senses  deceive,  and  it  is  prudent  never  to  trust  completely  those  who  have  deceived  us 
2  Cartesian  dualism  is  defined  as  the  separation  of  mind  and  matter  into  two  different  but  interacting 
substances.  The  explanation  for  such  an  interaction  is  assigned  to  divine  dispensation.  The  definition  is 
taken  from  the  Oxford  Dictionary  ofPhilosophy  ed.  by  Simon  Blackburn,  Oxford  Univ.  Press,  1996. 
3  Descartes'  theory  is  going  to  be  discussed  in  a  very  fragmented  way-,  the  interest  in  this  thesis  is  just  to 
show  why  Plato'  view  of  soul-body  cannot  be  considered  to  be  the  kind  of  dualism  that  Descartes'  theory 
belongs  to.  The  translations  used  for  this  thesis'  purposes  are  John  Cottingham's  Rene  Descartes 
Meditations  on  First  Philosophy,  Cambridge  University  Press,  1986,  and  Stephen  Voss'  7he  Passions  of 
the  Soul  Rene  Descartes,  Hackett  Publishing  Company,  1989.  The  'Letters  to  Elizabeth'  are  from 
Descartes  Philosophical  Writings,  translated  and  edited  by  Elizabeth  Anscombe  and  Peter  Thomas 
Geach,  the  Open  University,  1970. 
41t  should  be  noted  that  Descartes  does  not  distinguish  between  the  soul  and  the  mind;  in  fact,  he  uses  the 
two  terms  interchangeably. 
222 even  once'  (1,18).  Such  a  deception  according  to  Descartes  is  possible  if  one  suppose 
that  there  is  an  evil  demon,  'some  malicious  demon  of  the  utmost  power  and  cunning 
has  employed  all  his  energies  in  order  to  deceive  me'  (1,20).  If  there  were  such  a 
demon,  the  beliefs  he  derives  from  the  senses  would  be  false,  they  cannot  therefore  be 
beyond  any  doubt.  Descartes'  doubt  about  the  reliability  of  the  senses  is 
methodological.  He  tries  to  doubt  everything  in  order  to  discover  what  he  can  know  for 
certain.  By  casting  doubt  on  the  validity  of  the  senses  as  means  of  achieving 
knowledge,  Descartes  establishes  those  beliefs  that  could  resist  the  sceptics.  So,  as  was 
mentioned  above,  Descartes  held  that  the  belief  in  one's  own  individual  existence  could 
resist  any  sceptic's  challenge:  'If  I  convinced  myself  of  something  then  I  certainly 
existed'  (11,25).  Thus,  his  argument  is  that  the  very  fact  that  one  can  ask  whether  one 
exists  is  conclusive  that  one  does  exist,  because  one  has  to  exist  in  order  to  think.  In 
Descartes'  words:  'I  am,  I  exist,  is  necessarily  true  whenever  it  is  put  forward  by  me  or 
conceived  in  my  mind'  (H,  25)5.  Descartes'  argument,  then,  is  that  mind  and  body  are 
completely  distinct  since  his  mind  is  essentially  a  thinking  thing  while  body  is 
essentially  extended.  For  Descartes  the  'I  am'  refers  only  to  a  thing  that  thinks,  a 
thinking  thing  (11,27).  The  body,  on  the  other  hand,  is  'whatever  has  a  determinable 
shape  and  a  defmable  location,  and  can  occupy  a  space  in  such  a  way  as  to  exclude  any 
other  body'.  The  body  'can  be  received  by  touch,  sight,  smell,  and  can  be  moved  in 
various  ways,  not  by  itself  but  by  whatever  else  comes  into  contact  with  it'  (11,26). 
A  ffirther  reference  to  the  distinction  between  mind  and  body,  which  also  shows 
Descartes'  conviction  that  there  is  an  interrelation  between  the  mind,  the  self  and  the 
. 
body,  is  found  in  Descartes'  sixth  meditation.  He  shows  how  the  body  relates  to  the 
5The  problem  that  Descartes'  theory  faces,  then,  is  that  although  he  is  based  on  the  existence  of  God  as  a 
non-deceiver  to  prove  his  mind's  existence,  the  idea  of  God  is  said  to  be  in  his  mind.  In  that  way  he  is 
faced  with  a  circular  argument 
223 self.  'As  for  the  body  which  by  some  special  right  I  called  'mine',  my  belief  that  this 
body,  more  than  any  other,  belonged  to  me  had  some  justification.  For  I  could  never  be 
separated  from  it,  as  I  could  from  other  bodies;  and  I  felt  all  my  appetites  and  emotions 
in,  and  on  account  of,  this  body;  and  finally,  I  was  aware  of  pain  and  pleasurable 
ticklings  in  parts  of  this  body,  but  not  in  other  bodies  external  to  it'  (VI,  76).  This 
notion,  though,  of  Descartes  is  taken  on  faith:  'it  is  true  that  I  have  a  body  that  is  very 
closely  joined  to  me.  But  nevertheless,  on  the  one  hand  I  have  a  clear  and  distinct  idea 
of  myself,  in  so  far  as  I  am  simply  a  thinking,  non-extended,  thing;  and  on  the  other 
hand  I  have  a  distinct  idea  of  body,  in  so  far  as  this  is  simply  an  extended,  non-thinking 
thing.  And  accordingly,  it  is  certain  that  I  am  really  distinct  from  my  body  and  can 
exist  without  if  '  (VI,  78).  Descartes,  hence,  on  the  one  hand  recognises  that  by  feeling, 
having  sensations  he  cannot  be  completely  separate  from  his  body,  but  on  the  other 
hand  he  still  holds  that  the  self  is  something 
dilstinct  from  the  body.  He  argues:  'nature 
also  teaches  me,  by  these  sensations  of  pain,  hunger,  thirst  and  so  on,  that  I  am  not 
merely  present  in  my  body  as  a  sailor  is  present  in  a  ship,  but  that  I  am  very  closely 
joined  and,  as  it  were,  intermingled  with  it,  so  that  I  and  the  body  form  a  unit'  (VI,  8  1). 
At  the  same  time,  he  holds  that  '...  it  is  certain  that  I  am  really  distinct  from  my  body 
and  can  exist  without  it'  (VI,  78). 
Another  element  in  Descartes'  thoughtý  which  suggests  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are 
only  coincidentally  relatedjs  his  claim  that  the  mind  is indivisible  while  the  body  is 
divisible.  Me  first  observation  I  make  at  this  point  is  that  there  is  a  great  difference 
between  the  mind  and  the  body,  inasmuch  as  the  body  is  by  its  very  nature  always 
divisible,  while  the  mind  is  utterly  indivisible.  For  when  I  consider  the  mind,  or  myself 
in  so  far  as  I  am  merely  a  thinking  thing,  I  am  unable  to  distinguish  any  parts  within 
myself;  I  understand  myself  to  be  something  quite  single  and  complete.  Although  the 
224 whole  mind  seems  to  be  united  to  the  whole  body,  I  recognise  that  if  a  foot  or  arm  or 
any  other  part  of  the  body  is  cut  off,  nothing  has  thereby  been  taken  away  from  the 
mind'  (VI,  85-86).  Again,  here,  Descartes  talks  about  mind  versus  body.  The  mind  is 
indivisible,  while  the  body  is  divisible  6.  Descartes  thinks  of  the  self  as  single  and 
complete,  the  self  cannot  be  seen  as  one  in  plurality.  Moreover,  he  implies  that  this 
particular  body,  although  linked  to  the  self,  is  not  a  necessary  part  of  it. 
In  order  to  fully  appreciate  and  understand  Descartes'  position  on  the  soul-body 
relation,  though,  one  has  to  look  into  Yhe  Passions  of  the  Soul,  and  into  his  letters  to 
Elizabeth.  In  Yhe  Passions  of  the  Soul  Descartes  provides  one  with  a  detailed  analysis 
concerning  the  nature  of  man.  He  distinguishes  the  functions  of  the  soul  from  those  of 
the  body.  In  a  very  crude  way,  this  distinction  is  that  the  functions  that  can  be  equally 
attributed  to  inanimate  bodies  should  be  attributed  to  the  body  alone,  while  the 
functions  that  are  incapable  of  belonging  to  a  body  should  be  attributed  to  the  soul 
(article  3,329  5-10).  Based  on  such  a  distinction,  Descartes  attributes  every  kind  of 
movement  to  the  body,  and  every  kind  of  thought  to  the  soul  (article  4,329  15). 
Despite  the  fact  that  such  a  distinction  may  appeal  as  plausible,  Descartes'  view  faces 
difficulties  in  explaining  in  a  satisfactory  way  the  relation  of  soul  to  body.  The 
problem  that  Descartes  faces  concerns  the  relations  among  the  brain,  the  soul,  and  the 
animal  spirits.  In  particular,  Descartes  holds  that  all  bodily  movements;  movements  of 
the  muscles,  as  well  as  all  the  senses  depend  on  nerves.  These  nerves  come  from  the 
brain,  which  contains  a  very  fine  air,  namely  the  animal  spirits  (article  7,332  25-30). 
He  then  distinguishes  between  movernents  occurring  in  the  brain  that  create  sensations 
to  the  soul,  and  movements  that  cause  the  spirits  to  cause  movement  on  bodily 
members  (article  13,338  15-25).  At  the  same  time,  Descartes  claims  that  the  functions 
6AIthough  Descartes'  view  here  is  sirailar  to  the  view  Plato  seemed  to  hold  in  the  Fhaedo  79a. 
225 of  the  soul  are  its  thoughts,  which  he  categorises  into  its  actions  and  its  passions  (article 
17,342  10-15).  What  is  of  importance,  though,  in  Descartes'  distinction  between  the 
actions  of  the  soul  and  those  of  the  body,  is  that  the  actions  of  the  soul  necessarily 
involve  volition,  will,  while  the  bodily  actions  are  done  automatically,  mechanically.  A 
characteristic  example  of  this  distinction  is  Descartes'  reference  to  dreams.  He  claims 
that  imaginations  'arise  because  the  spirits,  agitated  in  various  ways  and  coming  upon 
traces  of  various  impressions  which  have  preceded  them  in  the  brain,  haphazardly  take 
their  course  through  certain  of  its  pores  rather  than  others.  Such  are  the  illusions  of  our 
dreams'  (article  21,344  20-  345).  Thus,  although  the  brain  process  may  be  the  same, 
what  characterises  it  as  an  action  of  the  soul  or as  one  of  the  body  is  volition.  If  I  have 
willed  for  it,  is  an  action  of  the  soul  otherwise  it  is  one  of  the  body. 
This  point  in  turn  points  towards  Descartes'  view  that  the  person,  is  the  conscious  self, 
the  part  that  wills.  This  view  is  finther  supported  by  Descartes'  insistence  on  the  soul's 
nature  as  non-extended.  He  argues  that  the  soul  is  'of  a  nature  which  has  no  relation  to 
extension,  or  to  the  dimensions,  or  other  properties  of  the  stuff  the  body  is  composed 
of,  but  only  to  the  whole  collection  of  its  organs  -  as  becomes  apparent  from  the  fact 
that  one  cannot  in  any  way  conceive  of  a  half  or  a  third  of  a  soul,  or of  what  extension 
it  occupies...  '  (article  30,351  10-20).  This  leads  us  perhaps  to  the  most  difficult  claim 
of  Descartes'  regarding  the  soul-body  relation,  the  soul's  relation  to  the  pineal  gland. 
Descartes  claims:  '...  even  though  the  soul  is  joined  to  the  whole  body,  there  is 
nevertheless  one  part  in  [the  body]  in  which  [the  soul]  exercises  its  functions  in  a  more 
particular  way  than  in  all  the  others...  a  certain  extremely  small  grand'  (article  31,352 
1-15).  The  difficulty  that  we  are  faced  with,  here,  in  explaining  the  particulars  of 
Descartes'  theory,  is  that  although  he  wants  to  distinguish  soul  from  body,  he  also 
wants  to  explain  the  relation  between  the  two.  His  solution  is  that  the  soul  moves  the 
226 little  gland  that  causes  the  movement  of  the  animal  spirits  that  in  turn  cause  a  chain  of 
physiologically  explained  reactions  to  the  body.  In  Descartes'  words:  'the  whole  action 
of  the  soul  consists  in  this:  merely  by  willing  something,  it  makes  the  little  gland  to 
which  it  is  closely  joined  move  in  the  way  required  to  produce  the  effect  corresponding 
to  this  volition'  (article  41,360  1-5). 
There  is  though  a  question  that  remains  unanswered  7,  how  can  pure  will  move  the  little 
gland?  This  question  was  raised  by  princess  Elizabeth  to  Descartes:  'how  the  human 
soul  can  determine  the  movement  of  the  animal  spirits  in  the  body  so  as  to  perform 
voluntary  acts'  (Letter  IX  A,  Princess  Elizabeth  to  Descartes).  Descartes'  answer 
seems  to  be  that  along  with  the  notion  proper  of  the  body,  which  is  extension,  and  along 
the  notion  proper  to  the  soul,  which  is  consciousness,  he  recognises  a  notion  proper  of 
the  soul  and  body  together,  the  notion  of  their  union.  In  an  attempt  to  explain  the 
notion  of  union  between  soul  and  body  Descartes  talks  about  the  qualities  or  powers 
that  enable  the  soul  to  move  the  body.  His  example  is  gravity.  He  says  that  'Now  I 
hold  that  we  misuse  this  notion  by  applying  it  to  gravity...  but  that  it  has  been  given  to 
us  in  order  that  we  may  conceive  of  the  way  that  the  soul  moves  the  body'  (Letter  IX  B, 
Descartes  to  Princess  Elizabeth).  The  question  though  remains  unanswered.  As 
princess  Elizabeth  argues,  she  cannot  'understand  the  idea  by  means  of  which  we  are  to 
judge  of  the  way  that  the  soul,  unextended  and  immaterial,  moves  the  body,  in  terms  of 
the  idea  you  used  to  have  about  gravity'  (Letter  X  A).  Descartes'  answer  then  was  that 
6matter  and  extension  to  the  soul  is  nothing  else  than  to  conceive  the  soul  as  united  to 
the  body'  (Letter  X  B).  Unfortunately  though,  such  an  answer  is  not  a  satisfactory  one, 
because  to  say  the  least  it  begs  the  question.  How  is  one  to  explain  the  notion  of  the 
7  Peter  Remnant  ('Descartes  Body  and  Soul',  Canadian  Journal  ofPhilosophy  9,3  (1979)  3  81-82)  holds 
that  although  Descartes  promises  to  answer  the  above  question  in  his  Treatise  of  Man,  in  fact  he  never 
does. 
227 soul-body  union  with  the  idea  that  the  matter  and  extension  of  the  soul  is  its  union  to 
the  body? 
Thus,  although  Descartes'  basic  line  of  reasoning  is  that  of  the  soul  and  body  being 
intermingled,  he  still  holds  that  the  self  is  the  soul  while  the  body  is  something 
altogether  distinct.  He  strongly  argues  that  the  self  is  the  soul,  and  consequently  he 
cannot  provide  one  with  the  necessary  details  for  the  required  interrelation  between 
soul  and  body,  he  thus,  does  not  adequately  explain  how  the  soul  that  is  not  extended  is 
linked  to  the  body. 
Aristotle  on  Soul-Body  Relation 
We  can  now  turn  to  Aristotle's  theory  of  soul-body  relation.  In  the  De  Anima,  Aristotle 
attempts  to  explain  scientifically  the  workings  of  the  human  being  as  an  -organism  in 
nature.  Aristotle  like  Plato  holds  that  the  soul  is  what  animates  the  body.  But  for 
Aristotle,  the  soul  is  not  a  separate  entity  able  to  exist  on  its  own;  rather,  he  treats  the 
soul  as  the  'form'  of  the  body,  which  is  matter:  'soul  is  an  actuality  or  formulable 
essence  of  something  that  possesses  a  potentiality  of  being  besouled'  (11,2,414a26-28). 
He  thus  holds  that  body  without  a  soul  is  not  a  human  being,  and  claims  that  soul 
cannot  exist  independently  of  body.  In  his  own  words,  'the  body  is  the  subject  or 
matter...  hence  the  soul  must  be  a  substance  in  the  sense  of  the  form  of  a  natural  body 
having  life  potentially  within  it'  (DA  11,1,412al7-21).  Tbus,  despite  the  fact  that  both 
philosophers  treat  the  soul  as  that  which  animates  the  body,  Aristotle's  view  differs 
from  Plato's  in  a  very  significant  point,  namely,  the  soul's  independent  existence.  For 
Plato  if  the  soul  is  to  animate  the  body,  it  must  exist  independently  and  even  be  prior  in 
time  to  the  body.  On  the  other  hand,  Aristotle  treats  the  soul  as  a  kind  of  essence  that 
228 cannot  be  distinguished  from  the  body  that  it  animates.  Ibus,  as  M.  Frede  argues, 
when  Aristotle  introduces  the  notion  of  essence,  he  is  not  introducing  a  new  entity. 
Frede  argues  that:  'when  Aristotle  is  insisting  on  es$ences  or  natures,  he  is  insisting  that 
objects,  natural  objects,  human,  beings,  are  not  just  configurations  of  more  basic 
material  constituents  and  hence  should  not  just  be  conceived  in  this  way's.  A  point, 
which  marks  off  Aristotle's  view  from  any  modem  theory  of  supervenience  is  that  he 
treats  the  soul  as  the  form  of  the  body,  and  hence  as  the  formal  cause  of  the  body. 
Moreover,  he  recognises  at  least  one  part  of  soul  that  is  capable  of  existing 
independently  of  body,  namely  intelligence.  Aristotle's  view  on  the  active  intellect  is 
that  it  is  immortal,  an  issue  that  seems  to  come  in  opposition  to  his  claim  of  the  soul 
being  the  form  of  the  body  9. 
What  can  we  make  then  of  Aristotle's  notion  of  intelligence  and  consequently  of  the 
soul?  In  the  De  Anima  Aristotle  explicitly  claims  that:  'we  have  no  evidence  as  yet 
about  mind  or  the  power  to  think;  it  seems  to  be  a  widely  different  kind  of  soul'  (DA  11, 
2,413b24).  The  thinking  part  of  soul  is  said  to  differ  from  the  rest  because  it  is  eternal 
while  the  rest  are  perishable,  'it  alone  is  capable  of  existence  in  isolation  from  all  other 
psychic  powers'  (DA  11,2,413b26-27).  Thus,  both  Aristotle  and  Plato  hold  that  there 
must  be  something  in  the  human  being  that  is  capable  of  being  immortal.  For  Aristotle, 
though,  the  immortality  of  intelligence  does  not  indicate  personal  survival,  while  for 
Plato,  throughout  the  dialogues,  what  survives  death  must  contain  more  than  pure 
reason.  In  particular,  as  K.  V.  Wilkes  says,  Aristotle's  immortal  and  eternal  psychic 
power  'would  be  nothing  like  me  that  survives  bodily  death"o.  On  the  other  hand, 
Plato's  view  is  that  although  it  is  the  reasoning  element  that  survives  death,  it  is  so 
8  Michael  Frede,  'On  Aristotle's  Conception  of  the  Soul',  in  M.  C.  Nussbaum  -  A.  Oksenberg  Rorty 
(eds),  Essays  on  Aristotle's  De  Anima,  Clarendon  Press  Oxford  1992,  p.  95. 
9  This  is  discussed  further  in  the  comparison  among  Plato,  Aristotle  and  Descartes  that  follows. 
10See  K.  V.  Wilkes,  'Psuchi  versus  the  Mind',  in  M.  C.  Nussbaum  -  A.  Oksenberg  Rorty,  p.  125. 
229 formed  by  the  embodied  state  that  it  'carries'  with  it  personality  traits,  in  other  words, 
the  element  of  soul  that  survives  death  for  Plato  is  not  purely  intellect".  Thus,  as 
Wilkes  argues,  Aristotle's  idea  of  immortality  is  'more  like  that  of  Heraclitus  than  that 
of  contemporary  Christianity,  we  do  not  survive  as  ourselves,  but  something  else  does: 
12  the  Heraclitean  fire,  or  the  Aristotelean  light  of  intellect 
Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Descartes 
Having  thus  drawn  an  outline  of  the  two  philosophers'  views  on  the  soul-body  relation, 
I  will  attempt  to  show  the  similarities  and  differences  among  the  views  of  Plato 
Aristotle  and  Descartes,  so  as  to  show  why  Plato's  theory  of  soul-body  relation  cannot 
be  treated  as  a  Cartesian  dualism.  Through  this  process  of  comparison  and  contrast,  it 
will  be  indicated  that  Aristotle's  view  in  some  respects  acts  as  an  intermediate  position. 
The  first  point  that  shows  a  significant  difference  between  Plato  and  Descartes  is  that 
Plato,  in  the  Timaeus,  holds  that  the  soul  is  the  cause  of  reason  and  motion,  in  other 
words,  the  soul  is  what  animates  the  body  and  what  brings  intelligence  to  it.  The  notion 
of  the  soul  being  the  cause  of  motion  is  an  essential  one  for  Plato.  In  the  Laws,  Plato 
says  about  the  soul:  'it  is  one  of  thefirst  creations,  born  long  before  all  physical  things, 
and  is  the  chief  cause  of  all  their  alterations  and  transformations'  (892a).  Moreover,  the 
soul  is defined  as  'motion  capable  of  moving  itself  (Laws  896a).  In  a  similar  manner, 
Plato  holds  in  the  Phaedrus  that  the  soul  is  self-mover  that  moves  everything  else: 
&every  soul  is  immortal.  That  is  because  whatever  is  always  in  motion  is  immortal, 
while  what  moves,  and  is  moved  by,  something  else  stops  living  when  it  stops  moving. 
"This  issue  is  clearly  stated  in  the  Republic  Xwithin  the  myth  of  Er  618b,  in  the  Timaeus  42b-c,  and  in 
90e-91c. 
12  See  further  Wilkes,  p.  126. 
230 So  it  is  only  what  moves  itself  that  never  desists  from  motion,  since  it  does  not  leave 
off  being  itself  In  fact,  this  self-mover  is  also  the  source  and  spring  of  motion  in 
everything  else  that  moves'  (Phaedrus  245c-d). 
For  Descartes,  though,  the  soul  cannot  be  seen  as  something  that  animates  the  body, 
since  he  insists  on  the  soul  being  a  thinking  thing  and  the  body  an  extended  thing.  For 
Descartes  the  soul  happens  to  be  connected  to  a  particular  body  that  is  a  perfectly 
functioning  mechanism.  A  clear  indication  of  this  is  that  Descartes  denies  soul  to 
animals  who  are  clearly  self-movers.  Descartes'  view  then  of  how  the  soul,  the  mind, 
which  is  a  thinking  thing  can  relate  to  a  body,  which  is  an  extended  thing,  is  unclear. 
Although,  as  was  discussed  at  the  relevant  section  of  this  chapter,  he  introduces  the  idea 
that  the  soul  affects  the  pineal  gland,  and  from  there  all  possible  movements  of  the 
body  start,  he  does  not  give  us  the  details  of  this  relation.  In  The  Passions  of  the  Soul 
Descartes  claims  that  'the  whole  action  of  the  soul  consists  in  this:  merely  by  willing 
something,  it  makes  the  little  gland  to  which  it  is  closely  joined  move  in  the  way 
required  to  produce  the  effect  corresponding  to  this  volition'  (article  41,360  1-5).  At 
best,  his  view  seems  to  be  that  the  soul  in  a  mysterious  way  can  affect  a  body,  soul  is 
not  the  source  of  animal  motion  but  somehow  affects  it  by  altering  the  flow  of  animal 
spirits,  but  there  is  no  particular  reason  why  it  affects  this  particular  body.  In  a  sense, 
Descartes'  view  of  the  soul  affecting  the  pineal  gland  could  hold  even  if  the  brain  were 
imaged  to  be  separated  from  the  body.  There  is  no  obvious  reason  why  my  soul  should 
affect  the  pineal  gland  in  my  brain  rather  than  the  one  in  someone  else's  brain.  This 
Cartesian  view,  then,  could  be  associated  with  Dennett's  thought  experiment  13  where  a 
brain  in  a  vat  is  linked  to  a  body,  which  is  situated  some  way  away.  My  soul  could 
affect  the  pineal  gland  in  the  brain  in  the  vat  and  that  in  turn  could,  in  principle,  be 
13  Daniel  C.  Dennett,  'Where  am  IT,  in  D.  PL  Hofstadter  -  D.  C.  Dennett  (eds),  The  Mind's  I  Fantasies 
and  Reflections  on  Selfand  Soul,  198  1,  pp.  217-229. 
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--I  --  - linked  to  a  distinct  body.  The  sense  in  which  this  body  belongs  to  my  soul  is  simply 
that  my  soul  can,  directly  or  indirectly,  affect  that  body  and  the  body  in  turn,  directly  or 
indirectly,  affects  the  soul.  No  close  relation  is  required. 
Another  way  that  the  relation  between  the  soul  and  the  pineal  gland  could  be  explained 
is  the  one  proposed  by  Sara  Broadie.  She  argues  that  the  explanation  of  the  link 
between  mind  and  body  cannot  be  that  the  mind  wills  such  a  union,  for  'without  sense 
experience  we  could  not  have  an  idea,  either  definite  or  indefinite,  of  a  particular 
body'  14 
.  According  to  her  reading  then,  'only  God,  a  third  being  of  infinite  power,  can 
cause  by  his  will  a  union  between  substances  of  such  mutually  alien  natures  as  mind 
and  body'15.  Although  Broadie's  conclusion  is  a  correct  one,  based  on  Descartes' 
ideas,  unfortunately  it  is  one  that  is  taken  as  a  matter  of  faith  and  not  as  proven 
philosophically. 
Thus,  the  first  point  of  difference  between  Plato  and  Descartes  is  that  of  the  soul  acting 
as  a  life-principle.  What  remains  to  be  seen  is  Aristotle's  position  on  this  issue.  As 
was  mentioned  previously,  Aristotle  like  Plato  holds  that  the  soul  acts  as  the  animating 
principle  of  a  body.  He  characterises  the  soul  as  the  form  of  the  body.  But  what  is 
exactly  Aristotle's  view  on  the  issue,  and  why  is  his  view  to  be  treated  as  an 
intermediate  of  Plato  and  Descartes'  views?  Firstly,  Aristotle  like  Plato  assigns  to  the 
soul  the  role  of  the  animator.  Without  the  soul  the  body  cannot  be  characterised  as  a 
human  body,  it  is  just  inert  matter,  matter  without  form.  On  the  other  hand,  unlike 
Plato,  Aristotle  holds  that  the  soul  is  a  form,  and  therefore  is  not  something  that  comes 
to  be,  and  it  is  not  divisible.  Thus,  as  Christopher  Shields  argues,  the  fact  that  Aristotle 
14  Sara  Broadie,  'Soul  and  Body  in  Plato  and  Descartes',  The  Aristotelean  Society  Proceedings  101 
(200  1)  p.  301. 
15  See  further  Broadie,  ibid. 
232 is  committed  to  the  immateriality  of  souls  is  due  to  the  following  arguments:  'a)  First, 
the  soul  cannot  be  moved  by  itself  (DA,  1,3).  Every  magnitude  can  be  moved  kath' 
hauto  (de  Galeo  268bl5-16).  Therefore  the  soul  is  not  a  magnitude.  b)  Second,  the 
soul,  as  a  form  of  the  body,  is  not  generable  (Metaphysics  VII,  8).  This  is  so  since 
whatever  comes  to  be  has  form  as  well  as  matter,  but  form  is  not  a  compound  (Meta 
VH,  8).  Therefore,  the  soul  does  not  have  matter.  c)  Third,  ýhe  soul  is  not  divisible 
(DA  411b27).  But  whatever  is  not  divisible  is  not  a  magnitude  (Physics  219al  I, 
237al  1).  Therefore  the  soul  is  not  a  magnitude.  d)  Fourth,  the  soul  is  neither  one  of 
the  elements  nor  from  the  elements  (de  Generatione  et  Corruptione  334alO-I  1)16. 
There  is,  in  other  words,  a  crucial  distinction  between  Plato  and  Aristotle,  namely,  that 
of  the  soul's  separate  existence.  For  Plato  the  soul's  inunateriality  is  a  proof  to  its 
existence  prior  to  body.  For  Aristotle  on  the  other  hand,  the  soul's  immateriality  does 
not  prove  its  separate  existence.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  from  most  of  what  Aristotle  says 
in  the  De,  4nima,  the  body  is  io  much  necessary  for  a  human  being  as  the  soul  is.  As  K. 
V.  Wilkes  argues  not  all  complex  systems  can  provide  the  'matter'  (hardware)  for  a 
psuchi-competence.  Form  puts  constraints  on  matter  and  vice  versa  17 
. 
She  thus  goes 
on  to  claim  that  the  body  is  a  necessary  condition  for  thinking  in  general  and  the  active 
intellect  in  particularls. 
This  is,  thus,  the  point  according  to  which  we  can  differentiate  Aristotle's  position  to 
that  of  Descartes'.  As  it  was  indicated  earlier,  Descartes  holds  that  the  soul  is  not  the 
cause  of  the  body;  the  body  is  a  perfect  mechanism  that  operates  according  to  its  own 
rules.  The  soul,  therefore,  happens  to  be  related  to  the  body  and  thus  interact  with  it. 
For  Aristotle,  though,  the  body  on  its  own,  is  nothing  but  inert  matter.  Likewise,  the 
16  Christopher  Shields,  'Soul  and  Body  in  Aristotle',  Oxford  Studies  in  Ancient  Philosophy  6  (1988) 
F'Sle!:  4ýVilkes, 
p.  124.  That  is  why  Aristotle's  view  cannot  be  seen  as  a  kind  of  functionalism. 
"See  Wilkes,  p.  126. 
233 soul's  existence  depends  on  the  body's  existence.  Thus,  as  Shields  argues,  Aristotle 
cannot  be  treated  as  a  Cartesian  dualist,  because  he  denies  that  the  soul  is  separate  from 
the  body.  In  Shields'  words:  'it  is  clear  that  Aristotle  is  no  sort  of  Cartesian...  he 
regards  souls  as  ontologically  dependent  on  bodies...  Aristotle  denies  Cartesianism  but 
he  does  not  thereby  deny  dualism'19. 
Another  point  that  indicates  that  neither  Plato  nor  Aristotle  could  be  treated  as 
Cartesian  dualists,  is  the  issue  of  the  soul's  spatial  location.  Plato  holds  that  the  soul, 
whether  he  refers  to  the  reasoning  element,  or  to  the  tripartite  soul,  cannot  exist  outside 
space.  It  has  to  be  spatially  located,  but  that  does  not  mean  that  it  always  has  to  be 
located  in  a  human  body.  Plato  does  not  explain  the  exact  relation  between  the  mortal 
parts  of  the  soul  and  the  body  -  perhaps  because  he  lacks  the  means  to  make  the 
requisite  distinction.  What  could  be  argued  here  on  Plato's  behalf  is  that  he  does  not 
think  of  the  mortal  parts  as  ontologically  distinct  from  the  body,  the  mortal  parts 
couldn't  exist  without  the  body.  Having  said  that,  though,  it  is  not  clear  what  the 
particular  relationship  is.  It  cannot  be  an  identity  because  of  the  language  used.  Plato 
insists  on  terminology  that  indicates  that  the  mortal  parts  are  placed  within  bodily  parts, 
not  that  they  are  tautologous  to  them:  'they  provided  a  home  for  the  mortal  soul  in 
another  place  in  the  body'  (69e).  Further  examples  of  this  kind  of  language  are  the 
following:  '...  they  settled  nearer  the  head'  (70a)  and  'they  assigned  it  its  position 
there...  '  (70e).  Similarly,  the  relation  of  the  mortal  parts  to  the  body  cannot  be  that  of 
supervenience  because  the  mortal  parts  are  created  along  with  the  body,  they  are  not  the 
result  of  the  body's  constitution.  That  the  soul  occupies  'space',  then,  implies,  at  least, 
that  for  Plato  the  soul  is  not  a  substance  totally  and  completely  separate  from  the  body. 
It  rather  indicates  that  by  necessity  there  is  no  sharp  distinction  between  soul  and  body, 
the  soul  is  interconnected  to  the  body  for  the  human  being  to  live.  In  other  words,  there 
19  Shields,  pp.  131-132.234 can  be  no  human  being  without  the  existence  of  both  soul  and  body,  the  result,  the 
human  being,  is  what  determines  the  relation  between  the  soul  and  the  body.  So,  for 
the  human  being's  existence  it  is  irrelevant  whether  the  soul  is  able  to  exist 
independently  of  the  body,  because  a  human  being  cannot  exist  without  both  a  soul  and 
a  body. 
Aristotle,  now,  holds  that  the  soul's  existence  depends  on  the  body'O.  The  soul  is 
necessarily  located  in  space;  it  is  embodied.  This  position  of  his,  though,  differentiates 
him  from  both  Plato  and  Descartes'  views.  Aristotle,  unlike  Descartes,  recognises  the 
soul's  embodiment  to  a  particular  body  as  the  only  one  possible.  In  other  words,  the 
soul's  existence  and  the  body's  existence  are  determined  by  the  human  being.  Shields 
treats  this  claim  as  pointing  towards  a  view  of  supervenient  dualism.  He  argues  that: 
'Aristotle  affmns  that  mental  states  depend  in  an  intimate  way  on  physiological 
states'21,  and  thus  claims  that  the  best  overall  consistent  interpretation  of  Aristotle  is 
that  he  is  a  supervenient  dualist22.  It  should  be  noted  here  that  Shields  does  not  treat 
Aristotle  as  being  a  materialist;  the  interpretation  that  he  proposes  is  a  different  kind  of 
dualism  to  that  of  Descartes.  He  claims  that  'given  his  analysis  of  form  and  soul 
Aristotle  cannot  be  regarded  as  any  sort  of  materialiSt'23  . 
Alan  Code  and  Julius 
Moravcsik  also  support  the  view  that  Aristotle  cannot  be  seen  as  being  a  materialist. 
They  argue  that  'if  materialism  is  a  view  according  to  which  principles  goveming  the 
matter  of  a  natural/physical  entity  are  sufficient  for  all  the  behaviour  and  changes  it 
undergoes  qua  natural/physical  thing,  then  neither  his  [Aristotle's]  psychology  nor  his 
24 
physics  is  materialist'  . 
Their  argument,  thus,  is  that  although  Aristotle's 
207be  intellect  though  is  excluded. 
21  Shields,  pp.  133-134. 
22  Shields,  P.  134. 
23Shields,  pp.  105-106. 
24  Alan  Code,  Julius  Moravcsik,  'Explaining  Various  Forms  of  Living'  in  M.  C.  Nussbaurn  -  A. 
Oksenberg  Rorty,  p.  13  1. 
235 hylomorphism  is  committed  to  the  existence  of  physical/natural  structures  underlying 
perception  and  cognition,  it  is  a  mistake  to  see  these  structures  as  arising  from  the 
powers  of  inanimate  matter25. 
Another  point  of  difference  between  Plato  and  Aristotle  on  the  one  hand,  and  Descartes 
on  the  other  is  the  way  they  treat  the  issue  of  death.  For  Plato  and  Aristotle  death  is 
defined  as  the  separation  of  soul  from  body.  Plato  argues  in  the  Timaeus  that  death 
occurs  when  the  bonds  that  hold  soul  and  body  together  are  broken,  either  in  a  natural 
or  an  unnatural  way.  The  actual  process  is  described  as  follows:  'the  interlocking  bonds 
of  the  triangles  around  the  marrow  can  no  longer  hold  on,  and  come  apart  under  stress, 
and  when  this  happens  they  let  the  bonds  of  the  soul  go.  The  soul  is  then  released  in  a 
natural  way,  and  finds  it  pleasant  to  take  its  flight'  (81d).  This  is  how  Plato  treats  the 
process  of  a  natural  death.  An  unnatural  death,  on  the  other  hand,  is  'a  death  that  is  due 
to  disease  or  injury,  (81e)  and  is  seen  as  'painful  and  forced'  (81e).  Plato's  distinction 
between  natural  and  unnatural  death  shows  that  the  former  is  due  to  the  natural  decay 
of  the  elements  of  the  body,  and  therefore  the  bonds  between  the  soul  and  the  body, 
while  the  latter  is  due  to  a  sudden,  unexpected  separation  of  the-soul  from  the  body.  A 
point  that  should  be  stressed  here,  then,  is  that  Plato  does  not  hold  that  it  is  the  structure 
of  the  body  that  enables  the  soul  to  inhabit  the  body.  He  rather  holds  that  to  have  a  soul 
is  to  have  a  certain  something,  the  animating  principle  for  the  body.  The  soul's 
structure,  though,  within  the  body  shows  also  that  it  is  influenced  by  the  body's 
condition.  This,  in  turn,  indicates  that  the  bonds  of  soul  to  body,  the  relation  between 
the  two  is  such  that  when  in  a  particular  proportion  they  constitute  the  human  being. 
When  the  proportion  is  loosened  or  destroyed,  then  the  soul  leaves  the  body,  and  death 
occurs.  In  other  words,  Plato  seems  to  argue  that  because  the  bonds  between  the  soul 
2SSee  further  Code  &  Moravcsik,  p.  133. 
236 and  body  become  inadequate,  death  comes  about.  The  significance  of  this  description 
of  death  is  that  it  does  not  treat  soul  and  body  as  two  elements  that  exist  side  by  side, 
rather  the  soul  can  coexist  with  the  body  only  when  the  latter  is  in  an  appropriate  state. 
Aristotle,  now,  although  in  the  De  Anima  does  not  provide  us  with  a  definition  of  death, 
holds  like  Plato  that  someone  dies  because  the  soul  is  separated  from  the  body.  This  is 
so  because  the  soul  is  the  element  that  animates  the  body,  the  soul  is  what  determines 
whether  something  is  living  or  not26.  On  the  other  hand,  Descartes  claims  that  death 
occurs  due  to  the  malfunctioning  of  the  body  mechanism.  Descartes  argues  that:  'the 
soul  departs  when  someone  dies  only  because  that  heat  ceases  and  the  organs  used  to 
move  the  body  disintegrate'  (De  An.  Article  6,33015-20).  He  thus  argues  that  'death 
never  occurs  through  the  fault  of  the  soul,  but  only  because  one  of  the  principal  parts  of 
the  body  disintegrates'  (article  7,330  23-25).  In  that  way  Descartes  describes  the  body 
as  a  machine  and  compares  it  to  automata.  One  might  observe  here  that  the  definitions 
of  death  provided  are  not  that  distinct.  Indeed  all  three  philosophers  treat  death  as  the 
separation  of  soul  from  body.  The  main  difference,  though,  between  Plato  and 
Aristotle  and  Descartes  is  that  Plato  and  Aristotle  recognise  the  soul  as  the  cause  of  life, 
and  therefore  its  loss  as  the  cause  of  death.  Descartes  on  the  other  hand,  thinks  that 
death  occurs  because  the  body  is  not  working  properly,  and  this  has  as  a  result  the 
soul's  release. 
The  last  point  of  difference  among  Plato,  Aristotle  and  Descartes  is  their  notion  of 
perception.  Perception  is  a  characteristic  example  of  the  relation  between  soul  and 
body.  Plato  in  the  Theaetetus  argues  that  perception  is  different  from  knowledge  in  that 
there  is  no  judgement  involved  in  perception.  For  Plato  'knowledge  is  to  be  found  not 
26  As  J.  P.  Vincenzo  states  ('Plato  and  Aristotle  on  the  Soul',  Philosophia  19-20  (1989-1990)  276), 
Aristotle  conceives  of  soul  as  the  cause  of  life  witilin  organic  natural  bodies  possessing  potential  life. 
237 in  the  experiences  but  in  the  process  of  reasoning  about  them'  (Theaetetus  186d).  To 
illustrate  the  point  that  'it  is  in  cases  where  we  both  know  things  and  are  peTceiving 
them  that  judgement  is  erratic'  (I  94b),  Plato  introduces  the  wax  image.  He  assumes 
that  the  block  of  wax  is  in  the  soul  and  its  function  is  to  take  'impressions  of  everything 
we  wish  to  remember  among  the  things  we  have  seen  or  heard  or  thought  of  ourselves' 
(191d).  In  that  way  he  can  argue  that  there  are  cases  of  false  judgements.  These  are 
cases  where  being  mislead  by  perception,  we,  our  souls,  do  not  'bring  together  the 
proper  stamps  and  records'  (I  94b)  and  thus  judge  falsely. 
Aristotle  on  the  other  hand,  uses  the  same  example,  the  wax  tablet,  as  a  model  of 
perception.  Aristotle  argues  that  'by  a  sense  is  meant  what  has  the  power  of  receiving 
into  itself  the  sensible  forms  of  things  without  the  matter'  (De  Anima  11,12,424al6). 
Aristotle  claims  that  like  the  impressions  of  a  signet  of  bronze  or  gold,  the  sense  is 
affected  by  what  is  coloured  or  flavoured  or  sounding,  but  it  is  indifferent  to  what  in 
each  case  the  substance  is...  '  (De  Anima  11,12,424a24).  In  that  respect,  as  M.  F. 
Burnyeat  says  '  It  is  striking  that  Aristotle  should  apply  to  perception  a  model  which 
Plato  used  for  judgement  in  contrast  to  perception...  Plato  had  contrasted  perception 
with  judgement.  He  had  argued  that  there  is  no  awareness  in  perception  itself,  just  a 
causal  interaction  with  sensible  qualities  in  the  environment....  Aristotle's  applying  the 
wax-block  model  directly  to  perception  is  a  way  of  insisting,  against  Plato,  that 
perception  is  awareness,  articulate  awareness,  from  the  Start,  27.  TbUS,  in  Plato's 
account,  perception  is  just  the  physical  stimulation;  it  does  not  on  its  own  involve 
judgement,  while  for  Aristotle  perception  is  the  awareness. 
27  See  fin-ther,  M.  F.  Burnyeat,  'Is  Aristotelean  Philosophy  of  Mind  Still  Credible?  '  (A  Draft),  in  M.  C. 
Nussbaum  -  A.  Oksenberg  Rorty,  p.  2  1. 
238 Descartes,  now,  distinguishes  two  causes  of  perception.  Perception  can  be  caused  by 
mental  or  bodily  events,  what  differentiates  the  two  is  volition  (The  Passions  of  the 
I 
Soul,  article  19,343  10-25).  What  should  be  noted,  therefore,  is  that  although  both 
Plato  and  Aristotle  treat  perception  as  the  first  level  of  a  process  that  can  lead  to 
knowledge,  Descartes  seems  to  categorise  perception  according  to  the  will. 
Conclusion 
Tbroughout  this  thesis  the  emphasis  was  placed  in  trying  to  determine  Plato's  notion  of 
the  soul-body  relation.  As  we  have  seen,  Plato's  view  changes  somewhat  from  the 
early  dialogues  to  the  late  ones.  This  change,  though,  it  has  been  argued,  was  not 
drastic  enough  to  alter  Plato's  view  on  the  soul-body  relation,  rather  it  helped  him 
modify  his  theory  and  present  us  with  a  more  detailed  view.  In  particular,  from  the  idea 
of  a  single  soul,  Plato  moves  into  the  view  that  the  soul  is  tripartite.  This  enables  him 
to  hold  his  initial  position  that  the  soul  is  immortal  and  at  the  same  time  to  show  in  a 
detailed  way  the  soul's  relation  to  the  body  so  as  to  form  a  human  being.  Thus,  the  soul 
cannot  be  treated  as  something  altogether  separate  from  the  world  and  therefore  is 
treated  as  being  part  of  it. 
Thus,  although  the  Timaeus  solved  a  lot  of  the  questions  that  were  raised  concerning 
the  soul-body  relation  in  the  early  and  middle  dialogues,  there  are  other  questions  that 
remain  unanswered.  The  one  that  I  attempted  to  examine  was  whether  Plato  could  be 
considered  a  Cartesian  dualist  or  not.  As  it  was  indicated  in  the  previous  chapter,  and 
in  this  one,  Plato  could  not  be  treated  as  a  Cartesian  dualist  for  a  number  of  points. 
Namely,  A)  for  Plato  the  soul  along  with  the  body  compose  a  human  being.  Although 
the  soul  is  tripartite,  one  part  is  immortal  and  therefore  somehow  quite  distinct  from  the 
body  and  the  other  two  are  formed  along  with  the  body,  the  whole  soul  is  treated  as  a 
239 in  the  experiences  but  in  the  process  of  reasoning  about  them'  (7heaetetus  186d).  To 
illustrate  the  point  that  'it  is  in  cases  where  we  both  know  things  and  are  perceiving 
them  that  judgement  is  erratic'  (I  94b),  Plato  introduces  the  wax  image.  He  assumes 
that  the  block  of  wax  is  in  the  soul  and  its  function  is  to  take  'impressions  of  everything 
we  wish  to  remember  among  the  things  we  have  seen  or  heard  or  thought  of  ourselves' 
(191  d).  In  that  way  he  can  argue  that  there  are  cases  of  false  judgements.  These  are 
cases  where  being  mislead  by  perception,  we,  our  souls,  do  not  'bring  together  the 
proper  stamps  and  records'  (1  94b)  and  thus  judge  falsely. 
Aristotle  on  the  other  hand,  uses  the  same  example,  the  wax  tablet,  as  a  model  of 
perception.  Aristotle  argues  that  'by  a  sense  is  meant  what  has  the  power  of  receiving 
into  itself  the  sensible  forms  of  things  without  the  matter'  (De  Anima  11,12,424al6). 
Aristotle  claims  that  like  the  impressions  of  a  signet  of  bronze  or  gold,  the  sense  is 
affected  by  what  is  coloured  or  flavoured  or  sounding,  but  it  is  indifferent  to  what  in 
each  case  the  substance  is...  '  (De  Anima  11,12,424a24).  In  that  respect,  as  M.  F. 
Burnyeat  says  '  It  is  striking  that  Aristotle  should  apply  to  perception  a  model  which 
Plato  used  for  judgement  in  contrast  to  perception...  Plato  had  contrasted  perception 
with  judgement.  He  had  argued  that  there  is  no  awareness  in  perception  itself,  just  a 
causal  interaction  with  sensible  qualities  in  the  environment....  Aristotle's  applying  the 
wax-block  model  directly  to  perception  is  a  way  of  insisting,  against  Plato,  that 
perception  is  awareness,  articulate  awareness,  from  the  start  27 
. 
Thus,  in  Plato's 
account,  perception  is  just  the  physical  stimulation;  it  does  not  on  its  own  involve 
judgement,  while  for  Aristotle  perception  is  the  awareness. 
21See  finiher,  M.  F.  Burnyeat,  'Is  Aristotelean  Philosophy  of  Mind  Still  CredibleT  (A  Draft),  in  M.  C. 
Nussbaum  -  A.  Oksenberg  Rorty,  p.  2  1. 
238 Descartes,  now,  distinguishes  two  causes  of  perception.  Perception  can  be  caused  by 
mental  or  bodily  events,  what  differentiates  the  two  is  volition  (The  Passions  of  the 
Soul,  article  19,343  10-25).  What  should  be  noted,  therefore,  is  that  althoýgh  both 
Plato  and  Aristotle  treat  perception  as  the  first  level  of  a  process  that  can  lead  to 
knowledge,  Descartes  seems  to  categorise  perception  according  to  the  will. 
Conclusion 
Throughout  this  thesis  the  emphasis  was  placed  in  tying  to  determine  Plato's  notion  of 
the  soul-body  relation.  As  we  have  seen,  Plato's  view  changes  somewhat  from  the 
early  dialogues  to  the  late  ones.  This  change,  though,  it  has  been  argued,  was  not 
drastic  enough  to  alter  Plato's  view  on  the  soul-body  relation,  rather  it  helped  him 
modify  his  theory  and  present  us  with  a  more  detailed  view.  In  particular,  from  the  idea 
of  a  single  soul,  Plato  moves  into  the  view  that  the  soul  is  tripartite.  This  enables  him 
to  hold  his  initial  position  that  the  soul  is  immortal  and  at  the  same  time  to  show  in  a 
detailed  way  the  soul's  relation  to  the  body  so  as  to  form  a  human  being.  Thus,  the  soul 
cannot  be  treated  as  something  altogether  separate  from  the  world  and  therefore  is 
treated  as  being  part  of  it. 
Thus,  although  the  Timaeus  solved  a  lot  of  the  questions  that  were  raised  concerning 
the  soul-body  relation  in  the  early  and  middle  dialogues,  there  are  other  questions  that 
remain  unanswered.  The  one  that  I  attempted  to  examine  was  whether  Plato  could  be 
considered  a  Cartesian  dualist  or  not.  As  it  was  indicated  in  the  previous  chapter,  and 
in  this  one,  Plato  could  not  be  treated  as  a  Cartesian  dualist  for  a  number  of  points. 
Namely,  A)  for  Plato  the  soul  along  with  the  body  compose  a  human  being.  Although 
the  soul  is  tripartite,  one  part  is  immortal  and  therefore  somehow  quite  distinct  from  the 
body  and  the  other  two  are  formed  along  with  the  body,  the  whole  soul  is  treated  as  a 
239 unity  that  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  human  being.  B)  Plato  argues  that  the  soul  is 
spatially  located,  it  is  a  part  of  the  world.  In  that  respect,  it  differs  to  Descartes'  notion 
of  the  fundamental  natures  of  soul  and  body;  the  soul  for  Descartes  is  an  essentially 
thinking  thing,  while  the  body  is  an  essentially  extended  thing.  C)  Also,  for  Plato,  the 
soul  is  the  cause  of  motion  and  reason,  two  notions  that  cannot  fit  Descartes'  idea  of  the 
separate  existences,  the  mind  existing  independently  of  the  body.  Hence,  although 
Plato  like  Descartes  holds  that  the  soul  is  not  identical  to  the  body,  for  Plato  the  self, 
the  human  being  is  composed  of  a  soul  and  a  body.  On  the  other  hand,  Descartes  holds 
that  in  principle  at  least  the  mind  the  soul  is  the  real  self,  the  body  is  just  an  automaton 
that  accidentally  happens  to  be  interrelated  to  a  soul.  This  distinction  is  more  than 
adequate  so  as  to  conclude  that  Plato  should  not  be  treated  as  a  Cartesian  dualist. 
Finally,  even  after  the  changes  on  his  theory  of  soul  and  body,  as  they  were  presented 
in  the  Timaeus,  Plato  does  not  provide  us  with  a  conclusive  view  of  the  soul's  nature. 
He  cannot  be  seen  as  a  Cartesian  dualist,  since  without  a  soul  Plato  claims  the  body 
couldn't  function.  Plato,  thus,  emphasises  the  mutual  interdependence  between  soul 
and  body.  The  desires  for  instance  that  are  attributed  to  the  soul,  are  at  the  same  time 
treated  as  partly  belonging  to  the  body.  Another  example  of  this  relation  of 
interdependence  is  that  of  love.  In  the  Symposium,  Plato  talks  about  love  as  a  desire 
and  moves  from  the  love  of  a  beautiffil  body,  the  purely  physical  desire,  to  the  love  of 
the  Forms  of  Beauty  and  Good.  If  he  held  that  reason  is  something  completely  separate 
to  the  bodily  desires,  he  wouldn't  be  able  to  talk  of  a  process  of  advancing  from  the 
merely  physical  to  the  intellectual.  In  general  terms,  if  Plato  thought  that  reason  is 
something  altogether  separate  from  anything  material,  then  he  couldn't  avoid  being 
treated  as  a  Cartesian  dualist,  but  throughout  his  dialogues  he  tries  to  emphasise  the 
relation  of  mutual  interdependence  between  soul  and  body.  Although,  then,  Plato's 
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mental  or  bodily  events,  what  differentiates  the  two  is  volition  (The  Passions  of  the 
Soul,  article  19,343  10-25).  What  should  be  noted,  therefore,  is  that  although  both 
Plato  and  Aristotle  treat  perception  as  the  first  level  of  a  process  that  can  lead  to 
knowledge,  Descartes  seems  to  categorise  perception  according  to  the  will. 
Conclusion 
Throughout  this  thesis  the  emphasis  was  placed  in  trying  to  determine  Plato's  notion  of 
the  soul-body  relation.  As  we  have  seen,  Plato's  view  changes  somewhat  from  the 
early  dialogues  to  the  late  ones.  This  change,  though,  it  has  been  argued,  was  not 
drastic  enough  to  alter  Plato's  view  on  the  soul-body  relation,  rather  it  helped  him 
modify  his  theory  and  present  us  with  a  more  detailed  view.  In  particular,  from  the  idea 
of  a  single  soul,  Plato  moves  into  the  view  that  the  soul  is  tripartite.  This  enables  him 
to  hold  his  initial  position  that  the  soul  is  immortal  and  at  the  same  time  to  show  in  a 
detailed  way  the  soul's  relation  to  the  body  so  as  to  form  a  human  being.  Thus,  the  soul 
cannot  be  treated  as  something  altogether  separate  from  the  world  and  therefore  is 
treated  as  being  part  of  it. 
Thus,  although  the  Timaeus  solved  a  lot  of  the  questions  that  were  raised  concerning 
the  soul-body  relation  in  the  early  and  middle  dialogues,  there  are  other  questions  that 
remain  unanswered.  The  one  that  I  attempted  to  examine  was  whether  Plato  could  be 
considered  a  Cartesian  dualist  or  not.  As  it  was  indicated  in  the  previous  chapter,  and 
in  this  one,  Plato  could  not  be  treated  as  a  Cartesian  dualist  for  a  number  of  points. 
Namely,  A)  for  Plato  the  soul  along  with  the  body  compose  a  human  being.  Although 
the  soul  is  tripartite,  one  part  is  immortal  and  therefore  somehow  quite  distinct  from  the 
body  and  the  other  two  are  formed  along  with  the  body,  the  whole  soul  is  treated  as  a 
239 unity  that  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  human  being.  B)  Plato  argues  that  the  soul  is 
spatially  located,  it  is  a  part  of  the  world.  In  that  respect,  it  differs  to  Descartes'  notion 
of  the  fundamental  natures  of  soul  and  body;  the  soul  for  Descartes  is  an  essentially 
thinking  thing,  while  the  body  is  an  essentially  extended  thing.  Q  Also,  for  Plato,  the 
soul  is  the  cause  of  motion  and  reason,  two  notions  that  cannot  fit  Descartes'  idea  of  the 
separate  existences,  the  mind  existing  independently  of  the  body.  Hence,  although 
Plato  like  Descartes  holds  that  the  soul  is  not  identical  to  the  body,  for  Plato  the  self, 
the  human  being  is  composed  of  a  soul  and  a  body.  On  the  other  hand,  Descartes  holds 
that  in  principle  at  least  the  mind  the  soul  is  the  real  self,  the  body  is  just  an  automaton 
that  accidentally  happens  to  be  interrelated  to  a  soul.  This  distinction  is  more  than 
adequate  so  as  to  conclude  that  Plato  should  not  be  treated  as  a  Cartesian  dualist. 
Finally,  even  after  the  changes  on  his  theory  of  soul  and  body,  as  they  were  presented 
in  the  Timaeus,  Plato  does  not  provide  us  with  a  conclusive  view  of  the  soul's  nature. 
He  cannot  be  seen  as  a  Cartesian  dualist,  since  without  a  soul  Plato  claims  the  body 
couldn't  function.  Plato,  thus,  emphasises  the  mutual  interdependence  between  soul 
and  body.  The  desires  for  instance  that  are  attributed  to  the  soul,  are  at  the  same  time 
treated  as  partly  belonging  to  the  body.  Another  example  of  this  relation  of 
interdependence  is  that  of  love.  In  the  Symposium,  Plato  talks  about  love  as  a  desire 
and  moves  from  the  love  of  a  beautiful  body,  the  purely  physical  desire,  to  the  love  of 
the  Forms  of  Beauty  and  Good.  If  he  held  that  reason  is  something  completely  separate 
to  the  bodily  desires,  he  wouldn't  be  able  to  talk  of  a  process  of  advancing  from  the 
merely  physical  to  the  intellectual.  In  general  terms,  if  Plato  thought  that  reason  is 
something  altogether  separate  from  anything  material,  then  he  couldn't  avoid  being 
treated  as  a  Cartesian  dualist,  but  throughout  his  dialogues  he  tries  to  emphasise  the 
relation  of  mutual  interdependence  between  soul  and  body.  Although,  then,  Plato's 
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